The date was June 25, 1950. The American people were shocked
to learn that the North Korean army had massed its forces and rolled across the
38th parallel, which since World War II had served as the artificially devised
demarcation line, into South Korea. President Harry Truman responded
forthrightly to the surprise assault by having our ambassador to the United
Nations (U. N.) urge the Security Council to respond to this unprovoked
aggression. With the council’s unanimous approval, the United Nations engaged
in a police action to stop the belligerent force. Fortunately, the USSR
representative was absent from the Security Council and unable to stop the
resolution; unfortunately, the United States was ill-prepared for war.
In Japan, our armed forces were engaged in occupation of the
Japanese mainland after Japan’s formal surrender in September 1945.
Essentially, no preparation had been made for war. The overall commander of our
forces, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, who was primarily engaged in the formidable
task of transforming the Empire of Japan into a democratic society, was quickly
named commander of the U. N. forces. Ground troops were immediately committed
to the Korean peninsula to bolster the rapidly retreating South Korean and U.
S. military forces. The situation was critical, and the North Koreans rapidly
drove back the South Korean army and the U. S. Army forces (deployed from
Japan) to the southern tip of the Korean peninsula, which became known as the
Pusan perimeter.
U. S. Air Force airlift, well experienced after the massive
effort to relieve besieged Berlin, swung into action and delivered the most
urgent supplies from the United States. A sealift effort followed as well.
Those early forces were desperately buying time, maintaining a foothold in
Korea, until the major deployment of forces and logistics came on-line.
Critical to our military response was information regarding
the disposition of the attacking forces, their major lines of attack, the size
of their forces, and their major military equipment, armor, artillery, and
supply lines. The North Korean attack moved so swiftly that response plans were
overtaken by events. Intelligence information was desperately needed, so USAF
reconnaissance aircraft were quickly deployed from central Japan to Itazuke Air
Base (AB) on Kyushu Island, Japan, the base closest to Korea.
The only tactical reconnaissance unit based in Japan was the
8th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (TRS) equipped with twenty-five RF-80 single
engine jet aircraft. The RF-80, derived from the F-80 (the first truly
operational jet aircraft of the USAF), was well-equipped with cameras adequate
to the task. The first combat mission of the Korean War fell to Lt. Bryce Poe
II, who flew from Itazuke AB across the straits to South Korea. Lieutenant Poe
was no novice to reconnaissance, having flown his RF-80 in Top Secret missions
over the Vladivostok area of the Soviet Union. Immediately, the RF-80s began to
photograph every airfield in North Korea.
The demand for accurate intelligence information was a top
priority. In the fast-moving and fluid operations, reconnaissance included
visual as well as photographic collection. Rapid film processing and immediate
photo interpretation were critical, but the sheer amount of work quickly
exceeded the capabilities of the 548th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron. Joint
doctrine established that the Army would provide their own photo interpreters
to provide intelligence analysis specific to Army needs within a joint
organization. However, the army had no available photo interpreters, and the
joint organization did not exist. Therefore, individuals throughout every area
of operations, Army and Air Force, handled the initial operations in an ad hoc,
emergency manner, which required extraordinary initiative.
It is difficult today to imagine the confusion, and yet
determination and commitment of our armed forces. The understrength,
ill-equipped, and insufficiently trained Army troops were determined to hold
the perimeter against overwhelming odds and not be driven into the Sea of
Japan. The USAF was involved with close air support and interdiction missions
attempting to stem the flow of North Korean men and equipment that were
besieging the perimeter. A major problem was the short range of the F-80 and
RF-80 aircraft that had to operate from Japan because no suitable bases were
available within the perimeter.
In the demobilization subsequent to World War II, the USAF
had declined to forty-eight groups by the time the Korean War broke out. Its
personnel strength of 411,277 officers and men represented less than 18 percent
of its wartime strength. Later, the USAF chief of staff, Gen. Hoyt S.
Vandenberg called it a shoestring Air Force. Requests for more F-80Cs, F-82s,
B-26s, B-29s, C-54s, F-51s, C-47s, RF-51s, and RF-80s could be met only
piecemeal.
