Illustration showing military units and troop movements during operations in the Eastern sector of the war.
Shakargarh
1 Corps was responsible for offensive defence in the area around the Shakargarh Bulge. For this the Corps had 36, 39 and 54 Infantry Divisions, 2 (I) and 16 (I) Armoured Brigades with supporting arms and services. 39 Division took limited part in the operations. Of its three infantry brigades, 33 Brigade went to Poonch, 323 Brigade was deployed for defence in the Ramgarh Sector west of Degh Nadi, and 87 Brigade occupied the firm base initially, later used inside the Bulge. HQ 39 Division was used in the initial stages with 72 Brigade of 36 Division under command. The armoured brigades also functioned less a regiment each. A regiment of 16 (I) went to the Ramgarh Sector for defence and a regiment of 2 (I) was placed under HQ 36 Division initially. 1 Corps had three other sqns. The only formation which was employed unbroken was 54 Infantry Division. Reinforced 26 Division guarded the Jammu Sector and secured the area of Chicken’s Neck between the Chenab and Tawi Rivers, employing an infantry brigade and one armoured regiment for 24 hours. Far too much force remained unutilised, in the sector.
Thus 1 Corps launched an offensive with about two divisions, five armoured regiments plus three sqns to give depth to the sensitive Samba – Hiranagar Sector along with a thrust from the SE. Though the progress was slow and penetration limited, the Corps achieved the overall aim of providing greater security to the vital lines of communication to J&K. For the offensive they received about 16 sorties a day. Sukhoi 7s and Hunters provided close support with MiGs providing escorts.
The Corps reached a line short of Zafarwal – Shakargarh and its thrust brought in Pak reserves both from Chhamb and from the southern reserve. With the presence of Pak 6 Armoured Division and 8 (I) Armoured brigade in the sector, 1 Corps could not have gone too deep and should have anticipated reactions by Pak armour. Yet the Corps lost the initiative when Pak 13 Lancers and 31 Cav of 8 (I) Armoured Brigade reacted against them on 16 December.
Armour of different units was inducted into the bridgehead across Basanter Nala in driblets throughout the day12. Instead of concentrating a complete armoured brigade to destroy two regiments of Pak armour in an armour battle supported by Air, they merely helped defend the bridge head by inducting mixed troops of sqns and half sqns. Another opportunity to inflict a decisive defeat was wasted due to lack of vision and amateur handling of armour.
Punjab
In the riverine sector of Punjab a number of enclaves were exchanged but the more serious were two intrusions, one at Husainiwala, and the other at Fazilka. A Pak brigade with an armoured sqn was used for each of these on the first night of the War. At Husainiwala 15 PUNJAB was well deployed and fully equipped but not battle ready when surprised on the first night of the War. At places they fought well but the Battalion was withdrawn by the 4th.
48 Brigade of 7 Division captured Pakistani Sehjra Bulge from the north. With the capture of this Bulge 7 Division reduced threat to Harike but failed to even attempt to recapture Husainiwala. 7 Division had 48 Brigade in Sehjra, 29 Brigade was reserve at Patti. 29 Brigade with an armoured regiment should have been employed to recapture Husainiwala from the north. Area south of Husainiwala was occupied by a brigade of 14 Division. Failure to even plan to recapture lost areas is a cause for concern, showing weakness in Generalship at Division and Corps levels.
South of Ferozepur the Army Commander had deployed 163 Infantry Brigade and 51 Para Brigade brought down from the Tibet border. In addition 1 Armoured Division and 14 Infantry Division less one brigade were located to counter possible offensive by Pak 2 Corps at Multan. In addition 50 Para Brigade less one battalion was flown in from the East on 11 December. Armour regiments were also shifted from the east.
At Fazilka a battalion panicked and withdrew from the forward positions when tanks appeared behind them. The Corps commander (Lt Gen NC Rawley) recommended withdrawal from the forward positions but the proposal was countermanded by Gen Candeth who ordered the positions retaken, as stated in his book.
The counter attacks launched by 67 Brigade were poorly coordinated and hastily launched. Once again the Infantry found itself alone. A sqn of 18 Cav was unable to move forward for its task13. The result was failure of the counter attacks by 4 JAT despite bold and resolute leadership of Lt Col RK Suri, resulting in heavy and avoidable casualties14. Lt Gen NC Rawley, who had lost Walong in 1962, now watched from his tactical HQ.
11 Corps had one armoured brigade. Of this 71 Armd Regt was used for the capture of Dera Baba Nanak enclave under 96 Brigade. A troop of 66 Armd Regt was used to support another infantry attack; but the bulk of the armoured brigade remained unused. No armour was used even to support 48 Infantry Brigade for the capture of Sehjra. In Fazilka when a Sqn of 18 Cav failed to move, 11 Corps failed to utilise its armour to remove the incursion at Fazilka. Generalship and command of armour was weak.
