When China’s peasant army intervened in the Korean War in
October 1950, all of the material factors favored the UN armies. Led by Marshal
Peng Dehuai, the Chinese attacked into Korea with roughly 380,000 men commanded
by two army groups, the 13th and the 9th.6 The 13th Army Group with about
180,000 men faced the main UN force, the US Eighth Army marching up the western
side of the Korean peninsula, while the 9th Army Group faced the US X Corps on
the eastern side with only about 120,000 men. In addition, the units assigned
to the 13th Army Group were all veteran formations from the Chinese civil war.
Against them, the UN forces consisted of 450,000 men, of which about 225,000
were Republic of Korea (ROK) troops.
Peng Dehuai in his Marshal uniform
In addition to their slight numerical edge, the UN armies,
and particularly their American backbone, possessed an incalculable advantage
in equipment, mobility, and firepower. Chinese units were laughably
underequipped compared to their American counterparts. Only one-quarter to
one-third of the Chinese infantrymen even had rifles. The vast majority went
into battle with only grenades. The Chinese armies attacked without any
artillery. They had a few Katyusha MRL batteries but held these in reserve at
first. They had no antitank weapons. Instead, every Chinese platoon carried
enough TNT for 8–10 five-pound satchel charges that had to be placed in the
wheels of a tank or thrown through an open hatch to have any effect. The
heaviest weapons Chinese units possessed were a handful of 120-mm mortars per regiment
and only light mortars and light machine guns at lower echelons. Those weapons
the Chinese did have were a heterogeneous assortment captured from the Japanese
and the Guomindang and so consisted of older US, European, Japanese, and some
Russian small arms. The Chinese had no radios below regimental headquarters,
and had so few of these that divisions generally relied on runners for
communications. Finally, the Chinese entered Korea with a logistics system that
had to rely entirely on porters except for about 800 old trucks, of which only
300–400 were operational on any given day.
The Chinese Intervene. The initial Chinese assault began on
October 21, 1950. They struck with total surprise. Chinese CC&D efforts
were phenomenal, and US intelligence never detected the movement of their vast
armies into Korea. The Chinese also were greatly aided by the self-deception of
UN-commander General Douglas MacArthur’s headquarters. MacArthur adamantly
believed that the Chinese would not intervene (and if they did that they would
be easily defeated by US air power), and so he and his subordinates repeatedly
disregarded evidence of an impending Chinese offensive.
When the Chinese attacked, UN forces were caught spread out
all over northern Korea and completely unsuspecting. The Chinese hit so quickly
and so hard that many units were overrun before they knew what was happening.
Initially, the Chinese deliberately targeted South Korean formations, believing
them to be weaker than American or other non-ROK formations. They enveloped the
ROK 1st Infantry Division, attacking simultaneously from the rear and both
flanks before the division ever knew they were there. The South Koreans fought
their way out only because they were able to call on enormous US firepower to
cover their retreat. The Chinese then smashed the ROK 6th and 8th Infantry
Divisions, caving in the right flank of the ROK II Corps and causing the entire
corps to collapse. The Chinese armies kept pushing west, trying to roll up the
lines of the US Eighth Army. They enveloped and mauled the US 8th Cavalry
Regiment at Unsan, before the Eighth Army commander, Lt. General Walton Walker,
ordered the entire army to fall back to the Chongchon River. At the Chongchon,
the United States was able to regroup and bring to bear its overwhelming
firepower to halt the Chinese advance.
Marshal Peng concluded that it would be too costly to try to
break through the UN lines along the Chongchon and instead opted to pull back
in hopes of luring the UN armies back north. Peng’s intention was to coax the
UN forces out of their fortified lines and get them on the move where they
would be easier prey for another Chinese offensive. In addition, the Chinese
started to suffer from logistical problems almost immediately. Within days of
the initial attacks, Chinese combat units had outstripped their man-powered supply
columns. Chinese units carried only three days of food, and after a week of
combat were tired and starving. This too argued in favor of a withdrawal and
preparation for a new offensive.
