Il-4T 5th GMTAP, Black Sea Fleet
Pe-2 (205th series) 40th BAP, Black Sea Fleet
A-20DO 30 RAP, VVS Black Sea
Though varying in intensity, air activity was more effective
and dangerous than submarine activity all through the year. Off the part of the
coast held by the Soviets (with the naval bases of Poti and Batumi) it made
operating increasingly difficult for the German submarines. Their main task was
attacking the Soviet coastal traffic, especially that carrying supplies to the
forces at Novorossiysk and Mount Myshako. When the submarines attempted to move
close in- shore by night, they were picked up by intersecting searchlights stationed
on the coast, and then attacked from the air, after the plane had illuminated
them with a kind of star shell. They attributed their detection to the noise of
their diesel engines, which must have been picked up with listening gear on the
shore. By switching over to electric drive, they sometimes escaped the
searchlights, but as soon as planes came they had to dive.
In this context, it should be mentioned that contrary to
Soviet assertions, not a single one of the six German submarines was lost at
sea to enemy action. When the Germans retreated from the coast of the Black Sea
in August 1944, one submarine was put out of action by bombs dropped from the
air on the naval base at Constanta. Two were scuttled by their crews at
Constanta; the last three operated until their fuel was exhausted. Then their
crews scuttled them off the Turkish coast.
Soviet air attacks on warships, convoys, and ports were
frequent all through the year. The planes used bombs, torpedoes, and often
their guns at close range. The impression on the German side was that the
Russians carried out naval reconnaissance with torpedo planes for the double
purpose of reconnoitering and also attacking when suitable targets were
sighted. The convoys had to watch constantly for attacks by single planes with
torpedoes. They generally came from the direction of the sun. In most cases,
the torpedoes missed, but now and then they hit a target. A war diary (probably
Admiral Black Sea) said on 22 January: “The vigorous employment of the Air
Force, and particularly of aerial torpedoes, represents a substantial threat to
the still inadequately protected convoys.”
Besides reconnaissance and torpedo attacks, the third task
of the Soviet planes was to drop magnetic mines into the shipping channels. The
results of these various activities are illustrated by the events of a few days
in January 1943:
20 January: Repeated torpedo attacks by single planes on
convoys along the Rumanian and Bessarabian coast. No success reported.
21 January: Air attack on Anapa with 88 bombs (war diary:
“The importance of that port for our supplies is recognized”).
22 January: Attack by several torpedo planes on a convoy
assembling off Sulina. Steamer Kolosvar (1,200 GRT) takes one bomb hit on her
stern, is towed to the beach, and later towed into Sulina. Planes flew out of
the sun, in misty weather, and launched torpedoes at an altitude of 40 meters,
distance 400 meters. One plane fired its guns shortly before dropping false
recognition signal (war diary, Naval Special Duty Detachment).
Verkehr mit Kleinfahrzeugen (MFP) in the Black Sea
24 January: MFP-323 [Marinefährprahm (MFP)], en route to
Feodosiya towing a minesweeping coil (for magnetic mines) struck an ELM
(Englische Luft-Mine, a magnetic mine dropped by plane) and sank. Only two men
were rescued. In February 1943, the Soviet landing forces at Novorossiysk were strongly
supported from the air. When the bridgehead near the town was cut off from the
beach, planes attempted to supply it, but could not save it.
The Kerch area and the German warships there, whether
carrying supplies or laying mines, were often attacked from the air. On 25
February, naval ferry barges laying protective minefields south of the entrance
to the Kerch Strait were repeatedly bombed and gunned. On the same day, bomb
attacks in several waves hit the town and port of Kerch. Two days later near
Kerch, MFP-353 was severely damaged by bomb hits. Ten men were killed, five
wounded.
Other regions were not neglected. On the same day, Italian
MTBs returning from a night operation against the traffic under the coast
between Tuapse and Gelendzhik were repeatedly attacked by planes, but suffered
no damage. Off the southern tip of the Crimea, a single plane attacked a convoy
of towed barges with bombs and guns, but the gunfire of the escorting MFPs
prevented it from doing serious damage. On 1 March, the supply traffic across
the Kerch Strait was again the target of several attacks. After a direct bomb
hit on her stern MFP-176 was a total loss. MFP-273 was severely damaged. On 9
March, MFP-371 (without cargo) struck a mine near Kerch and sank with her
entire crew. The necessary minesweeping operations hindered the ferry traffic
across the Strait. In the foIIowing weeks, bomb attacks and minelaying in the
Kerch Strait were continuous. On 22 March, a motor barge carrying ammunition
blew up after a bomb hit; MFP-331 and a tug were damaged.
