The commander of the 67th TRW requested that a few F-86s be
modified to carry cameras. When forwarded to the United States, these requests
were rejected because RF-84Fs were to replace the RF-80s. But the RF-84s never
came. The 15th TRS commander, working with other pilots in the squadron,
prepared a mockup of the nose section of an F-86 fitted with a horizontally
mounted camera shooting through a mirror angled at 45 degrees for vertical
photography.
The wing commander supported this effort to FEAF, and six
F-86As were identified in a project called Honey Bucket for modifications in
Japan. General Vandenberg, during a visit to the Far East, strongly supported
the effort and directed that kits be prepared by North American Aviation to
expedite the conversion of these F-86As to a reconnaissance version. The first
RF-86A arrived at Kimpo AB in December 1951 and was flown by a 15th TRS pilot
who had previously flown the F-86. Following several camera test flights in
South Korea, the first RF-86A combat missions were flown in January 1952. Early
photography was not very satisfactory for two basic reasons: the vibration of
the mirror, and the reversed image. These factors demanded that the film
receive special handling for processing and expert photo interpretation because
of the blurred images.
Other reconnaissance elements transferring to the
operational control of the 67th TRW in May 1951 were Firefly C-47s. These
aircraft had been first used in January 1951 to drop flares to help identify
trucks and trains. Their efforts were combined with the flare drops of RB-26s
searching for targets at night, bringing in B-26s for night interdiction.
At one time, Firefly aircraft with RB-26s operated at night
in MiG Alley to identify trucks and trains. The slow C-47 Firefly aircraft were
quickly restrained to a lower latitude, away from the area of MiG operations,
because the risk was considered too great. Another time, the Firefly aircraft
flew north, armed with specially designed tacks to drop at extremely low
altitudes over roads used by enemy trucks. One C-47 almost ran into three enemy
tanks after dropping eight tons of these roofing nails. Calling in B-26s, the
C-47 pilot overflew the road again, dropping flares for the attack. The trucks
stalled by punctured tires were then attacked. On one such mission,
thirty-eight trucks were destroyed.
The Firefly C-47s were so successful that twenty C-46s were
requested to be assigned to the 67th TRW. This was denied because of a shortage
of flares. Sometimes the Marine Corps night fighters would work with the USAF
Firefly aircraft and, after the trucks were illuminated, would attack with
500-pound bombs and 20-mm cannon.
Both the RB-26s and RB-29s had problems with the flash bombs
used to illuminate targets for night photography. A new system of cartridge-ejection
illumination was problematic because the defect rate was high. This system
required flying at 3,000 feet, but, given the mountainous terrain and intense
ground fire, this was too low for sustained operations. Subsequently, the
combination of the M-46 photoflash bomb and night cameras solved the problem
when photographs were taken at 7,000 to 8,000 feet. However, to use SHORAN
navigational aids, the aircraft needed to operate at still higher altitudes.
The M-120 photoflash bomb was then introduced to provide illumination up to
25,000 feet, but when photography was attempted at 14,000 feet, the cameras did
not produce the desired results. Thus, the RB-26s had to fly at lower altitudes
without the benefit of SHORAN for navigation.
The RB-29s operated at 20,000 feet for safety as well as
effective use of the SHORAN navigation equipment. The M-120 photoflash bombs
were supposed to be effective, but large-scale photography could not be obtained
with the focal length of the cameras that the planes carried. Finally, a camera
with a shorter focal length was used and exposures were triggered by the light
of the photoflash bombs.
The RB-45s were not effective at night because opening the
bomb bays to drop the photoflash bombs produced vibrations that made the photography
ineffective.
Essentially, by June 1952, the 67th TRW was providing all
the prestrike and poststrike photography required by the strategic bombers.
A decision was made to strike North Korean power complexes
virtually simultaneously, but initially planners hesitated to target the dam at
Suiho because it was so close to MiG Alley. Other dams to be attacked included
Chosen 3 and 4, Fusen 1 and 2, and Choshin 1 and 2. This effort necessitated
USAF and Navy fighter-bombers as well as B-29s attacking at night. Two RF-80s,
escorted by F-86s, photographed the results two hours after the attack and
confirmed extensive damage. North Korean electric power had been reduced by 90
percent when eleven of the thirteen plants were rendered unserviceable. MiGs
had not entered the fray.