The Chinese Second Phase Offensive, their main assault
against the UN, began in late November 1950. By that time, Marshal Peng had
regrouped and resupplied his forces and believed he had his support services in
better shape for a new offensive. He would commit 388,000 Chinese troops
against a UN force in northern Korea that now numbered only 342,000. To make
matters worse, the Americans had interpreted the withdrawal in early November
as an indication that the Chinese had been beaten—despite the fact that they
had won nearly every battle they fought—and had run back to Manchuria.
Consequently, on November 24, MacArthur ordered a renewed offensive to the Yalu
River, despite the misgivings of some of his more clear-headed field
commanders. Once again, UN forces pushed back up the peninsula, spread out, and
paid little heed to forward reconnaissance. The Chinese struck on November 25th
like a hurricane. They attacked with complete surprise and their operations
were devastating.
Contrary to popular belief, Chinese forces rarely employed
“human wave” attacks. Human wave assaults entail hurling masses of lightly
armed infantry against an enemy position in an effort to take that position
through shock and attrition. The idea is that the horde of soldiers will simply
swamp the position despite their paucity of skills or weaponry. The Chinese
regularly employed massed infantry tactics, but rarely human wave attacks. The
differences are subtle but important.
In Korea, Chinese forces were so lightly armed that they
could not generate adequate firepower for virtually any military operation.
Consequently, the Chinese had to employ masses of infantry for those roles in
which better-equipped armies would normally use firepower. Specifically,
Chinese armies could not use firepower to cover the movements of a unit or to
pin an adversary while another force maneuvered against it. Instead, the
Chinese had to use infantry assaults for all of these tasks. In addition, the
Chinese at times employed what they called the “short attack”—a variant of the
Soviet echelon attack, albeit without tanks. In a short attack, Chinese
infantry formations would repeatedly attack a narrow enemy defensive sector in
hope of wearing down the defenders and creating a breakthrough they could
exploit. While manpower-intensive, both of these approaches represented more
sophisticated uses of light infantry than what is traditionally meant by a
“human wave attack.”
The most common Chinese tactic was to employ masses of
infantry to keep constant pressure on a position—just as a Western force would
use firepower to do the same—while other elements outflanked and enveloped the
enemy position. Obviously, this resulted in terrible casualties because keeping
pressure on a UN position required the Chinese to send large numbers of lightly
armed infantry into the heavy firepower of US and allied units. The Chinese
only employed true human wave attacks on occasion late in the Korean War, when
so many of their veteran soldiers had been killed that they had to rely largely
on raw recruits who lacked the training and experience to employ more
sophisticated tactics.
Bloody or not, Chinese tactics were highly effective,
securing victory after victory despite the lopsided imbalance in weapons and
equipment. Chinese units employed a constant screen of reconnaissance patrols
to locate enemy positions. Chinese patrols would then further probe the enemy
lines looking for unit boundaries, flanks, gaps, and other weak points. Under
cover of darkness, infantry units would infiltrate through these gaps or around
the enemy’s flanks. These forces would be employed in the attack to surround
front-line combat units; overrun enemy command posts, artillery, and other
support units; and set up ambushes deep in the rear to cut the enemy’s escape
route. Other Chinese units, employing painstaking CC&D, would sneak up as
close to the enemy defensive positions as possible without giving themselves
away. The purpose of this was to be able to rush the defender from a short
distance to get into close combat immediately. This was advantageous because
the Chinese were superb in hand-to-hand combat and because this hindered UN
units from bringing their artillery and air support to bear.
Whenever possible, the Chinese would begin their attack
suddenly and under cover of night. Ideally, Chinese infantry infiltrated
earlier would combine with formations in front of the enemy to launch assaults
from all sides simultaneously. When this was impossible, some units would
launch a frontal assault to pin the enemy as other forces conducted a double
envelopment of the position. Then, while some reduced the encircled enemy
positions, others would bypass them and push on into the rear to attack the
enemy’s depth. As soon as one sector was secured, Chinese forces would press on
quickly deeper into the enemy’s rear or into the flanks of nearby enemy units.
When enemy forces were put to flight, Chinese units pursued aggressively for as
long as they could. These tactics were employed at every level of the Chinese
military, from army group and army right down to company and platoon, and
proved highly successful throughout the war.
