Marshal Georgy Zhukov had expected the main German summer
offensive to try again for Moscow and the Stavka assessed that the most likely
enemy avenue of approach was from the Bolkhov region, north of Orel.
Consequently, Zhukov ensured that a great deal of the new tank production was
sent to this sector and that he would have control over them. Yet when it
became obvious by early July that the Germans were not going to try for Moscow
again, Zhukov refused to allow his heavily-reinforced Western Front to stand
idle while Heeresgruppe Sud crushed ” the Bryansk and Southwestern Fronts.
With six tank corps under his command, Zhukov recommended to Stalin that the
Western Front could mount a counter- stroke against the German 2. Panzerarmee
guarding the northern part of the Orel salient. On 2 July, the Stavka
authorized Zhukov to conduct a counteroffensive to help take some of the
pressure off the Bryansk Front and possibly divert Hoth’s armour away from
Voronezh. With minimal planning, Zhukov directed General-leytenant Konstantin
K. Rokossovsky’s 16th Army to attack the Zhizdra sector held by General der
Artillerie Joachim Lemelsen’s XXXXVII Panzerkorps and General-leytenant Pavel
A. Belov’s 61st Army to attack the Bolkhov sector held by the German LIII
Armeekorps. These two Soviet attack sectors were 90km apart and hence not
mutually supporting. Zhukov was hoping to execute something resembling Deep
Battle, but in his eagerness to `do something’ before Voronezh fell, he opted
to commit two of his armies to an operation with negligible logistical
preparation or coordination between units.
Belov attacked first on the morning of 5 July, committing
the 12th Guards Rifle Division and the 192nd Tank Brigade as his main effort
against the boundary of the German 112 and 296. Infanterie-Divisionen. Over 250
artillery pieces were available to support the attack, but most of their
ammunition was fired in the initial prep bombardment. Achieving local surprise,
the Soviet guardsmen managed to create a 3km-deep dent in the German security
zone before being stopped by mines and well-directed artillery fire in front of
the German HKL (main line of resistance). Nor was Soviet air support very
helpful and the 192nd Tank Brigade lost six of its tanks to fratricidal Soviet
air attacks. When the Soviet attack stalled, the Germans were able to rush
reinforcements, including Hauptmann Martin Buhr’s Sturmgeschutz-Abteilung 202,
to strengthen their HKL. Despite failing to achieve a breakthrough, Belov
decided to commit his armoured exploitation force – General-major Dmitri K.
Mostovenko’s 3rd Tank Corps with 192 tanks – at 1400 hours on 7 July. By this
point, the element of surprise was gone and the German HKL in front of Belov’s
shock groups had been made nearly impregnable with assault guns, 8.8cm flak
batteries and additional panzerjagers. Unsurprisingly, Mostovenko’s armour
suffered heavy losses from anti-tank fire as they arrived on the battlefield
and Belov’s artillery no longer had the ammunition to suppress the enemy guns.
There is an important lesson in Mostovenko’s situation, in that an
operational-level commander must ensure that he has sufficient fire support
remaining when his exploitation force is committed. Instead, the 3rd Tank Corps
was stopped cold and bloodied by determined German infantry divisions and could
not advance. Although Belov continued attacking for another five days, he
achieved nothing.
By waiting an extra day to attack, Rokossovsky’s 16th Army
was able to make a considerably stronger opening effort, with three rifle
divisions, five rifle brigades and three tank brigades in the first echelon.
General-major Vasily G. Burkov’s 10th Tank Corps, with 152 tanks, waited to
exploit the breakthrough. Rokossovsky used 400 artillery pieces to support the
attack, as well as over 600 tactical air support sorties, but due to the
difficult terrain in his sector he chose to attack across a fairly wide 20km
frontage; this was the exact opposite of the German schwerpunkt, which
committed all resources at a decisive point. The Zhizdra sector was also
heavily wooded and marshy, which made armoured operations difficult – Zhukov
apparently had not considered terrain in his decision to attack. Kicking off at
0800 hours on 6 July, Rokossovsky’s infantry managed to advance 3-5km into the
208. Infanterie-Division’s defenses before encountering the same determination
as Belov had discovered. Even worse, the 17 and 18. Panzer- Division were both
available to reinforce the front-line German infantry divisions in this sector.