One can only marvel at the ability of U. S. forces to hold
the perimeter, while forces were being moved from the United States by ship and
air to provide more muscle to our limited capabilities. Meanwhile, General
MacArthur developed an audacious plan involving a strategic envelopment of the
North Koreans that, although exceedingly risky, proved to be masterful in
planning and execution. The very high tides at Inchon, on the west coast of
Korea, a few miles from Seoul, made the planned amphibious operation
problematic. RF-80 aircraft took dicing shots (low-level photo missions with
cameras aimed obliquely through the nose of the aircraft) that enabled our
skilled photo interpreters to determine accurately the height of the sea wall
and the exact times and extent of the tides. The amphibious operation proved a
stunning success. U. S. forces broke out of the Pusan perimeter, and the
combined penetration and successful envelopment from the Inchon beachhead broke
the North Korean attack, allowing U. N. forces to push repel enemy, northward
up the peninsula.
USAF reconnaissance assets now included the Strategic Air
Command (SAC) reconnaissance bombers, RB-29s, relegated to medium status with
the now-operational B-36 heavy bomber. Navy reconnaissance jet aircraft
operated from aircraft carriers, and Marine Corps reconnaissance aircraft were
later based on land. The traditional reconnaissance effort was augmented by
other intelligence-gathering efforts from slower flying C-47s and C-46s, which
were sometimes operated openly by the USAF and at other times, by clandestine
organizations. Prisoner interrogation provided another form of collecting
useful information, fitting into the effort to produce an accurate picture of
the enemy’s capabilities. Nevertheless, the bulk of all intelligence
information was collected, produced, and interpreted by the USAF.
Principal USAF reconnaissance assets included the RB-29,
RB-45, RF-80, RF-51, and RB-26. With the exception of the RF-80 and RB-45,
these aircraft had major roles in World War II. Providing airfields suited for
these jet aircraft posed a major problem that proved so serious that one F-80
fighter squadron converted to F-51 Mustangs simply to provide close air support
flying from the short, dirt runways available in Korea. The construction of
adequate runways and support facilities was a major activity.
RB-29s provided photoreconnaissance that allowed the B-29s
to bomb strategic targets in North Korea. In a short time, it was determined
that strategic bombing was no longer needed because no more targets remained.
This was before dams and hydroelectric generating plants became targets later
during the war. After September 26, 1950, all B-29 bombing missions were
directed against tactical targets.
The demobilization of the armed forces in the five years
after World War II had significantly reduced our capabilities to effectively
wage war. New aircraft were entering production-the F-86, F-84, RF-84F, B-47,
and RB-47-but we began fighting the war with World War II equipment. Already,
we had forgotten the lessons learned in that war. All the tactical training and
coordinated efforts relating to tactical air forces in the support of army
units had to be relearned. Individual units had established standards of
proficiency, but the bare-bones budget did not allow for joint exercises. The
call-up of reserves with World War II experience lessened the learning curve,
but time for training was not available; experience in combat and necessity
accelerated coordination of the required team effort.
Another major factor limited our fighting capabilities in Korea.
The invasion of South Korea seemed to presage an all-out communist effort in
Europe. Consequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sought to limit the movement of
men and equipment to fight in Korea. All subsequent military events in Korea
needed to be viewed through the prism that Korea was considered as likely to be
only the first phase of a major conflict with communist forces worldwide.
Deployment of tactical reconnaissance units to Korea had the
8th TRS (RF-80s) arriving at Taegu, South Korea, on October 2, 1950, and the
162d TRS (RB-26s) arriving from Langley AFB on October 8, with both supported
by the 363d Reconnaissance Technical Squadron, which had also urgently deployed
from Langley. These units formed the 543d Tactical Support Group. In November
1950, the 45th TRS, recently activated with RF-51 Mustangs, joined the 543d
Group.
Besides the critical shortage of reconnaissance aircraft,
the shortage of experienced intelligence experts, that is, photo interpreters,
posed a daunting task. Since no reserve photo interpreter organizations had
been created after World War II, training new photo interpreters was the only
way to reduce the workload.
General Vandenberg told Lt. Gen. George Stratemeyer,
commander of Far East Air Forces (FEAF), that to be effective, tactical
operations required the interdiction of targets that were the sources for
supplies, ammunition, and troops. B-29s of the 22d and 92d Bombardment Groups
deployed to Japan for operations against North Korea, augmenting three other
groups already available. Industrial centers of Wonsan, Pyongyang, Hungnam,
Ch’ongjin, and Rashin were identified as targets. Their selection was based on
their falling into one or more of the following categories: port facility, railroad
head, petroleum production and storage site, aircraft factory, armament
manufacturing, chemical and light-metal plant, and hydroelectric facility.
Three of the bombardment groups were dedicated to strategic
targets; the other two were used for interdiction. The FEAF Target Section had
not prepared target folders for North Korea prior to the Korean War. Old target
folders and photography were discovered at Guam, and these materials, combined
with the efforts of the RB-29s of the 31st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron,
produced the radarscope photography to meet the demand. The 548th
Reconnaissance Technical Squadron handled the photofinishing and photo
interpretation. Of forty-six strategic bombing attacks, bomber crews lacked
adequate photography and radarscope intelligence for only one target.