The Chinese used these tactics in November 1950 to tear huge
holes in the UN lines. The main Chinese attacks were directed against the
center of the UN front, where the Eighth Army in the west and the X Corps in
the east were separated by the impassable mountains of central Korea. The
Chinese 13th Army Group attacked the ROK II Corps and the US IX Corps on the
right flank and center (respectively) of the Eighth Army advance while the 9th
Army Group attacked the US 7th Infantry Division and the 1st US Marine Division
holding the left flank of the US X Corps.
Chinese successes were spectacular. In the west, the Chinese
split and then destroyed the two forward divisions of the ROK II Corps,
allowing two entire Chinese armies to push around the right flank of the Eighth
Army and envelop the US 2nd Infantry Division as well as the right flank of the
US 24th Infantry Division. The 2nd Infantry Division took 4,000 casualties and
lost over 50 percent of its equipment fighting its way out of the Chinese
encirclement. A Turkish Brigade rushed north to hold the collapsing right flank
was butchered, and the US 1st Cavalry Division also took heavy losses when it
was brought forward for the same purpose. Chinese forces penetrated and
enveloped parts of the US 25th Infantry Division and the ROK 1st Infantry
Division, forcing both back with heavy losses. In the east, Chinese forces
outflanked and mauled the US 7th Infantry Division. The only significant
reverse the Chinese suffered during the entire campaign was against the US 1st
Marine Division, which conducted a brilliant fighting withdrawal. Although the
Chinese threw two entire field armies against them, the Marines fought
phenomenally and, with plentiful fire support, they crippled the Chinese 9th
Army Group and cut their way south.
The Marines aside, UN forces fell back in panic and
confusion and the Chinese pressed them as hard as they could. However, the
Chinese advance simply ran out of steam south of Pyongyang. Several factors
were at work. First, Chinese forces could not advance as quickly as the UN
could retreat. Without any motor transport, the Chinese could not keep pace
with the fully mechanized UN units. The Chinese lost contact with the UN on
December 3 and did not catch up to them again until December 20 when the UN had
regrouped and formed a new defensive line north of Seoul. Second, China’s
ramshackle logistical system could not support an advance even as quick as the
Chinese infantry could march. As in October, Chinese units quickly began to run
out of food and ammunition. As winter crept in and they had no warm clothing,
they also began to suffer heavy losses from frostbite and exposure. Many units
showed superhuman endurance and kept moving south without resupply, but
eventually they too had to halt. Finally, US air power prevented the Chinese
from advancing during the day and complicated Chinese logistical problems by
working over roads, bridges, and rail lines, and destroying many of the precious
few trucks and rail cars the Chinese had.
Continuing the Offensive. The Chinese resumed their assault
on New Year’s Eve. This “Third Phase Offensive” was a virtual replay of its
predecessor. The Chinese again took the UN forces largely by surprise,
launching 280,000 men against a 100-mile assault sector. In the center of the
peninsula, Chinese units again concentrated on the ROK II Corps, again smashing
through it and then turning onto the flanks of the American units on either
side. In the west, the Chinese mostly broke through the ROK divisions deployed
between the American divisions, and then conducted double envelopments of the
US units. Once again, in the first weeks of the offensive, the Chinese
inflicted heavy losses on the UN forces and sent them reeling backward.
However, almost immediately, logistical problems and China’s dearth of motor
transport—compounded by the relentless pressure of US air power—prevented the
Chinese from turning local successes into strategic victories. Time and again,
Chinese units could not move fast enough to close their encirclements before
the UN units slipped from their grasp. By mid-January 1951, the Chinese had
taken Seoul and pushed the UN south of the Han River, but they ran out of steam
before they could obliterate the UN armies altogether.
The Third Phase Offensive was China’s last shot at victory
in Korea, and when it failed, stalemate became inevitable. By late January
1951, several important changes had deprived the Chinese of the capability to
achieve a decisive victory. First off, Chinese losses were staggering.
According to Marshal Peng, by the end of the Third Phase Offensive, China had
lost roughly half of the force originally deployed to Korea in October and
November 1950. Most of these casualties were the result of combat, logistical
problems, and winter weather, with combat losses being the smallest of the three
categories. What mattered was that so many of those killed were the hardened
veterans of World War II and the Chinese Civil War. Consequently, Chinese
armies increasingly were filled out with raw recruits sent to Korea with
virtually no training.
