Indian T-55 tanks on their way to Dhaka.
Location of IAF, PAF and BAF units on December 1971 in and around Bangladesh. Some unit locations are not shown. Map not to exact scale.
Pakistan’s PNS Ghazi sank off the fairway buoy of Visakhapatnam near the eastern coast of India, making it the first submarine casualty in the waters around the Indian subcontinent.
By Lt Gen K K Khanna, PVSM, AVSM**(Retd)
Introduction
The Indo Pak War of 1971 was the first war conducted totally by Indian Commissioned officers led by General (later Field Marshal) SHFJ Manekshaw. Most senior officers had some experience of war. Lessons had been learned from the 1965 Conflict. Therefore the Indian Army and the Air force of 1971 were far better prepared for war. For the Indian Navy it was their first major action.
Rapport between the Government and the Chiefs was better. The civil servants in the MOD played no major role due to the Chiefs interacting directly with the political leaders. A treaty signed with the USSR safeguarded Indian interests abroad.
On the other hand the Pakistani forces led by their conceited and politicised Generals had the unenviable task of crushing the insurrection in the Eastern Wing that too with their Bengali colleagues suspected of treachery. Their hope of success hinged on moral and material support from USA, China, some Islamic countries and their own baseless notions of martial superiority.
India was forced to go to war to return a million plus refugees from East Pakistan, and to support the population in their just fight against genocide unleashed by West Pakistan, supported by the US whose mock concern for human rights developed many years later.
War clouds were thick over the subcontinent by the time PAF attacked Indian airfields at 5.45 PM on 03 December 71. Ground battles commenced in nearly every sector, almost immediately. IAF Canberras struck Pakistani airfields the same night.
Operations in East Pakistan
Indian operations in the East were conducted by Eastern Command under Lt Gen JS Aurora. Maj Gen JFR Jacob was the Chief of Staff.
The IAF deployed 10 combat sqns in the East. There were three sqns each of MiG 21s and Gnats, two sqns of Hunters, one of Sukhoi 7s, one sqn of Canberras, and units of helicopters and transport aircraft. Since PAF had a solitary F 86 Sabre Sqn at Dacca, this was neutralised in the first 48 hours after which the Eastern skies were completely controlled by the IAF.
The IAF made full use of Kalaikunda, Dum Dum, Panagarh, Bagdogra, Hasimara, Tezpur, Gauhati, Kumbhigram, and Agartala airfields. Sqns were redeployed as the Army formations advanced. Gnats were moved forward to Agartala and some Hunters were deployed at Jessore in East Pakistan.
With tactical air centres at Corps level and air control teams provided to formations the latter could demand and utilise close air support, however since the land and air forces had not trained together the full potential of the air could not be not utilised1.
2 Corps in The South Western Sector
2 Corps was employed south and west of the River Padma. Pakistani 9 Division occupied two strong fortresses of Jhenida and Jessore. Indian 2 Corps had 4 and 9 Infantry Divisions, 45 Cav, and a sqn of 63 Cav. HQ Bengal Area operated on its south on the Satkhira Axis. Lt Gen TN Raina was the GOC.
The divisions bypassed Pakistani strong points to advance straight to the fortresses in depth. Both fortresses fell by 07 December. 4 Division then captured Magura and a bridge over the Madhumati River but did not advance further, though there were no Pakistani troops between them and Dacca. Only the Pakistani Division HQ fell back to Faridpur on the Padma River. 2 Corps was allotted 50 Para Brigade less one battalion. It was an ideal situation to exploit, though it would have involved crossing the Padma River, but Army HQ had emphasised the importance of Hardinge Bridge across the Padma R in the North and Khulna Port in the south. So, 4 and 9 Divisions swung north and south respectively. At the same time the IAF destroyed a couple of spans of the Hardinge Bridge, which highlights the need for joint planning. 2 Corps occupied area west of the Madhumati R2.
The Para Brigade less a battalion was employed in a purely ground role. On 11 December, the Brigade less 2 PARA was moved by the Army HQ to the Western Front and therefore played no major part in the war.