In themselves and in comparison with what was going on in
other theaters of war, these events seem no more than mere incidents. However,
they added up, and the scale of operations was· different here. Except for the
few Rumanian destroyers, which never undertook offensive operations, there were
no large warships at the disposal of the Axis powers, and very often, no planes
for reconnaissance and protection. The Soviet Navy was fully aware of this
situation and did its best to damage the supply traffic and the German-held
ports. Submarines and particularly airplanes were its weapons.
In the following months, Sevastopol was bombed many times.
Some ships were damaged; one used as accommodation for the crews of the MFPs
was sunk (not three transports, as the Soviets claimed). At sea, there were so
many attacks that only a few examples can be given. Apparently, the tactics
differed considerably in quality. On 31 -March, in an attack on the escorted
minelayer Grafenau (a converted steamer), two torpedoes were dropped from a
height of 80 to 100 meters, but they expended themselves on the surface. Then
in a second pass, two more were dropped, this time from a height of 20 to 30
meters. The torpedoes were outmaneuvered and one plane was shot down. On 10
April a war diary observed: “The fact that no losses occurred in most of
the aerial and bombing attacks on supply steamers is to be attributed to the
circumstance that those attacks were not carried out vigorously enough, and
that the relatively heavy antiaircraft fire forced the attacking planes to turn
away too soon.”
This was noted after an unsuccessful attack on a convoy with
towed barges west of Feodosiya. But it was also noticed that combined attacks
of the Soviet planes improved. On the same day an attack of this kind on the
tanker Prodromos (800 GRT) was carried out with unusual tactical skill. While
two bombers came in at an altitude of 2,000 to 3,000 meters, two others
attacked from the direction of the sun at a height of only 100 meters. At
first, they dropped bombs on an escorting gunboat but missed; then they dropped
five bombs close to the bow of the tanker. Just when the ship turned to port to
avoid the bombs two torpedo planes made a surprise attack from starboard and
dropped three torpedoes at a distance of about 500 meters. All the torpedoes
jumped high out of the water: one was a surface runner. Only by skillful
maneuvering did the tanker escape bombs and torpedoes. Then the planes attacked
again with their guns, in three waves closely following each other.
The German Air Force was very interested in the cargo of the
tanker. As a consequence, on her next trip three days later, the Prodromos was
escorted for the first time not only by gunboats, but also by fighter planes.
All through April attacks continued, most of them
unsuccessful. In the first half of May, very low visibility protected the
convoys. On 18 May, the 88th Anapa convoy was first attacked near Anapa by a
submarine with two torpedoes, which expended themselves on the surface, then
three hours later by four bombers and four fighters with bombs and guns. The
convoy suffered no serious damage.
On 19 May, the 89th Anapa convoy of four MFPs was attacked
by seven or eight planes with bombs and guns when it approached its
destination. MFP-309 and MFP-367 with cargoes of ammunition and guns took a
number of bomb hits and sank when the ammunition exploded. The survivors were
picked up by MFP-126, which was also damaged, and MFP-144, which escaped
unhurt. Two of the attacking planes were shot down. But half the convoy was
wiped out! This showed clearly how dangerous attacks on this vital supply line
could be.
Little is known about the situation of the Soviet Naval Air
Arm regarding material and supplies, or personnel, training, and losses. It can
be assumed that the number of planes increased considerably in the course of
the year, as it did in the Baltic. According to a report of the 1st German MTB
[Motor Torpedo Boat] Flotilla, new types of planes and equipment were being
used by the Russians. From the late fall of 1942 on, Anglo-American convoys
traversed the Barents Sea almost without loss and carried great amounts of war
material to Murmansk. After the Axis powers lost North Africa in the spring of
1943, the passage through the Mediterranean was free, and supplies went to the
Persian Gulf and from there unhampered to the Soviet forces.
1st MTB Flotilla reported:
20 May 1943. Moonlit night. Very fast planes, apparently
Mosquitos, attack the flotilla returning from the Caucasus coast (where the
MTBs had operated against the coastal traffic), followed by 8-10 bombers.
Attack tactics: In the approach the planes, firing 2 guns, come to within 25
meters of the boats and drop 15 to 20 fragmentation bombs when pulling up. They
also drop 4 to 6 light bombs (about 30 kg) which are suspended under the wings.