Meanwhile, Chinese logistical problems continued to worsen.
American air power prevented the Chinese from effectively using the railroads
inside Korea, so supplies had to be carried by porter from the Manchurian
border 300 kilometers away. Chinese divisions required remarkably few
provisions compared to their American counterparts, but as soon as they went on
the offensive, the extra distance from the Manchurian railheads began to weigh
down their advance. At the end of the Third Phase Offensive, Chinese troops
were attacking UN units primarily to seize their rations rather than to take
their positions or drive them out of Korea.
In addition, Lt. General Matthew Ridgway took command of the
US Eighth Army in late 1950 and then succeeded General MacArthur as theater
commander in 1951. Ridgway was a brilliant general who rebuilt the UN armies
and devised new tactics for fighting the Chinese. With Ridgway in command, UN
forces were far more dangerous than they had been in the past.
In early February, Ridgway launched a limited counterattack
that made little progress and took heavy casualties. Less than a week later,
the Chinese responded with their Fourth Phase Offensive. Through outstanding
CC&D efforts the Chinese again surprised the UN units, but the declining
strength of the Chinese armies and the growing strength of UN forces with
Ridgway in command made this offensive even less successful than the last.
Surprise and Chinese tactical prowess again combined to bring some short-term
successes: Chinese armies again routed several ROK divisions, allowing the
Chinese to penetrate and envelop nearby American units. The US 2nd Infantry Division,
finally back on line after its drubbing in November, was once again encircled
and mauled. This time, however, Ridgway had devised tactics that allowed the UN
to employ its firepower more effectively to kill Chinese and break up their
assaults. Chinese units suffered appalling losses as a result of these tactics,
and again their logistics failed them, forcing pauses that let UN units slip
away before they could be cut off and destroyed. After only a week, the Chinese
were forced to pull back to regroup.
It took the Chinese over two months to recover from their
Fourth Phase Offensive. During this time, Ridgway launched a series of limited
counterattacks that succeeded in retaking Seoul. Then on April 22, the Chinese
commenced their Fifth Phase Offensive. This was Peng’s last bid at victory, and
for it he had assembled 500,000 Chinese and North Korean troops. Yet it too
followed the trend of accomplishing less than its predecessor.
The Chinese again achieved tactical surprise, and again
aimed their initial assaults at ROK units. However, Ridgway had begun a program
to retrain and re-equip ROK troops and, this time, the ROK divisions were
pushed back, but not routed. UN troops also had learned to defend their
positions in-depth and from all sides so that Chinese infiltration was much
harder and less effective. In addition, the UN now had roughly 650,000 troops
(227,000 US, 400,000 ROK) defending a much shorter front, making it far more
difficult for the Chinese to find gaps between their units. Finally, Ridgway
had concentrated unprecedented levels of firepower and simply obliterated
everything in front of the UN lines. American artillery batteries were employed
to bombard suspected Chinese assembly points whenever an attack seemed
possible, while the US air forces conducted over 7,000 ground attack sorties in
support of UN troops.
Chinese manpower reserves and tactical skills were such that
they were again able to penetrate the UN lines, but they could not translate
these breakthroughs into strategic victories. Mobility and logistics problems
hobbled the Chinese advance from the start, giving Ridgway time to bring up
American divisions held in reserve that proceeded to check and then reduce the
Chinese penetrations with overwhelming firepower. As their supplies dwindled
and their casualties soared, Chinese morale disintegrated and whole units began
to crack under American pummeling. The Chinese pushed to the outskirts of
Seoul, but were unable to retake the city.
The War Drags On. After the failure of the Chinese Fifth
Phase Offensive, the fighting in Korea bogged down into a bloody stalemate.
Both Peng and Ridgway recognized that they could not score a decisive victory
over the other. Chinese maneuver skills and manpower resources essentially
balanced out American firepower, mobility, and logistics. Both sides conducted
frequent limited offensives meant to secure more advantageous defensive
terrain, but neither attempted another grand “end-the-war” offensive.
