Route of Cyrus the Younger, Xenophon and the Ten Thousand.
Without the help of Cyrus, the younger son of Darius II, a Spartan victory over Athens might well have never happened. It was in spring 405 that Cyrus gave to Lysander another great sum of money and his thoughts on how to deal with the resurgent Athenian fleet. While his advice might have struck the imperious Lysander as rather condescending, Cyrus ‘ money, and what he symbolized, was crucial to the Spartan war effort.
After this conference, Cyrus returned home as Darius, sick and feeling the end near, wanted to see his younger son before dying (Xen. Hell . 2.1.15; Anab . 1.1.1 – 2). On Darius ‘ death, sometime in 404, Cyrus ‘ older brother Arsices (or Arses) took the throne as Artaxerxes II and before long palace intrigues and dislikes led to a break between the brothers. Behind this rupture probably was Tissaphernes, satrap of Sardis, whose stature and status in Aegean affairs Cyrus had displaced. Embittered perhaps, he now intrigued against the young prince. Artaxerxes apparently believed Tissaphernes ‘ tales and only the intervention of Parysatis, their mother, secured Cyrus ‘ release from jail and return to his command in the west.
The danger and the disgrace from which Cyrus had escaped were not forgotten. Once beyond his brother’s reach, Cyrus began to take measures to ensure that he would never again be so vulnerable. He cultivated relationships at the court where Parysatis, who favored him, did what she could to help. From his base in Sardis, he took care to look after the native peoples in his provinces, that they should not only regard him favorably but they should also be fit for military action.
Then, sometime early in 402/1, Cyrus began to exploit his network among the Greeks, directing his garrison commanders to recruit more soldiers, especially from that seemingly inexhaustible supply of mercenaries, the Peloponnese. The pretext for this measure was Tissaphernes, whom Cyrus claimed, planned to move against the Ionian cities, formerly his but now under Cyrus ‘ control. Tissaphernes scented the plot and attempted to derail it. At court Parysatis helped veil events in the west, evidently persuading Artaxerxes that a ` private ‘ war had erupted between Cyrus and Tissaphernes, which explained the military build – up going on in the west. For his part, Cyrus sent in the usual tribute further concealing his intentions. Artaxerxes then was doubly deceived and Cyrus ‘ preparations for a war against his brother continued unimpeded.
Cyrus assembled a number of native troops from among his provincial populations, but it was Greeks in whom he trusted. In his two years working with Lysander and the Spartan war effort in Ionia, Cyrus had met many soldiers and formed useful relationships with them. He now began making use of these. His first contact was the Spartan Clearchus who had served extensively in the Bosphorus, fighting the Athenians for control of Byzantium and at Arginusae. After the war Clearchus had persuaded Spartan authorities to send him against the Thracians on a punitive expedition. Recalled home on a change of policy, Clearchus refused orders and went rogue. Exiled, he took up the life of a mercenary soldier (c. 402/1?).
Now a renegade soldier of fortune, Clearchus was just one of many men who had been displaced and/or alienated by wartime service. Cyrus now gave him a huge sum of money, 10,000 darics; Clearchus then recruited an army, hiring 1000 hoplites, 800 Thracian peltasts and 200 Cretan archers (Xen. Anab . 1.2.9). With this force he campaigned against the Thracians north of the Hellespont, earning even more money from grateful local towns, happy to see the ` barbarians ‘ punished and a peace of sorts established (Xen. Anab . 1.1.9).
Cyrus ‘ companionship and purse made him popular with other Greeks too and these he now contacted or assisted as occasion warranted. Aristippus of Thessaly, in a struggle with various rivals at home, asked Cyrus for enough money to recruit 2000 mercenaries for three months: Cyrus gave him money for 4000 for six months, stipulating that he not come to terms with his enemies without Cyrus ‘ approval. Other commanders were asked for assistance in recruiting men for a prospective war against the Pisidians, ostensibly causing trouble in Cyrus ‘ lands. Like the armies recruited by Clearchus and Aristippus, Meno (Thessaly), Proxenus (Boeotia), Sophaenetus (Stymphalia), and Socrates (Achaea) all assembled forces of mercenaries with Cyrus ‘ money. Altogether these commanders found more than 13,000 Greeks looking for employment as well as opportunity and adventure. Some, like Clearchus, were there simply because they liked to fight – who or where not mattering very much, if at all (Xen. Anab . 1.1.10 – 11).
