One of Napoleon’s most senior commanders and his most daring cavalry leader, Murat had a complex association with Napoleon over two decades ending in 1815. He played a key role early in Napoleon’s rise to power by delivering the artillery the young general needed to repress a Parisian mob in 1795. Murat added to his list of political deeds in Napoleon’s favor by intervening at a crucial point during the coup of Brumaire (9-10 November 1799), to ensure Napoleon’s success. Moreover, Murat developed a personal tie to the French commander by marrying his sister, Caroline.
Murat began to build his battlefield reputation when he accompanied Napoleon to Italy and Egypt. Napoleon came to rely on Murat’s cavalry to perform the mounted arm’s traditional function of leading the advance of the army and scouting out enemy forces. Murat became the ideal instrument for Napoleon’s aggressive style of warfare. In the aftermath of battles like Jena (14 October 1806), Murat’s troopers hunted down and decimated the remnants of the defeated army. At the Battle of Eylau (14 February 1807),Murat’s charge with the cavalry reserve of the Grande Armée saved the day for the Emperor. Moreover, Murat’s wild courage on the battlefield stood as a hallmark of Napoleon’s operations.
Following his role in bringing French forces into Spain in early 1808, Murat repressed the ensuing Madrid insurgency and departed for Naples, where he replaced Napoleon’s brother Joseph as monarch. He returned to fight under Napoleon in the Russian campaign of 1812 and the campaign in Germany of the next year, but his role as an independent monarch, combined with the influence of his politically ambitious wife, clouded his relationship with the French emperor. As a result of the failed invasion of Russia, Murat had developed doubts about Napoleon’s eventual fate and moved, from the start of 1813, to establish ties with Austria and Britain, the Emperor’s most adamant opponents. As unsophisticated politically as he was courageous on the battlefield, Murat found it impossible to maneuver effectively in this dangerous international environment. Uncertain where to place his loyalties, he betrayed Napoleon in 1814, then rallied to the restored Emperor in 1815. He ended up losing his throne in Naples and dying at the hands of a Neapolitan firing squad.
Joachim Murat was born on 26 March 1767, at La Bastide in Gascony. The son of an innkeeper who also worked as a land agent for a local aristocratic family, Murat found himself pointed by his family toward the priesthood. He showed no inclination to accept this profession, and just before he turned twenty, while studying at a nearby seminary, he enlisted in the army of Louis XVI and served for two years in the cavalry.
After the outbreak of the Revolution, Murat joined the National Guard, then returned to his old regiment. He rose steadily in rank during the years after he received a commission as a lieutenant in 1792. By the fall of 1795 he was a major in a cavalry regiment stationed in Paris. The opportunity to move toward military eminence came by chance. The Directory, the new executive body governing France, faced a popular challenge to its authority. Its efforts to rig France’s constitution to maintain many of its supporters in the French Convention (or legislature) roused mass opposition, and opponents were gathering in the streets of Paris to confront the new government. The young general, Napoleon Bonaparte, was given the task of opposing the mob, but, with only 5,000 troops at his disposal, he knew he needed masses of artillery to be successful. In the early hours of 5 October he sought a cavalry leader to seize the National Guard artillery depot at Sablons in the suburbs of Paris. Murat took the assignment, and, at 6:00 A. M. that morning returned to Bonaparte with forty field pieces. These were the weapons that Bonaparte employed to disperse the mob with the famous “whiff of grapeshot,” in which an estimated 300 Parisians were killed or wounded.
A grateful Bonaparte permitted Murat to assume a position on his staff when the young general was ordered to command the (French) Army of Italy in the spring of 1796. Now promoted to the rank of colonel with the position of aide-de-camp to Bonaparte, Murat had his first great opportunity to shine on the battlefield. At Dego, on 14 April, Murat led the first of the cavalry charges that made him famous. In numerous encounters, sometimes leading cavalry units, sometimes at the head of infantry, he demonstrated his courage and élan. After the defeat of Piedmont, Murat had the honor of bringing the captured enemy banners and armistice terms to the Directory back in Paris. With the close of the campaign in early 1797, Murat had reached the rank of général de brigade.