Instead, the Chinese dug-in deep. They built elaborate
trench and tunnel complexes with interlocking fields of fire, strongpoints,
minefields, and hidden exits from which the defenders could launch sudden
counterattacks from unexpected locations. According to Marshal Peng, the
Chinese dug 1,250 kilometers of tunnels and 6,240 kilometers of trenches by
war’s end. In the late summer of 1951, after the failure of China’s great
offensives, the USSR began to provide Beijing with modern weaponry. The Soviets
sent tanks, artillery, trucks, infantry weapons, and advanced fighter aircraft
such as the MiG-15 to China. This new arsenal gave the Chinese considerably
more firepower than in the past and a better ability to hang on to their
defensive positions.
As a result of the sudden influx of Soviet equipment into
China, the war in the air over Korea became interesting just as the war in the
ground deadlocked. The Chinese Communists had never had an air force before,
and their pilots had no more than a year of training before they took to the
skies, so Beijing set only modest objectives for the new service. Essentially,
Marshal Peng asked only that the Chinese Air Force provide air defense for his
ground armies. At first, the Chinese fighters tried to intercept US
bombers—mostly B-29s—attacking the Chinese logistics network in northern Korea.
The B-29 was no match for the MiG-15 and thus Chinese pilots began doing
considerable damage to US bomber formations in late 1951. However, these
operations prompted the United States to deploy advanced F-86 Sabre and F-84
Thunderjet squadrons to Korea to escort the bombers and clear out the MiGs. In
dogfights with the US fighters, especially the Sabres, the Chinese were
initially mauled. The Sabre was a slightly more capable aircraft than the MiG,
but the big difference was that virtually all of the US pilots were veterans of
World War II while the Chinese were brand new to flying. Nevertheless, over
time the Chinese pilots gained experience, and some became quite good.
As the size of China’s air force grew and the experience of
its pilots improved, Beijing tried more ambitious air operations. First, in
April 1951, the Chinese attempted to make a major air effort in support of
their Fifth Phase Offensive by employing large numbers of IL-10 Sturmovik
ground-attack aircraft they had received from the USSR. However, in ferocious
battles with the US Sabres and Thunderjets, the MiGs could not clear the sky
for such a ground-support campaign.
Next, the Chinese attempted to halt the US air campaign
against Chinese lines of communication that was hampering the flow of supplies
south to the front lines. In the summer and fall of 1951, the Chinese deployed
690 combat aircraft in Manchuria, of which 525 were MiG-15s, to try to gain air
superiority over the battlefield. At that time, the United States had only one
wing of Sabres and another of F-84s in Korea. United States’ pilots reported
that the Chinese were better led, better trained, better organized, and
employed better tactics than in the past. In some cases, this was because the
Soviets had dispatched some of their own veteran pilots to fly the MiGs for the
Chinese (and North Koreans).
Although the Chinese continued to be on the losing end
against the Sabres, they were able to put up such huge numbers of aircraft that
they began to seriously interrupt the US tactical air campaign against their
logistics system. In response, the US air forces threw all their assets into a
massive offensive counter-air campaign consisting of fighter sweeps and
constant attacks on Chinese forward air bases. The MiGs rose in defense and
fought huge, swirling dogfights with the American fighters. Although the US Air
Force was unable to knock out the Chinese airbases altogether, they shot down
hordes of MiGs in this way. Nevertheless, in 1952, the Chinese Air Force became
even more aggressive, deploying ever greater numbers of aircraft (1,800
aircraft, including 1,000 jet fighters) and flying them farther and farther
south. Still, although Chinese dogfighting skills continued to improve, they could
never beat the Sabre pilots, and so over the course of 1952 and 1953, attrition
began to wear down the Chinese Air Force, forcing it back on the defensive, and
reducing its ability to interfere with other US air operations. Ultimately, the
American Sabres would shoot down 566 MiGs for the loss of about 100 of their
own.
With the fighting deadlocked on the ground and the United
States having defeated the Chinese air threat, both sides agreed to peace talks
in 1951. Nevertheless, it took two years of on-again, off-again negotiations to
produce a ceasefire agreement on July 27, 1953, largely because of
disagreements over the handling of prisoners of war. Actual costs for the
Chinese remain unknown, but the most recent assessments suggest that probably
around 450,000 Chinese were killed in the fighting. On the other hand, the
South Koreans suffered 137,899 killed and the Americans 36,516 dead, most of
whom were killed fighting the Chinese.