When withdrawing they fire with 3 or 4 machine guns rigidly mounted in the
tail, or in some cases with movable machine guns. MTB 8-72 received 15 hits,
all of them 20-mm armor-piercing shells. 8-49 also hit, developed a big cloud
of smoke. Two men slightly wounded, both 20-mm AA guns hit; but remained
serviceable. The radio operated only on emergency power. Hits in 2 tanks in
compartment No. 6 and- holes below the waterline, repaired by damage control
group. A two-engined plane is hit several times by shells from the 20-mm guns
of 8-72 while making its approach. One landing gear is extended, parts of the
other fall into the water beside the MTB. The plane steadily loses altitude and
plunges into the water about 1,000 meters away. Fighter protection is
requested. One ME-110 (German fighter) does not manage to find the flotilla
until the afternoon. 8-49 is brought in despite severe damage.
The same unit reported on a day attack:
4 June 1943. No casualties or damage by dive attack out
of the sun by 3 YAK-4s, 12 bombs dropped. When defensive fire is opened, one
man parachutes out of a plane and is taken prisoner. One hour later two Douglas
Bostons drop bombs from an altitude of about 1,500 meters and fire their guns
when withdrawing. MTB 8-26 damaged by bomb fragments, 2 men seriously wounded,
3 slightly. One plane shot down. One hour later another attack by 3 Douglas
Bostons, which dropped 18 bombs but missed. Aircraft fire again as planes
withdrew.
The attacks on the convoys to the port of Anapa continued.
On 27 May, the 97th convoy was attacked. MFP-328 was sunk. In the immediate
vicinity of the port, MFP-332 with a cargo of 80 tons of gasoline for the Air
Force was attacked by 16 bombers. and fighters and caught fire. She was beached
and burned out; her crew was saved. Six of the attacking planes were shot down
by antiaircraft fire and fighters. Three days later, all nine bombers attacking
an Anapa convoy were shot down by antiaircraft guns of the ships and by
fighters. During the month of May 1943, the Soviet Naval Air Arm undertook
about 120 attacks on ships at sea and on ports and unloading places.
On 3 June, a convoy entering Akmechet was attacked by
bombers, whose target was evidently the tug Hamburg. The ship was damaged and
had to be beached, but was able to leave after five days. Immediately
afterwards, the port was heavily attacked. According to the war diary of the
Naval Special Duty Detachment the reason probably was that the tug looked
similar to “Ship 19,” a ship specially equipped for submarine
hunting, which had had a brush with a sub- marine a few days earlier.
During the air attacks on the convoys a new kind of aerial
torpedo was observed that ran on the surface and detonated after a certain
distance. It was supposed that these torpedoes were meant to damage
shallow-draft vessels like the MFPs, which were difficult to hit with normal
torpedoes (war diary of the 3rd Flotilla of motor minesweepers). There is no
proof, however, that they were not simply defective.
Attacks continued all through the summer against the same
targets. On 5 June, the MTB base at Ivan Baba suffered heavy casualties and
considerable destruction when hit by bombs. On 12 June off Feodosiya five
bombers attacked a convoy composed of two steamers protected by two Rumanian
gunboats and two MFPs. The planes flew out of the sun and were discovered too
late. Three bombs hit the steamer Birgit (1,970 GRT) forward-she sank slowly,
bow first.
On 17 June, 18 planes attacked a convoy of towed barges near
Kerch. One barge was hit and sank after its cargo of ammunition exploded. As it
drifted burning, six planes attacked it with 30 bombs. On 19 June, a group of
German artillery carriers and RA-motor minesweepers bombarded the port of Yeysk
on the Sea of Azov. Six Russian planes attacked them repeatedly at low
altitude. They opened fire at a distance of about 1,000 meters; the motor
minesweepers answered with all their guns at 500 meters. According to the Ger-
mans’ observation the Russian pilots had not the nerve to fly into that hail of
fire. Their own gunfire, which at first was well aimed, became inaccurate. One
of the Russian planes was shot down.
On 25 June, the 123rd Anapa convoy was attacked just outside
the port by twelve bombers covered by six fighters. The defense was prepared:
German fighters were in the air and shot down six of the attacking planes. The
convoy did not suffer any damage. On its way back, it was attacked again. This
time there were no fighters present. MFP-142 was hit and her cargo of old
uniforms caught fire. She was towed back and the fire was extinguished.