Another reward for Murat’s performance in Italy was an invitation to join the inner circle of Bonaparte’s officers who accompanied the ambitious young general to Egypt in the spring of 1798. Here Murat’s exploits featured his battlefield triumph at Aboukir in July 1799. Confronting a Turkish army that had just landed on the Egyptian coast, Murat recognized that the Turks had dangerously weakened the center of their line. He led his cavalry in a charge, crushing one set of Turkish defenses after another. He capped this success with an improbable but amply recorded exploit: the defeat in single combat and then the capture of the commander of the Turkish army. Bonaparte rewarded him with promotion to général de division.
Murat received another sign of Bonaparte’s regard for his talents when the latter included him in the small party that accompanied the French general home in the fall of 1799. The daring young cavalry officer again proved his value to Bonaparte by his service during the coup d’état that elevated Bonaparte to the senior position of the French government- First Consul. Murat had been placed in command of the cavalry forces around Paris, and he accompanied Bonaparte to Saint-Cloud to force approval of the coup from France’s legislators. When Bonaparte seemed to falter in a fatal manner in confronting the Council of Five Hundred, Murat called in soldiers who dispersed the assembled representatives and saved the day for the future emperor.
By now Murat had a growing personal tie to Bonaparte as his relationship with the First Consul’s sister Caroline moved toward a betrothal. The two were married in January 1800. Soon afterward, Murat again displayed his battlefield panache in leading cavalry units across the Alps and into the north Italian plain. On 14 June he took a significant role in the closing moments of the Battle of Marengo, reversing the earlier success of Bonaparte’s adversaries and winning the day for the French.
Murat was designated a marshal on 19 May 1804, in the first list of eminent French soldiers to receive the honor. He also had the distinction of commanding the Paris garrison. But his relationship with Napoleon was frequently stormy. He saw other members of Napoleon’s family receive lavish rewards in the form of territory and titles that exceeded what the newly crowned Emperor gave him. When asked to follow Napoleon’s orders to arrange a rigged trial for the duc d’Enghien, after the young member of the French royal family had been kidnapped from Baden in western Germany, Murat saw the whole affair as a stain on his honor. He at first refused, then consented only under intense pressure from the Emperor.
But Napoleon continued to rely heavily on Murat’s military qualities. In August 1805, in preparation for the campaign against Austria, Napoleon dispatched Murat in disguise to scout the regions of central and southern Germany where the campaign would be fought. Murat’s cavalry then led the way for the Grande Armée as it wheeled eastward from bases on the Rhine to encircle the Austrians under Feldmarschalleutnant Karl Mack Freiherr von Leiberich at Ulm. But Murat’s enthusiastic advance on the south bank of the Danube left General Pierre Dupont’s division dangerously isolated on the other side of the river. It was not the only occasion when Murat displayed more daring than judgment. After the success at Ulm, he raced toward Vienna along the southern bank of the Danube, neglecting to cover the army corps of Marshal Adolphe Mortier on the river’s northern side. As a result, Mortier came close to disaster when a large portion of the Russian army turned on him.
Along with Marshal Jean Lannes, Murat participated in a brilliant ruse after the French entry into Vienna. Pretending that an armistice had been declared, the two French commanders seized control of a vital and heavily defended bridge across the Danube. But Murat found his triumph here clouded by an example of political ineptitude. Following the fall of Vienna, the cavalry commander was ordered to pursue the fleeing Russians northward. When he encountered the enemy, Murat allowed himself to be ensnared in an armistice-and then to be drawn into full-fledged peace negotiations with the enemy. By the time Napoleon expressed his outrage at Murat’s acts in excess of authority, the Russians had made their escape.
Nonetheless, the remaining period of operations against the Third Coalition and successive Napoleonic campaigns gave Murat an opportunity to burnish his reputation as a peerless combat commander. In November and early December 1805 he led the advance guard to Austerlitz. He had an even more spectacular success in the Jena campaign of 1806 against Prussia. Once again, his troopers led the army into enemy territory, but Murat’s great achievement was his devastating pursuit and destruction of the vanquished Prussian forces. His cavalry spread throughout northern Germany, and he tracked down and captured Friedrich Ludwig Fürst zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen (usually abbreviated to Hohenlohe), who commanded the last large remnant of the Prussian army. He then chased down and captured General Gebhard von Blücher, the most energetic leader on the Prussian side and his counterpart as senior cavalry commander.
