There was no doubt that the strain, and the growing number
of relatively inexperienced aircrew being committed to the battle – some with
as little as 20 hours’ experience on Spitfires or Hurricanes – was beginning to
tell on Fighter Command during the last days of August and into September, as
the deficit between British and German losses narrowed. To make matters more
difficult, the Germans were tightening up their fighter escort procedure. On 1
September, when the Heinkels of KG 1 attacked the docks at Tilbury, its 18
bombers were escorted by three Jagdgeschwader – roughly four fighters to every
bomber. All the German aircraft returned to base, having been virtually
unmolested by the RAF. The day’s operations cost the RAF 15 fighters, including
four Hurricanes of No. 85 Squadron, against the Luftwaffe’s nine. The losses
contrasted sharply with those sustained during a series of savage air battles
on 31 August, when the RAF lost 24 aircraft and the Luftwaffe 28.
The scores were again close on 2 September, when several airfields,
including Biggin Hill, Lympne, Detling, Eastchurch (three times), Hornchurch
(twice) and Gravesend were heavily attacked, together with the aircraft factory
at Rochester and Brooklands aerodrome, adjacent to the vital Hawker and Vickers
factories. Fighter Command maintained standing patrols over its sector
airfields during the day and lost 23 aircraft against the Luftwaffe’s 26, seven
of which were Messerschmitt 110s.
On 3 September the airfield attacks continued, North Weald
being very severely damaged, and in the day’s fighting the RAF and Luftwaffe
each lost 16 aircraft. Meanwhile, across the Channel, events were taking a new
and dramatic turn.
That morning, Reichsmarschall Göring summoned his
Luftflotten commanders, Kesselring and Sperrle, to a conference at The Hague.
The main item on the agenda was the feasibility of a ‘reprisal’ attack on
London; the Luftwaffe Operations Staff had ordered Luftflotten 2 and 3 to
prepare such an attack on 31 August, even though there still existed ab order
from Adolf Hitler forbidding bombing raids on the capital.
A lack of documentary evidence makes it hard to reconstruct
the process leading to the decision to attack London. Hitler’s desire for
reprisals following RAF attacks on Berlin, themselves a consequence of the
erroneous raid on London in August, certainly played its part, but this is not
the whole of the story. Bombing attacks on targets in the London area had been
at the core of a plan originated by II Fliegerkorps before the start of the air
offensive, the idea being to wear down the British fighters by bringing them to
battle over the city, which was within the range of German single-engined
fighters. That was one valid reason for attacking the city, although it hinged
on another, far less valid one. This was the belief of Luftwaffe Intelligence
that Fighter Command only had between 150 and 300 aircraft left early in
September, so that the final blow could be delivered to it over London. The
head of Luftwaffe Intelligence, Oberst Josef Schmidt, had arrived at this
conclusion by simply deducting the wildly exaggerated figures of German combat
claims from the originally assumed British fighter strength, at the same time
underestimating British fighter production. It was one of the most incredible
misconceptions of wartime German intelligence, and yet it was supported by both
Göring and Kesselring. It was not supported by Feldmarschall Hugo Sperrle of
Luftflotte 3, nor by Luftwaffe Signals Intelligence, which had compiled far
more accurate figures for Fighter Command’s strength.
On 4 September, Hitler declared in public that he now wanted
to ‘erase’ British cities, and on the following day he gave the order to attack
London and other major cities by day and night. The assault on London was to
begin in the afternoon of 7 September, and was to be directed mainly against
the docks. The city was to be attacked by Luftflotte 2 by day and Luftflotte 3
by night. Simultaneous attacks were to be conducted against armament factories
and port installations. Thirty aircraft and armament factories were selected,
and attacks on these began on 4 September, in parallel with continuing raids on
Fighter Command’s airfields. But from now on, London was the key target, and on
that decision rested the outcome of the Battle of Britain.
