Artillery of the Imperial Guard

The artillery of the Imperial Guard, which grew into the Grande Armée’s artillery reserve, had inconspicuous beginnings. It originated with the light artillery detachment of Napoleon’s Guides; part, if not all, came back from Egypt and was incorporated into the new Consular Guard before Marengo in June 1800, where a small company served (and lost heavily). By 1802 Songis was the commander of the Guard artillery, which was composed of two artillery companies and a train company.

In 1804, when the Consular Guard became the Imperial Guard, there were only two companies of horse artillery and two artillery train companies. Two years later, the horse artillery had grown into a regiment of six companies, accompanied by six companies of the train battalion. One of the artillery companies was Italian. They were the pick of the line, and were well trained and equipped. By 1808, Napoleon had ordered Colonel Drouot to organize a Guard foot artillery regiment. Three companies were first organized, and served excellently at Wagram. Additionally, three companies of “conscript artillery” were formed, later becoming Young Guard artillery. When the foot artillery regiment was formed, the Guard horse artillery regiment was reduced to two squadrons of two companies each.

After the war with Austria in 1809, Drouot finished organizing his regiment of foot artillery, giving it a band and sapeurs, and finally issuing it with bearskins in place of the shakos the men had previously worn. By 1813, the Guard had six companies of horse artillery, and six of foot artillery, both classed as Old Guard; one company of horse artillery; and fifteen companies of foot artillery classed as Young Guard. The artillery train had become a regiment of twelve companies, and there was a company of ouvriers and pontonniers, and a Young Guard artillery train regiment was formed as an adjunct for the Young Guard artillery companies.

When the Guard artillery was being overhauled and rebuilt after heavy losses in Russia, some of the troops were drawn into it from the excellent and well-trained Artillerie de la Marine, who also served as infantry, forming four large regiments assigned to Marmont’s VI Corps. They were issued dark blue overcoats like those of the Imperial Guard, and fought so stoutly at Lützen that the Allies thought them to be Guard infantry.

The Guard artillery served as the army artillery reserve from 1809 until the end of the Empire. As such, it formed the major part of Lauriston’s huge 102-gun battery at Wagram in 1809, suffering such heavy losses that it had to be reinforced with Guard infantrymen. Coignet stated that when the Guard infantry was asked for volunteers, everyone wanted to go. It participated in Drouot’s artillery attack at Lützen in 1813, as well as the decisive element at Hanau the same year. It also formed the artillery mass that blew out the Prussian center at Ligny in 1815, as it had the Allied center at Lützen, again paving the way for the decisive assault by the Guard infantry. The Guard artillery gave the Emperor a reserve of highly trained, well-equipped, and very motivated artillerymen who could perform any artillery mission assigned to them.

The Guard artillery held annual gunnery (shooting) contests at La Fère. Guns and equipment were always kept in the highest state of readiness, and even in the first battles of 1813, with many inexperienced gunners in the ranks, they fought excellently, generally outperforming their Allied opponents.

One interesting situation developed in the Guard artillery between the officers who had been “school trained” and long-service officers who had ended up in the artillery or had been promoted up through the ranks and had never been to a formal school. They were experienced officers, but they were now were being considered as “unqualified” because of a lack of schooling. They were long in experience, however, and the common-sense decision was finally rendered that they could keep their status and station.

One officer of the Guard artillery, Major Boulart, left an interesting memoir of his service in the Grande Armée. One story he related took place after the bloodbath at Essling in May 1809. He had been hotly engaged against the Austrian artillery, dueling outnumbered, and had suffered some loss. After the battle he met Napoleon, who stopped to question him about his unit’s performance, the losses he had suffered, and how he was going to replace what he had lost. He informed the Emperor precisely what shape his unit was in, and that he had one gun that needed a vent replaced and would have to go to the armory for repair. Napoleon, seemingly displeased, demanded to know why this problem had not been taken care of earlier, and, not waiting for Boulart to reply, told the unhappy officer that he would inspect him the next day and that he expected him to have all of his pieces in serviceable order and present for action.

Boulart went to his superior, told him of his apparently insurmountable problem, and was given permission to procure one of the captured Austrian pieces of the same caliber for the purposes of the inspection and to keep it until his original piece was returned, repaired, from the arsenal in Vienna. Boulart did so, and when Napoleon showed up the next day at the appointed time and place, he asked Boulart if he was prepared for inspection. Boulart told him he was, how he had brought his battery up to strength, and waited the Emperor’s pleasure. Napoleon smiled at him, told how pleased he was, and informed him that he did not need to be inspected. Undoubtedly, he wanted the good Major Boulart to have his full complement of artillery and found the correct way to motivate him, Napoleon’s personal inspections being somewhat dreaded in the Grande Armée.

Finally, two anecdotes from the ubiquitous Major Boulart, who was a witness to Senarmont’s chevauchée at Friedland in 1807 and was a well-trained and skilled officer who took great pride in his Guard artillerymen, are given below. Both of these incidents took place during the buildup for and invasion of Russia in 1812.

Major Jean François Boulart, a man who in odd moments likes to play the flute, has brought one of the Guard’s three artillery columns all the way from its depot at La Fère, outside Paris. In their tall, plaqueless bearskins and dark-blue, red-trimmed uniforms, he says, his gunners were “a magnificent object of general admiration. On 5 June the Emperor had come and reviewed my artillery. He wasn’t a man to make compliments, but he found it handsome. He had the goodness to spend a lot of time in my company.”


For quite a while my gaze followed the three Guard batteries under a well-nourished fire and covered with a hail of roundshot whose falls one could only see by the dust they were raising. I thought they were lost, or at least half so. Happily, the Russians aimed badly, or too high.


Lisunov Li-2

4,937 Russian Li-2s were manufactured from the Douglas plan.

The PS-84 had flown with Aeroflot primarily as a passenger transport before World War II. When Germany attacked the Soviet Union in 1941 many of the PS-84s were taken into military use and redesignated the Lisunov Li-2 in 1942. The military models were equipped with a 7.62 mm (.30 in) ShKAS machine gun, and later with a 12.7 mm (.50 in) UBK heavy machine gun. The aircraft were used for transport, partisan supply, bombing, and as ambulance aircraft. A version designated Li-2VV (Vojenny Variant = military variant) had a redesigned nose for extra defensive armament and could carry up to four 250 kg (551 lb) bombs under the wings. Smaller bombs could be carried inside the fuselage and thrown out the freight hatch by the crew.

