The variety of roles undertaken by the Rangers during World War II in part reflected an age-old problem with special forces – what are they for? Most commanders of the time were trained to operate with conventionally organized and equipped brigades, divisions and corps-sized units, not with battalions of specialist infantry numbering a few hundred men. This problem led directly to the diverse multitude of front-line combat missions that the Rangers undertook between 1942 and 1945, and sometimes left them being deployed as nothing more than headquarters security details – a somewhat bizarre job for specialist infantry. This was temporarily the case in northwest Europe in late 1944 and on Luzon in 1945. Although the battalions underwent amphibious assault training and all took part in such operations, the Rangers were deployed on numerous other tasks, only a few of which involved the type of ‘ranging’ familiar to their eighteenth century counterparts. This very flexibility made the Rangers a prized asset for many senior commanders but for the Rangers themselves it sometimes meant learning on the job. Darby, for example, insisted that his 1st Battalion conduct night-time training during the North African campaign, a decision that was of immense and immediate value.
The Rangers’ greatest successes in World War II were chiefly as spearhead assault troops during the opening phase of an amphibious landing. In North Africa, Sicily, at Salerno, Anzio, on D-Day and at Leyte Gulf they conducted operations, most involving neutralizing coastal defences, designed to ease the way for the main assault forces. Despite the dangers associated with such missions, most were quickly completed and, with the exception of the Pointe du Hoc assault on D-Day, achieved at little cost due to the speed of the Rangers’ attacks and the often low-grade opposition they faced. Pointe du Hoc was an altogether tougher proposition as all of the other landings were conducted across nothing more than gently shelving beaches or low sea-walls and, by attacking under cover of darkness or at early dawn, the Rangers enjoyed an element of surprise. On D-Day, the Rangers had none of these factors in their favour yet they persevered and successfully stormed the cliff-top position. Despite their heavy losses the assault was undoubtedly one of the finest moments of June 6 and its inherent dangers were recognized by General Omar Bradley. In his autobiography, he remarked in reference to Lieutenant Colonel James Rudder, commander of the assault companies: ‘No soldier in my command has ever been wished a more difficult task than that which befell the 34year- old commander of this Provisional Ranger Force.’
Yet the Rangers were also called upon to conduct other missions and here the results were more mixed. There was mountain fighting in Tunisia, Sicily and Italy, attacks against fixed defences in northwest Europe after D-Day, and in an echo of the past, patrols and reconnaissance missions similar to those pioneered by the Ranger companies of colonial America. The results of the mountain fighting were generally favourable if occasionally costly. The Rangers were successful in Tunisia, Sicily, at Salerno and around Cassino, although the perils involved in fighting at altitude in winter were reflected in the high casualty suffered by the battalions in the last case. Attacking fixed defences is not usually considered the role of specialist light infantry, yet the Rangers were undoubtedly a valuable asset in capturing Brest during the late summer of 1944.
With regard to patrols, raids and larger operations involving movement through and behind enemy lines, during World War II the Rangers achieved some of their greatest successes – and one of their greatest defeats – in this way. Sened in Tunisia was an early indication of their capabilities and was followed by two highly regarded operations, at Irsch-Zerf in February 1945 and the Cabanatuan raid in January 1945. Both earned the units involved a Presidential Unit Citation, and the latter, which was the subject of a photo essay in Life by renowned war photographer Carl Mydans, brought the 6th Battalion immense fame in the United States. So intense was the media interest, the battalion’s after-action report concluded that, ‘If it lasted one more day, more buttons would have to be sewn on and larger hat sizes secured. The men were walking on air. ‘Yet lrsch-Zerf and Cabanatuan have to be balanced by the disaster at Anzio. Operation Shingle was badly managed for the most part but the effective loss of three battalions outside Cisterna in January 1944 was one of its lowest points and an acute embarrassment to the Allies. Little blame can be attached to the battalions involved and the defeat did not end the Rangers’ contribution to the Allied victory as a further three battalions took their place.
The Rangers chief weakness was that they were essentially light infantry trained for swift and short-lived operations, not prolonged fighting. For the most part the standard battalions were equipped with nothing more powerful than light-medium mortars and machine guns. Such weapons were suitable for fast-moving operations against light opposition that were expected to last only a few hours but proved inadequate against stronger opposition. Action reports also frequently speak of shortages of ammunition a situation that reflected the Rangers’ lack of integral logistical support. Indeed, it was not uncommon for Rangers to seek out other units for such supplies and they constantly had to rely on external mechanized transport. There were attempts to beef up their firepower by adding, for example, the Cannon Company, or seconding units with heavier weapons to them, but the battalions continued to rely on outside support, whether from warships or other independent ground units. During the final stages of the war in Europe, the situation was largely reversed. The Rangers were starved of opportunities to act independently and units were no longer being attached to them, rather it was the Rangers themselves that were being attached. Nevertheless the Rangers had an outstanding combat record and few units of a comparable size matched the range and number of hazardous mission they successfully completed before their temporary demise at the end of the conflict.