20 Mountain Division In The North West
Pakistan had 16 Division in the north western sector with three brigades, one armd regiment, two artillery regiments, and one mortar battery. After fall of Jhenida in the south, 57 Pak Brigade also sidestepped into the sector.
20 Division plus 340 (I) Infantry Brigade advanced into the sector from the west. One brigade advanced from the north. HQ Eastern Command had laid down tasks for each brigade with detailed timings.
Initial attacks on Hilli made little progress despite very heavy casualties. The GOC decided to strike deep, bypassing Hilli. Brig Bakshi Joginder Singh, Commander 340 Infantry Brigade volunteered to advance along with an armoured regiment. The bold advance to Pirganj cut the Pak div sector into two on 07 December, with the Pak GOC caught in the northern portion. 340 Brigade advanced south to contact Bogra by 13 December. Meanwhile Pak 57 Brigade from Jhenida sidestepped into this Sector.
The Command HQ ordered 340 Infantry Brigade to advance to Dacca but also ordered dispatch of 63 Cav to the Western Front on the 12th. Destruction of ferries by Engineers hampered further advance3.
The reason to move 63 Cav from the East to the Western Front on 12 December is not clear. An inimical carrier task force of the US Seventh Fleet sailed into the Bay of Bengal yet the Army HQ moved precious resources from the east to the west.
101 Area
93 Pak Brigade with two infantry battalions supported by a light battery were deployed in the Central Sector of East Pakistan. Pak paramilitary forces were grouped under a battalion called 57 Baluch for deception. There were fewer water obstacles in this sector and a guerilla force under ‘Tiger Siddiqui’ operated in the Madhupur Jungles.
Yet the force that was deployed in this Sector was only a brigade (95) under 101 Area. Later another brigade (167) was inducted, on withdrawal from the North on 08 December. Mukti Bahini under FJ Sector, one additional infantry battalion and BSF also operated in the area.
Despite limited resistance the advance by the two brigades was cautious and sluggish. Two strong points of Jamalpur and Mymensingh, south of a tributary of the Brahmaputra, held up the advance. No help seems to have been taken of the Mukti Bahini or ‘Tiger Siddiqui’. While others were bypassing strong points, the brigade wasted time in dramatised correspondence, asking the strong points to surrender and waiting for replies. It was only after a few days that the leading battalion crossed the river upstream and went around Jamalpur. 2 PARA was dropped on the 11th but was too late to prevent withdrawal of the Pak troops to Dacca. 95 Brigade finally moved to link up with 2 PARA at 5 PM on 12 December. Had the two brigades tried to outflank the strong points sooner, as most other formations did, the advance to Dacca would have been much faster4.
By this time 4 Corps had already been across the Meghna River for three days. It was now advancing to Dacca. GOC 101 Area now decided to pick up speed to beat 4 Corps to it. Undue haste resulted in unnecessary casualties.
With the availability of Mukti Bahini, the ‘Tiger Siddiqui’ freedom fighters, and tremendous air support available, the advance of 101 Area should have been faster.
4 Corps In The East
4 Corps was the biggest Corps in the East and was led by a dynamic General. Gen Sagat Singh’s main punch was 57 and 23 Divisions. 8 Div under Maj Gen KV Krishna Rao advanced with two brigades to capture Sylhet assisted by Echo Sector of Mukti Bahini. D Sector of Mukti Bahini operated in the remaining Corps Zone. Kilo Force was created under Brig Anand Sarup, Commandant CIJW School, just before the War. It had two ‘I’ battalions and an EBR battalion5.
On commencement of operations 59 Brigade under Brig CA Quinn, advanced and captured Sylhet. This involved helilift of one infantry battalion across a water obstacle.