A total of 4,937 aircraft were produced of all Li-2 versions between 1940 and 1954 and it saw extensive use in Eastern Europe until the 1960s. The last survivors in use were noted in China and Vietnam during the 1980s. There were many versions, including airliner, cargo, military transport, reconnaissance, aerial photography, parachute drop, bomber, and high-altitude variants. The Li-2 also saw extensive service in the Chinese Air Force in the 1940s and 1950s. Lisunov Li-2 of Aeroflot at Monino near Moscow in 1994

Several airlines operated Lisunov Li-2s, among others Aeroflot, CAAK, CSA, LOT, Malév, Polar Aviation, TABSO and Tarom .

Specifications (Li-2)

General characteristics

Crew: 5-6

Capacity: 24 passengers

Length: 19.65 m (64 ft 5 in)

Wingspan: 28.81 m (94 ft 6 in)

Height: 5.15 m ()

Empty weight: 7,750 kg (17,485 lb)

Loaded weight: 10,700 kg (23,589 lb)

Max takeoff weight: 11,280 kg (24,867 lb)

Powerplant: 2× Shvetsov ASh-62IR 4-bladed VISh-21, 746 kW (1,000 hp) each


Maximum speed: 300 km/h (186 mph)

Cruise speed: 245 km/h (152 mph)

Range: 1,100-2,500 km (685-1,550 mi)


3 × 7.62 mm (.30 in) ShKAS machine guns

1× 12.7 mm (.50 in) UBK machine gun

1,000 kg bombs (normal load)

2,000 kg (4,409 lb) of bombs (short distances)

There is only one Li-2 restored to airworthy condition. Hungarian registered HA-LIX was built in 1949 in Airframe Factory Nr.84 (GAZ-84) of Tashkent, as serial number 18433209 and still flies sightseeing tours and regularly participates at air shows.



Original passenger airliner, equipped with 14-28 seats. Somewhat smaller span and higher empty weight, it was also equipped with lower-powered engines compared to the DC-3. The cargo door was also transposed to the right side of the fuselage.


Medevac version.


Redesignation of PS-84s impressed into military use.


Paratroop transport version (1942), with reinforced floor and tie-downs, plus cargo doors (slightly smaller than the C-47 doors) on the left.


Aerial photography version.


Military transport aircraft with defensive armament (designation started from 17 September 1942).


Basic civil passenger model (1945).


Civil “combi” passenger-cargo version.


Glass nose version.


“Reconnaissance” version, with bulged windows fitted behind the cockpit.


Transport version (1945).


Polish bomber trainer version.


High-altitude weather surveillance version of the Li-2, equipped with turbocharged engines.


Transport/bomber version (1942)


Yugoslavian version equipped with American Pratt & Whitney R-1830 engines (similar to the DC-3)

Battle of Ratan, 1809

The last battle on Swedish soil, which took place on 19–20 August 1809. Having conquered Finland from Sweden, the Russians had a small force in the northern parts of what is now Sweden. The Swedes sought to eliminate this through a combined assault from land and sea, but the Russians moved more rapidly, defeating the Swedish force landed at Ratan at Sävar on 19 August. The next day, the Swedish force was attacked when evacuating from Ratan but the artillery fire from Swedish warships shown in the illustration kept the Russians at bay. Peace followed soon after.

As the Swedish army in Finland found itself defeated, it left the country and retreated back to northern Sweden. The Russians soon followed in due course and large parts of the country came under Russian occupation. The operations at Sävar and Ratan, where the coastal fleet would be involved, were only sporadic Swedish attempts to delay the war and try to reconquer occupied parts of Sweden. The ultimate goal was to liberate the town of Umeå, by surrounding general Kamenski who had the town under occupation with his Russian army. Swedish general Wrede was just south of Umeå, and when his landing of 7.500 troops under Wachtmeister north of Umeå, the surrounding of the city would be complete. This daring operation was to be executed in a joint army-navy operation and all this was agreed upon at a war meeting at Härnösand August 5 1809, where such big names like Döbeln and Sandels participated. The king, Karl XIII as Gustav IV King Adolf had been gotten rid of by a formidable military coup, told Wachtmeister, “The expedition must not be lost, if so Sweden is lost.”

Under Admiral Puke a navy of two ships of the line (Kung Adolph Fredric and Försigtigheten), one frigate (Jarramas) as well as 52 smaller vessels of various types set out for the operations behind enemy lines. The smaller ships were towed by the larger frigate and ships of the line, to increase the speed, to allow the Swedish to get to the point of landing as fast as possible.

Admiral Johan af Puke was an able admiral and war hero (although his name may not sound that thrilling in English). As mentioned above, he had been the commander of “Dristigheten”, the first ship that broke the Russian line at Viborg in 1790. He was therefore a renowned leader when he took command of the expedition to northern Sweden in 1809.

On August 17 1809, the forces arrived at Ratan, outside Umeå, where a thick fog effectively covered the attackers. The landing of the troops went as according to plan and the next day, the land troops started the march upon Sävar. On the night between the 17th and 18th Swedish captain Nordenskiöld led an attack against Umeå itself with his nine gunsloops. He shelled the bridge over the Umeå river but was not able to destroy it as he was met by hard Russian artillery fire. Wachtmeister did not do a thing to assist him, although the explosions were heard to Sävar, and so Nordenskiöld returned out to sea after his failed mission. On the morning of the 19th the troops were attacked by 6.000 Russians in Sävar where they were commanded by Wachtmeister. The land troops here lost one of the bloodiest battles of the war, to the Russian general Kamenski. Wachtmeister showed just exactly how bad a military commander he was.

Wachtmeister retreated back to Ratan with his tails between his legs after having lost at Sävar and at Ratan he was protected by the guns of the navy as well as artillery that was mounted on a nearby island as well as on the beaches. Kamenski followed and in the afternoon on August 20, he attacked without thinking twice. The Russian troops advanced without fear upon the Swedes. The Swedish guns immediately opened fire; death rained down on the Russians from the guns of the Swedish navy as well as from the land artillery, they cut deep, bleeding holes in the Russian lines. Kamenski lost about 3.200 in dead and wounded in this daring but foolish attack. “The village of Ratan was razed to the ground and the treetops were cut all the way to Djäkneboda”, Allan Sandström tells us in his book “Sveriges sista krig”. After these heavy fighting, Kamenski and Wachtmeister met for negotiations. The Russian commander demanded that the Swedes should ship out immediately, which the weak Wachtmeister agreed upon. Wachtmeister promised to ship out, and on August 22, the Swedes left.

