In 1858 William became Regent in place of his brother. New
elections to the Landtag produced liberal successes and William appointed
moderate liberals to the government. The hopes of liberal nationalists that
Prussia would now lead the way to a reformed and national Germany were raised
by these events. This pointed to one vital difference between Prussia and
Austria: Prussia had a constitution and an elected parliament which provided a
basis for a liberal direction of policy before any major crisis; Austria only
moved in such a direction as the result of such a crisis. (Apart from general
studies such as Blackbourn 1997; Brose 1997; and Sheehan 1989, on the ‘New Era’
see Hamerow 1972, part I.)
The Prussian government had never slavishly followed Austria
since 1850, although this was an impression that Bismarck cultivated in his
reminiscences in order to highlight the difference his appointment made
(Bismarck 1899; Feuchtwanger 2002; Gall 1986; Lerman 2004). During the Crimean
War Prussia refused to go beyond an alliance with Austria based on strict
neutrality. Since 1856 it had quietly allied itself with Russia rather than
Austria on matters where there was conflict. Prussia’s trade policy had
determinedly kept Austria out of the Zollverein and had involved close links to
France, a policy opposed by principled conservatives. (See Voth 2001; Böhme
1974; Hahn 1984 on customs union policy; Barclay 1995, chap. 10 has details on
conservative criticisms.) Indeed, when Bismarck in 1864 suggested a weakening
of this policy as part of his then dualist cooperation with Austria, ministers
with financial and trade responsibilities, along with Rudolf Delbrück who
shaped tariff policy, ensured Bismarck was overruled (Feuchtwanger 2002, chap.
6).
Prussian population growth was about twice that of Austria.
Its booming economy began to pull ahead of that of Austria in the later 1850s
and early 1860s. (Huertas 1977, chap. 1 revises earlier estimates of Austrian
growth rates for the period 1841–58 upwards, but notes a slackening
thereafter.) Add to that Prussia’s limited international commitments compared
to Austria, a much lower state debt and the impact of the army reforms by the
mid-1860s, and one can conclude that there was a sharp tilting of the balance
of power between the two states, although this was probably not fully or widely
realised at the time. (See Chapter 8 below for further analysis.) Generally,
however, the preference of the conservatives who shaped policy in these years
was to follow an independent course from Austria but to avoid direct conflict
so far as possible and certainly not to provide any support to liberal
nationalism. Thus the liberal hopes raised in 1858 by the turn-around in
domestic political, social and economic change were doomed to disappointment in
the foreign policy sphere.
This pragmatic conservative line continued in 1859, steering
between principled conservatives who wanted Prussia to ally with Austria
against France (seeing the war in anti-French rather than pro-Italian terms)
and principled liberals who looked sympathetically upon the Italian liberal
nationalist cause and wanted Prussia to take up such ideas. Then there was the
eccentric position of Bismarck who urged the government to use Austria’s
difficulties to expand its own position in Germany, seeing this in dynastic and
Prussian, rather than liberal and national terms. (Doc. 47, p. 159 outlines
Bismarck’s ideas more generally and a little earlier.) Some of these
differences were reflected in the policy-making elite of the time [Doc. 49, p.
161]. Much to the dismay of Austria, and Francis Joseph in particular (Bled
1994, chap. 5), the Prussian government insisted that it could only provide
assistance if put in charge of all non-Austrian Bund troops. This, along with
Prussian mobilisation on the Rhine in case Louis Napoleon extended the scope of
his actions, appeared to Austria as a bid for leadership in Germany. It was one
reason Austria rapidly concluded a peace with France, while the mobilisation
also made Louis Napoleon anxious to bring the war to an end (Hallberg 1973,
chap. 9).
War and defeat had greatly weakened Austria and stimulated
the national movement which looked to Prussia for leadership. However, it had
also uncovered Prussian frailties. Partial mobilisation revealed many problems
in the army, a matter of acute concern to William who worried about an
increased threat from France. After all, the first Napoleon had started with
military success in northern Italy and then turned his attention to the
Rhinelands. Following a review William ordered a radical reform of the army,
expanding its numbers, increasing the length of service from two to three years
and marginalising the role of the territorial reserve army, the Landwehr.
(Williamson 1998 deals with some of these matters. See also Bucholz 2001; Craig
1964; and Showalter 1986.) These reform plans offended the new liberal majority
in the Landtag, not so much because of the additional expenditure that would be
incurred (state finances were healthy and the liberals recognised the need for
a strong army) but rather due to the increased length of service and diminished
role for the Landwehr, coupled with the insistence of the king that he alone
had complete power of command over the army. Liberals feared that, rather than
being used to back up a forward policy within Germany, this army might become
an instrument of the monarchy against parliament.
