Chinese Tactical Leadership.
Chinese junior officers performed equally well, perhaps even
better, than their generals. The Chinese employed a highly decentralized
command system that placed a heavy burden on tactical leaders. Because Chinese
operations were often conducted at night, involved large-scale infiltrations,
had few radios, and placed a premium on stealth, it was often impossible for
senior commanders to direct their forces in the midst of battle. The Chinese
also placed a premium on decisions made on the spot in response to immediate
circumstances. In particular, they emphasized the immediate exploitation of
gaps and weak points such as unit boundaries, which meant that junior officers
were expected to recognize such opportunities and act on them without direct
orders. As one historian observed, “The nature of the Chinese Red Army, with
its paucity of modern military equipment, placed a great deal of responsibility
on unit commanders, they were to follow the general plan if they could, but not
be afraid to deviate if it seemed appropriate.” To facilitate this, the Chinese
army conducted extensive pre-attack briefings, with senior officers providing
remarkable amounts of information to their subordinates to ensure that more
junior commanders would be able to make smart decisions during the battle based
on a full understanding of the plan and the intelligence regarding enemy forces
and intentions. Indeed, virtually all Chinese operations were planned only at
general levels, and the specifics were typically left to the commanders in the
field to decide as the circumstances dictated.
Chinese junior officers performed extremely well in this
system. They kept up a constant stream of patrols to find the enemy, and then
to probe for routes of attack, flanks, gaps in the line, unit boundaries, etc.
Once they had a reasonable picture of enemy dispositions they formulated a plan
of attack and put it into action. They showed tremendous individual initiative
and aggressiveness. They rarely seemed to let an opportunity pass, and reacted
quickly and flexibly to the ebb and flow of combat. At times, they did miss
opportunities to exploit, but typically because their logistics failed them or
they had suffered such heavy casualties taking the position that they had too
little left to follow through. When one approach failed, Chinese junior
officers devised a new plan of action and then put it into effect. They also
showed a real flare for improvisation in their approach to combat situations.
As just one example of this, in 1950 one Chinese company commander had his men
light the dried grass near an American position on fire when they could not
find a way to flank the American lines. The grass burned straight up the hill
the Americans were holding, forcing them to abandon the position.
Chinese tactical units operated at a quick operational
tempo, especially given their lack of motor transport. Chinese junior officers
fully recognized the need to hit hard and fast and to keep hitting the enemy
with rapid blows so that he could not recover. Consequently, they bypassed
resistance when possible and drove as far and as fast into the rear as they
could to overrun command posts and keep the enemy reeling. In one incident,
Chinese troops smashed the ROK 15th Infantry Regiment and then pursued so
quickly that they passed the retreating South Korean troops, overran the
regiment’s command post, and then turned to ambush the combat units (again) as
they fled south.46 Even when one Chinese unit might stop to regroup on an
objective, other elements of the force—or other units of the same
formation—would take it upon themselves to keep moving forward to maintain the
pace of advance and not give the enemy any breathing space.
One of the greatest strengths of the Chinese military at
every level was their predilection for maneuver. Shu Guang Zhang notes that the
PLA itself believed that its forces could overcome American advantages in
firepower because they were “good at maneuvering, flexibility and mobility and,
in particular, good at surrounding and attacking [the] enemy’s flanks by taking
tortuous courses, as well as dispersing and concealing forces.” The PLA’s
favored form of attack—and counterattack—was what Lin Biao referred to as the
“one point, two sides” maneuver, which consisted of a frontal assault to pin
the enemy coupled with a double envelopment. Chinese forces at every level from
army group to squad employed this approach, and when it proved impossible, they
found other ways to maneuver against their foe, performing a single envelopment
or simply attacking from an oblique angle to the defender’s lines. American,
South Korean, Turkish, British (and in 1962, Indian troops) reported being
constantly outflanked and hit from the rear by Chinese units.
These traits were equally apparent in defensive operations.