While the young pilots of Dowding’s Fighter Command fought
and died over the Channel and the harvest-fields of southern England, RAF
Bomber Command had been waging its own war against the enemy in the Channel and
North Sea areas. On 13 July 1940, Bomber Command switched a major part of its
efforts to the German invasion preparations in the ports, anchorages and
harbours stretching from Delfzijl in the north of Holland to Bordeaux in
south-west France. These ports were to be attacked frequently during the four
years that were to pass before the Allied invasion of Europe, but the most
intensive phase of the air offensive against them – the ‘battle of the Barges’,
directed against the armada of small craft assembled by the Germans for the
thrust across the Channel – lasted until the end of October 1940.
Aircraft of every Bomber Command Group, as well as Coastal
Command and the Fleet Air Arm, took part in this nightly offensive, the
importance of which has to a great extent been eclipsed by the massive air battle
that dragged its vapour trails over the skies of southern England during that
long summer. But the Battle of Britain was, in the broad sense, a victory for
the British bombers too; for although the Hurricanes and Spitfires of Fighter
Command denied the Germans the air superiority necessary for a successful
invasion, the attacks mounted on the invasion ports were so effective that,
even if the Luftwaffe had succeeded in obtaining temporary mastery of the air
over southern England, Hitler’s invasion fleet would have been in no position
to sail on the planned date.
This was clearly substantiated by the Germans themselves on
several occasions. On 12 September, for example, only three days before
Operation Sealion was scheduled to take place, HQ Navy Group West sent the
following signal to Berlin:
Interruptions caused by the enemy air forces, long-range
artillery and light naval forces have, for the first time, assumed major
significance. The harbours at Ostend, Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne cannot be
used as night anchorages for shipping because of the danger of English bombing
and shelling. Units of the British fleet are now able to operate almost
unmolested in the Channel. Owing to these difficulties further delays are
expected in the assembly of the invasion fleet.
With the invasion thought to be imminent, Bomber Command
launched a maximum effort offensive against the enemy-held ports. On the night
of 13/14 September the bombers sank 80 barges in Ostend harbour, and the
following night severe damage was inflicted on concentrations of enemy craft at
Boulogne. This raid was carried out by the Fairey Battles of the newly-formed
Nos. 301 and 305 (Polish) Squadrons, flying their first operational mission.
The Battles of Nos. 12, 103, 142 and 150 Squadrons – at full strength again
after the losses they had suffered in France – also carried out attacks on the
enemy ports during this period. It was the Battle’s swan-song as a first-line
aircraft; in October it was withdrawn from operations and replaced by Wellingtons
and Blenheims.
On 14 September, Hitler issued a Supreme Command Directive
postponing the launch of Operation Sealion until 17 September. On the morning
of the 16th, however, the German Naval War Staff once again reported that the
invasion ports had been subjected to heavy bombing:
In Antwerp considerable casualties have been inflicted on
transports. Five transport steamers in the port have been heavily damaged; one
barge has been sunk, two cranes destroyed, an ammunition train has blown up,
and several sheds are burning.
There was worse to come. On the night of 16/17 September,
only hours before the crucial German Supreme Command conference that was to
decide whether or not the invasion would take place, a force of Blenheims and
Battles surprised a strong concentration of enemy landing craft in the open sea
off Boulogne. Several barges and two transports were sunk, with heavy loss of
life. The vessels had been engaged in an invasion training exercise. German
bodies, washed up on the English Channel coast later, gave rise to rumours that
an invasion had actually been attempted.
On that same night the RAF also struck at the whole coastal
area between Antwerp and Le Havre, and this prompted the German Naval Staff to
report the following day that:
The RAF are still by no means defeated; on the contrary,
they are showing increasing activity in their attacks on the Channel ports and
in their mounting interference with the assembly movements.
This statement was underlined by Bomber Command on the night
of 17/18 September when, in full moonlight conditions, every available aircraft
pounded the Channel ports and caused the worst damage so far to the invasion
fleet. Eighty-four barges were sunk or damaged at Dunkirk alone, while
elsewhere a large ammunition dump was blown up, a supply depot burned out and
several steamers and MTBs sunk. The next day, the Naval Staff report made
gloomy reading:
The very severe bombing, together with bombardment by
naval guns across the Channel, makes it necessary to disperse the naval and
transport vessels already concentrated on the Channel and to stop further
movement of shipping to the invasion ports. Otherwise, with energetic enemy
action such casualties will occur in the course of time that the execution of
the operation on the scale previously envisaged will in any case be
problematic.
