Dancing with Bears-The Berlin Airlift – Set during the Berlin airlift this scene captures the harassment of the Soviet planes as Allied cargo comes in on a constant schedule. By Brian Bateman
The Berlin blockade and subsequent airlift was the first serious confrontation between the Western allies and the Soviet Union during the COLD WAR.
In 1948, the Soviet Union attempted to limit the ability of U. S., British, and French occupation forces to travel to their respective sectors in the German capital of Berlin, which was within Soviet-occupied East Germany. The Soviets blockaded the city by land, thus forcing the Western powers to enter by air.
Seeds for the crisis had been planted during the famous Crimea Conference (Yalta) in February 1945. With World War II nearing its conclusion, the Allied leaders- specifically, American president Franklin Roosevelt, British prime minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet premier Joseph Stalin-began making preparations for the future of Germany. Among the arrangements made between the “Big Three” was that Berlin would be divided into occupational zones. However, there was no stipulation concerning access to those zones. Making matters worse, the long-strained relationship between the Soviet Union and the West began deteriorating rapidly after the war.
In July 1945, the Potsdam Conference, between new American president Harry Truman, Churchill, and Stalin, was held. During the conference, it was decided that Germany would be administered as a single economic entity under an Allied Control Council. The council would be headed by U. S. Army general Lucius Clay, West Germany’s new military governor and the commander of American occupation forces in that country.
In March 1946, less than a year after the close of hostilities, Churchill traveled to Fulton, Missouri, where he made his famous “IRON CURTAIN” speech. In it he asserted that a dangerous communist line had been drawn across the middle of Europe: “From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the [European] Continent.” The prime minister’s statements were considered provocative by the Soviets, and many historians have since argued that his speech officially launched the cold war. That same year, Stalin issued his own terse warning, proclaiming that World War II had been unavoidable, an inevitable consequence of “capitalist imperialism”-implying that such a war might recur.
Beyond the rhetoric, a developing trend among U. S. foreign policy makers to contain communist expansion throughout the world was perceived by the Soviets as overtly hostile. The Soviets also became unnerved by the rebuilding of Germany under the Marshall Plan, as well as by a growing desire on the part of the Western powers to establishing a separate capital in West Germany.
In late 1947, discussions between the Soviets and the West completely broke down over charges that the Western powers were violating a number of the Potsdam agreements. The following year, a Soviet-sponsored coup d’état in Czechoslovakia brought that country under communist domination. Almost immediately, Clay cabled the following message to the Army intelligence chief, Lt. Gen. Stephen J. Chamberlin: “For many months, based on logical analysis, I have felt and held that war was unlikely for at least ten years. Within the last few weeks, I have felt a subtle change in Soviet attitude which I cannot define but which now gives me a feeling that it may come with dramatic suddenness. I cannot support this change in my own thinking with any data or outward evidence in relationships other than to describe it as a feeling of a new tenseness in every Soviet individual with whom we have official relations. I am unable to submit any official report in the absence of supporting data but my feeling is real. You may advise the Chief of Staff of this for whatever it may be worth if you feel it advisable.” The CIA was immediately directed to analyze the developing situation in Europe and report to the president.
On March 16, the Agency delivered to President Truman a NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE (NIE) stating that war with the Soviets “was not probable within the next sixty days.” By the end of the month, the CIA’s estimate was even less reassuring. While Clay’s cable and the CIA estimate were under consideration, the occupying forces of the United States, Great Britain, and France began to consolidate their respective zones in West Germany. This was the first step toward the reestablishment of a single, independent German state. As part of that process, and to promote economic recovery, the Western powers also attempted to reform the existing monetary system with a new West German currency. The proposed currency, over which the Soviets would have no control, would be legal tender in the western sectors of Berlin. The city of Berlin, divided between East and West, was located approximately 100 miles inside East Germany. Berlin was essentially an island, surrounded by Russian soldiers.
The idea of a unified Germany alarmed the Soviets. Unification meant strength. After all, the USSR had been invaded by the Germans, twice.
On March 20, the Soviets withdrew from the Allied Control Council. On March 31, they declared that Western military passenger trains bound for Berlin would not be allowed to enter the city unless all passengers submitted to physical searches.
The Soviets also established their own new currency in East Berlin, as a response to the West’s monetary reforms; the Soviet currency was released just 24 hours before the new West German mark was to begin circulation. Less than three months later, on June 24, the Soviets closed the doors on West Berlin, cutting off all highway and rail routes into the western zones.
The blockade effectively placed West Berlin’s 2.5 million civilians at the mercy of the Soviets, unless the Western powers could circumvent the blockade. Reeling from the aftermath of a world war, the Berliners were totally dependent on reserve stores of food and medicine and airlifted supplies. Clay later wrote, “It was one of the most ruthless efforts in modern times to use mass starvation for political coercion.”
Several options to counter the blockade were considered. One of the more provocative ideas was proposed by FRANK GARDINER WISNER, a former operative with the OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (the wartime precursor to the CIA), who had become chief of the CIA’s OFFICE OF POLICY COORDINATION (OPC).
Wisner, along with several top-ranking U. S. Army officers, believed that Berlin could be taken by force. After all, the Soviets had yet to develop the atomic bomb. The idea was to send in a self-contained task force, complete with engineers, artillery, armor, and a small force of infantry. The force would jump off from one of the Western-occupied zones and fight its way toward the capital city.
The proposal was shelved in favor of something less confrontational-the Berlin airlift. Under the command of the U. S. Air Force’s brash, cigar-chewing General Curtis LeMay, C-54 transport planes began supplying Berlin on July 1. Code-named Operation VITTLES (unofficially, “LeMay’s Feed and Coal Company”), Western pilots flew nearly 300,000 transport sorties into West Berlin, delivering an average of 5,000 tons of life necessities every day, for the next 321 days. The effort, which gained wide public support around the world, was an enormous success.
On May 12, 1949, the Soviets conceded and reopened the land routes. That same month, East and West Germany were established as separate republics.
