Excellent view of the New Britain invasion and seven landing ships.
U.S. and Japanese movements in western New Britain during late 1943 and early 1944.
During 1943 the US strategy in the South-west Pacific centred on a two-pronged push, the first north-west across the central and northern Solomon Islands and the second northward through Papua and New Guinea. The ultimate objective of both was New Britain, which contained Rabaul, a vital Japanese naval and air base that effectively blocked any northward advance beyond the Solomons. As part of this strategy, the overall command of Halsey’s South Pacific Area forces, renamed the US Third Fleet, was temporarily transferred from Nimitz to MacArthur. Halsey’s task, under MacArthur’s direction, was to engage Japanese naval and air forces in the Solomons and undertake a series of leap-frogging amphibious assaults on enemy-held islands that would take his command ever closer to eastern New Britain. Meanwhile, MacArthur’s parallel advance to the west was designed to leap-frog along the coast of Papua and New Guinea as a prelude to an amphibious assault on western New Britain. The combined operation by MacArthur and Halsey, which was agreed in late April, was given the code name Elkton. By August, following a series of successful landings and the ongoing destruction of a greater part of Japan’s naval and air resources, it was decided that Rabaul itself could be isolated, left to wither on the vine, rather than taken by direct assault. However, western New Britain was still considered a prime target, not least because of the Japanese airfields it contained.
The proposed landings on western New Britain, code-named Cartwheel, underwent several modifications before the final details were agreed on 15 December, a mere 11 days before the 1st Division was supposed to land. As a diversion, there was a preliminary landing at Arawe on the south-west coast by elements of the 1st Cavalry Division on the 11th. Meanwhile the 1st Marine Division was to be transported to the target beaches. The main assault was to be led by Combat Team C based on the 7th Marines, which was to come ashore at Borgen Bay a short distance from Cape Gloucester on the north-west coast of the island. Once a beachhead perimeter had been secured Combat Team B, centred on the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 1st Marines, had the task of advancing on a nearby Japanese airfield. The 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, was to conduct a landing at Tauali some 19km (12 miles) away on the opposite side of Cape Gloucester and then establish blocking positions on the main road to prevent any Japanese troops on the cape escaping or halt any reinforcements attempting to reach them.
The opening assault on 26 December by Combat Team C was expected to be opposed but the commander of the Japanese forces in western New Britain, General Shinjiro Komori, had few men in the area of Borgen Bay as he believed the local terrain behind the beaches – dense jungle and swamp – was all but impassable. The marines found the going tough; men disappeared up to the thighs in the mud and water or became entangled in root systems hidden below the surface. The supporting bombardment only churned up the ground more and brought rotten trees crashing to the ground – the first US fatality of the landings was a man crushed by a falling tree.
The marines struggled through the swamp in the face of only sporadic enemy fire and were able to establish a perimeter on dry ground some 700 metres (800 yards) inland. Combat Team B now began to move out from the perimeter and the 1st Marines almost immediately ran into the first serious resistance, which centred on a complex of four bunkers connected by camouflaged trenches. The position proved difficult to neutralize as bazooka rounds simply ploughed into the soft earth without detonating, while flamethrowers were rendered ineffective by the dampness. An accompanying tracked landing vehicle was sent against the position but stuck fast between two trees and two of its crew were killed. The driver kept his head, freed the vehicle, and crushed the bunker under its tracks. The accompanying marines then cleared the rest of the complex with their rifles and grenades. Twenty-five Japanese soldiers were killed in the brief firefight but the marines also recorded seven dead and an equal number wounded.
The 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, had an easier time landing at Tauli. Preceded by fire from warships, aircraft and rocket-firing landing vessels, the landings were unopposed. Several abandoned enemy bunkers were checked as the marines pushed inland and established a perimeter some 457m (500 yards) inland that severed the coast road by nightfall. However, the battalion was not immediately able to inform Rupertus of its success as radio transmissions to Borgen Bay were inhibited by the intervening Mount Talawe. Radio communications were set up by the morning of the 27th and the other battalions of the 1st Marines were allowed to begin their push on the enemy airfield. By the onset of darkness they had advanced some 5km (3 miles) along the line of the coast road toward the objective.
Although their response to the initial landings had been uncoordinated and generally weak, Japanese resistance steadily grew in intensity. On the night of the 27th-28th, they launched an attack against the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, which was holding a sector of the main beach-head’s perimeter, with the intention of isolating the 1st Marine battalions moving against the airfield. The marines prevented any penetration of their perimeter and killed around 200 of the Japanese. On the 28th the marines at Borgen Bay began their move against the Cape Gloucester airfield. Around midday, as the 1st Marines were moving on the objective, they were hit by intense machine-gun and mortar fire from a road block of a dozen well-concealed bunkers manned by around 250 Japanese troops. The battle for what was later nicknamed Hell’s Point was intense. The attackers deployed three tanks to shatter the bunkers one by one at close range and then individual squads of marines dealt with the survivors. For nine men killed and 36 wounded, the marines had killed some 270 of the Japanese and dealt with the only major obstacle between them and the airfield. On the 29th the main assault against the airfield was launched. Erupting out of the dense jungle along the eastern edge of the airfield the marines were able to deploy in textbook fashion across an expanse of grassland. Supported by armour and artillery fire, the marines swept across the target zone, meeting minimal opposition. The airfield soon fell; just three marines had been wounded in taking the key target.