Unteroffizier Erich Hager, a Pz. IV driver in the 6./Pz. Regt 39, noted that
his battalion had completed two days of gunnery training just prior to
Rokossovsky’s offensives, so the crews were well-honed.
Rokossovsky’s first echelon included the 94th, 112th and
146th Tank Brigades and the 519th Tank Battalion with flamethrower tanks, a
total of 131 tanks, while Lemelsen decided to initially commit only small
armoured kampfgruppen into battle to stabilize the front, but kept some armour
in reserve to deal with the Soviet tank corps. Both panzer divisions had been
forced to contribute a Panzer- Abteilung to reinforce the divisions involved in
Blau, leaving only seventy-one tanks in the 17. Panzer-Divisionen and forty-seven
tanks in the 18. Panzer- Division. Hager’s 6. Kompanie was committed, but
quickly lost three of its eleven Pz. IV (short-barreled) tanks. Hager noted
that the Soviets had a 4-1 superiority in tanks in his sector. On 7 July, Lemelsen
committed more of his armour to prevent a breakthrough of the infantry HKL,
resulting in a brutal nine-hour battle between the opposing tanks and
artillery. Hager’s Pz. IV was hit three times, once in the hull and twice on
the turret, but only one crew member was injured by spalling (splinters from
the armour). Some tank-vs.-tank combat occurred as close as 200 meters. Hager
noted,
Thirty enemy tanks were destroyed and one Pak. Lots of
the Russian tanks were USA (American M3 Lees). Attack continues with infantry
on the HKL. Whole Abteilung shoots, shoots, shoots. Russian artillery and tanks
shoot straight at us. We cannot do anything about it as they are further away
than 3,000 meters . . . All in all, 6 of our tanks are hit but they do not burn
up so can be recovered . . . Return to refuel and rearm at 2000 hours. What a
day!
The 17 and 18. Panzer-Division managed to prevent a
breakthrough and shot up most of Rokossovsky’s infantry support tanks in the
process. As Hager noted, German tank losses were also significant, but since
they held the ground most damaged tanks could be recovered and repaired.
Despite lack of a breakthrough, on the evening of 7 July Rokossovsky decided to
commit Burkov’s 10th Tank Corps, but their night deployment was seriously
hindered by the marshy terrain in the sector. Whenever near the front, large
armoured units are frequently moved at night in order to avoid detection by the
enemy and thereby gain the maximum advantage of surprise. A well-trained armour
unit will send a quartering party ahead to reconnoiter the route of march from
the assembly areas all the way up to the front, leaving traffic control
personnel along the way to ensure that vehicles stay on the correct path.
However, the Red Army of mid-1942 had not yet learned these lessons and
instead, tanks and vehicles of Burkov’s 10th Tank Corps blundered off the road
and got stuck in marshes. When daylight on 8 July arrived, Burkov’s armour was
still all bunched up in column formation on trails just behind the front and
Lemelsen requested Luftwaffe air strikes on the mass of Soviet armour. German
air superiority over the Zhizdra sector was absolute and Rokossovsky later
wrote, `before the battle I had never seen the Germans throw so many aircraft
into such a small sector as the one in which the 16th Army was operating.’
Burkov’s armour was badly knocked about by the Luftwaffe and entered battle
piecemeal, not as a corps.
During the night of 7-8 July, the 17. Panzer-Division dug in
a number of its tanks along the HKL to protect them from Soviet artillery fire
and they awaited Burkov’s armour. Hager’s Pz. IV knocked out a T-34 but was hit
on the hull by an HE round that damaged the track and engine. Nevertheless,
Hager’s Pz. IV kept firing until all ammunition was expended and remained in
the fight for eight hours. One German tank platoon of three tanks knocked out
ten attacking Soviet tanks and, overall, Burkov’s corps lost about fifty tanks
on its first day in action. Even though it was clear by 8 July that neither
Belov nor Rokossovsky was going to achieve any worthwhile success, Zhukov
ordered the offensive to continue and 9 July was a repeat of the previous day.
Hager noted,
The battle begins at 1200 hours. We have to stay in the
same position and fire until our ammunition runs out. Russian tanks are driving
around in front of us but do not see us luckily . . . 35 tanks attack us and 35
tanks are knocked out and burning. At 1700 hours we finally leave the battle
and make our way to refuel and rearm with 4. Kompanie. Also make repairs.