The 67th TRW established a targets section in the Technical
Reconnaissance Squadron. Targets were not in short supply, as evidenced by the
fact that the squadron had a backlog of 300 sites by November 1952. Daily
intelligence reports and photographs were provided to Fifth Air Force
Intelligence from both the 67th TRW and the 91st Strategic Reconnaissance
Squadron. In fact, the greatest problem was the ability of Fifth Air Force to
properly interpret, process, and assign target missions.
The 67th TRW was responsible for keeping close watch over
all major airfields and main lines of communication in North Korea, for
identifying targets for interdiction, and for providing visual and
photoreconnaissance in front of Eighth Army units, including mosaic coverage in
depth of the front, prestrike photography, and poststrike (bomb damage)
photography. Photography for the Eighth Army extended fifteen to twenty miles
in front of each corps. Visual reconnaissance sightings were reported directly
by the pilot to fire-support coordination centers.
The biggest problem for providing adequate, timely photo
intelligence to forward Army units was the shortage of qualified Army photo
interpreters. The breakdown of responsibilities between the Army and the Air
Force was clearly spelled out in joint documents, but the Army could not
produce the photo interpreters. It fell to the Air Force to supply the
personnel, within its own limitations of qualified photo interpreters.
The 67th TRS continued to produce more photography and
intelligence information than could be used, despite being handicapped with
older aircraft. After losing five RF-51 Mustangs to ground fire while
conducting visual reconnaissance missions, the Mustangs were restricted to
6,000 feet. The Mustang, with its radiator slung on the fuselage beneath the
aircraft, was particularly vulnerable to ground fire because a single enemy
round that penetrated the radiator could drain all the coolant and cause the
engine to seize.
In July 1952, the Eighth Army introduced the 98th Engineer
Aerial Photo Reproduction Company, giving it a capability of handling 5,900
negatives and producing 25,000 prints daily. Eighth Army stated that it needed
from Air Force reconnaissance 4,900 negatives daily when it was engaged in fighting,
and 3,600 negatives when it was static. In September 1952, Eighth Army agreed
to the establishment of a Reconnaissance Branch in the joint operations center,
which eventually resulted in the Army’s reducing its need for photographic
coverage.
The Eighth Army demand for photographs did not vary
regardless of weather or the fewer daylight hours during winter. This resulted
in 30 percent of the Fifth Air Force effort being dedicated to Army front
lines. The Army wanted 3,600 daily negatives at a scale of 1:6,000 or 1:7,000.
These had been the preferred scales during World War II, but they proved
problematic for the faster jet aircraft still equipped with World War II
cameras. Installation of image motion compensators on the cameras provided a
workable solution. The army requested oblique photography at a scale of
1:3,000, but because of the high aircraft loss rate, Lt. Gen. Glenn O. Barcus
in October 1952 prohibited reconnaissance aircraft from operating below 9,000
feet when within 30,000 yards of the front lines. Over heavily defended areas,
such as Pyongyang, aircraft would have to remain above 12,000 feet.
The Far East communist aerial order of battle in mid-1952
included some 7,000 aircraft: 5,000 Soviet, 2,000 Chinese, and 270 North
Korean. Antung was the principal airfield, but several satellite airfields were
located nearby. Other aircraft were located in the Mukden and Changchun area as
well as the Port Arthur-Dairen group, and Peiping-Tientsin and Tsingtao group.
These airfields were photographed not only by RF-80s but
also by the RF-86s assigned to the 15th TRS. One pilot, Lt. Mele Vojvodich,
flying an RF-86 Sabre, spoke of flying an almost weekly coverage of the MiG-15
airfields in the Antung complex. He also flew at least one mission up to the
Harbin area. Although spotted by MiGs, he was able to outrun them, first at
altitude, and then down on the deck. Subsequently, he was awarded the
Distinguished Service Cross for his RF-86 missions. Lt. Tom Gargan, who also
flew both the RF-86 and the RF-80, was also awarded the Distinguished Service
Cross for an RF-80 mission after completion of his tour, ending with the
armistice on July 27, 1953.
Although F-86s from the 4th and 51st Fighter Wings escorted
some of these reconnaissance missions, the number of aircraft drew too much
attention and led to photo mission aborts. Tactics varied. Sometimes an RF-86
was accompanied by a single F-86, and at other times, by more escorts. Occasionally,
the escort had to break off to engage a MiG, leaving the RF-86 behind.