Chinese tactical commanders were just as diligent about reconnaissance when on
the defensive. They were careful to disguise their positions and built
ingenious defensive networks. Chinese forces were also extremely active on
defense and rarely sat passively in their trenches while being attacked. In
battle, Chinese units would abandon their positions if they thought that they
could move into a better one, preferably one from which they could fire or
counterattack into the attacker’s flank or rear. Chinese units counterattacked
vigorously and quickly at every level. Indeed, many Chinese defensive positions
were designed to lure the enemy in and crush him with a devastating
counterattack (often from several sides simultaneously). Whenever possible, the
Chinese attempted to conduct flanking counterattacks to cut off the attacking
force and crush it. Moreover, if they repulsed an attacker, Chinese units
frequently seized the opportunity to pursue or even launch an immediate attack
of their own.
The Chinese appear to have done adequately in combined arms
operations when their very limited experiences are taken into account. In
Korea, the Chinese initially employed pure infantry formations, but by the end
of the war they also fielded considerable numbers of artillery batteries. By
and large, the Chinese did well in employing their artillery to support their
infantry formations both when attacking and in defense.
Chinese Rank and File Performance. China’s soldiery did all
that could be expected of them. Personal bravery among Chinese units was very
high. The Chinese Army attacked with great confidence and enthusiasm. In Korea,
this remained the case until the cold, the lack of food and other supplies, as
well as the terrifying losses in combat began to set in during 1951. Chinese
unit cohesion was likewise excellent. Although numerous Chinese units did begin
to crack in 1951 at the end of the Fifth Phase Offensive, what was impressive
was just how much hardship and adversity these formations endured before that
happened. By that time, many of the Chinese soldiers were literally starving to
death, clinically exhausted, and numbed by five months of attacks into the
teeth of UN firepower. Most armies would have fallen apart long before.
Chinese weapons handling was mostly poor, albeit with
several bright spots. Chinese marksmanship was lousy across the board. Chinese
infantrymen could do little with their small arms. One exception to this rule
was that Chinese units were often inexplicably good with light machine guns.
Chinese forces also suffered heavily from the limited technical skills of their
personnel. Consequently, few could handle electronics equipment, heavy
weaponry, or other technology-intensive machines. To at least some extent, the
Chinese had to forgo certain weapons that were simply beyond the technical
skills of their men. Moreover, Chinese troops rarely got the maximum
performance out of even the relatively simple weaponry they employed.
By contrast, Chinese artillery and mortar operations were
very competent. Although Chinese forces entered the war with only light mortars
and almost no artillery, by 1952 they had learned to employ their new
Soviet-supplied indirect-fire weapons in a fairly sophisticated manner. As the
war progressed, the ability of Chinese mortar and artillery units to mass their
fire became an important element in their defensive operations. Chinese
artillery batteries could rapidly combine their fire even when geographically
dispersed, their fire missions were often very accurate, and they could quickly
and flexibly shift their fire from one target to the next as required by
front-line commanders. Chinese mortar units even got so good that they could
silence US mortars in counter-battery duels.
Chinese Combat Support and Combat Service Support
Performance. Above all else, logistics was the bane of Chinese military
operations. In Korea, China might have scored one of the most impressive
victories in modern history had its supply services been able to keep pace with
its combat units and had its combat units been able to move faster than they
did. As one historian has said of Marshal Peng, “It was not the Americans who
were defeating him; it was winter, and the Chinese inability to fight this sort
of war on a straight offensive basis. The logistics of an attacking army are
perhaps six times more difficult than those of a defending army, and Marshal
Peng’s logistics, by his own statements, were so ridiculous as to be
laughable.”
The causes of these logistics problems may not be as clear
as they may seem. The most obvious problem the Chinese faced was that they had
too few trucks and trains to supply their army, and too few air defenses to
protect the logistical network from air attack. In addition, they had other
material complications. For example, in Korea, Chinese forces used a multitude
of small arms, none of which were manufactured in China and most of which were
no longer manufactured at all. Consequently, providing ammunition and spare
parts to the combat units was a nightmare. However, it is unclear whether
Chinese logistics problems also were related to China’s low levels of education
or other socioeconomic factors. Logistics for an army that is even crudely
modern requires quartermasters able to read and do arithmetic and often more
complicated mathematics. In addition, supplying such a vast army, over such
great distances with such a multitude of different weapons, is a complex
project to say the least.