If so my position was very critical, I shall do everything in my power to bring my troops therefrom. Although I must agree upon the fact that it was very sad to retreat from a victory like this, which we had won in the last two days, in which I not only did beat the enemy and chased him out to his boats, but also personally placed him upon these boats, so to speak”, Kamenski reported to the Czar. And with these words ended Sweden’s last war.

IT-1 Missile Tank

The IT-1 Missile (Istrebitel Tankov or Tank Destroyer-1) began life as `Object 150′, born out of necessity and political pressure from Russian government.

Nikita Khrushchev was a big supporter of missile armed tanks and saw the advantage they had over existing AFV’s in Russian service at the time. Testing would run from 1957-1962 with very some good results, as the optics and ammunition of the time limited the accuracy of main battle tanks. The new `3M7 Drakon’ missile excelled over standard ammunition and allowed crews to hit targets further out and with greater accuracy, but with the advent of newer optics and ammunition, the need for missile armed tanks began to wane in favour of standard tanks.

The main drawback of the `Drakon’ missile was the huge 500 metre `dead zone’ around the tank, as in essence the missile would not arm itself until it had passed through a 500 metre zone. This would render the tank useless in a close-range battle. Another problem was the limited number of missiles carried in the tank, merely fifteen rounds, and to complicate things further, the equipment needed for the missile system weighted in at 520kg! Still, even with the drawbacks on the IT-1, the tank managed to serve with the Russian Army for two years, 1968-1970, after which many were converted over to recovery vehicles.

After the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, Khrushchev was determined to change the face of world power and American nuclear domination once and for all. He ordered the Oboronka to concentrate on missiles and missile-firing weapons, and was of a mind to eliminate all tanks from the pro duction inventory. The three major tank design bureaus had been given a warning about this in the late 1950s when he requested they examine missile-firing tanks. In 1960, Khrushchev was shown their first efforts: Kartsev’s Object 150, a missile-firing design which used what would become the T-62 chassis and a flat turret, and which eventually was accepted as the IT- 1 tank destroyer; and Kotin’s last new heavy tank design, Object 277, which caused Khrushchev to terminate all heavy tank design work.

This continued to bubble for two years, and at the height of the Cuban problem (22 October 1962) Khrushchev got to see another example of work by the three bureaus. Here Morozov showed Object 430, which he was told to con vert into a missile-firing tank. Kartsev showed Object 167, which carried three 9M14 Malyutka (AT-3 SAGGER) missiles on a rack at the back of its turret; and Kotin showed Object 282, which was a T-10 with a pop-up missile launcher. Khrushchev roundly criticized all three, but only Kartsev stood up to him and argued back that the army still needed tanks. Morozov went back and worked on two antitank missile-armed versions of Object 430, Kartsev did some more on Object 150, but Kotin was told in no uncertain terms that the production of any more heavy tanks would not be tolerated. That the T-10 remained in production until 1966 is a mark of Kotin’s ability to circumvent even the Premier as well as his lack of acumen when it came to future vision.

Top vehicle is Taifun 9M15 (typhoon) was a Soviet missile developed to arm the Obiekt 287 missile tank based on the T-64 tank chassis. 

All was essentially reversed when Khrushchev fell from power in 1964, but the grounds had been laid for developing tanks which could also fire missiles through their main guns.


Von Kleist’s Panzergruppe 1 versus the Southwest Front Part I

The situation facing Heeresgruppe Süd at X-hour on 22 June 1941 was far more disadvantageous than that faced by either of the other two German army groups. Von Kleist’s Panzergruppe 1 had to conduct an opposed river crossing across the Western Bug into a heavily-defended fortified region, which meant the 6.Armee’s infantry would first have to create a series of bridgeheads before German armour could be committed. Beginning at dawn on 22 June, the 6.Armee used five infantry divisions to conduct multiple crossings across the Western Bug River. The 298.Infanterie-Division, with the help of Brandenburg infiltration troops, managed to seize an intact bridge at Ustilug. German pioneers also succeed in capturing an intact bridge further south, at Sokal. Two Soviet rifle divisions opposed the crossing but were too thinly spread to seriously interfere with the initial bridge seizures. Wasting no time, 6.Armee immediately sent Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 197 across the Sokal bridge at 0450 hours. In order that von Kleist’s panzers would not be delayed by the use of just two bridges, German pioneers immediately began building pontoon bridges across the river to provide multiple crossing points. Despite the successful crossing of the Western Bug, von Kleist could initially commit only three of his nine motorized divisions to exploit the bridgeheads due to the narrowness of the attack sector and congestion at the two bridges. General der Panzertruppen Ludwig Crüwell’s 11.Panzer-Division crossed the Sokal bridge and pushed past weak resistance nearly 30km by the end of the first day. From Ustilug, the 6.Armee was able to seize the town of Vladimir Volynskii, which opened the way for General der Panzertruppen Friedrich Kühn’s 14.Panzer-Division to push toward Lutsk – Panzergruppe 1’s intermediate objective.

General Leytenant Mikhail P. Kirponos, in command of the Southwestern Front, hurried to his new wartime command post at Tarnopol, but once there he could barely communicate with any of his subordinate forces for the first two days of the war. His headquarters personnel were unable to establish a functioning radio command net (during peace-time, the Red Army tried to avoid use of radio communications in order to limit opportunities for adversary signals intercepts, but when war erupted suddenly, most units had neither the experience nor the correct code books to initiate secure communications) so he was forced to rely upon civilian phones to try and coordinate his forces. In this command vacuum, local commanders began making their own decisions on how to respond to the German invasion. The Soviet 5th Army, headquartered in Lutsk, directed General-major Semen M. Kondrusev’s 22nd Mechanized Corps to counterattack the German forces threatening Vladimir Volynskii. Although most of this corps was about 100km from the border, by chance its most powerful formation, Polkovnik Petr Pavlov’s 41st Tank Division, was conducting field training just north of Vladimir Volynskii. Pavlov had thirty-one KV-2 heavy tanks (which lacked 152mm ammunition) and 342 T-26 tanks, which were in an excellent position to counterattack the German 14.Panzer-Division as it marched over the bridge at Ustilug. Instead, Pavlov found himself in a quandary that was not uncommon in the Red Army of June 1941 – he was out of radio communications with Kondrusev’s corps headquarters and his pre-war mobilization orders directed him to deploy to Kovel – away from the Germans at Ustilug. Pressured by local Soviet commanders to do something to help the crumbling border defenses, Pavlov split the difference by sending the bulk of his tanks on the road to Kovel, but detaching a tank battalion under Major Aleksandr S. Suin with fifty T-26 light tanks to support Soviet infantry at Vladimir Volynskii. Suin’s battalion arrived just in time to be shot to pieces by German panzerjäger, who knocked out thirty of his T-26 tanks and forced him to abandon Vladimir Volynskii.