In the 1807 campaign in Poland, Murat’s battlefield aggressiveness appeared at its best. At the Battle of Eylau on 8 February, he led one of history’s greatest cavalry charges. As the two armies struggled with each other, the center of the French battle line began to crumble. Murat led eighty squadrons of cavalry in a ferocious assault that halted the advancing Russians and saved the day.
In late 1807 Murat was appointed the commander of French forces in Spain. Over the course of the next several months, his troops occupied the major cities of northeastern and central Spain as Napoleon pressured the Spanish royal family to abandon their titles and responsibilities. Although Murat sought the position of King of Spain, the role went to Napoleon’s brother Joseph. News of the French takeover led to a dramatic uprising of the Madrid population. Murat suppressed the insurgency with efficient brutality, but opposition to the French presence nonetheless spread throughout the country. Murat was fortunate that Napoleon named him to become King of Naples to fill the position formerly held by Joseph. Unlike most other senior figures in the French army, the great cavalry commander was thus able to avoid the frustrations and defeats that came during service in Spain from 1808 through 1813.
Murat took up his duties as the King of Naples in July 1808. He had already been honored with territory and a title when Napoleon named him grand duc de Cleves et de Berg in 1806. But the Kingdom of Naples offered a wider stage than had the small dukedom in northwestern Germany. The new king reformed the Neapolitan military system, recaptured the island of Capri from a British-led force, and planned to reconstitute the old Kingdom of the Two Sicilies by seizing the island of Sicily and joining it to his territory in the south of the Italian mainland. Murat soon discovered that, while he saw himself as an independent crowned head, Napoleon viewed him as little more than a regional governor helping to preserve French hegemony in Europe. Thus, Murat could not acquire French troops to aid his Neapolitans in an expedition against Sicily.
The Russian campaign brought Murat back to Napoleon’s side as the leader in a great military undertaking. Once again Murat’s cavalry led the way for the Grande Armée and, at Napoleon’s direction, they set a murderous pace for the units behind them. Moving rapidly through a desolate part of Europe devoid of forage, Murat’s cavalry began to disintegrate, with horses dying from the strain. Other arms of the French force likewise suffered during the advance on Moscow.
When a desperate Napoleon ordered a retreat westward in mid-October, Murat urged Napoleon to take a southerly route back to Smolensk. Napoleon rejected this advice after Russian forces blocked the French at Maloyaroslavets, and, despite Murat’s objections, the French retraced their steps over the barren region through which they had invaded. In early December Murat received an unwelcome promotion to de facto commander of the remainder of the Grande Armée. Napoleon had decided to leave the army at Smorgoni in order to return rapidly to Paris.
The Russian campaign and the accompanying destruction of the Grande Armée convinced Murat that Napoleon’s defeat was almost inescapable. Thus, after leading the surviving French forces from Smorgoni westward, Murat shook off his responsibilities and handed over command to Eugene de Beauharnais, Napoleon’s stepson. Returning to Naples in early 1813, he took the crucial step of opening negotiations with the enemy. Talks with the Austrians and, more indirectly, with the British, continued throughout the year.
Murat’s last military service to Napoleon came in the fall of 1813. Napoleon called on the King of Naples to join him in Germany. The Emperor needed experienced senior leaders for his campaign against the potent enemy coalition (the sixth) led by the Austrians, Prussians, and Russians. Moreover, rumors of Murat’s possible change of sides had circulated widely, and Napoleon preferred to have the courageous but unpredictable cavalry leader under the imperial eye. From Murat’s perspective, Napoleon’s victories at Lützen and Bautzen in the spring of 1813 indicated that the Emperor might survive after all, and Murat clearly felt ambivalent about placing himself alongside the enemies of France.