Very little information exists regarding China’s maintenance
capabilities. During October and November 1951, the Chinese generally were able
to keep 300–400 of their 800 trucks running on any given day. A 50 percent
operational readiness rate is usually considered very poor, and this would fit
well with the pattern of difficulties the Chinese experienced in other aspects
of military operations related to technical skills. Still, it would be rash to
conclude based on this single scrap of evidence that Chinese armies experienced
considerable problems with maintenance and repairs. The Chinese were using
mostly very old trucks captured from the Guomindang and the Japanese. It is
unclear what kind of shape they were in when the Chinese Communists got them,
or what kind of an inventory of spare parts and lubricants they had by 1950.
Moreover, 800 trucks is an absurdly low number to try to support an army of
over 300,000 men, so those trucks may have been driven to death. For all of
these reasons, this meager evidence on its own cannot support the conclusion
that Chinese maintenance practices were poor, even though this would fit the
pattern suggested by Chinese problems with logistics and weapons handling.
Limited evidence suggests that Chinese combat engineers were
reasonably good. Although the Chinese were known to use infantry battalions to
clear paths through minefields by having them walk across in line-abreast, they
generally could rely on a competent corps of engineers. In Korea, Chinese
engineers built impressive fortifications very quickly. Chinese engineers
showed a tremendous ability to cross water obstacles. The US Air Force was
constantly frustrated by the speed and ingenuity of Chinese engineers building,
repairing, and circumventing bridges knocked down by US air strikes.
Chinese Air Force Performance. China’s air force made a
reasonable effort given its newness. The Chinese did not necessarily do “well”
in any category of air operations, but deserve high marks for learning quickly.
The planning and direction of Chinese air operations was
reasonably good. Chinese Air Force leaders initially recognized that their
squadrons were only capable of defensive counter-air missions, and so they
concentrated on trying to disrupt the US campaign against Chinese logistics.
Later, as the forces available to them improved, they took on more ambitious
missions. The Chinese quickly deduced the weaknesses of the F-86 Sabre,
specifically its limited range, and designed tactics to try to take advantage
of that problem. Although the United States quickly countered, the Chinese in
turn devised a counter to the Americans’ counter-tactic. The United States
ultimately prevailed in this contest, but this rapid interplay indicates that
Chinese Air Force leaders were intelligent, creative, and resourceful and
actively tried to shape aerial encounters, rather than passively accepting
situations as they occurred.
Chinese air forces concentrated almost exclusively on
counter-air missions; consequently, this is the only category of air operations
in which the Chinese performance can reasonably be assessed. The Chinese began
very poorly but had made major improvements by war’s end. The chief factor was
the experience of Chinese pilots. At the start of the war, the Chinese Air
Force was brand new and had only a handful of qualified pilots, none of whom
had participated in air-to-air combat before. When these men went up against
the World War II veterans of the US Air Force they were slaughtered. The
Chinese began sending large numbers of pilots to the USSR for training, and
over time, they began to give the American pilots a harder time. There was
never a month during the Korean War when Chinese MiG squadrons did more damage
to the Americans than they sustained themselves, but by 1952 they had reduced
the number of losses they were taking and had increased the number of US planes
they were shooting down.
Chinese Air Force Performance.
China’s air force made a reasonable effort given its
newness. The Chinese did not necessarily do “well” in any category of air
operations, but deserve high marks for learning quickly.
The planning and direction of Chinese air operations was
reasonably good. Chinese Air Force leaders initially recognized that their
squadrons were only capable of defensive counter-air missions, and so they
concentrated on trying to disrupt the US campaign against Chinese logistics.
Later, as the forces available to them improved, they took on more ambitious
missions. The Chinese quickly deduced the weaknesses of the F-86 Sabre,
specifically its limited range, and designed tactics to try to take advantage
of that problem. Although the United States quickly countered, the Chinese in
turn devised a counter to the Americans’ counter-tactic. The United States
ultimately prevailed in this contest, but this rapid interplay indicates that
Chinese Air Force leaders were intelligent, creative, and resourceful and actively
tried to shape aerial encounters, rather than passively accepting situations as
they occurred.