In spring 401 Cyrus was finally ready to move against his brother. The various Greek contingents assembled in Sardis where they made a great display of their military skills, frightening the natives who fled in panic, much to the soldiers ‘ amusement (Xen. Anab . 1.2.18). This bit of soldierly and cynical humor reflects not only conventional notions of how the Greeks viewed non – Greeks, but also how soldiers regard non – soldiers. It is also an attitude that had evolved from the extensive wartime service these men had experienced which shaped their outlook on life in various other ways.
As Cyrus ‘ army moved east, the soldiers gradually became aware that it was the Great King Artaxerxes himself whom they would be fighting. This produced some dissension within the ranks which Cyrus managed to ease with an increased rate of pay as well as the persuasive oratory – and a little intimidation from his leading commander, Clearchus. Armies on the march encounter many problems, some of them resulting from personal clashes of hard men not inclined to forgive easily. On one occasion soldiers of Clearchus got involved in a dispute with others, which Clearchus resolved but not fairly. Next day, men of the injured party belonging to Meno attacked Clearchus as he made his way through camp. Immediately Clearchus sounded the call to battle, and moved into battle formation planning to attack. Another officer, Proxenus, attempted to calm Clearchus but his words had little effect. Cyrus ‘ intervention was helpful, but Xenophon, a witness to the affair, makes clear that what really happened was that Clearchus got a grip on himself and calmed down.
Xenophon’s emphatic portrait of Clearchus as a ‘warlover’ points to the enduring consequences of the battlefield experience (Xen. Anab . 2.6). No different are the actions taken by Clearchus ‘ antagonists in this soldierly brawl. Clearchus, as many others in Cyrus ‘ army, had fought through the recent war and had emerged changed from that experience with violence. Subsequent events make this clear. In September 401 Cyrus finally brought his brother Artaxerxes to battle on the plain of Cunaxa near Babylon. In the fight that followed Cyrus ‘ Greek mercenaries did their job well, defeating the Persians and driving them from the field. But Cyrus had managed to get himself killed as he challenged his brother to single combat. With their employer dead, the Greek army was left surrounded by the enemy, and far from home. Within a short time they were also bereft of their own commanding officers, treacherously seized in a peace parley and viciously killed.
But the army did not dissolve. Its rank and fi le simply elected new officers and over the next nine months, simply fought their way home, reaching the Hellespont in summer 400. In the course of the march the Greeks committed various brutalities, the sort of thing that happens all too often in war. While fighting in the vicinity of the ancient Assyrian capital of Nimrud, they killed a number of Persians whom they then mutilated as a warning to the others (Xen. Anab . 3.4.5). Xenophon notes that this was done without cause. Among the men who did this were more than few who had spent too many years in battle witnessing and inflicting pain. In short they knew all too well the truth of Thucydides ‘ dictum that war was a violent teacher – that what the inexperienced might see as despicable acts of violence could and did become ` normal ‘ . The atrocities around old Nimrud had been anticipated many times in the Great Peloponnesian War
– the horrors of Corcyra, the slaughter of the Athenians in Sicily, the despoiling of the dead in countless battles. Scenes of dramatic horror matched these too, as often depicted in the plays of Euripides with their multiple acts of violence on children and women or, again as but one example, the killing and mutilating of Achilles ‘ son Neoptolemus by his Delphian enemies.
Later, entering the mountains of Kurdistan, the Greeks were forced to fight as they marched. Assaulted on every side and losing men daily, they captured two natives to find another route, one that would take them around the enemy. Under interrogation the first prisoner would only say that there was no other path, at which he was killed. The second prisoner then became talkative and provided the desired information, adding that the first man had not cooperated in order to protect his family (Xen. Anab . 4.1.23 – 5). Both incidents give insight into the conduct of war by the Greeks, again many of whom had learned their trade in the violence of the Peloponnesian War. In 399 the remnants of Cyrus ‘ expeditionary force under the command of Xenophon joined Spartan forces in Ionia. Already the Spartans were conducting military operations against their former Persian allies – another war and old soldiers simply going on to the next fight.