Two bills – one to reform the army and the other to pay for
these reforms – were put before the Landtag in early 1860. William refused to
accept that the parliament could alter anything in the army reorganisation bill
though he could not deny the budgetary powers of the parliament. The Landtag
made it clear it would only provisionally grant extra monies. This was a
fateful decision because it meant that the army reforms could be set in hand,
even if their cost had not been firmly approved. In an attempt to improve the
situation William dissolved the parliament and called for new elections. The
result, and this was repeated over the next couple of years, was the return of
a larger and more determined liberal majority. The combination of
liberalisation, a more mobile and organised society and crisis was generating
political forces beyond the control of the regime. In early 1861 a new party,
the Progressive Party, was formed which took the liberal lead. Subsequently,
branches of the Progressive Party were formed in other states, pointing up the
national implications of the conflict. (Anderson 1954 is a study of the
constitutional crisis.)
One possible way out of the crisis was for the government to
pursue the national policy liberal politicians demanded (see, for example,
document 4 in Williamson 1998). It is no coincidence that in December 1861,
just as there was a new round of elections, the Prussian government under the
leadership of Manteuffel, floated a new version of the Union policy of 1849–50.
It resembled the Nationalverein programme (document 3 in Willamson 1998) except
that it did not make provision for any elected national assembly. In part this
was a response to yet another initiative by the Saxon minister Beust for a
federated Germany with an executive authority, court and national
representation but also more influence for the medium states [Doc. 50, p. 162].
Neither domestically nor beyond Prussia did the policy
initiative work. Austria and the medium states rejected the idea, just as they
had done in 1850. The Progressive Party registered electoral victory. In the
new Landtag it decided against voting any more provisional budgets for army
reforms. William dissolved the Landtag yet again in March 1862 but elections in
May returned an even more determined liberal majority. In the meantime, Austria
– well into its constitutional policy under Schmerling – decided to take up the
issue of national reform in conjunction with some of the other German states.
It was at this juncture that the decision to appoint
Bismarck Minister-President was taken by the embattled William on the advice of
his War Minister, the architect of the army reforms, Albrecht von Roon. As a
book in this series (Williamson 1998) deals with Bismarck from 1862 until the
end of his career, I will not spend much time on biographical detail but just
note some key points. (See Gall 1986; Pflanze 1990; Feuchtwanger 2002; Lerman
2004 for English language studies of Bismarck.)
Bismarck had long advocated confrontation with Austria in
order for Prussia to expand in Germany. In his memoirs late in life, he
suggested that previous Prussian governments had subordinated themselves to
Austria and only with his appointment was this policy reversed. This is at best
a half-truth, tending to make policy appear as a function of personality and
contributing to a one-sided ‘great men make history’ view. As we have seen,
Prussia steered a confrontational course in foreign policy in 1849–50 and took
an independent line from 1854, including a determinedly anti-Austrian line in
key areas of trade policy and Zollverein membership. What it did not do, until
December 1861, was revive the Union policy which had brought it into direct
conflict with Austria in 1850. However, Bismark had loudly condemned that
policy and supported the Olmütz agreement that brought it to an end [Doc. 44,
p. 157]. Indeed, his own appointment as ambassador to the restored Bund in 1851
arose directly out of that agreement and his support for it. It also had the
effect of bringing into the diplomatic service a man who had failed to complete
his probationary period as a civil servant, resigned from office, retreated to
run his estates in Brandenburg, and had only come back into politics with the
constitutional crisis of 1847, and then by taking a hard counter-revolutionary
line in 1848–49.
Indeed, it was that reputation as a determined defender of
royal prerogative during a crisis rather than his maverick opinions on Prussian
foreign policy which accounts for Bismarck’s appointment in September 1862. His
immediate objective was not to lead Prussia into Germany but to assert the
royal will over the liberal majority in parliament, a majority which was the
most important force agitating for such a forward national policy.
This domestic challenge was to be Bismarck’s major
preoccupation for the first year or so after his appointment. Bismarck argued
that the budget already granted to the government should continue to operate at
a time when the executive and the upper house (Herrenhaus) of the legislature
failed to agree with the lower house (Landtag), on the grounds that those
drafting the constitution had never meant government to break down in the event
of such a disagreement. This dubious ‘constitutional gap’ theory worked because
the Landtag was not for its part prepared to pursue active sanctions against
the government such as leading a tax boycott or some other kind of civil
disobedience.