12 Div was poised to launch an offensive in the northern sector of the Division sector. On 03 December Pakistan’s 18 Division launched a bold thrust by an armoured regiment and an infantry battalion to Laungewala towards Jaisalmer. The thrust lacked air and ground support and therefore could neither go too deep nor sustain for long. The company defended locality at Laungewala commanded by Maj Chandpuri remained firm as resources were brought in to destroy the attackers. The Pak action scuttled the 12 Div offensive further north and forced the division to defeat this pre-emptive action. A hastily raised 122 Sqn of the IAF at Jaisalmer which had only six Hunters, destroyed the Pakistani tanks and vehicles in the open desert15.
12 Division took time to recover but followed up and made some gains inside Pak territory but failed to take advantage of the Pak weakness in the area, despite adequacy of air support. Wg Cdr Bawa, the Base Cdr at Jaisalmer sent a message to the TAC commander at Jodhpur “Not being utilised fully. Request more utilisation”16.
Further south 11 Division and 10 PARA (SF) exploited enemy weakness in the sector to capture large areas. An airbase was established at Uttarlai. 10 Sqn of Maruts, some Gnats, and MiGs operated from this base carrying out successful raids in the South.
Karachi
On the morning of 04 December four hunters from Jamnagar led by Wg Cdr Don Conquest attacked some oil tanks at Karachi. That night patrol boats of the Navy also attacked Karachi Harbour. Karachi airbase and harbour were hit repeatedly by both the Navy and the Air Force with no coordination between them.
Air Commodore (later ACM) Dilbagh commanded Pune airbase. He had 35 Sqn of Canberras which also attacked Karachi airfield. The Sqn Cdr was Wg Cdr KK Badhwar. On one of his strikes on 09 December, he saw and struck oil reservoirs, near the harbour. ACM Dilbagh passed on the information to Central Air Command with a request to pass it to the Air HQ to claim the destruction of the oil installations17. ACM Dilbagh was not aware the oil tanks had already been hit earlier. Both air raids are mentioned in PC Lal’s book.
No one seemed to know who else was hitting Karachi. It was free for all. Even the AF station cdrs did not know who else was hitting Karachi or other targets. What a way to fight a war!!
44 Sqn of AN 12s was moved from Chandigarh to Bareilly. Before the War the IAF had devised ways to use these transport aircraft for night bombing of targets. During the War the Sqn conducted raids in the East and in the West. Their raids on the Changa Manga forest west of Ferozepur and at Kahuta north of Poonch were conducted with six aircraft dropping thousands of tons of bombs on area targets18.
The Air Situation In The West
As in 1965 a large amount of fighter effort was used for airfield protection in 1971. Since the air defence over the remaining Indian air space was not favourable, formations such as 1 Corps asked for CAPs. Unlike 1965, the PAF avoided combat with the IAF after the first few days. Whether this was merely to conserve their resources for a long drawn out war promised by Gen Yahya Khan, or sheer incompetence of senior PAF officers, is difficult to say. The attrition suffered by the PAF was not such as to force them off the skies.
Plenty of air effort was used to hit the railway systems from Karachi to the North. Attacks were also executed on oil and gas plants19. The IAF claimed destroying a large number of tanks and other military equipment loaded on trains. Since damage assessment was purely on reports filed by the pilots a more reliable system of damage assessment is necessary to get the actual picture. It is also necessary to evaluate whether all the effort to cripple the Pakistani railways was really necessary or could it have been done just as effectively with a few attacks on carefully selected targets. Joint planning would help utilise the air optimally conserving resources for other important targets.
The Airforce also needs to know that destruction of military equipment at random in depth areas is useful but makes little difference to the course of the War. Destruction of say six enemy tanks in contact with own forces is far more important than destruction of 40 tanks in the battle zone. Thus intimate close support desired by the Army formations is far more important in time and space than search and destroy missions in depth areas that all Air Forces love to execute, at times hitting the same targets and claiming plenty of kills. The Army needs close support.
Assessment
There can be no doubt that the Army, Navy and the Air Force served the Nation extremely well. Outstanding bravery and dedication was displayed by the officers and men of the Indian Armed Forces for which the senior leadership deserved full credit.
Credit is also due to those who prepared the forces for war in the preceding years. However, the neglect of 15 years since 1947 could not be overcome in just a few years after 1965. Therefore there were still many shortcomings, unfortunately swept under the carpet for the sheen of victory. The most serious weakness lay in failure to introspect at the triservice level to learn lessons for the future. Even now the history of the 1971 War is based on individual accounts and perceptions.