Chinese air forces concentrated almost exclusively on
counter-air missions; consequently, this is the only category of air operations
in which the Chinese performance can reasonably be assessed. The Chinese began
very poorly but had made major improvements by war’s end. The chief factor was
the experience of Chinese pilots. At the start of the war, the Chinese Air
Force was brand new and had only a handful of qualified pilots, none of whom
had participated in air-to-air combat before. When these men went up against
the World War II veterans of the US Air Force they were slaughtered. The
Chinese began sending large numbers of pilots to the USSR for training, and
over time, they began to give the American pilots a harder time. There was
never a month during the Korean War when Chinese MiG squadrons did more damage
to the Americans than they sustained themselves, but by 1952 they had reduced
the number of losses they were taking and had increased the number of US planes
they were shooting down.
Nevertheless it is still the bottom line that, throughout
the war, the Chinese never performed as well as the Americans in air combat
maneuvering. They fought aggressively, and they maneuvered, and some of their
pilots were able to really exploit the capabilities of their aircraft, but they
were never able to do it at the same level as the Americans. As a result, US
Sabre pilots racked up at least a 5:1 kill ratio against the Chinese for the
war.
Decisive Factors in the Korean War.
Chinese forces did as well as they did in combat for several
reasons. Chinese leadership at both strategic and tactical levels was
unquestionably the most important factor in Chinese successes. China’s generals
did a superb job employing the resources at their disposal to achieve Beijing’s
political objectives. In many of their campaigns, the Chinese achieved
spectacular results that almost certainly would have been beyond the reach of
less competent generals commanding the same forces. Similarly, it is difficult
to fault Beijing’s generals for Chinese failures. Ultimately, the tasks set for
them by their political masters may well have been unachievable.
Chinese tactical competence was just as important as the
skill of their strategic leadership. In battle, the Chinese were an extremely
dangerous foe, and what is so incredible is that they achieved this level of
tactical prowess despite pitiful weaponry and illiterate soldiers mostly
incapable of taking full advantage of the meager equipment they possessed. It
is remarkable that Chinese infantry companies of roughly 100 men equipped with
no more than a few dozen rifles, perhaps three or four light machine guns, and
maybe a light mortar or two, could attack and defeat entrenched American units
of roughly equal size but lavishly armed with the most modern weapons and
backed by fearsome air and artillery support. Chinese tactical formations
maintained a torrid pace of operations, although this inevitably outstripped
what their logistical train could support. Their units displayed this tactical
excellence from squad to division levels, and the credit for this has to go to
China’s tactical commanders. With only a few exceptions, the Americans were
never able to match Chinese tactical skills in Korea, and only were able to
achieve a stalemate through the application of overwhelming firepower to bleed
the Chinese army white—and they could do so only because Chinese logistical
failings prevented them from overrunning the peninsula altogether.
Another important aspect of China’s victories was its superb
intelligence capabilities. In Korea, China won the intelligence war, and in
doing so, went a great distance toward winning the entire war. China’s constant
attention to reconnaissance and its persistent efforts to gather information on
its adversary in any way possible usually gave Chinese military leaders at all
levels an excellent understanding of the adversary they faced. On the other
hand, China’s meticulous attention to operational security and CC&D
prevented their enemies from knowing much if anything about their own
operations. At the grandest strategic level, the Chinese moved over 300,000 men
into Korea without the United States realizing it. At tactical levels, Chinese
platoons and battalions often passed right under the noses of US, ROK, and
other Western units before and during a battle.
Chinese military setbacks were largely the product of two
weaknesses: logistics and weaponry. Chinese deficiencies in supplying and
moving their forces were literally crippling because they led to widespread
starvation and frostbite. In 1950–1951, this failing was unquestionably the
most important factor that prevented China from turning a remarkable victory
into a decisive one.
China’s arsenal was its other great problem. The Chinese
simply lacked the equipment that their adversaries possessed, both in terms of
quantity and quality. The gap between the arms of a US, or even a ROK, unit and
those of comparable Chinese units was immeasurable. Nevertheless, China’s
deficiencies in terms of arms should not be exaggerated: the Chinese armed
forces achieved stunning successes despite this problem, and their defeats do
not seem to have been the result of deficiencies in weaponry. Had the Chinese
been better armed, their operations almost certainly would have been even more
successful, but there is no reason to believe that this would have compensated
for the logistical problems that brought their Korean offensives to a halt.