81 Brigade of 8 Division was then placed under 57 Division on 13 December. 57 Division, which had been deployed in Mizo Hills, advanced from Agartala to Dacca. Initially the Division advanced westwards to the Meghna River, but instead of crossing it at Ashuganj – Bhairab Bazar, in a brilliant move GOC 4 Corps helilanded troops to the south west at Rajpura on 09 December and later even further at Narsinghdi. Remaining troops crossed in river craft. One bn was left to contain a Pak brigade at Bhairab Bazar. Though a sqn of PT 76 tanks was available under a high profile officer (Major Shamsher Mehta), its contribution was negligible during the war. Without waiting for tanks, 57 Division continued advance from Narasinghdi to Dacca.
Further south in the sector Pak 39 Division (newly raised) held strong points at Comilla, Mynamati, Lalmai Hills, and Laksham. 23 Indian Division under Maj Gen RD Hira bypassed forward positions and advanced deep to capture Daudkandi and Chandpur Ports on the Meghna R. GOC of Pak 39 Division escaped on a gunboat on 09 December when Chandpur was captured. He was injured in an air attack on the boat, but escaped to Burma. 14 JAT under Lt Col LN Sabherwal of 23 Division was moved by steamer to Baidya Bazar for move to Dacca. Pak forward positions collapsed or surrendered thereafter.
South of 23 Division, Kilo Force advanced to Chittagong. They entered Chittagong on 17 December to accept the surrender. Further south a battalion was landed by sea at Cox’s Bazar6.
4 Corps in the East had the disadvantage of minimum airbases to support them. Hence they received support from Gauhati, and perhaps from Hasimara. Later additional forces were moved to Kumbhigram and Gnats to Agartala, despite the length of runway being limited.
ACM PC Lal writes that Gen Sagat Singh could make better use of Air resources since he had been a paratrooper hence had lived and worked in close proximity of the Air Force. The ACM should realise that synergy must be institutionalised and not personalised7.
In fact Gen Sagat had become a paratrooper only as a Brigadier. Other than that one tenure as the Para Brigade Commander, nowhere had he lived in close proximity of the AF. His exposure to the AF was like that of any other General. As GOC 101 Area he made use of MI 4 heptrs in Mizo Hills to visit posts and to conduct special heliborne operations. He made better use of the heptrs during the War on account of his own vision and professional acumen. Even he had problems with the Eastern Air Command, brought out in his biography recently published. It was only after the placement of a dynamic Gp Capt Chandan Singh that the heptr support improved.
HQ Eastern Command
On approval of plans by HQ Eastern Command, tasks on D Day basis had been issued. The Army Commander had issued orders to capture strong points such as Hilli, Laksham, and Lalmai Hills. In addition, the Army HQ had emphasised the importance of objectives such as Khulna, Hardinge Bridge, Chandpur, and Daudkandi.
Such detailed orders curbed initiatives of field commanders. Bold commanders such as Gen Sagat Singh, ‘Rocky’ Hira modified and even disregarded some orders on their own, achieving outstanding successes with fewer casualties. The others missed opportunities due to excessive control by higher HQ and suffered avoidable casualties.
Eastern Command had a strong reserve of a Para Brigade which should have been used as a strategic reserve. It was allotted to 2 Corps, who used it merely as an additional infantry brigade. By 09 December, 4 Corps had crossed the Meghna R and captured Chandpur Port on the same river. The Para Brigade could have been utilised to assist 4 Corps advance to Dacca. The Army Commander asked 340 Infantry Brigade to move to Dacca from the northwest. That too when the Brigade was around Bogra and 63 Cavalry was moved out of the Command to the Western Front. At no stage was 2 Corps asked to exploit its success beyond the Madhumati River. 2 PARA was launched too late for optimum effect on the ops. A strategic force like the Para Brigade remained under-utilised first by Eastern Command and then by Western Command after 11 December.
Signal Intelligence (SI) played a vital role. On the 9th the SI intercepted a message about Pak GOC 39 Division escaping in a gunboat. The GOC was injured when Gnats fired on the gunboat. On the 14th when the SI intercepted a transmission about a high level meeting at the Government House, the message was passed to the IAF who organised a MiG 21 strike on the Government House at the exact time. The Governor of East Pakistan resigned and moved to the Intercontinental Hotel which was neutral zone. The SI also intercepted a transmission indicating plans of Pakistani Generals to escape to Burma. Gen Sam Manekshaw transmitted a message to the Pakistani Generals indicating intention to intercept them if they tried to escape. The Navy had effectively blockaded East Pakistan. The psy war broke the Pakistanis’ will to fight and avoided further bloodshed in the East.