Patterns of Chinese Military Effectiveness
Overall, Chinese military forces fought very well during the
Korean War. Chinese forces labored under a variety of important disadvantages,
many of them derived directly from the poverty and underdevelopment of Chinese
society at the time. Yet they scored major victories, knocking the UN armies
out of North Korea and then fighting them to a draw around the 38th Parallel.
Of greater importance, the specific performance of Chinese military forces in
battle showed little similarity to that of the Arab armies. Although there were
areas of overlap, primarily related to limited technical skills, even in these
cases the similarities were not identical.
Chinese Strategic Leadership. China’s generals mostly showed
a high degree of competence. Peng Dehuai obviously stands out as a first-rate
commander, but Beijing’s strategic direction in general was very good.36 Allan
Millett has argued that if Peng had deployed more of his force east of the
Chongchon River in the November 1950 Second Phase attack, it would have
produced an even more crushing victory than Peng achieved. That may be a
correct appraisal, but it still does not detract from Peng’s performance under
difficult conditions, nor the scope of what he did accomplish on this and many
other occasions. In particular, Peng and China’s other generals seemed to have
had an excellent understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of their own
forces and carefully crafted their operations to suit those capabilities.
Peng’s various offensives in Korea were well conceived, and
had UN forces been less mobile and his own logistical system been more robust,
the UN might easily have been thrown off the peninsula altogether. Even working
under these constraints his operations achieved remarkable results. His
offensives always featured a single-minded concentration of force against the
decisive points coupled with deft maneuvers to confuse and cut off enemy
formations. Nor would it be fair to criticize Peng for failing to incorporate
his own logistical weaknesses and the enemy’s mobility into his planning:
Peng’s mission, throw the UN off the Korean peninsula, probably was
unattainable given the capabilities of his forces, yet he came remarkably
close.
The direction of Chinese operations also was first class in
every category. China’s military moves were thoroughly planned and meticulously
prepared. Chinese generals used feints, deception, disinformation, and maneuver
in superb combinations to achieve surprise and defeat otherwise superior
opponents. They were extremely diligent about reconnaissance and intelligence
operations. Although willing to pay heavily in casualties, it is difficult to
say they squandered lives: Chinese operations were well-thought-through and
there was a clear, well-reasoned purpose to their sacrifices. Chinese strategic
leaders kept the control and organization of their forces simple and
straightforward and commanded enormous armies with remarkably primitive
communications systems. Chinese offensives were noteworthy for consistently
securing surprise, uncovering the weak sectors in an enemy’s defense,
concentrating overwhelming force at the decisive point on a battlefield, and
forcing the enemy to fight at a disadvantage through rapid maneuver. On the
defensive, Chinese operations were marked by a thorough appreciation for the
terrain, extensive and well laid-out fortifications, and an ability to sense
the flow of battle and shift forces appropriately in response to changes.
Before we move off the topic of China’s strategic
leadership, it is worth noting that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was
heavily politicized at this time in commissarist fashion.39 Political officers
were present down to company level, and numerous officers and soldiers were
Communist Party members who enforced party dogma. Chinese officers generally
assumed that the political commissars were more powerful than they were since
all military orders had to be countersigned by the ranking political officer.40
Patrick Coe has noted that in the Chinese military of the Korean War,
“Decisions in combat (and elsewhere) not only had to be militarily or
tactically correct; they also had to be politically correct.” Mao Zedong was a
notoriously paranoid, capricious, and bloody-minded dictator who terrified his
generals. Peng’s own rise was primarily a result of his steadfast loyalty to
Mao, yet Mao endlessly micromanaged Chinese operations, often pushing
strategically foolish ideas that drove Peng and his staff to distraction.
All of this reinforces the point that while politicization
can be an impediment to military effectiveness, it is not inevitable, and
various armies have found ways to compensate. Likewise, emphasizing the
promotion of loyalty over competence does not mean that every general in a
politicized military will be incompetent. There are brilliant loyalists too,
especially in armies with considerable recent combat experience where the audit
of battle can help sort the wheat from the chaff.
