The foundation of medieval heavy cavalry was the warhorse itself. The horse had to be a warrior in its own right, capable of entering the chaos of battle at a charge without panicking at the sounds and smells of warfare. It needed to be strong enough to carry a fully armoured man into the fray and fierce enough to take an aggressive part in the battle. Such horses were difficult to find and they did not occur naturally, but from a process of selective breeding and training.
During the classical period, Greek and Roman horse breeders specially bred horses for entertainment and warfare. Horse riding was introduced into the Greek Olympic games as early as 648 bce, and Greek friezes indicate the existence of large and lighter breeds characteristic of Eurasian stock. In fact, Alexander’s own horse, Bucephalus, which died in India at the age of thirty, was almost certainly of Bactrian descent. The popular Roman pastime of chariot racing required a special breed from the north African province of Numidia, while Roman cavalry mounts were acquired from as far away as Transoxiana.
But because a variety of horse breeds had reached the Mediterranean basin in the classical period, it should not be thought that the supply of quality horses was assured. Generations of careful breeding for size, speed and controllability could be quickly lost if any stallion that was not specially selected covered a good mare. And if quality mares mated at will, the result could be disastrous. In the late Roman and early medieval periods, the introduction of uncontrolled breeding destroyed hundreds of years of selected genetics, resulting in horses unsuited for mounted warfare.
In the early medieval period, most riding horses were what would now be considered ‘cold-blooded’ mounts, relatively heavy-boned, slow and unresponsive to commands. Mounts of this period were of medium size (between 14 and 15 hands, and 800 and 1,000 pounds), with no particularly distinguishing features. But horse breeding evolved throughout the medieval period, with stables in western Europe interbreeding ‘hot-blooded’ breeds from the east, such as the Arabian, with western mounts. Islam’s expansion across north Africa and into the Iberian peninsula in the seventh and eighth centuries brought the Arabian breed into Moorish Spain. From the eleventh century onwards, Norman contacts with Spanish breeders (both Christian and Muslim) led to an influx of superior warhorses north of the Pyrenees. Even William the Conqueror was known to have ridden at least one excellent Spanish horse at Hastings. Norman contacts with Muslim breeders in Sicily and southern Italy also augmented their selection of warhorses.
After the crusades, larger Anatolian and Iranian ‘Nisaean’ breeds were introduced to western Europe. The result of these systematic breeding policies was a superior mount, the destrier, with the finest destriers including Arabian blood acquired via Andalusian or other Spanish breeds. As a result, destriers were far more expensive than any other mount, costing between 700 and 800 times more than the cheapest horse.
The destrier itself was usually a stallion, and the size of the warhorse increased throughout the high Middle Ages, reaching its largest proportions in the fourteenth century. Although historians and hippologists argue about the dimensions of the typical warhorse, the magnus equus or ‘great horse’ of the late Middle Ages was a sturdy steed of 17 hands (as opposed to the 12 or 13 hands of average horses) and 1,200 to 1,300 pounds, capable of supporting its own barding and a knight in full plate armour. But the added encumbrance took its toll. Horses suffered from increased fatigue and dehydration, and the practice of targeting horses, earlier considered ‘bad war’, was now becoming commonplace on a battlefield where knights were increasingly encased in a metal carapace. Consequently, medieval cavalrymen required more mounts when they went on campaign.
By the middle of the thirteenth century, a single knight was supported by a retinue called collectively the lance garnie, consisting of the knight himself, a mounted squire and two mounted light infantry archers. The squire carried the knight’s armour on a packhorse, and also tended to the knight’s warhorse, which was never ridden unless in battle. With six or more horses attached to every knight, no mounted expedition of any size could rely on finding sufficient forage on the way, forcing the army to carry its own fodder and increasing further the number of horses required.
Military expeditions and battles in medieval western Europe were much smaller than those of the classical period, and the well-organized professional supply system that supported the Roman war machine was absent in the localized and decentralized environment of medieval Europe. Few regions could sustain armies for prolonged periods of time, and with poor communications, troops were dependent for supply on fixed points, usually magazines located in castles or walled cities. Because obligatory feudal service was for short periods during the warmer months, campaigns were rarely long, except for sieges. When on campaign, early medieval armies either lived off the countryside or, because of poor logistical support, they evaporated.
But logistics improved by the high Middle Ages, with the emergence of important political leaders capable of marshalling significant resources for military campaigns. For instance, William of Normandy built 700 ships, including 200 horse transports, for his invasion of England in 1066. During the crusades, Latin armies in the Near East were required to march long distances over barren country, forcing the western Europeans to learn logistical organization or perish. In fact, during the First and Second Crusades, more men died from starvation or lack of fodder for their horses than from any other single cause, including Muslim swords and arrows. King Richard I of England demonstrated a keen grasp of logistics during the Third Crusade by establishing an intermediate supply base on Cyprus, by exploiting the logistical potential of sea power in his march from Acre to Ascalon, and by his refusal to besiege Jerusalem without adequate logistics. Richard’s Levantine campaign, distinguished by his brilliant combined-arms tactics at the battle of Arsuf in 1191, reveals the sophistication of medieval supply and support.
Medieval logistics, like medieval warfare as a whole, suffered from a lack of centralized authority. But medieval warfare did continue to benefit from Roman civilization. Networks of Roman roads and bridges were maintained and expanded, while old Roman walls were incorporated into medieval fortifications. When centralized authority was present, medieval commanders were capable of amazing feats, such as supporting an amphibious assault against England and large expeditionary forces to the Near East and north Africa.