On 19 September, four days after the great air battle over
London and southern England that would henceforth be marked as Battle of
Britain Day, and which cost the Luftwaffe 56 aircraft, Hitler ordered the
invasion fleet assembled in the Channel ports to be dispersed so that ‘the loss
of shipping space caused by enemy air attacks may be reduced to a minimum.’
Operation Sealion had been postponed indefinitely, and Hitler’s preoccupation
now was with the projected attack on the Soviet Union.
Between 15 July and 21 September, according to German naval
sources, the British air offensive sank or damaged 21 transports and 214 barges
in the Channel ports, about 12 per cent of the total invasion fleet. These
figures should be treated with some reservation, as even at this stage of the
war the Germans were in the habit of playing down their actual losses in
confidential reports to the Supreme Command. The actual loss, in terms of both
men and material, was probably higher, but even the figure of 12 per cent is
sufficient testimony that the bombing effort during those crucial weeks was far
from wasted.
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the effort against the
Channel ports was grossly under-estimated by the War Cabinet. Churchill in
particular expressed disappointment at the results of the attacks, as revealed
by air reconnaissance, in a minute to the Air Minister, Sir Archibald Sinclair,
on 23 September:
What struck me about these [reconnaissance] photographs
was the apparent inability of the bombers to hit very large masses of barges. I
should have thought that sticks of explosive bombs thrown along these oblongs
would have wrought havoc, and it is very disappointing to see that they all
remained intact and in order, with just a few apparently damaged at the
entrance.
Churchill did not take into account the fact that many of
the barges, although apparently intact, had been made unseaworthy by damage
that the photographs did not show. The bomber crews who were over the ports
night after night knew that they were sinking the barges faster than anyone had
thought possible. The only question in their minds was whether they were
sinking them fast enough to thwart the invasion if Fighter Command were
annihilated.
The ports were easy to find, but they were not an easy
target. Light flak was plentiful and losses were heavy. The anti-aircraft
defences were particularly strong around Antwerp, and it was while attacking
this target on the night of 15/16 September 1940, that Sergeant John Hannah,
one of the crew of a Hampden of No. 83 Squadron, carried out an act of great
courage that won him the Victoria Cross. The citation tells the story.
On the night of 15 September 1940, Sergeant Hannah was the
wireless operator/air gunner in an aircraft engaged in a successful attack on
an enemy barge concentration at Antwerp. It was then subjected to intense
anti-aircraft fire and received a direct hit from a projectile of an explosive
and incendiary nature, which apparently burst inside the bomb compartment. A
fire started which quickly enveloped the wireless operator’s and rear gunner’s
cockpits, and as both the port and starboard petrol tanks had been pierced
there was a grave risk of fire spreading. Sergeant Hannah forced his way
through to obtain two extinguishers and discovered that the rear gunner had had
to leave the aircraft. He could have acted likewise, through the bottom escape
hatch or forward through the navigator’s hatch, but remained and fought the
fire for ten minutes with the extinguishers, beating the flames with his log
book when these were empty.
During this time thousands of rounds of ammunition exploded
in all directions and he was almost blinded by the intense heat and fumes, but
had the presence of mind to obtain relief by turning on his oxygen supply. Air
admitted through the large holes caused by the projectile made the bomb
compartment an inferno and all the aluminium sheet metal on the floor of this
airman’s cockpit was melted away, leaving only the cross bearers. Working under
these conditions, which caused burns to his face and eyes, Sergeant Hannah
succeeded in extinguishing the fire. He then crawled forward, ascertained that
the navigator had left the aircraft, and passed the latter’s log and maps to
the pilot.
