Russian prisoners of war after the Battle of Tannenberg.
Eastern Front, 17–23 August 1914.
Movements of 23–26 August 1914. Red: Germans, blue: Russians
Movements of 27–30 August 1914.
The general staff had expected that Russia would be slow to
mobilize, but the Tsar’s army defied these estimates by coming into action
quite quickly against the German forces in East Prussia. There the 200,000 men
of the German Eighth Army, commanded by 66-year-old Generaloberst Maximilian
Wilhelm Gustav Moritz von Prittwitz und Gaffron, had been deployed to secure
the eastern frontier while Germany’s main onslaught fell upon France in the
west. Although the Russian army’s preparedness to conduct offensive operations
was considerably less than that of the Germans, it nevertheless responded with
alacrity to a French request to launch an offensive on the Eastern Front.
Having moved two armies into East Prussia in mid-August, III Corps of Russian
General Rennenkampf’s First Army struck the German I Corps at Stallüponen on 17
August.
Altogether the Russians fielded some 250 battalions against
a German strength of about 144, although the German Eighth Army’s artillery was
significantly stronger in terms of the ratio of supporting guns to battalions
and of the amount of heavy artillery it had available. In addition, Russian
command and control and support arrangements were generally archaic: for
example, compasses were available, but few maps were issued, even at formation
headquarters. Many Russian junior officers could not read maps in any case.
Insufficient availability of telephone cable meant that many operational
messages were necessarily sent by radio, but these were often transmitted ‘in
clear’ (unencrypted) because the Russian signallers either had no codes or else
the message recipients were incapable of decoding them. Meanwhile, little
mechanical transport was available to the Russian army, and despite the
updating action taken after Russia’s defeat by Japan in 1904 much of the army’s
other supporting services and logistical arrangements were still primitive. In
East Prussia in 1914 neither the Russian commander-in-chief, General Jilinsky,
nor his two army commanders, General Rennenkampf (First Army) and General
Samsonov (Second Army) displayed more than average competence as commanders,
while at the same time the dislike of Rennenkampf and Samsonov for each other
was well known. On the other hand, events on the German side would reveal
shortly that the professional ability and judgement of the Eighth Army
commander, Generaloberst von Prittwitz und Gaffron, also failed to measure up
to that which was expected of an army commander.
In response to the Russian attack, von Prittwitz und Gaffron
ordered I Corps, commanded by General der Infanterie Hermann von François, to
withdraw his corps to Gumbinnen. But von François refused to do this and
instead attacked the Russians, taking some 3,000 prisoners before at last being
forced to fall back to Gumbinnen, albeit with the loss of seven guns.
Meanwhile, General der Kavallerie (later Generalfeldmarschall) Anton Ludwig
August von Mackensen’s XVII Corps43 and Generalleutnant (later General der
Infanterie) Otto von Below’s I Reserve Corps moved to reinforce von François,
arriving at Gumbinnen at about midday on 20 August. Gumbinnen was then the
scene of the next clash, where von François attacked the Russian flank that
morning and took a further 5,000 prisoners. Von Mackensen’s XVII Corps was,
however, less fortunate. It arrived at Gumbinnen ahead of von Below’s corps and
was immediately committed to the battle, where a local Russian advantage in
artillery first halted the German advance and then broke the newly arrived
corps. There followed the rare sight of an entire German corps rendered
non-effective, one division actually breaking and fleeing the battlefield, with
many of its soldiers retreating as far as fifteen miles before their flight was
finally halted. Although they had lost about 19,000 men, Gumbinnen was a
victory for Rennenkampf’s First Army, but it had been achieved in relative
isolation, as General Jilinsky lacked both the aptitude and the essential
command and control facilities to coordinate the actions of his two armies
successfully and thus exploit the Russian success.
In the belief that his rival’s success at Gumbinnen heralded
an imminent German collapse, and determined to gain his own victory, General
Samsonov advanced his Second Army to the south of the Masurian lakes. Although
these sizeable lakes now effectively divided the two Russian armies from each
other such that the Second Army could no longer be supported by the First, von
Prittwitz und Gaffron assessed that the Russian advance was so strong that the
whole of the Eighth Army should now withdraw west of the River Vistula. At
19.00 hours on 20 August he issued the necessary warning order and notified by
telephone chief of the general staff Generaloberst Helmuth von Moltke at army
supreme headquarters in Koblenz of his intentions. In practice, this decision
was somewhat premature, for within 24 hours two of the principal staff officers
in Eighth Army headquarters had persuaded von Prittwitz und Gaffron that
offensive action rather than a withdrawal was both necessary and feasible. Accordingly
the army commander rescinded his earlier order for a retreat to the Vistula,
thus stabilizing the operational situation and establishing the foundation from
which a major German success would shortly be launched.