Only vaguely aware of the extent of German advances by the end of 22 June, Kirponos was able to get in touch with General-major Ignatii I. Karpezo’s 15th Mechanized Corps, located near Brody, and order them to counterattack Crüwell’s 11.Panzer-Division near Radekhov while the rest of Kondrusev’s 22nd Mechanized Corps deployed to counterattack at Vladimir Volynskii. The 1st Anti-tank Brigade (RVGK) under General-major Kirill S. Moskalenko, which was fully motorized and equipped with forty-eight 76.2mm F-22 anti-tank guns and seventy-two 85mm M1939 anti-aircraft guns, was ordered to create a blocking position west of Lutsk. Moskalenko’s anti-tank unit was one of the most powerful anti-armour formations in the Southwest Front and was also plentifully supplied with anti-tank mines. Kirponos had four other first-echelon mechanized corps in the Southwest Front, but the 4th and 8th Mechanized Corps spent the first few days of the war marching and counter-marching to no useful purpose. Rokossovsky’s cadre-strength 9th Mechanized Corps was beginning a 200km march to Lutsk, but would not arrive for a few days. The 16th Mechanized Corps was even further away from the border. In short, although Kirponos had an overall 6–1 numerical superiority in tanks over von Kleist’s Panzergruppe 1, the piecemeal arrival of Soviet armour on the battlefield meant that the Red Army’s advantage was whittled down to a 2–1 local superiority, which was adequate for defense but not attack. Nevertheless, an order from the Stavka, signed by Georgy Zhukov, was received at Kirponos’ command post at 2300 hours on 22 June, directing Kirponos to counterattack with five mechanized corps within less than forty-eight hours.

On 23 June, von Kleist’s armour advanced eastward, with Kühn’s spearhead in the north and Crüwell’s spearhead in the south. They were advancing along very narrow frontages and not mutually supporting, as they were separated by a distance of over 50km. Under these circumstances, the Red Army should have been able to inflict heavy losses on these vanguard units. During the morning, the 13.Panzer-Division reinforced the 14.Panzer-Division across the Western Bug and, together with infantry from 6.Armee, they began to mop up the remaining Soviet border defenses. Crüwell’s 11.Panzer-Division advanced to Radekhov with Kampfgruppe Riebel (Oberstleutnant Gustav-Adolf Riebel’s Panzer-Regiment 15 and the Luftwaffe I/Flak Regiment General Göring, with twelve 8.8cm flak guns) and Kampfgruppe Angern (Oberst Günther von Angern’s 11 Schutzen Brigade and the 119.Artillerie-Regiment). Part of the Soviet 20th Tank Regiment, from General-major Sergei I. Ogurtsov’s 10th Tank Division, was in the town, but they were apparently caught by surprise and hurriedly abandoned Radekhov, along with twenty BT-7 and six T-34 tanks. After securing the town, Riebel sent a tank platoon from Oberleutnant Edel Zachariae-Lingenthal’s 5./Panzer-Regiment 15 forward to reconnoiter to the south and this platoon spotted a group of Soviet tanks in column approaching Radekhov from the southwest along a road. The German tanks quickly occupied hull-down ambush positions and waited until the Soviets – which were T-34 medium tanks – were within 100 meters. Then the five Pz.IIIs opened fire with 3.7cm and 5cm Panzergranate AP rounds.

Even though at this short distance every shot was a hit, the Russians drove on without much visible effect … Despite repeated hits, our fire had no effect. It appears as if shells are simply bouncing off. The enemy tanks disengaged without fighting and retreated.

This Soviet probe merely alerted Riebel to the presence of an impending Soviet armoured counterattack and he promptly deployed the I and II/Panzer-Regiment 15 in a linear defense just west of Radekhov, with the Luftwaffe 8.8cm flak guns in the center and Kampfgruppe Angern’s artillery behind him.21 Soon thereafter, Ogurtsov conducted a sloppy, unsupported attack with just two tank and two motorized infantry battalions across open terrain in broad daylight. He refused to wait for reconnaissance to spot the German positions or his own artillery to deploy, so his forces went into battle blind. Tank–infantry cooperation was virtually non-existent. The 100-odd Soviet tanks attacked in several waves; first the light BT-7 and BA-10/20 armoured cars, then the medium T-28 and T-34 and finally the KV-1 heavy tanks. The German tankers opened fire at about 400 meters and easily put paid to the first wave of Soviet light tanks, but the T-34s began engaging the German tanks from 800–1,000 meters and knocked out three Pz.III and two Pz.IV tanks. The 5cm KwK 39 L/42 was completely ineffective at that range, but in desperation Oberleutnant Zachariae-Lingenthal ordered his Pz.IVs to fire 7.5cm Sprenggranate 34 (HE) rounds at the T-34s. Since the T-34s had been committed straight after a long approach march, they were still carrying reserve fuel drums on their back decks, which could be set alight by shell fragments. A lucky hit or two convinced the Soviets to pull back. Despite the near invulnerability of their armour to German 3.7cm and 5cm guns, a number of T-34s and KV-1s were immobilized by hits on their tracks and then abandoned by their crews. After suffering nearly 50 per cent losses, Ogurtsov broke off his amateurish attack. The Soviet 10th Tank Division lost forty-six tanks in their first battle with 11.Panzer-Division, but knocked out five German tanks and several anti-tank guns. After the action, Zachariae-Lingenthal inspected some of the abandoned T-34 tanks, alarmed by its superior firepower and armoured protection and later wrote, ‘this was a shocking recognition to the German panzer and panzerjäger units and our knees were weak for a time.’