This airman displayed courage, coolness and devotion to duty
of the highest order and by his action in remaining and successfully
extinguishing the fire under conditions of the greatest danger and difficulty,
enabled the pilot to bring the aircraft to its base.
The Royal Air Force was not alone in its campaign against
the German invasion forces that were assembled mainly in the ports of Dunkirk,
Ostend, Calais and Boulogne. Whenever possible, even though operating
conditions in the Channel had become very difficult because of air attack, the
Royal Navy took the opportunity to strike at shipping movements off the enemy
coast. On 8 September 1940, for example, three motor torpedo boats, MTB 14, MTB
15 and MTB 17, set out from Dover to attack a German convoy of about 30 small
vessels approaching Ostend. Two of the boats, MTBs 15 and 17, entered Ostend
harbour under cover of darkness and an RAF air raid and launched their
torpedoes, hitting two vessels. Exactly what they hit was never established,
but it was the first successful MTB torpedo attack of the war.
On the night of 10/11 September, a striking force comprising
the destroyers Malcolm, Veteran and Wild Swan set out to patrol the Channel off
Ostend, which was again under air attack, when radar contact was made with an
enemy convoy. Soon afterwards, the destroyers made visual contact with the
enemy, aided by the light of flares dropped by the RAF, and opened fire,
sinking an escort vessel, two trawlers that were towing barges, and a large
barge.
Offensive sweeps of this kind were a regular feature during
September 1940, when the threat of invasion was at its height, the naval forces
usually operating from Harwich or Portsmouth; the Dover destroyer force had
been dispersed, having suffered substantial damage through air attack. At the
same time, aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm, operating from bases in south-east
England, joined the RAF in maintaining pressure on the enemy invasion ports.
The biggest guns the Navy could bring to bear on the enemy
coast were mounted in two warships of World War I vintage, the battleship
Revenge and the monitor Erebus. Both mounted 15-inch guns, the Erebus being
fitted with a twin turret bearing her main armament and also with four twin 4
inch and two single 3 inch AA guns. She carried a crew of 300. On 20 September
she set out from Sheerness to bombard the German gun battery at Cap Gris Nez,
but the sortie had to be abandoned because of bad weather. On 30 September,
however, she fired 17 rounds into a concentration of invasion craft in the
Calais docks area, the fire being directed by a Fairey Swordfish spotter
aircraft. On the following day, the German battery at Wissant fired precisely
the same number of rounds at Dover by way of retaliation.
On 10 October it was the turn of HMS Revenge, the old
battleship – armed with eight 15-inch guns – sailing from Plymouth with a
screen of 5th Flotilla destroyers: Jackal, Kipling, Jupiter, Jaguar, Kashmir
and Kelvin. The cruisers Newcastle and Emerald were also at sea, protecting the
western flank, while a flotilla of six MTBs sailed from Portland to provide a
screen against S-boats. Revenge’s target was Cherbourg, and for 18 minutes,
beginning at 0333 on 11 October she laid a barrage of 120 15-inch shells across
the crowded harbour, to which was added a total of 801 4.7 inch shells from the
seven escorting destroyers. The resulting conflagration could be seen 40 miles
(64km) out to sea. The British force reached Spithead at 0800 without damage,
despite being shelled for the best part of 10 miles (16km) by a German heavy
battery.
On 16 October HMS Erebus, escorted by the destroyers Garth
and Walpole, again bombarded the French coast in the vicinity of Calais with
the aid of spotter aircraft. Forty-five salvoes were fired, beginning at 0100,
before the British force withdrew. Neither Erebus nor Revenge made any further
sorties of this kind, even though the British heavy gun defences on the Channel
coast in October were still pitifully weak. The pre-war heavy gun strength on
the Straits of Dover, comprising two 9.2 inch and six 6 inch guns, had been reinforced
during the summer by one 14 inch, two 6 inch and two 4 inch guns, all Naval
weapons, together with a pair of 9.2 inch guns on railway mountings; and in
October these were further reinforced by two 18.5 inch guns from the old depot
ship Iron Duke, also on railway mountings, and a battery of four 5.5 inch guns
from HMS Hood. Further heavy gun batteries, at Fan Bay, South Foreland and
Wanstone, would not become operational until a much later date, by which time
the invasion threat had passed.