After two days of battle Hager’s Pz. IV was still
combat-capable, but operating in degraded mode. Statistics about numbers of
`operational tanks’ should con- sider that many in this category were actually
rather marginal. After firing some- thing like 200 rounds in two days, the
recoil system on the 7.5cm cannon was malfunctioning and finally broke down
altogether. The tank’s radio was also non- operational after repeated hits on
the hull and turret and the running gear was in poor condition. Nevertheless,
Hager’s degraded-mode Pz. IV was committed into action again on 10 July, when
17. Panzer-Division mounted a counterattack against the off-balance 10th Tank
Corps. Oberstleutnant Otto Busing led a kampfgruppe from his II/Pz. Regt 39,
which included Hager’s 6. Kompanie:
The same attack again. The whole Abteilung. Now the fun
starts . . . The regimental commander[Busing] took a hit, bailed out. Hauptman
Karen ” arrived. Took a hit, bailed out. Hauptmann Borsch came up, took a
hit, bailed out . . . Hit in the steering, move on a bit and then back. Track
torn off. Have to bail out.
Hager and his crew walked on foot back to their battalion
assembly area – a not unusual occurrence for tankers on the Eastern Front – and
admitted that `not one Pz. IV came back’ from the attack. The men of II/Pz.
Regt 39 spent all of 11 July recovering their knocked-out tanks with the
battalion’s Sd. Kfz. 9 (FAMO) semi- tracks and, amazingly, the I-Gruppe
mechanics repaired six of the Pz. IVs by the end of 12 July. By that point,
Zhukov’s offensive had failed to seriously dent 2. Panzerarmee’s front or to
inconvenience German plans. Although PzAOK 2 suffered about 5,000 casualties,
both the 3rd and 10th Tank Corps were rendered combat-ineffective for some
time. Soviet C2 was abysmal during the offensive and inter-unit coordination
non-existent. Despite much heroism and bloodshed, the Red Army had not yet
learned how to break an entrenched German defensive line, particularly one
supported by panzers and assault guns.
Although Zhukov’s Zhizdra-Bolkhov offensive failed, he was
quick to urge more offensive action in this sector as well as against the
German 9. Armee in the exposed Rzhev salient. Zhukov still had four intact tank
corps under his immediate control and General-leytenant Petr L. Romanenko’s 3rd
Tank Army was nearby in the RVGK. However, the Germans noted that the recent
bungled Western Front offensive presented Heeresgruppe Mitte not only with an
opportunity to mount a riposte to eliminate all or part of the Sukhinichi
salient before the Red Army recovered, but also to distract Zhukov’s remaining
armour away from the vulnerable Rzhev salient. Despite the priority of Blau,
Hitler and the OKH authorized a limited offensive known as Wirbelwind, set to
begin in early August. Schmidt’s 2. Panzerarmee would form the schwerpunkt of
its offensive with General der Infanterie Heinrich Cloßner’s LIII Armeekorps,
which was given 11 and 20. Panzer-Divisionen, the 197 and 202.
Sturmgeschutz-Abteilungen and four infantry divisions. In addition, Schmidt
retained Lemelsen’s XXXXVII Panzerkorps with the 18. Panzer-Division and gained
Generaloberst Josef Harpe’s XXXXI Panzerkorps, with the 9, 17 and 19.
Panzer-Divisionen. Schmidt’s divisions also received their first Pz. IIIJ and
Pz. IVF2 replacement tanks, putting them on a more equal footing with Zhukov’s
T-34s. Despite the concentration of six panzer divisions in a fairly small
sector north of Bolkhov, Operation Wirbelwind has been overshadowed by
Operation Blau and the Battle of Stalingrad. Cloßner’s LIII Armeekorps attacked
the boundary of the Soviet 61st Army north of Bolkhov on the morning of 11
August and achieved some initial success. In particular, the 11. Panzer-Division
was able to advance up to 25km in heavily wooded terrain toward the
intermediate objective – Sukhinichi. Thereafter, Soviet resistance hardened
quickly and the Red Army was particularly formidable in forest-fighting. German
tankers were wary of moving along narrow forest tracks that were usually mined
and covered by anti-tank ambushes. While the 2. Panzerarmee succeeded in
gaining a small bridgehead over the Zhizdra river, the 16th Army blocked any
further advance toward Sukhinichi by moving Burkov’s rebuilt 10th Tank Corps
and General-major Aleksei V. Kurkin’s 9th Tank Corps to contain the German
advance. Three Soviet rifle divisions were cut off and destroyed and the two
Soviet tank corps lost about 200 tanks, but Wirbelwind failed to seize
significant terrain or seriously impair Zhukov’s freedom of action. Instead, it
was the German panzer units that suffered heavy losses in the ill-judged
offensive and diverted resources that could have been better used elsewhere.