Meanwhile, Kirponos tried vainly to bring up more of his mechanized corps in order to comply with the Stavka-directed counteroffensive on the morning of 24 June, but only the 15th and 22nd Mechanized Corps were in any position to do anything. Von Kleist was gradually feeding more armour into the battle as the Soviet border defenses were eliminated, but he initially held back the 9.Panzer-Division and his four motorized infantry divisions. This was an important command decision – throughout the Battle of Dubno, the Germans maintained strong mobile reserves, while Kirponos committed each formation as it arrived with nothing left in reserve to deal with enemy breakthroughs. Due to poor Soviet radio security at the division level and below, the German 3rd Radio Intercept Company was able to detect Soviet armour units moving toward the border. Although army and higher-level units used good encryption on their radio nets, the tank regiments and divisions employed simpler ciphers that the Germans could break and often failed to change frequencies and call signs for days after compromise. Soviet tank units also had a bad habit of calling for fuel supplies just before launching an attack, which provided German intelligence officers with a valuable indicator. Thus poor Soviet radio procedures in tank units handed another advantage to the German panzer divisions.

Not surprisingly, no grand Soviet counteroffensive materialized on the morning of 24 June, since neither the 15th nor 22nd Mechanized Corps were ready to attack. Instead, Kühn’s 14.Panzer-Division attacked eastward toward Lutsk at 0800 hours, supported by bombers from Fliegerkorps V. Kühn’s panzers brusquely pushed aside a Soviet rifle division blocking the road to Lutsk, but then ran straight into Moskalenko’s 1st Anti-tank Brigade west of Lutsk. Moskalenko’s unit was caught with its guns still limbered in column, enabling the panzers to shoot up his lead battalion, but once the rest of his unit deployed on line, the German tanks were vulnerable in the open. The Soviet anti-tank gunners were easily capable of penetrating the Pz.III and Pz.IV tanks at 1,000 meters or more, and it was only the lack of supporting infantry or tanks that prevented Moskalenko from giving 14.Panzer-Division a very bloody nose. As it was, both sides suffered significant losses in this first major duel between panzers and Soviet anti-tank guns. It was not until 1400 hours that the 22nd Mechanized Corps was finally ready to attack, and then only with part of the 19th Tank Division. Bravely charging, a battalion of forty-five T-26 light tanks struck the left flank of the 14.Panzer-Division near Voinitsa and briefly regained some ground. However, the Germans were merely withdrawing to regroup and at 1800 hours they struck back with a combined-arms attack that shattered the 19th Tank Division. Not only were most of the division’s light tanks lost, but the division commander was wounded and all three regimental commanders were killed or captured, as well as the artillery commander. The remnants of the Soviet division fell back in disorder toward Lutsk, along with Moskalenko’s anti-tank brigade. During the retreat, Kondrusev was killed by German artillery fire, leaving the 22nd Mechanized Corps leaderless.

Nor had Karpezo’s 15th Mechanized Corps been able to stop Crüwell’s 11.Panzer-Division, which bypassed Soviet blocking positions east of Radekhov and advanced 55km to the outskirts of Dubno. Karpezo seemed to think that his mission was to defend Brody, and was content to sit almost immobile as Crüwell’s division marched past him. Indeed, Crüwell took considerable liberty with Karpezo, leaving his right flank dangerously exposed – but nothing happened. German panzer commanders were trained to accept risk and ignore their flanks, and in 1941 this often paid handsome dividends. Generaloberst Hans-Valentin Hube’s 16.Panzer-Division followed in Crüwell’s path, as well as two infantry divisions, to exploit the breakthrough. Zhukov, who had arrived as Stavka representative at Kirponos’ command post at Tarnopol, ordered him to launch a counteroffensive into the flank of 11.Panzer-Division by 0700 hours on 25 June, even though this would be another piecemeal attack. While the German panzer corps commanders used radio to direct and maneuver their panzer-divisions in coordinated fashion, the Soviet mechanized corps operated with little or no coordination with other friendly formations at this point. Lack of C2-driven coordination prevented Kirponos from effectively massing his armour on the battlefield.

While the main armoured battle was developing around Dubno, Kirponos’ strongest armoured formation – General-major Andrey Vlasov’s 4th Mechanized Corps – was senselessly committed by the 6th Army commander to local counterattacks against the German 17.Armee approaching L’vov. Vlasov’s counterattack did not go well, as his armour was also committed piecemeal and without artillery support. Polkovnik Petr S. Fotchenkov’s 8th Tank Division lost nineteen of its 140 T-34s and the 32nd Tank Division lost sixteen tanks on 24–25 June fighting German infantry units. Vlasov did not report these heavy losses to Kirponos, but did claim the destruction of thirty-seven enemy tanks, even though no German armour was in this sector. Even worse, the tanks of the 4th Mechanized Corps were marched hither and yon by the 6th Army, which wanted tanks everywhere at once, but the result was that hundreds of tanks fell out due to mechanical defects.

25 June was a very good day for Panzergruppe 1. Generaloberst Eberhard von Mackensen had both 13 and 14.Panzer-Divisionen advancing toward Lutsk, and together they were strong enough to force Moskalenko’s anti-tank brigade to withdraw. By the afternoon, German tanks from 13.Panzer-Division seized a bridgehead over the Styr River and occupied Lutsk. The Soviet 9th and 19th Mechanized Corps, approaching from the east, were too late to save the city. Karpezo continued to sit immobile, ignoring Zhukov’s attack order, and allowed Crüwell’s 11.Panzer-Division to fight its way into Dubno by 1400 hours. Soviet infantry attempted to form a defensive line behind the Ik’va River, but Crüwell’s fast-moving kampfgruppen defeated this effort. The easy capture of both Lutsk and Dubno effectively drove a wedge between the Soviet 5th and 6th Armies, making efforts to coordinate joint actions even more difficult. The only positive aspect of the day for the Soviets was that the 9th and 19th Mechanized Corps were assembling near Rovno and the 8th Mechanized Corps had arrived to reinforce Karpezo at Brody. On a map, it appeared to Zhukov that the Red Army could mount a powerful armoured pincer counterattack to cut off the vanguard of Panzergruppe 1 at Dubno.

However, Zhukov’s efforts to jump-start a counteroffensive were no more successful on 26 June and only resulted in further diminishing Kirponos’ armour. General-major Konstantin K. Rokossovsky established a fairly strong blocking position due east of Lutsk, which prevented either the 13 or 14.Panzer-Divisionen from advancing directly on Rovno, but recognizing that his 100-odd light tanks stood no chance against Mackensen’s III Armeekorps (mot.), he opted to make only a demonstration to comply with the letter of Zhukov’s order and then shifted to the defense. General-major Nikolai V. Feklenko was less circumspect and obediently launched an attack with his 19th Mechanized Corps against 11.Panzer-Division at Dubno around 1400 hours. Feklenko attacked with about 200 tanks, but only two KV-1 and two T-34; the rest were either T-26 or T-37 scout tanks armed only with machine-guns. Crüwell easily repulsed Feklenko’s counterattack and both KV-1 tanks were lost. Adding insult to injury, Crüwell boldly pushed his motorcycle battalion, Kradschützen-Bataillon 61, 30km eastward to the outskirts of Ostrog.