Operations On The Western Front
Pakistani strategists believed that the security of their Eastern wing lay in the West. Hence strong forces were built up for a decisive victory in the West.
Mrs Gandhi, the PM ordered strategic defence on the Western Front. The overall strategy was sound; but formulated and disseminated only on 30 November 71.
By 1971 the IAF was well equipped and the pilots well trained. The strike aircraft of the IAF were MiG 21s, Su-7s, Hunters, Gnats, Mysteres, Maruts, and Canberras. They still had some Harvards and Vampires which were used in the hills.
In the West the IAF had about two dozen sqns of fighters and bombers against about 21 with the PAF. Most of these were deployed in Punjab and Haryana with only about five weak sqns further south. Pathankot had five sqns, with three each at Adampur and Halwara. One sqn and the TACDE were located at Amritsar. Besides these there were sqns at Ambala, Hindon, Sirsa, and Agra. AN 12s of 44 Sqn were moved from Chandigarh to Bareilly from where formations of AN 12s were used to bomb targets both in the East and in the West.
Pakistan had F 104 Starfighters, F 86 Sabres, MiG 15s, 17s, and 19s from China and Mirage IIIs. In addition they were provided aircraft by their allies, of which four F 104s were shot down by the IAF8.
Northern Sector
Despite difficult terrain and the weather in December, infantry commanders captured important heights in Partapur, Kargil, and Tangdhar Sectors. Heights captured north of Kargil provided greater security to the National Highway to Leh.
An important offensive was launched by 9 SIKH (Lt Col Chengappa) across Tutmari Gali to capture Kaiyan Bowl overlooking Lipa. This removed Pakistan’s presence on the Shamshabari Range. However in the area captured, one pocket was left uncleared. One battalion suffered heavy casualties in an attempt to secure the area after ceasefire. The GOC was blamed for incorrect reporting.
161 Brigade’s attacks to secure features on the Pir Panjal Range failed due to irresolute leadership. Though the GOC kept 268 Brigade unutilised in the Valley he deserves credit for securing important areas and retaining the initiative. Gnats and Vampires provided support from Srinagar airfield.
Poonch – Naushera
Expecting a Pakistani attack at Poonch, 33 Brigade of 39 Division was moved to Poonch just before hostilities commenced. This helped repel attacks by Pak 12 Div in the first few days. The other brigades of the Rajauri Division secured small areas across the CFL to retain the initiative. However 33 Brigade remained unutilised after the first two days of the War.
Though 25 Division lost no territory, the division with an additional brigade, could have been more aggressive. Harvards of 123 Sqn and Vampires provided close support in the hilly areas. 44 Sqn flew a mission of six AN 12s to bomb Kahuta north of Poonch.
Chhamb
If there is one battle that needs critical study, it is the Battle of Chhamb. Not just because it led to a reverse but because there were far too many disadvantages with the Indian forces for which our higher command failed to find answers.
A major disadvantage in the plains of J&K was that while it was J&K on the Indian side it was Pakistan, not POK, on the other side. Thus while all the restrictions of Karachi Agreement applied on the Indian side there were no restrictions on buildup of forces or preparation of defences on the Pakistani side. On the Indian side build up involved crossing the Chenab River, whereas there was no such obstacle on the Pakistani side. UNMOGIP closely monitored all aspects and even passed information to the other side. All these should have been appreciated by the Indian Generals well before the War.
10 Division had only two brigades initially ie 28 Brigade in the hills and 191 in the plains. The other two brigades 52 and 68, were not in the sector. The main defences of the Division were on heights east of Munawwar Tawi. On the west in Chhamb was 9 Horse with attached troops as covering troops for 10 Division. This was the situation till
October 1971.