The purpose of this study is not to list all the lessons learned during the 1971 Conflict. It is to analyse the performance of senior leadership during the War to identify strong points, and areas which need attention. These are listed in succeeding paras.
The Indian strategic planning and utilisation of resources was brilliant for which General Sam Manekshaw, other Chiefs and their staffs need the highest admiration. Credit is also due to the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister who played their parts magnificently.
Below them, from the Command down to Division level the Generalship was run-of-the-mill barring a few exceptions. Debilitating damage inflicted by Krishna Menon, Gen Kaul and the coterie could not be repaired in a just few years after 1962. Soldiers and civilians must understand it takes years to produce bold, professional military leaders and to build a highly responsive, truly professional military machine.
Divisions executed tasks which had been preplanned and approved by higher authorities but hardly any General could handle unforeseen situations by himself.
Plenty of resources remained unused in almost every sector. While the shifting of AF sqns from the east to the west was a wise move, the need to shift the Para Bde and armoured regiments remains unexplained. These forces could still be employed gainfully in the east. In the West there was neither a crisis, nor were all available resources already utilised. As a result, despite shifting, powerful resources remained unutilised during the War.
A major weakness was the inability to handle adversity, whether it was at Chhamb, Husainiwala, or Fazilka. No lesson was learned even after 1965, due to lack of moral courage to analyse operations objectively. At Laungewala the outcome was favourable due to effective close air support and the Pakistani’s unsound planning.
Handling of armour was uniformly weak barring a couple of regiments. This is a serious lacuna even today which can be eradicated only with better practical training of armour senior officers. If the cost of training is considered prohibitive or the wear and tear of equipment unacceptable, it is time to downsize the Army to have just a few smart well trained formations led by competent leaders. We need to learn lessons from the Germans or from the Israeli Defence Forces.
The Air could not be optimally employed in 1971 on account of lack of joint training and planning, as admitted by both Air and Army commanders. This continues to be a serious lacuna which costs the nation high. There is a need for the Services to learn to operate together by better tri-service training and education. If problems of attitude come in the way, the Army must find its own solutions to give its soldiers better chance of survival on the modern battlefield.
While we must be proud of the achievement of the Indian Armed Forces we must also acknowledge with humility that a major reason that contributed to our glorious victory was the incompetence of the Pakistani Generals. One Pakistani General admitted “cowardice, criminal folly, moral turpitude, and unprofessional ambitions should and must be dealt with severely, but how many of us can cast the first stone? How many of us were true professionals?20” Indian Generals must introspect and learn lessons.
End Notes
1. ACM PC Lal, My Years with the IAF, (Lancer, New Delhi), P 216.
2. Maj Gen DK Palit, The Lightning Campaign The Indo Pak War 1971, (Lancer Publishers), pp 106 – 109.
3. Maj Gen Lachhman Singh, Victory in Bangladesh, (Natraj Publishers Dehradun)
4. Palit, op cit, pp 128 -129.
5. ‘I’ battalions were light infantry battalions raised in 1970 to fight insurgency. After the war they were converted to regular infantry battalions. Battalions under Kilo Force were 31 JAT and 32 MAHAR, now 12 JAT and 15 MAHAR, and an East Bengal Regt bn. Brig Anand Sarup was Comdt Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School.
6. Palit, op cit, p 149.
7. Lal, op cit, pp 214 – 215.
8. ibid, p 223
9. ibid, p 230
10. ibid, 230
11. Lt Gen Harold G Moore and Joseph L Galloway, We were Soldiers Once … and Young, (Ballantine Books, New York), pp 161
12. Lt Gen KP Candeth, The Western Front, (The English Book Depot, Dehradun), pp 108 -112.
13. ibid, p 147.
14. Ibid, p 152
15. Lal, op cit, pp 280 – 282
16. ibid, p 284.
17. ACM Dilbagh Singh, On the Wings of Destiny, Centre For Air Power Studies, (KW Publishers Pvt Ltd, New Delhi), pp 138 – 139.
18. Lal, op cit, pp 300 – 302.
19. ibid, pp 182 – 183.
20. Gen KV Krishna Rao, Prepare or Perish, (Lancer Publishers Pvt Ltd, New Delhi), p 427
References
1. Maj Gen Shaukat Riza, The Pakistan Army 1966-71, (Natraj Publishers Dehradun)
2. Maj Gen Fazal Muqeem Khan, Pakistan’s Leadership in Crisis, (Alpha and Alpha Publishers, New Delhi)