Von Kleist’s Panzergruppe 1 versus the Southwest Front Part II

On the southern side of the bulge produced by Panzergruppe 1’s advance, Karpezo’s 15th Mechanized Corps was joined by General-leytenant Dmitri I. Ryabyshev’s 8th Mechanized Corps, which had just completed a 600km road march to the front. Ryabyshev’s corps had lost almost half its tanks due to mechanical breakdown, including forty-four out of forty-eight T-35 heavy tanks. Ryabyshev’s corps conducted a forward passage of lines early on 26 June, passing through Karpezo’s disorganized corps. Karpezo opted to remain on the defensive, allowing Ryabyshev to make the main effort in assaulting the right flank of General der Panzertruppen Werner Kempf’s XXXXVIII Armeekorps (mot.) between Leshnev and Kozyn. Ryabyshev began a premature attack with General-major Timofei A. Mishanin’s 12th Tank Division at 0900 hours, but the rest of his corps could not be committed until the afternoon. Ryabyshev intended to capture the village of Leshnev, then push on to seize Berestichko, which would isolate the 11.Panzer-Division at Dubno. Ryabyshev was confident that Mishanin’s division, which had a company of KV-1 tanks and a full battalion of T-34 tanks, could accomplish this mission.

Unfortunately, Mishanin’s armour was committed nearly straight off the line of march, with no time to reconnoitre the unfamiliar terrain or for his artillery and engineers to arrive. Consequently, Mishanin conducted a nearly pure-armour attack with his two tank regiments, but only minimal infantry support. The tanks immediately encountered very marshy terrain along the Syten’ka River, which was little more than a stream, but the Soviet tank crews lacked the skill to negotiate even this minor obstacle. Three T-34 tanks were stuck in the marshy terrain and Mishanin was forced to look for an alternate crossing in full sight of the German troops from the 57.Infanterie-Division in Lishnev. As the Soviet tanks bunched up around the river, the Germans called for artillery fire, which pounded the massed armour. Eventually, Mishanin was able to get his tanks across the marshy terrain and assault into Leshnev. The German panzerjäger were overwhelmed by the T-34 and KV-1 tanks and a number of Pak guns were crushed under their tracks. The German infantry abandoned Leshnev and fell back. However, before Mishanin could consolidate on the objective, an armoured kampfgruppe from Hube’s 16.Panzer-Division attempted to retake Leshnev. While the Pz.III and Pz.IV tanks were seriously out-gunned by the T-34 and KV-1 tanks, the German panzers enjoyed artillery and air support, as well as better C2, which evened the odds considerably. German gunners concentrated on hitting the tracks on the bigger Soviet tanks and succeeded in immobilizing some of the T-34s. Eventually, the German panzers broke off the action and retreated. Mishanin had twenty-five tanks stuck in the marshes or knocked out around Leshnev and was in no position to continue the attack with his unsupported armour. Instead, he sent a company of KV-1 tanks forward to sever the Berestichko-Dublin road and to shoot up some of the German wheeled traffic along this route. Ryabyshev’s other two divisions, the 34th Tank and 7th Mechanized, only got into the fight late in the day and achieved little or nothing.

Amazingly, one of the most powerful Soviet armoured units of June 1941 had failed to inflict significant damage on a single German infantry division. The Red Army’s failure to use combined arms tactics – which was mostly due to impatience in the higher command – almost completely negated the superior capabilities of the T-34 and KV tanks. By the end of 26 June, it appeared that Ryabyshev and Karpezo were still in an excellent position to smash in von Kleist’s right flank on the next day, but the Germans had their own surprise in store. German reconnaissance aircraft had been observing the mass of Soviet armour around Brody all day and they had spotted the GAZ-AAA radio trucks belonging to both the 8th and 15th Mechanized Corps command posts. Around 1800 hours, several groups of low-flying Ju-88 bombers from Fliegerkorps V came in and bombed both command posts. Karpezo was badly wounded but Ryabyshev survived, minus his radio truck, which was left burning. This one air strike – which was a result of poor operational security in the Red Army – seriously degraded Soviet C2 in the armoured battles around Dubno. On top of these difficulties, the Stavka reiterated its order at 2100 hours that Kirponos would continue attacking with all armoured forces and forbid even tactical retreats to prevent encirclements.

Despite Kirponos’ intent to launch a pincer attack from Rovno and Brody to encircle the German forces in Dubno, the lack of coordination between the mechanized corps and other Red Army units resulted in a series of piecemeal battles throughout 27 June. The pincer from Rovno collapsed as Feklenko’s and Rokossovsky’s understrength corps dashed themselves to pieces against 14.Panzer-Division and two supporting infantry divisions. Von Kleist’s panzers now had the benefit of infantry support, which had caught up with them, greatly increasing the staying power of the frontline units. Once the Soviet armour from the 9th and 19th Mechanized Corps was spent, the Germans committed their armour: both 13 and 14.Panzer-Divisionen attacked, threatening to envelop the remnants of Feklenko’s and Rokossovsky’s corps. Meanwhile, Crüwell’s 11.Panzer-Division blasted its way through a thin blocking force of Soviet infantry and captured Ostrog. A counterattack by fifteen BT-7 light tanks against Panzer-Regiment 15 in Ostrog failed to budge the Germans. Kirponos was forced to cobble together Task Force Kukin, a small mechanized formation, to block Crüwell from pushing even further east.

In spite of the myriad problems afflicting the Red Army’s armour units at the outset of the war, Ryabyshev’s 8th Mechanized Corps came close to achieving a real success southwest of Dubno on 27 June. Assembling Mishanin’s 12th Tank Division, Polkovnik Ivan V. Vasil’ev’s 34th Tank Division and Colonel Aleksandr G. Gerasimov’s 7th Motorized Division north of Brody, Ryabyshev was able to mount a fairly organized attack that managed to envelop and isolate the 11 and 16.Panzer-Divisionen, as well as part of the 75.Infanterie-Division, by midday on 27 June. A number of Soviet tanks were lost crossing the marshy terrain, but a mobile group with about 200 tanks succeeded in fighting its way to the outskirts of Dubno. Mishanin was wounded in the attack and Soviet losses were heavy, but the situation for Kempf’s XXXXVIII Armeekorps (mot.) was equally desperate. By the end of the day, German and Soviet armour units were thoroughly intermixed southwest of Dubno and there was no distinct front line.

