American forces in the Pacific and Asia did not have the
advantage of an ally like the British with extensive experience and advanced
equipment to carry the night defense load until US units were trained and
equipped for battle. The Japanese army and navy air forces dominated the day
skies in 1941 and 1942, however, and had no need to seek the night’s
protection. Only when the United States seized daylight air superiority after
January 1943 did Japanese night missions become the rule. To cope with this
growing problem, until the specially trained night fighter squadrons were
ready, the AAF redesignated the Hawaii-based 6th Pursuit Squadron a night
fighter unit. While the core of the unit remained in Hawaii to defend US
installations, in February 1943 one detachment deployed to Port Moresby, New
Guinea, and another to Guadalcanal with six P-70s each to help ground forces
struggling to defend those areas against enemy attacks. The crew members of
these units had no formal night training.
Equipped with SCR–540 airborne radar (equivalent to the
British Mark IV) and lacking superchargers, these first US night fighters
performed poorly. Most Japanese bombers flew above twenty thousand feet, while
P-70s struggled to reach that altitude and operated best under ten thousand
feet. Initially, the Americans lacked ground control radar, relying only on
vague reports of penetrating aircraft from coastwatchers. Crews had to develop
the techniques of ground controllers and antiaircraft artillery coordination in
combat. Against these obstacles, Pilot Capt. Earl C. Bennett and R/O TSgt.
Raymond P. Mooney of Detachment B on Guadalcanal claimed the first US
radar-directed (using the SCR–540, Mark IV airborne radar) night kill on April
19, 1943, though searchlights illuminated the enemy aircraft until radar
contact had been made. Pilot 1st Lt. Burnell W. Adams and R/O Flight Officer
Paul DiLabbio claimed the only kill for Detachment A at New Guinea in May.
Although three squadrons eventually flew P-70s in the Pacific theater, they
claimed only two victims. Eventually, the P-70s were withdrawn from night
combat altogether and used for attacks on shipping.
To make up for the technical shortcomings of the P-70, the
6th NFS acquired a few P-38 day fighters with the speed and altitude to
intercept enemy aircraft. Loitering at thirty thousand feet over Guadalcanal,
the P-38s had to wait for ground-based searchlights to illuminate enemy
bombers. This reliance on searchlights limited them to one night kill in May
1943. Later attempts to free the P-38s from this dependence by equipping them
with Navy AN/APS–4 airborne radars ultimately failed because of the excessive
workload imposed on the lone pilot.
The initial experience of the United States with night
fighters in the Pacific was not stellar. On March 20/21, 1943, Detachment B’s
P-70s failed to stop Japanese night bombers from damaging fifteen of the 307th
Bomb Group’s B–24s and five of the 5th Bomb Group’s B–17s on the ground at
Guadalcanal. Eight months later, in November, enemy night bombers sank one and
damaged three Allied ships at Bougainville. The AAF concluded from this initial
experiment in night fighting that “it proved impossible to prevent the Japanese
from inflicting some damage” on US ground and surface forces. In November 1943,
the AAF ordered the newly formed 419th NFS to Guadalcanal to rectify the
situation. Equipped with ground control radar, but lacking aircraft, the 419th
absorbed Detachment B of the 6th NFS. Demoralized by flying worn-out aircraft,
the new squadron flew only three night patrols, six scrambles, four intruder
missions, and four daylight sorties by the end of the year, claiming no enemy
aircraft at a cost of five aircraft and four dead crewmen. It was hardly an
auspicious beginning for Pacific-based US night fighters.
The 419th NFS, like all US night fighter units sent to the
Pacific, suffered from the low priorities of the Pacific war. The ten night
fighter squadrons that fought there had to make do with obsolescent ground
radars, including the 3-meter SCR–270 and 1.5-meter SCR–527, as the Microwave
Early Warning radar did not appear in the Pacific theater until late in the
war. Even this vintage equipment was too few in number, as priority went to
European operations. Spare parts, difficult to find in Europe, proved
impossible to secure in the Pacific. Also, the terrain of Pacific battlefields
sometimes interfered with night fighter operations, allowing Japanese intruders
to sneak in, shielded by mountains and hills. Ground radars were both
susceptible to severe echoing from ground returns and easily jammed. Optimally,
they had to be located in a flat area at least one-half mile in
diameter—difficult to find on the Pacific islands. Erecting radars near the
shore provided some relief.