But for Generaloberst von Prittwitz und Gaffron it was all
too late. His initial call to Koblenz had provoked horror within a high command
and general staff that could not countenance either the abandonment of German
territory or an apparently blatant disregard of von Moltke’s direction for the
Eighth Army to counter the Russian advance by offensive rather than defensive
action. Since that fateful telephone call, von Moltke had solicited reports
from a number of general staff officers in key posts within the various units,
formations and headquarters of the Eighth Army, and from these he had
ascertained that the situation was by no means as precarious as that portrayed
by von Prittwitz und Gaffron. As a result, and irrespective of the Eighth Army
commander’s subsequent change of orders on 21 August, von Moltke decided to
replace him forthwith.44 This decision, and von Moltke’s choice of a new
commander for the Eighth Army, would have important and far-reaching
consequences both for the army and, in due course, for Germany.
The officer now selected by von Moltke to take over command
of the Eighth Army was 66-year-old General der Infanterie (later
Generalfeldmarschall) Paul Ludwig Hans Anton von Beneckendorff und Hindenburg,
whose chief of staff at the Eighth Army would be Generalmajor Erich Friedrich
Wilhelm Ludendorff, an officer who had already gained a formidable reputation
on the Western Front during the siege of Liège, where he had served as deputy
chief of staff of the Second Army. Paul von Hindenburg was born on 2 October
1847 and, having gained a commission in the 3rd (Prussian) Regiment of Foot
Guards (3. Garde-Regiment zu Fuß), served as a junior officer during the wars
against Denmark, Austria and France in the period to 1871. Consistently
regarded as a very capable general staff officer, as well as a pragmatic and
strong leader, he rose to command an army corps as a Generalleutnant,
eventually retiring from active service in 1911. He had achieved command of an
army corps despite his well-known preference for service with troops rather than
in staff appointments, a preference that rarely resulted in rapid advancement
in the peacetime army but which earned him the loyalty and respect of those he
commanded. During the later years of his service, von Hindenburg had been
considered as a possible contender both for the post of chief of the general
staff and for that of Prussian minister of war, but this did not happen. When
he retired as a corps commander in 1911 his last first-hand experience of a
major conflict had been as an infantry junior officer in 1871, so that when von
Hindenburg was recalled to serve his country as commander of the Eighth Army in
late August 1914, almost half a century had passed since he had been at war.
Nevertheless, the formidable combination of army officer training, the general
staff system and a rigorous process of selection for high command – together
with the inherent ability and personal qualities von Hindenburg brought to his
new assignment – ensured that the right man had been found to produce a German
victory in East Prussia. In addition, this was an area that von Hindenburg
already knew well, not only due to the number of manoeuvres and general staff
training exercises staged there but also because he had been born in Posen
(modern Pozna in Poland) in East Prussia.
Dressed in his old 1911-era uniform, von Hindenburg was met
by his new chief of staff at the main railway station in Hannover on 23 August,
from where they would travel on together to Eighth Army headquarters.
Generalmajor (later General der Infanterie) Erich Friedrich Wilhelm
Ludendorff45 was a very different man from von Hindenburg, but the
personalities of the two generals complemented each other very well. Born in
1865 and in due course commissioned into the infantry, Ludendorff had no direct
experience of combat or of a major conflict prior to 1914. Unlike von
Hindenburg, however, he readily accepted that a career in the general staff was
the route to speedy professional advancement, and having achieved membership of
the staff he quickly demonstrated his aptitude, intellect and professional
abilities. Despite his undoubted professional competence, he also acquired a
reputation as an ambitious, mercurial, violent and abrasive officer who carried
these less-positive traits into his approach to the organization and conduct of
warfare. His vision of modern conflict was one of ‘total war’, waged to the
uttermost extent of the resources of the nation, with little thought for
matters of morality or principle if these should prejudice the army’s operations.
From 1904 to 1913 Ludendorff had worked in the operations and mobilization
department of the general staff, rising within it to head that department from
1908 until 1913. In that capacity he had been very directly involved in the
several measures proposed to increase the size of the army in the pre-war years
and had suffered the frustration of seeing the increases essential to the
success of the Schlieffen Plan refused by the government in 1912 and 1913.