Although Zhukov abruptly returned to Moscow, he continued to hound Kirponos by teletype messages to continue the counter-offensive against von Kleist’s Panzergruppe 1. Kirponos, intimidated by his commissars, complied and thereby sentenced much of the remainder of his armour to annihilation. Rokossovsky managed to scrape together a battle group with about fifty T-26 and BT light tanks, a handful of KV-2 heavy tanks and some infantry, which he used to attack into the northern flank of Panzergruppe 1’s bulge on the morning of 28 June. However, by this point the infantry from 6.Armee had arrived in force to bolster von Kleist’s exposed flanks and the panzerjägers from 299.Infanterie-Division stopped Rokossovsky’s attack cold. Polkovnik Mikhail E. Katukov led his thirty-three BT-2 and BT-5 light tanks into battle and lost all of them. As usual, Soviet armoured attacks went in with little or no reconnaissance support and negligible artillery support. Massed artillery, anti-tank fire and flak destroyed most of the Soviet armour, although a single damaged KV-2 limped away. Once the Soviet attack was spent, Generaloberst von Mackensen deftly coordinated the 13 and 14.Panzer-Divisionen into an all-out attack that smashed in the flanks of the Soviet 9th and 19th Mechanized Corps. The fragments of seven Soviet tank and motorized infantry divisions were routed and fled back behind the Goryn River. Feklenko abandoned Rovno, which was quickly occupied by the 13.Panzer-Division.

While disaster was striking the northern group of Soviet armour, Ryabyshev’s 8th Mechanized Corps found itself being encircled. This was the first instance in the war in the East of Soviet armour achieving a significant penetration of German lines, and Ryabyshev set a precedent that would occur again and again over the next two years. First, no follow-on forces were available to support the breakthrough; the nearly leaderless 15th Mechanized Corps mounted only a demonstration attack against the infantry of the German XXXXIV Armeekorps which provided no help to Ryabyshev. Second, the Germans reacted quickly to sever the narrow penetration corridor used by the attacking Soviet armour, isolating the bulk of the 12th and 34th Tank Divisions in a kessel just west of Dubno. Third, morale and C2 within the trapped forces quickly disintegrated, resulting in rapid loss of any unit cohesion. The German 75.Infanterie-Division played a vital role in isolating the bulk of Ryabyshev’s forces, which speaks volumes about the Soviet lack of battlefield situational awareness at this point. A foot-marching infantry unit could envelope fully motorized units. Once Ryabyshev’s armour was encircled, Hube’s 16.Panzer-Division began a series of attacks that quickly reduced the kessel. German heavy artillery and flak was brought up to finish off the trapped Soviet T-34 and KV-1 tanks, which were now low on fuel and ammunition; twenty-two tanks were knocked out. Ryabyshev, who was outside the kessel, personally led the 7th Motorized Infantry Division in an effort to break through to his two trapped tank divisions, but failed after crippling losses. By the end of 28 June, Ryabyshev’s corps had been neutralized and von Kleist’s Panzergruppe 1 had driven a deep wedge into the boundary of the Soviet 5th and 6th Armies. In just six days of battle, four of Kirponos’ mechanized corps had been defeated and the remainder had been seriously reduced.

For the first six days of the battle, while Kirponos was grinding up his own armoured forces in piecemeal battles, von Kleist held back the 9.Panzer-Division and his four motorized divisions. Once the best Soviet armoured formations were spent, von Kleist began to commit his second-echelon motorized forces on 28–29 June. The 9.Panzer-Division attacked unexpectedly into the flank of the Soviet 6th Army north of L’vov and quickly broke through its infantry. The 16 and 25.Infanterie-Division (mot.) used their superior mobility to quickly reinforce the flanks of Panzergruppe 1 at Berestichko and Rovno, which enabled the panzer divisions to resume their attacks eastward. Von Mackensen’s III Armeekorps (mot.) sliced into the fragments of Rokossovsky’s forces and pushed them back. After heavy fighting with Hube’s 16.Panzer-Division southwest of Dubno, Ryabyshev retreated with the remnants of his corps, reduced to 35 per cent of their initial tank strength, four infantry battalions and four batteries of artillery. The rest of his corps, roughly 10,000 troops and 200 tanks, were left in the kessel outside Dubno. With the Southwest Front’s forces in retreat or faced with encirclement, the Stavka finally ordered Kirponos to withdraw to the Stalin Line on the old border.

In the final actions near Dubno, the trapped tankers of the 34th Tank Division took advantage of fog along the Ik’va to stage a breakout operation on the night of 30 June, which succeeded in saving some troops, but not much equipment. In a confused night action – rare on the Eastern Front – the Soviets massed their remaining tanks and punched through Hube’s cordon. The Germans massed artillery, flak guns and tanks to destroy the fleeing Soviets, but some German troops panicked when T-34 and KV heavy tanks appeared out of the mist and overran their positions. Corps Commissar Nikolai Popel, leading the breakout, later wrote:

One of our T-34s flared up like a torch, darting around a field. Over a dozen Pz.IVs ganged up at the same time on a KV-1. We were shooting German vehicles pointblank. When ammunition ran out, we rammed them … Sytnik’s KV-1 [Major A. P. Sytnik, commander 67th Tank Regiment], in the heat of battle, rushed ahead of the others. [He] rammed several Pz.IIIs. His vehicle became a pile of shapeless metal. He began retreating with his crew deeper into the thickets.