During June 1943, Soviet planes repeatedly mined the
shipping channel at the mouth of the Danube.
On 7 July, Feodosiya and Yalta were attacked from the air.
At Feodosiya fourteen planes dropped 50 to 60 bombs. One harbor defense boat
was sunk; a slip with a Rumanian gunboat on it was damaged; beyond this only
some buildings were hit. Yalta was bombed by five planes. MFP-144 was damaged
and had to be beached; a fishing cutter sank. Yalta was attacked again on 19
July – motor minesweeper R-33 sank.
On 13 July, the 140th Anapa convoy was attacked by seven
bombers with bombs and guns. The planes evidently were armored, for the 20-mm.
antiaircraft shells were deflected. The bombers came in twice, at an altitude
of no more than 300 to 400 meters. Nevertheless, they damaged only one MFP
slightly. One bomber was shot down.
Three days later, the 142nd Anapa convoy was attacked by
nine bombers and three fighters. They came in very low, only 100 to 150 meters
high, dropped 80 to 100 small and medium bombs and fired their guns during the
approach and the retreat. Some men were killed or wounded by fragments. The
only direct hit sank an unmanned landing boat towed by a steamer. The
antiaircraft guns of the escorting MFPs brought down two planes; German
fighters accounted for another six.
On 26 July, the 152nd Anapa convoy was attacked by 15 bombers
with about 80 bombs and the usual gunfire. None of the ships was damaged; one
man was killed, one wounded. Then the planes were intercepted by German
fighters, which brought down ten of them. This was probably the reason why
another group of 21 planes sighted to seaward of the convoy did not attack.
The war diary of the Sea Commandant Caucasus for July 1943
remarked:
The steadily increasing bomb attacks in the last three
months on naval ferry barges (MFP) and convoys with tows, bound for Anapa and
Temryuk, and in the Kerch Strait, were mainly carried out by armored ground
attack planes, against which the 20-mm AA guns were able to score successes
only when the planes were in a favorable position and when armor-piercing
ammunition was used. The MFPs scored 6 kills, mostly with their 75-mm guns. The
fighter cover now available in this area brought down 28 of the attacking
planes in July.
In August, there were several attacks on Anapa convoys (Nos.
163, 166, and 167), but they caused only minor damage, and no losses.
S-Boot S-47 [sister ship of S-46]
S-Boot S-28
On 24 August, 1st MTB Flotilla reported:
Attack by 4 bombers and 6 fighter-bombers in continuous
independent passes with aircraft weapons, rocket bombs and fragmentation bombs.
One plane fires a type of rocket which explodes at an altitude of 100 to 150
meters and scatters an incendiary composition (not phosphorus), which started
some fires on the forecastle of MTB S-46, but they could be extinguished with
water.
On the same day, the senior officer of the flotilla reported
an un- successful night attack on his unit:
Star shells over the boats. One plane fires a green
flare, then aircraft weapons. Ten minutes later attack with bombs, at least 10
to 15 drop among the boats. After another ten minutes renewed bombing, 5 hits
on MTB S-28. Only the insufficiently shielded exhaust of the airplanes can be
made out, at first with the night glass, then with the naked eye against a
cloudless starry sky. Estimated altitude between 500 and 800 meters. Half an
hour later, again bombs and aircraft weapons fire.
The Russians apparently employ sea reconnaissance planes
with locating gear (radar). They fire green flares after identifying the MTBs.
These flares home in the bombers, and they maintain contact even after the
bombing attack is ended.
On 29 August 1943, the same unit reported:
First wave of planes replaced by new ones so that on an
average 10 to 12 planes participate in the attack, which they carry out in
close order. Getting in position at an altitude of about 1,000 meters, the
enemy dives to about 50 meters over the water. Armament: 20-mm guns, 27-mm guns,
and slow-firing 37-mm gun. Result: Maximum speed of the MTBs reduced to 20
knots by hits mostly of 20-mm guns. More or less severe damage on boats.
Request for fighter protection, especially urgent since 4 boats are to be
employed again on the same day.
These detailed reports are cited to give a picture of Soviet
air activity in this theater of war. In the beginning of September 1943, its
tempo changed as the over-all situation on the Russian fronts compelled the German
armies to fall back here, too. At the same time, the Russians felt strong
enough to take the offensive. The German decision to retreat across the Kerch
Strait and the Soviet decision to attack along the Black Sea coast coincided.