Murat returned to the ranks of the Grande Armée in August 1813, and he fought for Napoleon with his customary skill and enthusiasm throughout the fall campaign at Dresden, Liebertwolkwitz, Leipzig, and elsewhere. After the decisive French defeat at Leipzig, however, Murat became more determined than ever to break with the French emperor. Napoleon’s prospects seemed less than promising, and the French leader’s determination to go on fighting at all costs threatened disaster for all associated with him. Murat returned to Naples convinced that an agreement with Napoleon’s opponents was essential in order for him to maintain his throne in southern Italy. He also developed a wider ambition. Contacts with proponents of Italian unification, as well as the enthusiasm with which he was greeted by throngs of Italians while on his travels, suggested to Murat that he might become the ruler of a new, unified Italian kingdom.
By February 1814 Murat was formally aligned with Napoleon’s enemies. As Napoleon fought desperately to defend eastern France, his stepson, Eugene, faced an equally severe challenge in holding northern Italy. While Austrian forces pushed against Eugene from the east, Murat led a Neapolitan army of 30,000 men northward to threaten the French commander from the south. Nonetheless, Murat continued to maneuver recklessly in international affairs. Holding his forces back from combat, the cavalryman-turned-Neapolitan monarch contacted Napoleon and thereby brought the wrath of the British government on his head. Napoleon’s abdication helped momentarily to restore Murat’s position in the Allied coalition. But, as the delegates gathered for the Congress of Vienna, Murat’s hold on the throne of Naples was visibly shaky, and his representatives to the Congress were refused a seat at the gathering. Although Austria had been willing to see the Bourbons deposed in Naples in order to win Murat as an ally, the British had never fully accepted such a change.
The final act in the great drama of Murat’s career began with Napoleon’s return from exile in the spring of 1815. Murat led his forces northward against the Austrians, proclaiming his desire to unite all of Italy. He won an initial victory at the Battle of the Panaro River in early April, then suffered an irretrievable reverse at the subsequent Battle of Tolentino at the start of May. Fleeing to France, Murat was rebuffed when he asked Napoleon for a military command. Although Napoleon would have found good use for a leader like Murat during the Waterloo campaign, the Emperor decided against employing his talents.
Following Napoleon’s final defeat, Murat rejected the offer of asylum for himself and his family from the Austrian government. Instead, with a scratch force of 250 men he had raised in Corsica, he hoped to land in southern Italy and regain his throne. A storm scattered his small flotilla, and Murat found himself and a few dozen followers stranded at the small port of Pizzo. Now in the hands of the restored Bourbon rulers of Naples, Murat was quickly condemned by a court-martial. Napoleon’s brother-in-law and most daring battlefield lieutenant was executed by firing squad on 13 October 1815.
References and further reading Atteridge, A. H. 2001. Marshal Murat: King of Naples. Uckfield, UK: Naval and Military. Boycott-Brown, Martin. 2001. The Road to Rivoli: Napoleon’s First Campaign. London: Cassell. Chandler, David G., ed. 1987. Napoleon’s Marshals. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. —.1995. The Campaigns of Napoleon. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Cole, Hubert. 1972. The Betrayers: Joachim and Caroline Murat. New York: Saturday Review. Connelly, Owen. 1987. Blundering to Glory: Napoleon’s Military Campaigns. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources. Delderfield, R. F. 2004. The March of the Twenty-Six. London: Leo Cooper. Esdaile, Charles. 2003. The Peninsular War: A New History. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Goodspeed, D. J. 1965. Napoleon’s Eighty Days. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Gregory, Desmond. 2001. Napoleon’s Italy. Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press. Herold, J. Christopher. 2005. Napoleon in Egypt. London: Leo Cooper. Humble, Richard. 1974. Napoleon’s Peninsular Marshals: A Reassessment. New York: Taplinger. Johnson, David. 1999. Napoleon’s Cavalry and Its Leaders. Charlottesville, VA: Howell. Macdonnell, A. G. 1996. Napoleon and His Marshals. London: Prion. Nafziger, George F., and Marco Gioannini. 2002. The Defense of the Napoleonic King of Northern Italy, 1813-1814. Westport, CT: Praeger. Riehn, Richard K. 1990. 1812: Napoleon’s Russian Campaign. New York: McGraw-Hill. Smith, Digby. 2003. Charge! Great Cavalry Charges of the Napoleonic Wars. London: Greenhill. Weigley, Russell F. 1991. The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