When the F-80 fighter wings gave up their aircraft for more
modern straight-winged F-84s, the 15th TRS was able to incorporate a number of
F-80Cs into the squadron. These aircraft were modified to carry one vertical
camera with a 24-inch focal length. In August 1952, the 45th TRS gave up its
RF-51 Mustangs, and RF-80s from the 15th TRS were made available. Then both the
15th and 45th had a mixture of RF-80As and RF-80Cs, with the 15th TRS also
having some five RF-86As. Both squadrons then participated in visual and photo
missions.
Covert intelligence reported the presence of a political
school in North Korea for training subversives to penetrate into South Korea.
The facilities were confirmed through photography, and on October 25, 1952, the
1,000-man school providing a six-month training course was attacked and
virtually destroyed.
In December 1952, RB-26s worked with B-26s to locate train
traffic. When RB-26s spotted trains, they would illuminate them with flares,
and the B-26s would attack. In Operation Spotlight on December 30, four
locomotives were destroyed and one was damaged in a marshaling yard. Firefly
aircraft also participated in these operations. Thirty-three locomotives were
destroyed in January 1953, and twenty-nine, in February. Roads were also
blocked, and the vehicles in the resulting traffic jam would be destroyed. In
January and February of 1953, 5,432 vehicles were destroyed.
General Barcus, commander of Fifth Air Force, expressed
concern over the possibility of an enemy air offensive on January 5, 1953, when
Il-28 twin-jet medium bombers were introduced into Manchuria. These aircraft
occasionally flew parallel to the Yalu River within Manchuria, not crossing
into Korea, and they could have provided an important night attack capability.
On January 12, 1953, an RB-29 was shot down during a night
mission while it was dropping leaflets along the Yalu. MiG aircraft carrying
external fuel tanks engaged U. S. Marine Corps fighter-bombers, Royal
Australian Air Force Meteors, and RF-80s in late March 1953 in the Chinnampo
area south of Pyongyang, North Korea’s capital. This was an unusual departure
from their typical sorties, when they stayed within MiG Alley, close to
Manchuria.
In the spring of 1953, the 15th TRS exchanged its RF-86A
models for the newer version, the RF-86F. Its ability to carry four drop tanks
(instead of the previous two) significantly increased its range and made it
much easier to make deep penetrations into Manchuria to overfly and photograph
airfields.
In April 1953, reconnaissance revealed communist efforts to
make a number of airfields operational, undoubtedly in preparation for the
truce. Gen. Otto P. Weyland, commander of the Far East Forces, also
anticipating an imminent truce, waited until June 10 before ordering attacks.
Foul weather created delays before the airfields could be attacked, but every
airfield except one was considered unusable by June 23. Clearing weather
revealed rapid progress by the communists to again make these airfields
serviceable. Forty-three MiGs were photographed at Uiju, a sod field, and
twenty-one conventional aircraft were discovered at Sinuiju.
On July 12, 1953, an RF-80 reconnaissance flight revealed
the communists’ preparation for an attack on the relatively stabilized front.
They had chosen the cover of bad weather, but all Fifth Air Force resources
were available to respond. B-29s used SHORAN to attack eighty-five targets that
had been previously identified through reconnaissance photography. Forty-three
percent of air sorties flown in July, involving 3,385 sorties, provided close
air support for the Army. On July 20 and 21, B-29s in night sorties attacked
all these airfields. These were followed by fighter-bomber attacks continued
until July 23.
The truce was to take effect at 2200 on July 27, 1953. The
67th TRW mounted a maximum effort to photograph every airfield in North Korea
and in Manchuria that posed a potential threat to U. N. forces. All the
airfields in North Korea were shown to be unserviceable for jet aircraft.
Several RF-86 missions were flown into Manchuria to determine the aerial order
of battle. One mission photographed airfields in the distant Harbin area.
A pilot of the 45th TRS, flying an RF-80, was killed flying
a sortie near the Yalu River. He was the last man killed in combat during the
Korea War. The mission he was unable to complete was quickly undertaken by
pilots in the 45th TRS, who returned to Kimpo at dusk. An RB-26 flew the last
combat sortie of the Korean War.
The first combat mission of the Korean War was flown by Lt.
Bryce Poe II of the 8th TRS in an RF-80. The last was flown by an aircrew of
the 12th TRS, who returned to base by 2200 on July 27, 1953. Tactical
reconnaissance had fulfilled its enduring motto, First and Last Over the
Target.