While the British strove to disrupt enemy invasion plans,
German destroyers were extremely active in the Channel area during September
and October 1940, laying minefields to protect the flanks of their projected
cross-Channel invasion routes and also making hit-and-run sorties against
British shipping. One particularly successful sortie was undertaken on the
night of 11/12 October by the German 5th Flotilla from Cherbourg, comprising
the destroyers Greif, Kondor, Falke, Seeadler and Wolf. They sank the armed
trawlers Listrac and Warwick Deeping with gunfire and torpedoes, and shortly
afterwards destroyed the Free French submarine chasers CH6 and CH7, manned by
mixed French and Polish crews. The German ships withdrew safely; although they
were engaged by the British destroyers Jackal, Jaguar, Jupiter, Kelvin and
Kipling, the latter achieved nothing more spectacular than several near misses.
Another inconclusive action was fought between British destroyers of the 5th
Flotilla, supported by the light cruisers Newcastle and Emerald, and enemy
destroyers off Brest on 17 October, with no damage suffered by either side. The
British warships came under air attack during the operation, the most serious
threat coming from a flight of very determined RAF Blenheims whose crews had clearly
not been trained in warship recognition!
November 1940 saw a resurgence of air attacks on British
shipping by Junkers Ju 87 Stukas, which had been standing by at their airfields
in the Pas de Calais to lend tactical support to Operation Sealion, now
postponed. Their area of operations was the Thames estuary, where British
convoys were assembling, and between 1 and 11 November they sank one merchant
vessel and damaged six more. On 14 November they attacked targets in the Dover
area, destroying a drifter and damaging three more vessels, but these missions
marked the Stuka’s swansong over the British Isles.
There was a further destroyer action on 27/28 November 1940,
when the British 5th Destroyer Flotilla intercepted an enemy flotilla from
Brest. In the ensuing engagement the destroyer HMS Javelin was hit by two torpedoes,
which blew off her bows and stern and detonated the ammunition in her magazine,
destroying her superstructure as well as killing three officers and 43 ratings.
Amazingly, she remained afloat and was towed into harbour, to spend 13 months
in dock being virtually rebuilt. She eventually returned to operations and went
on to survive the war.
Notwithstanding actions such as these, it was enemy mines
that accounted for the highest proportion of British shipping losses in the
closing months of 1940. Of the 42 Royal Navy vessels lost in the Channel area
between 1 September 1940 and the end of the year, 28 were sunk by mines.
The threat of invasion had receded, and Hitler’s eyes, by
the end of 1940, were turned towards the east. But the question must be asked
whether Operation Sealion might have succeeded, had it gone ahead. All the
accumulated evidence suggests that it would not. The matter is summed up
admirably by the official Royal Navy historian:
We who lived through those anxious days may reasonably
regret that the expedition never sailed for, had it done so, it is virtually
certain that it would have resulted in a British victory comparable for its
decisiveness to Barfleur or Quiberon Bay; and it can hardly be doubted that
such a victory would have altered the entire course of the war. It is indeed
plain today that, of all the factors which contributed to the failure of
Hitler’s grandiose invasion plans, none was greater than the lack of adequate
instruments of sea power and of a proper understanding of their use on the
German side. Britain, on the other hand, not only possessed the necessary ships
and craft, but they were manned by devoted crews who were imbued with a
traditional and burning desire to come to grips with the enemy invasion fleet.
Finally, we may remark how the events of the summer of 1940 emphasised once
again what many other would-be conquerors of Britain had learnt in turn –
namely, that an overseas expedition cannot be launched with any prospect of
success without first defeating the other side’s maritime forces, and so
gaining control of the waters across which the expedition has to pass.
In conflict with a centuries-old maritime power, there is
little doubt that Hitler, had he launched his invasion, would have learnt too
late the landsman’s lesson.