Inexperienced radar operators only made matters worse. In
January 1944, for example, the 418th NFS’s fighter controller scrambled a P-70
to intercept a bogey, which was in fact another P-70 already on patrol against
Japanese intruders. Ground control then vectored the patrolling P-70 to
intercept the one just launched. While orchestrating a merry chase, the
inexperienced controller directed both P-70s into a US antiaircraft artillery
zone, where they received heavy ground fire. Fortunately no one was hurt,
though important lessons were learned about proper airground control and
communication.
Many of the enemy sorties US night fighters had to defend
against most often were not coordinated raids, but individual attacks by
“Bed-Check Charlie”—a nickname given to all such single flights, which seemed
to come at the same time each night. More nuisance than threat, the attacks
nevertheless affected morale and had to be stopped. Many chroniclers of combat
in World War II write with near reverence for these solitary visitors, even
recording remorse when night defenses downed a “Bed-Check Charlie.”
The 418th NFS joined the 419th at Guadalcanal late in 1943,
and its experience was typical of all the early squadrons in the Pacific. Its
P-70s, unsuccessful in intercepting Japanese bombers over Guadalcanal, were
ordered to switch to night intruder work. From Guadalcanal, the 418th
accompanied MacArthur’s drive toward the Philippines and Japan, moving to
Dobodura, then to Cape Croisilles, Karkar, Finschhafen, and to Hollandia, New
Guinea. In May 1944 the squadron converted to B–25s, allowing it to carry more
ordnance on night intruder missions and have a better range for sea sweeps.
In August 1944 P-61s became available in the Pacific
theater, and the 418th, equipped with them, converted back to defensive
patrols, scoring four kills on Morotai and five from Mindoro during the Luzon
campaign. In the thirteen nights following December 27, 1944, the 418th gained
twelve of its eighteen victories of the war. Piloting a Black Widow, Maj.
Carroll C. Smith became the highest scoring night ace of the war, achieving
four kills on two missions on the night of December 29/30. Altogether, Smith racked
up eight kills, though three of them came during the day. His R/O for the five
night victories was 1st Lt. Philip B. Porter.
Meanwhile, the failure of B–24 night intruder missions over
Luzon forced the 418th NFS to postpone its night fighter operations and return
to night harassment and interdiction missions in support of MacArthur’s forces.
From the Philippines the unit went to Okinawa in July 1945, starting intruder
missions against Japanese airfields on the home island of Kyushu. Pilot 2d Lt.
Curtis R. Griffitts and R/O 2d Lt. Myron G. Bigler claimed the last night
fighter kill of the war during these operations.
At Wakde, the 421st NFS got its first kill on July 7, 1944,
after seven months of fruitless night patrols with P-70s and P-38s, and then
scored five more kills on Owi Island, four of them on the night of November 28
alone. It was on Owi that the “Mad Rabbiteers” of the 421st claimed the most
unusual night kill of the war. Pilot Lt. David T. Corts, hard on the tail of a
Japanese bomber, put his P-61 into a sharp turn when R/O Lt. Alexander Berg and
gunner SSgt. Millard Braxton warned him of an enemy fighter on their own tail.
Just as Corts pulled away, the fighter opened fire and shot down the enemy
bomber; Corts and his crew did not receive official credit for the kill.
Against aircraft that could reach their altitude, Japanese attackers resorted
to the heavy use of window/chaff, which proved generally ineffective against
the P-61’s SCR–720 radar. On some missions the enemy used fighters at low altitudes
to draw Black Widow patrols away from high-flying bombers.
