Kpengla was the seventh King of Dahomey. He succeeded Tegbessou, and ruled from 1774 to 1789.
Kpengla’s reign increased the size of the kingdom. He killed the chief of the Popo people, Agbamou, thus extending the empire into what is currently Togo. He destroyed the villages of Ekpe and Badagry (in what is now Nigeria), which were interfering with Dahomey’s regional monopoly on the slave trade. His main symbol is the akpan bird, a trade gun (flintlocks became the standard issue to the Dahomean army during his reign), and a Dahomey Amazon striking her head against a tree (a reference to a humorous war story stemming from one of his military campaigns).
We can glean some details of operations from an account of the battle between Dahomey’s army and the combined forces of Whydah and Popo when the former king of Whydah, hoping that Dahomey was sufficiently distracted by Oyo’s invasion of 1729, sought to re-occupy his town and country. Between them, Whydah and its ally were said to have gathered 15,000 troops, while the Dahomean force that came down from the north to engage it was depleted by the detachment of one force that was still raiding to the east and its own losses from the war with Oyo. On 16 July 1729 battle was joined, as the Whydah-Popo army divided into three units, one under Asu (a Whydah commander) and a second under the king of Whydah, while the Popo soldiers formed a third command. The council of the allies was divided, for the Dahomean force, made to appear larger by the addition of some female soldiers in the rear of their march, seemed to the king of Whydah to be too large. Nevertheless, his co-commanders disagreed, and battle was joined. Asu and the Popo divisions moved in with a withering attack on the Dahomean right, and were so successful that they forced it back. However, the Whydah troops on the other flank were less successful and broke themselves, in spite of the king’s efforts to stem the tide by lancing some of his own soldiers. With that break, the Dahomean right wing rolled up the allied left and was able to take Asu’s men in the rear, and then to drive the Popos from the field as well. In the rout, the king of Whydah only saved himself by taking refuge in the English fort, and then removing to the safety of his coastal island.
In an action at Serrachee in 1775, the Serrachee forces managed to break the lines of the Dahomey army and penetrated to a reserve unit posted with the baggage and commanded by the Sawgan. Having already sent his forces into the breach unsuccessfully, the Sawgan fought his opponents with musket and then with sword until captured. Warfare on the rivers, islands and lagoons was complicated. Not only did this environment limit movements in some ways, but the use of boats expanded and changed the way operations were conducted, even if infantry tactics might remain the same whether the soldiers were on land or serving as marines. When Popo revolted against Whydah in the late seventeenth century, Whydah forces, reinforced by some French marines sent to reinforce French commercial interests in Whydah, built floats to attack the town. However, the floats came under such heavy fire from the fortified houses of Popo that they had to break off the attack, and resolved never to attempt it again.
When Dahomey invaded Whydah in 1727, its troops had to halt at the border marked by the river, and the Whydah troops, seeing that the Dahomeans had no capacity to cross with boats or even by swimming, felt themselves safe. But eventually the Dahomean army found alternative crossings and, flanking the Whydah army, crushed it.
Dahomey’s war on Epe in 1778 demonstrates the complexities of operations in the coastal environment, where marine warfare from boats was often the norm. In addition, the restricted environment of swampy regions often made warfare here not unlike the forest warfare of the Gold Coast region to the west, where strategic use of clearings and roadways allowed carefully planned and placed forces to keep much larger armies at bay. Dahomey sought to overcome its traditional lack of water mobility by enlisting the Allada navy in its efforts. Four divisions of Dahomey troops advanced overland into Epe territory and were mostly victorious, but one 800–man-strong Epe detachment withdrew into a swampy area and delayed the Dahomeans for a long time by holding a pass into it with great tenacity and courage. Meanwhile, the Allada force landed its marines, but the Epe king who commanded the forces facing them managed to break their ranks and captured their transports, taking them to nearby Weme. The Epe then re-embarked in the boats and attacked the remaining Allada army, routing it. From there, they moved against the Dahomean rear as it crossed the swamp where the Epe detachment had delayed it. Although the Epe were successful, the Dahomey force were still able to plunder the country and withdraw.
The war against Badagri in 1783 took similar turns. Using support from Allada, Dahomean forces took Badagri’s beach, and then crossed the river at its mouth, with Allada watercraft ferrying their infantry across. At this point, however, the Badagri army withdrew into the swamps and used the restricted mobility of this area to harass and ambush the Dahomeans as they advanced, eventually cutting them off. Fortunately for Dahomey, the commander of the force was able to cut his way through the surrounding force, regain the boats, and withdraw from the river. At the other end of the region, the 1784 campaign by an alliance of people from the Ada and Accra region and the Danish against Aguna and its allies involved another sort of amphibious operation. The flotilla of the allies went upriver in a sizable number of canoes, many armed with a small bow cannon, and led by a raft containing two larger pieces. In all 115 watercraft crossed the river under fire to meet their allies, but the Agona people, skilfully entrenched, were not hurt by the fire of the artillery, and the direct water assault was called off. Eventually the force of some 2,500 landed upstream and proceeded inland, when confronted by extensive earthworks that lay behind a marsh at the town of Atocoo. These were attacked the hard way, by a frontal attack as infantry waded in the marsh up to their armpits in order to attack the works, while two other units worked through even more difficult terrain to take the works on the flanks. But neither group attempted a direct assault; rather they drove the defenders out by 45 minutes of sustained musket fire at close range. In another action involving the same principals in 1792, artillery fire was used to break and confuse the defenders behind their earthworks by setting fire to the bush and creating a panic which caused the defenders to break and run, leaving their leaders to commit suicide.
