Colonial troops and, to a lesser extent, Indians contributed
to Canada’s defeat, but British regulars bore the brunt of the fighting. The
relationships among redcoats, colonials, and Indians were strained, but the
developing rift between British officers and colonial civilians was even more
ominous. Regular officers believed colonial troops had no merits. They were,
wrote one of Braddock’s subordinates, “totally ignorant of Military Affairs.”
They were ill disciplined and lazy and, lacking even elementary knowledge of
camp sanitation, suffered an appalling rate of sickness. Colonies never fielded
as many men as the legislatures voted, officers failed to report accurately
their unit’s strength, and men deserted in droves, so the number of colonial
troops was always uncertain. The large enlistment bounties that were needed
also made colonial recruits exorbitantly expensive.
This catalog of shortcomings was true in many respects, and
understanding why is important. The Great War for Empire was a war of conquest,
requiring extended offensives far from the homes of most militiamen. But the
militia was a system for local defense. Large numbers of militiamen could not
be absent long without leaving their colonies vulnerable to enemy raids and
without dislocating the local economy. Militiamen were part-time
citizen-soldiers who had to run businesses, tend crops, and conduct the fishing
and fur trades. Consequently, authorities hesitated to impose militia drafts
and instead relied on volunteers, who came primarily from the lowest social
strata. In the few cases when a colony resorted to a draft, the sending of
substitutes and paying of commutation fines ensured that few middle- or
upper-class citizens served. But of all the high-ranking British officers
serving in North America, Lord Loudoun alone seemed to realize that colonists
marching with English regulars against some distant fort were different from
the men enrolled on militia musters. “The Militia,” he wrote, “are the real
Inhabitants; Stout able Men, and for a brush, much better than their Provincial
Troops, whom they hire whenever they can get them, and at any price.” Almost
all other British officers confused the expeditionary forces with the actual
militia, thus misjudging the militia’s military potential in defense of its own
terrain.
Holding such a low opinion of colonial soldiers, British
officers relegated them to auxiliary functions. They built roads, served as
wagoners and boatmen, and repaired and constructed forts. With their
aristocratic ties and long years of experience, English officers were reluctant
to treat American officers, who were usually young and newly commissioned, as
equals. While provincial officers had traditionally relied on exhortation and
admonishment to maintain discipline, English officers inflicted ferocious
punishment upon enlisted men, including liberal use of the lash and, for
serious offenses, execution by hanging or firing squad. To colonial soldiers,
whippings and executions were horrific and unnecessary. And because the redcoats
engaged in swearing, excessive drinking, and whoring, the colonists also
condemned them as profane, irreligious, and immoral—pollutants in a pure land.
And initial British defeats mingled with earlier memories, making a lasting
impression. The Walker expedition, Cartagena, Braddock, Loudoun at
Louisbourg—what right did professionals have to claim superiority? All in all,
serving with British regulars graphically reminded colonists of a standing
army’s threat to free people living in a free society, and persuaded them that
their own military institutions were morally and militarily superior.
British officers also considered Indians questionable
allies. Amherst described them as “a pack of lazy, rum-drinking people, and
little good,” and Forbes accused them of being “more infamous cowards than any
other race of mankind” and having a “natural fickle disposition.” These
impressions flowed in part from cultural ethnocentrism, but also from the
natives’ difficult position in the white rivalry swirling around them. Between
1748 and 1760 England and France negotiated constantly with the Indians and
tried to buy their allegiance through lavish gift giving. While the natives
listened to, and took presents from, both French and English ambassadors, they
were naturally anxious to be on the winning side. Inactivity, duplicity, and
hesitancy to go on the warpath were stratagems to buy time until a clear-cut
winner emerged. But these traits exasperated British professionals, who
demanded unwavering commitment.
Initially, with English arms suffering reverses, Indians
tended to support the French, and the British maintained the neutrality of
important tribes, such as the Creeks and Iroquois, only through astute
diplomacy coupled with large expenditures for gifts. The turning point in
Indian relations, as in the war itself, came in 1758 when a reversal of
battlefield fortunes occurred and the naval blockade prevented French goods
from reaching Canada. Addicted to European products through the fur trade and
white gift giving, French-aligned natives suffered. The tide of allegiance
shifted to England.
Although the British found that friendly Indians were
useful, in the final analysis they were not essential. To combat American
conditions and the enemy’s guerrilla methods, the British recruited white
frontiersmen and organized them into ranger companies to perform duties
traditionally done by natives. Regulars also made certain tactical adaptations.