According to the AAF, the “defense of Morotai [an island halfway
between New Guinea and the Philippines] was probably the most difficult task
undertaken by American night fighters during World War II.” Because of
MacArthur’s island-hopping strategy, Japanese air bases at Mindanao, Borneo,
Halmaheras, and the Palaus and Celebes Islands surrounded Morotai. Mountainous
terrain caused permanent echoes on early warning and ground control radars,
creating blind spots through which Japanese bombers could penetrate without
being detected. Sixty-three separate raids took place between October 8, 1944,
and January 11, 1945. The defenders had P-38s orbit over their airfields at
25,000 feet, while antiaircraft artillery with its shells fused at 20,000 feet
fired at the intruders. If searchlights illuminated a target, the ground fire
stopped while the P-38s pounced on the now-visible enemy. Meanwhile, the P-61s
of the 418th and 419th Squadrons orbited outside the ring of antiaircraft
artillery fire, waiting for orders from the ground control radar fighter
controller to vector them to a target. The defenders made sixty-one
interceptions with their airborne radar, claiming five kills.
At Leyte in the Philippines, US daylight air power proved so
deadly that enemy forces converted to night-time attacks almost immediately
after the invasion. The arrival of the 421st NFS on October 31, 1944, promised
to parry these blows, but the P-61 Black Widow lacked the speed advantage to
intercept fast high-altitude Japanese aircraft that used water-injection to
increase engine power. Crewmen of the 421st nevertheless proved what efficient
coordination between ground control radar and the P-61 could accomplish,
downing seven intruders before being relieved by Marine single-engine night
fighters. These seven kills included four on the night of November 28. Joined
by the 547th, the 421st spent the remainder of the war flying night convoy
cover, PT boat escort, and long-range intruder missions against the Japanese
home island of Kyushu. The thirteen kills of the 421st NFS and six of the 547th
stood in stark contrast to the last US night fighter squadron to arrive in the
Pacific, the 550th. It flew in combat for eight months with P-38s by day and
P-61s by night, without aerial success.
In 1944 Japanese night bombers launched a major effort to
disrupt the construction of US airfields on Saipan needed for the B–29 campaign
against the home islands. Flying P-61s, the 6th NFS began defensive operations
nine days after the Marines’ June 15 landing. Enemy attackers held the
initiative until new Microwave Early Warning radars linked to SCR–615 and
AN/TPS–10 “Li’l Abner” height-finder radars made three Japanese sorties one-way
trips. In thirty-seven attempts at interception from June 24 to July 21, the
defense made twenty-seven airborne radar contacts and claimed three kills. It
was on Saipan that a Pacific-based P-61 Black Widow snared its first victim on
June 30, 1944.
A typical Japanese aerial assault force consisted of a dozen
Mitsubishi G4M Betty bombers flying twenty miles apart. P-61 crews discovered
that if they could shoot down the lead bomber, the others would jettison their
bombs and flee. Black Widows from the 6th NFS and the 548th NFS downed five
additional enemy intruders before the attacks stopped in January 1945.
Thereafter, boredom set in for the crews of the 6th defending Saipan.
Occasionally success alleviated the boredom. Ground control
radar vectored the 6th Squadron’s “Bluegrass 56” over Saipan for five minutes,
until R/O Flight Officer Raymond P. Mooney picked up the bogey on his airborne
radar. He reported that
the Bogey was traveling very slowly and after closing to
400 feet our craft held position for 3 minutes and finally got visual contact.
Bogey was a Japanese single-engine dive-bomber (Kate). 90 rounds of 20-mm was
fired point blank into the enemy plane. The fire was plainly seen to enter the
right wing and fuselage. By accident cockpit lights flashed on in our craft
blinding pilot and preventing further observation.
The fighter controller notified Pilot 2d Lt. Jerome M.
Hansen that the bogey had disappeared from the ground control radar scope just
as Hansen had reported opening fire. The kill had to be listed as a probable,
though Hansen and Mooney received the Air Medal for their efforts. Mooney was
the 6th’s lone ace, with five kills to his credit.
The fighter controller notified Pilot 2d Lt. Jerome M.
Hansen that the bogey had disappeared from the ground control radar scope just
as Hansen had reported opening fire. The kill had to be listed as a probable,
though Hansen and Mooney received the Air Medal for their efforts. Mooney was
the 6th’s lone ace, with five kills to his credit. his second pass, the ground
controller reported the bogey was friendly The overeager P-61 crew from Saipan
had already put six large holes in the US Navy PBM patrol aircraft, a near
tragedy. The PBM had to be beached after landing to prevent it from sinking.