Indeed, he had also been an important contributor to von Moltke’s operational
review and modification of various aspects of the Schlieffen plan, having
worked closely with him in the years prior to the outbreak of war. So it was,
at Hannover Hauptbahnhof (the city’s main railway station) on 23 August 1914, that
the leadership duo that would just a year later assume total command of the
German army for the remainder of the war, was formed. The two officers’ onward
journey to the Eighth Army headquarters at Marienburg (now Malbork) on the
Vistula took them north and east from Hannover, and they arrived there later
that day. En route they developed their own strategy to deal with the Russians,
and on 25 August von Hindenburg signed off the operation order that committed
the Eighth Army to what would become known as the Battle of Tannenberg, a
defining moment not only of the fighting on the Eastern Front but also of the
wider war. On 26 August von Hindenburg was promoted Generaloberst.
In fact, the operations staff at the headquarters of the
Eighth Army had already produced a design for battle which virtually mirrored
that devised by von Hindenburg and Ludendorff on 23/4 August. There, the chief
of operations, Generalmajor Grünert, but more particularly his deputy,
Oberstleutnant Max Hoffman, had also identified the disjointed command and
control arrangements between the two Russian armies and the very different
operational approaches of Rennenkampf and Samsonov. They assessed that this
offered the Eighth Army an excellent opportunity to isolate and destroy the two
Russian armies separately by conducting a holding action against one Russian
army while concentrating and employing the maximum force against the other. In
addition, the physical barrier provided by the Masurian lakes further
exacerbated what was already the virtually non-existent coordination between
the two Russian armies.
Given Samsonov’s over-optimism and recklessness – even now
he was pushing his Second Army onwards at best speed in order to attack the
German right, with his exhausted infantry regiments marching up to twenty
kilometres a day – and Rennenkampf’s caution, the Germans judged that Samsonov
clearly posed the greater threat. A captured Russian map showing the First
Army’s operational plan, together with the steady flow of intelligence gleaned from
German intercepts of Russian radio traffic (all still sent in clear), tended to
confirm this assessment. However, if the Germans had miscalculated and
Rennenkampf should break through on the northern flank, which was held by a
predominantly cavalry force of just one division necessarily deployed on a
frontage that exceeded thirty kilometres, then the Eighth Army risked an
overwhelming attack into its rear area while its main combat units were still
dealing with Samsonov to the south. In any event, the meeting of minds between
the new commander and his chief of staff and the in-place operations staff of
the Eighth Army meant that the army’s new offensive could be launched in fairly
short order.46
As ever, the railway played a crucial part in moving major
elements of the German corps speedily and largely undetected to concentrate
against the Russian Second Army to the south. The German I Corps was still
de-training to the west of Tannenberg on 25 August following its move
south-west from Gumbinnen when Ludendorff, concerned by the threat posed by
Rennenkampf, ordered its commander, General der Infanterie Hermann von
François, to attack Samsonov’s Second Army forthwith. This was despite the fact
that none of the I Corps’ heavy artillery was by then available and that
neither I Reserve Corps nor XVII Corps would be able to support such an attack
as both corps were still moving south by road to join the battle against
Samsonov. At first von François refused to launch such an ill-judged venture,
but he was then visited by von Hindenburg, Ludendorff and Hoffman. The outcome
of the ensuing discussion was a statement by von François that, if the attack
order were indeed to be confirmed, he would only agree to carry it out on the
understanding that the resulting action would unavoidably have to be carried
out by the infantry alone! Hoffman, who was undoubtedly more in tune with the
Russian deployment and activities than Ludendorff, supported von François’
decision but did not declare this to the new chief of staff. Fortuitously,
however, just then intelligence was received that Rennenkampf’s progress was
sufficiently slow for his army to be unable to threaten the Eighth Army’s rear.
At the same time, Samsonov had ordered a pursuit of what he had mistakenly
assessed to be a still-demoralized and routed German XX Corps commanded by
General der Artillerie Friedrich von Scholtz.
As a result, the original assessment of the Russian
intentions made by Hoffman and Grünert was validated. Von François was no
longer required to carry out his premature attack, while Samsonov’s Second Army
was drawn even more deeply into the German trap. Battle was finally joined when
Samsonov launched his own attack at dawn on 27 August, advancing
north-westwards on a general line from Allenstein to Osterode. At that stage
the two corps commanded by von Below (I Reserve Corps) and by von Mackensen
(XVII Corps), which had deployed to the north and south of Tannenberg, fell
upon the Russian right. By that evening the Russian advance had been halted, with
many casualties sustained. Samsonov, however, was relatively undisturbed by
this turn of events and still anticipated the imminent arrival of the First
Army from the north. In the meantime, early that morning von François’ I Corps
– now with its full complement of heavy artillery available – had begun a
seven-hour bombardment of the Russian left, accompanied by a series of attacks
that virtually annihilated the Russian corps on the Second Army’s left wing.