On receipt of orders to prepare defences, a portion of 191 Brigade was deployed forward in Chhamb to provide a firm base for launch of 10 Division through the Sector.
On 30 November, orders were changed and strategic defence was ordered for the complete Western Front. The logic of this cannot be faulted since India had no reason to start a war with Pakistan in the West, but the question is – why was this decision taken so late? Nothing had changed in the last few months!
When 191 Infantry Brigade with four infantry battalions and one armoured regiment was still preparing defences, war broke out on the evening of 03 December. Pakistan launched an offensive by 23 Division with four infantry brigades and 2 (I) Armoured Brigade with three armoured regiments. A fifth brigade attacked the hills to the north. Unlike 1965 this time the attack was supported by PAF. More important, a bold Pakistani General led the attack.
191 Brigade fought well though it was provided only three air missions in direct support during the first three days. The Army HQ LO, one Brig Mathur, sent a message to the MO Directorate which created panic at the Army HQ and the Chief demanded all available air to be sent to Chhamb. The Corps and Army Commanders visited 10 Division on 05 December and expressed satisfaction with the resistance offered.
There still remains considerable confusion about close air support provided in the Chhamb sector which indicates the need to evolve a workable procedure for the future.
At Page 225 of his book ACM Lal highlights the need for Army to indicate targets for air strikes and not bother about number of sorties; at the same time he blames the Army for not demanding 45 sorties per day that could have been made available for close air support in Chhamb9. He also mentions that due to limited frontage only two aircraft could strike at a time hence Commander 4 TAC at Udhampur could employ a maximum of 28 to 30 sorties per day. If so how could 45 sorties be utilised? Did the IAF inform 15 Corps or 10 Division that 45 sorties could be made available? Since the situation on the ground was nebulous the Commander TAC, who blames a major in the HQ being uninformed, asked the aircraft to engage targets in depth. The group captain, whose basic task was to provide intimate close air support, could have checked with senior officers of 15 Corps. What was required was a helpful attitude.
On the other hand a senior PAF officer had been attached with Pak 23 Div to coordinate PAF support to the Pakistani attackers. It is perhaps for this reason that own troops saw only PAF aircraft in the first few days and reported this up the chain. Even the ACM confirms in his book that only three missions flew in close support of 191 Brigade in the first three days10.
Professionals in both the Army and the IAF may like to compare this with the kind of support provided by the USAF to 1/7 Cav at LZ X Ray on 15 November 1965. On a call of “Broken Arrow” by the AF Liaison officer with the Bn, all airborne aircraft in Vietnam came over the area flying at 1,000 ft intervals awaiting their turn to attack. By accurate attacks on the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong they saved 1/7 Cav from annihilation11. There is a drastic need for both the Army and the AF to learn lessons.
After three days of resistance, 191 Brigade was withdrawn to the east of Munawwar Tawi on 06 December and was earmarked as reserve. 10 Division resisted with 52 and 68 Brigades. 28 Brigade continued to resist attacks in the Hill sector. Fierce counter attacks were launched to destroy penetrations across Munawwar Tawi.
The situation stabilised and no side tried to change the status quo, till the end of the War. On 11th the Army and Corps Commanders visited 10 Division once again but no plan was made to recapture the lost area. The Army HQ remained quiet.
What forces could have been utilised to restore the situation? 10 Division had three brigades with 9 Horse, and 72 Armd Regt. North of them 33 Brigade was idle at Poonch. In Jammu Sector there were five infantry brigades and three armd regts (19, 36, 162, 168, and 323 Infantry Brigades; 8 Cav, 16 Cav and CIH). Of all these at least two brigades with one additional armoured regiment should have been made available to 10 Division, with abundant air support, to recapture lost territory.
It appears that, as in 1965, all commanders up the chain had reconciled to the loss as early as 11 December 71. Though the Chief was annoyed he passed no orders to retake Chhamb, with plenty of resources available. At the same time a positive development was that there was no attempt to find scapegoats. In their inactivity, the Army, Corps, and Division commanders operated in sync.