The 9. Panzer Division, which started the operation with 110 tanks, lost
forty-four tanks in Wirbelwind. Although difficult terrain was certainly a
factor in the failure of Wirbelwind, this was the second time since the
beginning of Blau that a German panzer schwerpunkt had been stopped cold by determined
Soviet resistance, which was an ominous portent of the Red Army’s growing
competence.
Just as Hitler decided to abort Wirbelwind, Zhukov made the
surprise decision to commit Romanenko’s 3rd Tank Army to the Bolkhov sector in
an effort to cut off 2. Panzerarmee’s spearhead. Romanenko’s 3TA had moved by
rail from Tula and assembled on the eastern flank of 2. Panzerarmee’s salient,
near Kozel’sk. Zhukov assembled a force of 218,000 troops and 700 tanks to
crush the German forces in the salient, which were outnumbered by 3-1 in
armour. Romanenko attacked at 0615 hours on 22 August, committing three rifle
divisions and a rifle brigade in the first echelon to claw their way through
the defenses of the German 26 and 56. Infanterie-Divisionen. After the infantry
had advanced 4-6km through the outer German defenses – but not achieved a real
breakthrough – Romanenko committed the 3rd, 12th and 15th Tank Corps into the
battle. Once again though, the Red Army’s use of large armoured formations was
marred by the lack of pre-battle reconnaissance; Romanenko’s tanks ran into
swamps, enemy mines and generally got lost in the forest trails. Even after
moving forward for twelve hours, Romanenko’s tanks had not yet encountered the
enemy and were behind the forward line of their own infantry. The Luftwaffe
managed to gain and keep local air superiority over this sector, enabling
Stukas and bombers to mercilessly hammer the stalled columns of Soviet armour.
Romanenko was finally able to get some of his armour, in piecemeal fashion,
into battle on 23 August, but by that time Cloßner had shifted the 11 and 20.
Panzer-Division to bolster the flagging ” German infantry. The Red Army
had little experience supplying a formation of 600 tanks and Romanenko’s tank
corps suffered from fuel shortages, even though they never gained more than
2-3km into the German line. An effort by Rokossovsky’s 16th Army to assist
Romanenko by attacking the western side of the German salient was quickly
snuffed out. Gradually, the combination of German panzer divisions in defense
and Luftwaffe overhead reduced the immobilized 3rd Tank Army into wreckage. By
the time that Zhukov finally ended the offensive in early September, the
attacking Soviet forces had lost 500 of 700 tanks and Romanenko’s 3rd Tank Army
had been rendered hors de combat. Afterwards, both sides shifted to the defense
and much of the remaining armour was transferred elsewhere.
Even though the fighting around Bolkhov-Zhizdra in
July-August 1942 is not well known, it involved six of the nineteen panzer
divisions and five of the twenty- two Soviet tank corps on the Eastern Front,
making these battles one of the largest clashes of armour in 1942. Neither side
enjoyed any real offensive success in these battles, mostly due to restrictive
terrain, and German air power played a prominent role in equalizing the Soviet
numerical superiority in manpower and tanks. It is also noteworthy that
Zhukov’s use of large armoured formations and efforts at conducting set-piece
offensives had no more success than other Soviet commanders at that time. The
Bolkhov-Zhizdra offensives were an amateurish waste of armour, costing the Red
Army another 1,000 tanks for no gain at all. On the other hand, Hitler’s
willingness to commit so much armour to a secondary theater violated the
principle of concentration of force, when he needed every Panzer-Abteilung,
Stuka sortie and liter of petrol available to support Heeresgruppe Sud’s drive
for the Caucasus.