Samsonov threw five more divisions into the battle, but they failed to break
through the German forces that had by then almost encircled him. By nightfall
on the 27th the Russian army group commander, Jilinsky, was at last becoming
aware of the disastrous situation concerning his Second Army and ordered
Rennenkamp to hasten his attack from the north.
On 28 August the fighting continued, and the German
encirclement of the Second Army was completed when von François again disobeyed
an order from Ludendorff, which on this occasion required him to move to assist
von Scholtz’s XX Corps. Fortunately, XX Corps did not need this assistance, and
by driving instead upon Neidenburg (now Nidzica), von François’ I Corps
effectively cut off the Russians’ potential escape route to the south. Although
the remnants of the ensnared Second Army fought on bravely and enjoyed some
local successes, including the temporary recapture of Neidenburg, the end was
not in doubt. Late on the night of 29 August Samsonov walked alone into the
dense fir woods, took out his pistol and shot himself. The last units of his
decimated army dug in and continued fighting until the morning of 31 August,
when they surrendered. By then the last of the Second Army’s ammunition was
gone, and there was no hope of resupply or relief. In the defeat of the Second
Army 50,000 Russians had been killed or wounded, with 92,000 prisoners taken by
31 August – the ‘day of harvesting’ as von Hindenburg termed it – together with
some 500 guns.
Of the great haul of prisoners taken, no fewer than 60,000
were directly attributable to the actions of von François, who had yet again
modified Ludendorff’s orders for his I Corps at the end of the main battle,
thus ensuring that the remaining Russian troops could not infiltrate away to
the south and east. Although his intuitive command of I Corps had been most
effective in accordance with the concept of Auftragstaktik, and he was a key
contributor to the German victory against the Second Army, von François had not
endeared himself to Ludendorff during the Battle of Tannenberg. Consequently,
despite his clear professional ability and suitability for advancement and high
command, von François was destined to remain a corps commander throughout the
war.
Meanwhile, now fully aware of Samsonov’s fate, Rennenkampf
withdrew his First Army, only to find himself being pursued by German forces
now reinforced by an additional two corps from the Western Front. During the ensuing
Battle of the Masurian lakes, fought between 5 and 15 September, von
Hindenburg’s forces finally crippled Rennenkampf’s army, which lost more than
125,000 men including 30,000 as prisoners, together with 200 guns. However, the
defeat of the Russian First Army was not as decisive as that of the Second
Army: Rennenkampf managed to disengage and withdraw part of his command
successfully, often marching his men more than thirty kilometres a day on
congested roads in blistering heat. The end of this follow-on battle by the
Masurian lakes marked the conclusion of the Battle of Tannenberg, a German
victory that had great significance for the wider conflict, shaping its future
course and that of European history, but particularly that of tsarist Russia.
Tannenberg also assured the future prominence and fortunes
of von Hindenburg and Ludendorff. The former continued as commander-in-chief on
the Eastern Front throughout 1915, achieving several further successes. By the
end of that year von Hindenburg had become a household name within Germany and
internationally, and when the Kaiser relieved General der Infanterie Erich
Georg Sebastian von Falkenhayn of his post as chief of the general staff in
August 1916 von Hindenburg assumed that appointment, becoming in practice
Germany’s supreme warlord throughout the remaining years of the war.
Meanwhile, Ludendorff continued as von Hindenburg’s
principal adviser, and so from August 1916 he exerted a very significant
influence upon many aspects of an army that was by then engaged in a modern,
industrialized war of attrition. He addressed the army’s doctrine, tactics,
technology and organization with great energy, as well as the key policies and
practicalities that affected the means of industrial production necessary to
support such an army. Whereas von Hindenburg was unquestionably Germany’s
military and national figurehead during those years, he lacked the sheer
ability of his subordinate. Ludendorff’s was the intellect and the brain that
drove the nature and spirit of the army and, arguably, that of the German
nation in arms from 1916 to 1918, while von Hindenburg’s great skill was to
recognize Ludendorff’s considerable, if sometimes erratic, attributes and his
own limitations, simultaneously directing, supporting and focusing the former
while not deluding himself over the latter. The enormous breadth of power and
responsibility that was accorded to von Hindenburg and Ludendorff from 1916
made them true warlords of their time and exemplars of more than a century of
Prussian and German military professionalism. For both of these senior officers
their ultimate wartime achievements were the culmination of a process that
began in East Prussia during August–September 1914 at Tannenberg and the
Masurian lakes.