An important aspect of this issue is whether Chinese
deficiencies in weaponry and logistics were purely the product of their
poverty, or the result of an inability among Chinese personnel to read and
write, to understand machinery, and to handle the complex requirements of a
modern army. Was the problem simply that the Chinese could not afford to build
or buy adequate numbers of modern arms, trucks, and combat consumables? Or, was
the problem that even had Beijing been able to acquire adequate supplies of this
materiel it would have made little difference because Chinese soldiers and
officers would have been unable to employ them properly?
This is a crucial question to understand the impact of
underdevelopment on military effectiveness. If the problem is simply one of
availability, then this says little about the impact of underdevelopment on the
performance of the personnel themselves. Of greatest importance, it would argue
that underdevelopment probably was not a very good explanation for Arab
military ineffectiveness, because in most of their wars the Arab armies had a
surfeit of weapons, mobility assets, and supplies. Unfortunately, very little
evidence is available, and what is available is contradictory. For example, the
poor dogfighting skills of Chinese pilots suggests that the problem was an
inability to fully exploit modern technology. On the other hand, the excellent
machine gunning and artillery skills of Chinese ground forces indicate just the
opposite, that the problem was simply the inadequacy of the available hardware.
As a final note, although China’s enemies have often blamed
their losses on Chinese numerical superiority in manpower, this excuse
unconvincing. In Korea, Chinese quantitative advantages were not great. The
Chinese often had fewer men in the field than the UN forces. Of course, the UN
armies had a much lower “tooth-to-tail” ratio so the Chinese frequently had
more combat soldiers available than did the United States. But these imbalances
should not have been decisive. For instance, in November 1950, China fielded
388,000 men against 342,000 UN soldiers. Even if one assumes that as much as 80
percent of Chinese manpower were combat troops while only 50 percent of UN
manpower were, the net figure is 310,000 Chinese soldiers against 205,000 UN
soldiers. Given the immense material disparity between the two sides, such a
difference in manpower should not have been decisive. In 2003, an
Anglo-American army of about 75,000 troops with similar material advantages
crushed an Iraqi army of 300,000 and conquered their country in under a month.
If the issue were merely mass versus materiel in Korea, the Chinese advantage
in mass should not have outweighed the UN advantage in materiel.
Regardless of the raw balance of manpower, the crucial point
is that the Chinese did not win by overwhelming numbers. The Chinese were
forced to employ mass as a substitute for firepower in their tactical maneuver
schemes. This should not take away from the fact that their victories over the
US-led armies in Korea were achieved by superior tactical competence. The
Chinese won battles by deceiving, confusing, and outmaneuvering their
opponents, not by drowning them in a sea of manpower. Especially prior to
Ridgway’s reforms, American military units in Korea were very mediocre, and
weren’t even as competent as their World War II antecedents. For the Americans,
having more such units would not have made nearly as much difference as having
more capable ones.
Chinese and Arab Military Effectiveness.
Comparing Arab military performance since 1948 with the
Chinese military experience in the Korean War shows pretty much the same thing
as the Libya-Chad case: vast differences in military effectiveness existed
between many Arab and non-Arab forces despite comparable levels of
socioeconomic development. China’s extreme backwardness does not appear to have
produced the same patterns of ineffectiveness in Chinese forces that
characterized Arab operations during the postwar era.
Aside from those categories related to limited technical
skills, the only areas in which Chinese and Arab armed forces appeared
comparable was in the high degrees of unit cohesion and personal bravery
displayed by both. Other than this, it is difficult to find areas in which the
Arabs fought as well as, or even just similar to, the Chinese. In particular,
the Chinese manifested none of the problems the Arabs had with information
management and tactical leadership in terms of initiative, creativity,
flexibility, responsiveness, etc. Instead, these were areas in which the
Chinese excelled. For the Chinese, maneuver warfare and information management
were arguably their greatest strengths, whereas for the Arabs these were their
greatest weakness.
