In this painting, the artist has brought together the two main events of 8 August. In the background the English fireships are making their night attack off Calais, while the English and Spanish ships in the foreground are fighting off Gravelines, a battle that lasted from the morning to the evening.
In mid-July the English intended to make a preemptive attack on the Armada in Spanish ports, but southerly winds kept them back. When the Spanish sailed into the Channel on 30 July, most of the English fleet was in Plymouth. The Armada formed its combatants and transports into a wide crescent, with additional groups of ships as tactical reserve. The intention was to fight in line abreast, and the heavy guns were probably concentrated fore and aft rather than in the broadsides. The Spanish knew that they were inferior in gunfire, while the English knew that they must avoid boarding as the Armada had a much superior infantry. Philip had no illusions that his fleet, with a high percentage of slow and unwieldy merchantmen, could bring the nimble English warships to close combat, but he was confident that it could fight off an English attack. If the Armada reached Parma’s army and protected its crossing, it had achieved its purpose.
The English fleet easily gained the windward position. As westerly winds prevailed in the Channel they took a position aft of the Spanish formation, which they attacked from the rear. In the first battle, off Plymouth on 31 July, the English fleet was divided in two parts, commanded by Lord Howard of Effingham and Sir Francis Drake. The ships attacked individually or in small groups, firing their bow guns, broadsides and stern gun s in succession, after which they hauled off to windward for reloading and to give place to the ship next astern. The rate of fire was slow and the effect of gunfire at long distance was limited.
Two Spanish ships were seriously damaged but only by accidents, and both were abandoned to the English – a sign that Medina Sidonia had no intention of fighting a decisive battle. He reformed the fleet into a vanguard and a larger rearguard, both sailing in line abreast and he formed groups of fast warships, which could be sent to any part of the formation. On the morning of 2 August, off Portland Bill, the wind for some hours gave the Armada the weather gauge. Medina Sidonia tried to bring about a close-range battle but the English avoided it. Long-distance gunfire continued until late afternoon but with little effect on both sides.
Next day the English fleet was divided into four squadrons, apparently for better control. On 4 August, the Armada passed the Isle of Wight and a new battle developed. The duke may have let a few ships trail as bait to lure the English into close combat. He may even have tried to use the Solent as a sheltered harbour. If these were his intentions, they both failed. Again, damage was limited, but both sides now lacked ammunition and refrained from further combat.
The Armada anchored off Calais in the evening of 7 August. The English main fleet was strengthened with the squadron which had been guarding the narrow straits. The first phase of the Spanish operation had been successful, but now geography and the complexities of a combined operation conspired to cause disaster. Since 1S74, the Dutch rebels had controlled the deepwater ports on their coasts. They now blockaded the ports in Flanders, preventing Parma’s vessels there from reaching open water. Furthermore, the sea outside these ports was shallow and did not allow the deep-drafted Armada ships to sail close enough to break the blockade.
With no deep-water base for the Armada, Parma’s invasion would have had to be launched immediately, before the Armada’s provisions ran out. But without control of the shallow waters, Parma’s fleet could not even set sail – a problem which ought to have been solved at planning stage. Parma and Medina Sidonia had believed for too long that the other had the solution, while Philip had underestimated the Dutch willingness to fight.
During the night of 7 August, the English sent eight fire-ships to drift into the Armada. The Spanish ships cut their anchor cables and escaped, but the formation lost its cohesion. During 8 August, in the battle off Gravelines, the English fleet attacked aggressively at close range and the effect of their gunnery markedly increased. Medina Sidonia could gradually reform his fleet, but four ships were lost and several damaged. Early on 9 August it looked as if the Armada would be stranded on the sandbanks off Flanders, but it was saved by a shift in the wind. Unbeknown to the Spanish, if Parma’s army had been able to pass the sandbanks, the battle-worn but unbroken Armada might have been able to protect its crossing. The English fleet had spent its ammunition and could not resume fighting for weeks. Without a port, the Armada had no alternative but to return to Spain.
With the prevailing winds and a seemingly superior British fleet at sea it was judged best to sail around the British Isles. The fleet was gradually scattered by gales and a total of 28 ships sank at sea or were wrecked on the Scottish and Irish coasts when seeking shelter to repair and get water. The first ships arrived in Spain on 21 September, but stragglers continued to arrive for about a month. Probably around half of the men who sailed did not return, mainly due to shipwrecks and disease. The victors did not fare much better in fact, as epidemic disease and logistical breakdowns caused the deaths of thousands of seamen, despite minimal losses in action.
Outcome
The Armada campaign did nothing to change the political and strategic situation. Philip’s attempt to win all his wars with one offensive strike failed, and the English still retained control of the Channel and the freedom to make raids on Spanish trade. The rise of England to maritime and naval pre-eminence came later and only after a long period of Dutch maritime supremacy. Philip diverted Parma’s army to the civil war in France. The Dutch gained much territory and time to develop their army and navy, while the French gradually rallied round their new king, Henry IV, against Spanish intervention. Spain did, however, remain the most powerful European state until the mid-17th century.
COMBATANTS
English & Dutch
- English naval forces during 1588: 23 major and 11 minor royal warships and 192 private vessels, of which around 30 may be counted as major combatants; total approximate displacement (calculated): 20,000 tonnes of royal warships and 30,000 tonnes of private ships; around 16,000men, of whom 1,500 were soldiers; Dutch: over 100 coastal warships.
- English commanded by the Admiral of England, Charles Lord Howard of Effingham; Dutch commanded by Just in of Nassau.
- English: small losses in combat, but several thousand died from disease and insufficient provisions; Dutch losses unknown.
Spanish
- Forces in late May 1588: 20 warships (galleons), 47 armed merchantmen, four galleasses (warships with auxiliary oars), four galleys, 21transport sand 31 small vessels; total approximate displacement (calculated): 50,000 tonnes; 8,000 seamen, 2,000 oarsmen and 19,000 soldiers.
- Commanded by Don Alon so Perez deGuzman el Bueno, Duke of Medina Sidonia.
- c. 9,000 soldiers and possibly 5,000 seamen and oarsmen killed, taken prisoner, lost in shipwrecks, missing; at least 35 ships lost, two captured by the English, two by the Dutch.