Though uttering a few choice, but not repeatable phrases, the Navy reported no
injuries. The rules of visual engagement were perfectly clear; unfortunately,
the humans who executed them were not perfect.
Saipan was also the site of the United States’ first effort
at airborne warning and control. Two B–24s of the 27th Bombardment Group
equipped with radar sets were to vector P-38s to intercept Japanese aircraft.
Unfortunately, the system was never used in combat.
On Iwo Jima the AAF combined the SCR–527 and SCR–270 radars
for early warning acquisition and the AN/APS–10 for ground control of
interception operations to stop the two or three Japanese bombers attacking
Allied forces on this island each night. Early warning radar would detect the
bombers’ presence at around 140 miles, between seven thousand and fifteen
thousand feet high. At fifty-seven miles, the “Li’l Abner” ground control would
make contact and begin vectoring defending P-61s of the 548th and 549th to
intercept them. Usually, the Japanese intruders would drop window/chaff at
thirty miles, blocking the older metric early warning radars, but the microwave
3-centimeter AN/TPS–10 kept working. Within ten miles of the Iwo ground radar,
the night fighters would break contact, and antiaircraft artillery would take
over. Eventually, after May 1945, there were few intruders to attack, and the
two night fighter squadrons soon shifted focus to intruder work in the Bonin
Islands.
Night intruder work to cut off Japanese garrisons on
scattered islands proved critical in the Pacific war. Generally this involved
attacks on enemy shipping. Because P-70s were ineffective in the night
interception role, commanders pressed them into intrusion work as early as
October 1943. When P-61 night interceptors began arriving in the early summer
of 1944, night intrusion work stopped until the spring of 1945. Soon, Allied
victories left few Japanese bombers to attract night fighter attention, and US
night crews returned to intruder operations.
Preparing for the invasion of Bougainville, Detachment B of
the 6th NFS from Guadalcanal began bombing Japanese airfields there in October
1943. Squadrons such as the 418th switched from P-70s to B–25s to improve the
efficiency of their night intruder missions. Bigger bombers meant bigger bomb
loads and longer range. For its part, the 418th NFS developed an innovative way
of attacking enemy positions in cooperation with PT boats patrolling near
Japanese-held islands. As guns onshore opened fire on the decoy boats, the
B–25s attacked the muzzle flashes so visible at night. Commanders also used
night fighters to suppress night artillery, a job reportedly much appreciated
by Marine and Army units struggling against stubborn Japanese defenders.
Night flyers quickly found that skip-bombing attacks on
enemy shipping, so effective by day, were also possible at night. Without
radar, airmen had trouble seeing ships at night, but soon discovered their
wakes were a dead giveaway. Flying at 250 feet, fighters and bombers, including
B–17s and –24s, dropped their bombs about sixty to one hundred feet short of
the target, allowing the bombs to skip into the side of the targeted vessel.
Some four-engine B–24 bombers were equipped with SCR–717 air-to-surface radars
for finding targets at night and AN/APQ–5 low altitude radars for bomb aiming.
Called “Snoopers,” three squadrons of about forty B–24s serving with Fifth,
Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Air Forces claimed to have sunk 344 enemy ships,
barges, and sampans at night, with 62 more probably destroyed and 446 damaged.
Missions in the China-Burma-India Theater
The P-61s of the 426th NFS went to China in November 1944 to
protect B–29 bases from Japanese intruders. As elsewhere, the night fighters
found the hunting poor, claiming only four kills by February 1945. Though
shifted to primarily night intruder work, P-61 crews also attacked enemy
personnel attending signal fires that guided Japanese night bombers to US
bases.
Within the CBI, the greatest success in night intruder work
occurred in Burma, largely because the Japanese were forced to use a single net
of north-south roads, one railroad, and the Irrawaddy River. Day fighters again
drove the enemy to operate mainly at night, creating attractive targets for the
P-61s of the 427th NFS and the B–25 Mitchells of the 12th Bombardment Group and
the 490th Bombardment Squadron. Flying at 1,500 feet, these aircraft followed
preassigned roads until they spotted truck lights. Diving to 150 feet, they
swept down the road with guns blazing. Standard procedure called for a return
twenty minutes later to restrafe burning vehicles and hamper the enemy’s
recovery efforts.