The fighting to secure the airfield fully was far from over. The Japanese tasked with protecting the base had melted away into the surrounding area, particularly into the foothills to the south. On the 30th furious counterattacks were launched against the marines around the airfield and at the blocking position on the opposite side of Cape Gloucester. The 1st Marines in particular had a stiff fight in what was nicknamed the ‘Battle of Coffin Corner’, killing 100 Japanese and driving off the remainder of the force trying to break through their road-block. Japanese losses were heavy elsewhere and their defeat allowed the airfield to be declared secure. MacArthur announced its capture to the US public as a present for New Year’s Day, although the value of the airfield was debatable. Already pounded by US aircraft, its cratered runways and battered facilities were strewn with the wreckage of around 30 Japanese planes. The Japanese, still holding out nearby, now bombarded the area, adding to the destruction. US engineers struggled to repair the damage due to the enemy fire, and the monsoon rains added to their difficulties as their heavy equipment stuck fast in thick mud. The base was only declared operational in mid-February.
The capture of the airfield did not end Japanese resistance in western New Britain as the high ground they held allowed them to fire on both the airfield and beachhead. The marines therefore prepared to attack the key to the area – Hill 660, 3.2km (2 miles) south of the Borgen Bay landing beaches. However, the approach to the objective was far from easy as the attackers had to negotiate a series of jungle-covered ridges before tackling the hill itself. The advance began on 2 January 1944, and progressed slowly. Japanese positions, expertly concealed and difficult to spot at anything but close range, had to be neutralized. In a series of sharp encounters over the following days, the marines captured a number of key points, such as Suicide Creek, Target Hill, and Aogiri Ridge, which opened the way for the planned assault on Hill 660. On the 12th the hill was pounded by aircraft, artillery and mortar fire to soften up the defences for the main attack – but many of the Japanese were left untouched in their solidly constructed bunkers.
The 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, led the push on Hill 660 on the next day. The first drive was up the hill’s north-west slope but was stopped in its tracks by the Japanese and the marines made little progress. Hope came from the south side of the position where a detachment of men commanded by Captain Joseph Buckley had been sent with a bulldozer to build a road block to prevent the Japanese from escaping. On the morning of the 14th the main assault force to the north-west stormed up the hill and captured its crest. The Japanese abandoned their positions and attempted to flee; many were cut down at Buckley’s road block. Numerous brief and furious skirmishes occurred over the following days as the marines conducted mopping-up operations, but on the 16th the Japanese launched a much larger counter-attack against the expanded US perimeter. Again Hill 660 was the centre of the fight, much of which was at close quarters. Aided by mortar fire the marines were able to beat off the Japanese, effectively ending enemy hopes of retaking the position. The battle for Hill 660 had cost the division 50 casualties, while Japanese losses totalled around 200 men.
The taking of Hill 660 ensured that the beachhead and airfield were secure and the marines now began to move across the island’s western half, conducting small-scale raids, or reconnoitring nearby islands. For example, elements of the 1st Marines landed on Umboi Island between New Britain and New Guinea on 20 February, and the regiment’s 1st Battalion spent the period 11-18 March skirmishing with the Japanese at Linga Linga Plantation on Eleanora Bay. As these operations took place, the enemy resistance on New Britain began to crumble. By 5 March the 5th Marines had pushed eastward to the base of Willaumez Peninsula, which juts out into the Bismarck Sea on the north coast of New Britain. The peninsula and the Japanese airfield at Talasea were important objectives. If the enemy could be beaten and the airfield secured then the main route from south and west New Britain to Rabaul in the east would be closed to the Japanese. Rather than advance overland up the peninsula, it was decided to conduct an amphibious assault directly against the airfield. The 5th Marines were ordered to carry out the operation, which opened at dawn on the 6th. The proposed air support did not arrive and the marines had to rely on support fire from their own tanks, which fired over the lowered ramps of their landing craft during the final approach. On landing the 1st Battalion established a defensive perimeter and the 2nd Battalion then began the drive on Talasea but quickly ran into heavy enemy mortar and machine-gun fire. Tanks were used at close range to destroy the Japanese bunkers, but progress was slow, partly due to the difficult terrain. Talasea was reached on the 9th, but pockets of resistance still had to be dealt with.
On the following day the marines finally secured Talasea and its vital airfield. A total contrast from the fetid swamps and jungle at Cape Gloucester, one marine described his arrival in the area and the sight of its neat village as ‘like finding heaven in hell’. There was still some Japanese resistance to be dealt with but the tempo of the battle declined to such an extent that the division was able to undertake a seven-week training programme. By the end of the division’s stint on New Britain, when the marines were replaced by the US Army’s 40th Infantry Division, they had been on the island for 131 days and recorded casualty figures of 310 men killed and 1,083 wounded. The Japanese later reported their own losses as 3,868 men killed. More importantly for US strategy, western New Britain was now clear of Japanese forces and the sizeable enemy garrison at Rabaul was effectively isolated and powerless. The seizure of western New Britain also prevented Japanese attacks on US shipping in the Vitaz Strait between the Solomon and Bismarck Seas, thereby securing an area vital to the next stage of MacArthur’s drive towards the Philippines from the South-west Pacific.
The division left New Britain in late April and sailed for Pavuvu in the Russell Islands some 105km (65 miles) off the north-west coast of Guadalcanal, which had been overrun against minimal opposition during Operation Cleanslate in February 1943. Although selected as the division’s forward base the area was less than perfect for tired and sick men. The island was far from the tropical ideal; it was swamp infested, frequently deluged by heavy rain, and facilities were basic – food, medical facilities and recreational opportunities were meagre. Equally, the island and its immediate neighbours were unsuited for the conduct of amphibious training to bring the division and its new drafts of replacements back up to full effectiveness. Even so the sojourn on the Russells lasted for some five months. On 26 August, the division transferred to the area around Cape Esperance on Guadalcanal to practise amphibious landings. Within a few weeks it was to undertake one of the most bloody but comparatively little known assaults of the whole Pacific campaign at Peleliu.