Robert F. Futrell, in his outstanding book, The United
States Air Force in Korea, sums up the contribution of tactical reconnaissance:
Despite the fact that the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance
Wing was handicapped by the failure of USAF reconnaissance systems to keep pace
with the requirements of the jet air age, it nevertheless far outstripped all
existing reconnaissance performance records. In Europe during World War II the
highest number of sorties flown in any month by a Ninth Air Force
reconnaissance group was 1,300 in April 1945. In Korea the 67th flew 2,400
sorties in May 1952.
From D-Day to V-E Day in Europe, the sortie rate of the
average Ninth Air Force reconnaissance group was 604 sorties a month, but in
the twelve-month period of April 1952 through March 1953 the 67th Group
averaged 1,792 sorties per month. During comparable periods, the photo group
that supported the U. S. Third Army in Europe made 243,175 negatives; the 67th
Group in Korea made 736,684. Still, the Eighth Army stated that only 75 percent
of their needs were being met, even though more reconnaissance missions were
flown during the Korean War than ever before.
USAF reconnaissance played a vital role in securing the
intelligence that was so crucial to both Eighth Army and USAF operations in
Korea. The political constraints that prevented the allies from pursuing
military operations into Manchuria against the Chinese, effectively providing
them a sanctuary, placed a significant burden on all planning and was a
challenge to intelligence collection. This was only mitigated by the Top Secret
overflights of RF-80s and RF-86s from the 15th TRS. Despite extraordinary
burdens resulting from the rapid downsizing of reconnaissance units after World
War II, USAF reconnaissance more than met the needs of the Eighth Army and the
bombing requirements of the U. S. Air Force.
Independent of what could be identified as conventional
missions, USAF reconnaissance activities were Air Force special operations
during the Korean War. Typically, their activities were so shrouded in secrecy
that only recently have the security wraps been removed. These activities were
directed by Far East Command and included selected elements of the USAF. Often
activities were melded into or were provided the cover of secrecy by
association with normal or routine combat operations.
Various units provided a variety of clandestine activities.
These included the training in intelligence reporting and subsequent insertion
into North Korea of parachute-dropped Koreans from C-46 and C-47 aircraft. Low,
night-flying C-46s and C-47s provided direct intelligence on Chinese forces
moving from Manchuria to attack Army forces in early December 1950. Other units
prepared and dropped leaflets in psychological warfare programs. Firefly
operations previously described were subsequently assigned to the Special
Forces. The USAF activities in these operations were organized as B Flight,
6167th Operations Squadron, Fifth Air Force, on April 1, 1952. The flight was
equipped with B-26s, C-46s, and C-47s.
Another unit was Subdetachment K of the 607th Counter
Intelligence. While stationed at Kimpo AB in 1950, MSgt. Don Nichols trained
and worked with South Koreans who successfully penetrated North Korea and
persuaded a North Korean pilot to defect with an Il-10. Nichols successfully
completed a number of intelligence operations that could only be considered
coups, such as securing a Russian T-34 tank and parachuting men into North
Korea to acquire target information. By March 1951, Nichols’s unit was
redesignated the 6004th Air Intelligence Service Squadron. Other USAF units
were involved in helicopter and crash rescue boat activity that at times could
serve as further means of providing valuable intelligence.
In July 1952, the 581st Air Resupply and Communications Wing
arrived at Clark AB in the Philippines from Mountain Home AFB, Idaho. The wing
flew twelve modified B-29s, four C-119s, four SA-16 amphibian aircraft, and
four H-19 helicopters. Its mission was aerial introduction, evacuation, and
resupply of guerrillas, and aerial delivery of psychological warfare
propaganda. All units maintained a high degree of readiness and alertness after
the July 27, 1953, truce. Reconnaissance units were kept busy flying along the
eastern and western coasts of North Korea. RF-80s and RF-86s used oblique
photography to record ground activity, and RB-45s were also very much involved.
Although these flights were maintained three miles off the coast of North
Korea, on occasion they tangled with MiGs.
The success of the RF-86 in combat and its ability to take
photographs deep into Manchuria and China led to an improved version of the
RF-86F capable of carrying twin forty-inch cone vertical cameras. On March 1,
1954, the 15th TRS deployed to Komaki with its RF-86Fs and RF-80s. There, eight
of the newly modified RF-86Fs were waiting. Within a few short weeks, the 15th
TRS was involved in a series of Top Secret missions that carried over into
1956. More than forty successful sorties were flown over various airfields in
the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea, without a single loss. Each of these
Top Secret missions was personally approved by President Dwight D. Eisenhower.