By 1 July, the Southwest Front was in full retreat and Panzergruppe 1 had achieved its initial objectives. The tank battles fought between Panzergruppe 1 and elements of seven Soviet mechanized corps around Lutsk-Rovno-Dubno-Brody in the first week of Barbarossa were the largest tank battles to date, involving over 600 German and 3,800 Soviet tanks. While it is true that von Kleist failed to encircle and destroy any Soviet mechanized corps, as occurred in the battle of the Bialystok-Minsk kessel, the 8th, 15th and 19th Mechanized Corps were badly mauled and three other mechanized corps lost at least half their strength. Approximately two-thirds of the Soviet armour, or 2,500 tanks, were lost in the battle between 22–30 June 1941; the majority of losses were caused by non-combat factors, including mechanical failure and lack of driver training. The technical superiority of the Soviet KV-1 and T-34 tanks counted for very little in the Battle of Dubno due to untrained crews and inept tactics. The Stavka’s insistence on launching a premature counteroffensive resulted in the best Red Army armoured units being thrown into battle piecemeal, where they were chopped to ribbons by veteran panzer units. In addition to material losses, losses of senior armoured leaders included two of six mechanized corps commanders, six of eighteen division commanders and ten of thirty tank regiment commanders. The surviving formations were reduced to division-size battle groups with little artillery or support services left after the retreat to the Stalin Line. The one bright spot for the Red Army in the Ukraine was that second-echelon armoured units near Kiev and the 2nd and 18th Mechanized Corps, deployed with the Southern Front near Odessa, were too distant to be significantly affected by the initial German Blitzkrieg; these formations would greatly assist Kirponos in slowing Heeresgruppe Süd’s advance upon Kiev in July–August.

In contrast to the damage suffered by Kirponos’ first-echelon armour, the German panzer units in Panzergruppe 1 suffered very light losses in the first week of combat; no senior panzer leaders were casualties and total personnel losses were around 5 per cent or less. Excluding Pz.I and command tanks, no more than twenty-five tanks in Panzergruppe 1 were totally destroyed by 30 June, with about another 100 damaged or down for mechanical defects, but all five panzerdivisions were still fully combat-capable. German leadership, from von Kleist, to von Mackensen and Kempf at corps level, to Crüwell and Hube at division level, had demonstrated great flexibility and aggressiveness. Even when briefly isolated, the panzer divisions retained their cohesiveness and fought their way out of trouble. To be sure, the Pz.III tanks armed with the 3.7cm KwK 36 L/46 cannon had proven to be a liability in combat against Soviet tanks, but the German skill at combined arms warfare and air-ground coordination had carried the day against Soviet numerical superiority and technical advantages. As Heeresgruppe Süd continued its advance to the Stalin Line in early July 1941, von Kleist was still outnumbered but his forces were better handled and, thus, capable of achieving decisive local superiorities.

Louis Philippe d’Orleans, Duke of Chartres at Valmy

The Duke of Chartres, on foot at left, and his brother, the Duke of Montpensier on horseback, are shown in green dragoon uniforms at Valmy.

French volunteers of the young republic (left) stand in stark contrast to the well-groomed regulars at right. At Valmy, the citizen soldiers proved they could stand up to enemy fire.

Some of Kellermann’s volunteers had already pleasantly surprised their commanders. One of the Duke of Chartres’ battalions was made up of new recruits. Its men refused orders to remain in the rear and guard the baggage trains. Confronted by the duke, a spokesman said, “General, we are here to defend our country, and we entreat you not to require any of us to leave the standard of our battalion for the purpose of guarding the baggage.”

“Very well,” answered the duke, “your baggage must take care of itself for today, and your battalion shall march along with your fellow soldiers of the line.”


The young Louis Philippe d’Orleans, Duke of Chartres, calm and highly visible on his horse amid the turmoil, lent his aid to the line officers as they steadied and reformed their battalions. Only 19 years old, the duke’s high rank as a division commander was due to his status as the son of the Duke of Orleans, one of France’s wealthiest men and the head of the cadet branch of the royal family. “I have never seen a general as young as you,” Dumouriez said upon their first meeting. “I am the son of the man who made you a colonel, and I am entirely at your service,” the duke replied.


King of the French from 1830 to 1848, Louis Philippe I was the son of Louis-Philippe-Joseph, duke of ORLÉANS (known as PHILIPPE ÉGALITÉ), and Louise-Marie de Bourbon-Penthievre. He bore the titles successively of duke of Valois, of Chartres (1785), and of Orléans (on the death of his father in 1793). Raised with his sister, the future Madame ADÉLAIDE, by Mme de Genlis, he was, like his father, a fervent supporter of revolutionary ideas. A member of the JACOBINS, he distinguished himself as an officer at the Battles of Valmy and Jemappes (1792).

Dumouriez had ordered Ferrand to take Jemappes, while at noon he launched his hammer blow. Supported by the cavalry and led by several artillery batteries, Chartres’ center and Beurnonville’s right advanced toward the ridgeline, formed in attack columns deployed en echequier (chessboard style). When they reached a range of 160 meters, Beurnonville deployed eight battalions and charged the Austrian center, taking several guns. Three Austrian cavalry squadrons countercharged, putting the French infantry to flight as reinforcements were rushed to the center.

The French commanders rallied Beurnonville’s fleeing infantry, while Chartres reordered his men to form the massive bataillon de Mons column. Followed by two regiments, the column advanced and retook the Cuesmes ridge, beating off Austrian counterattacks. On the French left Ferrand, with a 4-to-1 advantage, was encircling Jemappes with fifteen infantry battalions and cavalry. After initial slow progress south of the village, he took the small hill, although two grenadier battalions halted the next French advance on the village.

After the execution of his father, Louis-Philippe remained in exile, traveling and teaching mathematics and languages in Ger many, Scandinavia, the United States, and England. In 1809, he married his cousin, Marie-Amélie, who was King Ferdinand IV of Naples’s daughter. They had eight children. He returned to France after the abdication of NAPOLÉON I and was welcomed by LOUIS XVIII, who restored him to the Orléans estates. As the son of a former regicide, however, he was kept out of the court and out of political life. In the late 1820s, he became the favorite of the middle and lower classes, who had grown restive under the reactionary rule of CHARLES X.

In the JULY REVOLUTION OF 1830, which overthrew Charles, Louis Philippe, brought to power by the wealthy bourgeoisie, was proclaimed king of the French by the Chamber of Deputies. At first content to rule as a “citizen-king,” he conciliated the republicans who brought him to power, and dispensed with many royal privileges, beginning what is known as the JULY MONARCHY. He had also supported, more or less, such liberal newspapers as Le Constitutionnel and later Le National. Gradually, however, he became more authoritarian and sought to rule as well as to reign (see FRANÇOIS GUIZOT). The last years of his monarchy were marked by corruption and failures in both domestic and foreign affairs, and he was eventually deserted by both the democratic and the authoritarian elements. He was deposed by the REVOLUTION OF 1848 and, after his abdication, went into exile in England, where he died two years later.