They formed light infantry companies composed of agile, lightly armed men who
received training in irregular warfare tactics. Some units learned to deliver
aimed fire rather than volleys, to maneuver by companies instead of battalions,
and to march single file to lessen the impact of an ambush. These
modifications, however, were not widespread, and the British army’s success
depended on standard European practices. The regulars’ discipline and organized
persistence counterbalanced the virtues of Indian-style warfare.
Relations between British regulars and colonial civilians
were a reenactment of the Walker expedition performed on a continent-wide
stage. Conflicts over recruitment, quarters, transportation, and provisions
fueled mutual resentment. To fill understrength regiments and raise new ones,
the British hoped to tap the colonial manpower reservoir. In 1755 and 1756 they
met considerable success, enlisting some 7,500 colonists, but thereafter the
number of recruits dwindled. One reason was that men had a choice: long-term
service in the regulars with low pay and harsh discipline, or short-term service
in a provincial unit with an enlistment bounty, higher pay, and lax discipline.
Another reason was the often violent opposition to the unscrupulous methods
British recruiters used. For example, they recruited heavily among indentured
servants, a practice that colonists considered “an unconstitutional and
arbitrary Invasion of our Rights and Properties” that cast suspicion on all
recruiting. By 1757 mobs regularly harassed recruiters and “rescued” men whom
they assumed had been illegally recruited. The inability to find men outraged
professionals and forced Pitt to rely on full-strength regiments from the home
islands.
Redcoats needed quarters, especially during winter, but
America had few public buildings that could serve as barracks. The only option
was to quarter them in private houses, but citizens argued that soldiers could
not be quartered in a private home without the owner’s consent. Civilians had
the law on their side, but Loudoun insisted that “Whilst the War lasts,
Necessity, will Justify exceeding” normal quartering procedures. He told the
Albany city government “that if they did not give Quarters, I would take them”
by force. Albany officials maintained that Loudoun “assumed a Power over us
Very inconsistent with the Liberties of a free and Loyal
People. . . .” Civilians and soldiers invariably reached an
accommodation over quarters, but only at a high cost in mutual trust.
The British government also counted on colonial assemblies
to provide adequate provisions and timely transportation, but the colonies
proved stingy and dilatory—at least in the opinion of regular officers. Every
British officer complained about the reluctance of assemblies to comply “with
the just and equitable demands of their King and Country,” but legislators
acted at their own deliberate pace. They were so slow in fulfilling requests
that the British frequently impressed or seized what they needed, which was an
unjustified exercise of arbitrary power from the colonial perspective.
British officers thought they perceived sinister motives in
the colonials, who seemed “bent upon our ruin, and destruction,” working
tirelessly “to disappoint every Plan of the Government.” Professional soldiers
simply misunderstood colonial institutions and political philosophies.
England’s appointment of a commander in chief for North America imposed
centralized military control on a decentralized political system. Each colony
considered itself sovereign and was anxious to maintain its freedom of action
in military affairs. Allowing the Crown’s representative, who was also a
high-ranking officer in a suspect standing army, to direct the war effort would
reduce every colony’s independence. Furthermore, many colonists accepted
radical Whig ideology, which preached a dichotomy between power and liberty.
Every accretion of power reduced freedom’s sphere. When the British army
recruited fraudulently, quartered men illegally, impressed property, and tried
to bully assemblies, colonists feared that growing military power threatened
their liberty. Colonial legislatures believed they were fighting two wars of
equal importance, one against France and one for liberty.
Several important themes emerged from the colonial wars.
First, most Americans gained a high opinion of their martial abilities and a
low opinion of British professionals. Colonists typically emphasized British
defeats and insufficiently praised the triumphs of Amherst, Forbes, and Wolfe.
Such attitudes were a tribute to the colonists’ selective military memory and
help explain colonial confidence in 1775. Second, the wars had a nationalizing
impact. In 1763 each colony still jealously protected its sovereignty, yet
during the wars against New France important experiments in cooperation had
occurred. The Albany Plan, though rejected, was an evolutionary step leading to
the First Continental Congress. During the colonial wars English colonists
became Americans. Finally, a growing estrangement between England and the
colonies emerged. Many Englishmen agreed with Loudoun that the colonies assumed
“to themselves, what they call Rights and Privileges, Totally unknown in the
Mother Country.” Many colonists concurred with the Albany city council, which
stated that “Upon the Whole we conceive that his Majesties Paternal Cares to
Release us [from the threat of France] have in a Great Measure been Made use of
to oppress us.” The Peace of Paris, which should have pleased Englishmen
everywhere, left a bitter heritage.