As for any national policy, Bismarck was at a loss. The
revived Union policy of 1861 had been rejected by liberals, the medium states
and Austria. He took a firm free trade line in 1862 to ensure agreement with
France and the exclusion of Austria from the Zollverein. He continued with this
policy up until the renewal of the Zollverein in 1865 (though as we have seen,
he contemplated diluting the policy in 1864), making it clear that, if
necessary, Prussia would leave the customs union and negotiate separate
agreements with non-German states. Faced with such a threat the other German
states had no option but to fall into line [Doc. 55, p. 166].
Bismarck also strengthened the positive relationship with
Russia. At the heart of this was the Polish question. When a new insurrection
broke out in Russian Poland in 1863 Bismarck quickly and demonstratively
signalled Prussian support for its repression. However, the main domestic
effect was to alienate him even further from liberal nationalists who supported
the restoration of a Polish state and saw Russia as the main obstacle to German
unity and the liberal cause throughout Europe. His Polish policy also alienated
France, traditionally a supporter of Polish national claims. It is difficult
therefore to see how this would help Bismarck make any decisive policy change
in the German question. The liberal opposition was not greatly impressed by
Bismarck’s famous ‘blood and iron’ speech when he declared that the way of
solving the national question was not through parliamentary resolutions (the
1848 method) but through the use of power (see document 9, Williamson 1998). As
Bismarck was not actually pursuing an aggressive policy in Germany which might
require blood and iron, the phrase looked more like an oblique reference to the
crisis in Prussia than a signal of a possible change in foreign policy. Yet the
liberals never seriously believed that Bismarck was going to send soldiers into
parliament and try to cow it into submission. Indeed, they could not see him
remaining in office for very long given the weight of public and parliamentary
opinion against him.
They were right to believe that Bismarck was not prepared to
attempt a coup and return to non-parliamentary government. Bismarck was well
aware that in the long run, without parliamentary support, above all without
the support of the business and professional middle classes on which the
liberal majority was based, his could be little more than a stop-gap
administration. Such support was needed above all for the credit-worthiness of
the state. For all his harsh rhetoric Bismarck had no intention of going down
the path of coup d’état and a return to absolutism which some conservatives
envisaged. He would try to bribe and intimidate deputies, buy up newspapers to
express pro-governmental views, have discussions with radical labour leaders
like Ferdinand Lassalle about the possibility of basing monarchical rule on
popular consent, thereby under-cutting the liberal parliament elected on a weighted
franchise. He also ‘indiscreetly’ insinuated to deputies that he really wished
to govern with their support but that the king had to be persuaded and this
would only happen if parliament would be a little more forthcoming on its side.
All these measures and rhetorical tricks were intended to push liberals towards
agreement with Bismarck, not to replace the present constitution. Furthermore,
Bismarck was aware that his value to the king was precisely that he was
overriding but not abolishing parliament. Once things had gone that far
government could be handed over to bureaucrats and soldiers. Bismarck was a
creation of the constitutional politics he opposed and thereby also tied to
that politics. (See Gall 1986; Feuchtwanger 2002; and Lerman 2004: 59–60 for
detailed support for this interpretation of Bismarck.)
However, none of these tactical twists and bewildering array
of half-promises and veiled threats proved successful in Bismarck’s first year
or so in office. Poised between parliament and the hardline conservatives at
court, dependent almost entirely on the personal support of the ageing king,
blustering about radical new policies but actually governing in a traditional
authoritarian manner, it appeared to many that Bismarck was an interesting, unprincipled
politician who would not be able to retain power for long. His successes were
negative ones. He persuaded the king not to attend the princes’ congress
Austria had organised in 1863 as part of its bid to take the lead on national
reform. In return, he had suggested that a reformed Bund should have some
nationally elected assembly but one could hardly take such an idea seriously
from a man ruling in defiance of the one such assembly that existed in Prussia.
Indeed the Nationalverein rejected Bismark’s offer of a German parliament in
April 1865 because they did not find it credible. In 1863 a shrewd contemporary
might well have judged that Austria was making the running in German matters
and that Prussia was paralysed by internal conflict. (See Docs 51–54, pp.
164–66 on these reform proposals in 1863.)
The Schleswig-Holstein affair changed everything.