After the bombing of the Fusen hydroelectric plant on
September 26, 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed General MacArthur that
all the strategic targets had been eliminated and that all further medium bomber
missions would be for interdiction supporting his tactical operations in the
field.
On October 18, 1950, the 31st Strategic Reconnaissance
Squadron reported that some seventy-five fighters were seen at Antung, the
Manchurian air base immediately across the Yalu River, which formed the border
between China and Korea. An RF-80 pilot spotted fifteen propeller-driven Yak
aircraft at Sinuiju, in North Korea, and these were quickly attacked by F-80
fighter-bombers which strafed the field and destroyed or damaged seven of the
aircraft. One of the F-80s was shot down by gunfire from across the Yalu.
Before another attack by F-80s, the surviving Yaks had flown north. At this
time, six Russian-made MiG-15s flew into Korea, the first sighting of these
jets. Shortly thereafter, U. S. Army and Republic of Korea units approached the
Yalu.
As the result of a paper transaction, the 31st Squadron
returned to the United States and the 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron
replaced it on November 16, 1950. According to historical analysis, neither air
nor ground reconnaissance hinted at the major deployment of Chinese troops
immediately north of the Yalu as they grouped for an assault on U. N. forces.
Much of this oversight is explained by the severe limitations placed on
photoreconnaissance after the attack by two MiG-15s on an RB-29 of the 31st
Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron near Sinuiju on November 9, 1950. The
aircraft crash-landed at Johnson AB, Japan, killing five crewmembers. After
this incident, RB-29s were ordered not to approach the Yalu, leaving those
missions to the RF-80s flown by the 8th TRS, which was operating from Taegu,
well down the peninsula. Gen. George C. Kenney had speculated that the first
sign of Chinese communist entry into the Korean War would be observed through
air operations. The introduction of the MiG-15s proved his prescience.
As General MacArthur’s forces approached the Yalu, the
prevailing intelligence assumptions were that the deployment of Chinese forces
on the border were to ensure no incursions into Manchuria. However, on November
26, Chinese forces aggressively attacked in an effort to envelop and destroy
the U. N. forces.
Various explanations have been given for this intelligence
failure. RB-29 reconnaissance flights had been prohibited from approaching the
Yalu since November 9, leaving photo coverage to the 8th and 12th TRSs. Joint
doctrine called for three daytime reconnaissance squadrons: two would provide
visual reconnaissance, and one, photography in advance of an army. Although
demands from the Army and Air Force were extensive, the 8th TRS was not
overtaxed, as neither the Army nor the Air Force was capable of interpreting
all photography speedily because of the shortage of qualified photo
interpreters. In fact, the Air Force provided photo interpretation for the
Army, which was actually an Army responsibility. The 8th TRS photography
focused on the Yalu River crossings, with the 12th TRS flying a few night
reconnaissance missions. Fog greatly hindered night photography.
Photo interpreters analyzing reconnaissance missions were
frustrated over a reported intelligence failure. They had reported on masses of
Chinese troops crossing the Yalu River in the vicinity of Sinuiju, and they
noted major stockpiles of equipment concentrated there. Although they had
submitted these findings as special intelligence reports, to their chagrin, no
bombing raids were scheduled.
On December 15, the first F-86s arrived in Korea, forming
the 4th Fighter Interceptor Wing stationed at Kimpo AB (K-14) outside Seoul.
The F-86s escorted RF-80s that flew photo missions in the Sinuiju, Sinanju, and
Antung areas of operations. Throughout December, reconnaissance confirmed the
extension and improvement of runways at Antung in North Korea. At Dairen AB,
the Soviets had some 400 to 500 aircraft. The RF-80, limited to Mach
0.8-considerably slower than the speed attainable by the MiG-15s-had to be
escorted by F-86s on missions along the Yalu in the area now being called MiG
Alley. On December 4, MiGs boxed in an RF-80 and its F-80 escort and damaged
both aircraft with 23-mm cannon fire; both planes were fortunate to return to
base.
As a result of MiG attacks on RB-29s, the 91st Squadron took
control of two RB-45 jet reconnaissance aircraft on January 31, 1951. They had
been assigned to Reconnaissance Detachment A of the 84th Bombardment Squadron.
Although at first successful in outrunning the MiGs, they too had difficulties.
In one attack on April 9, an RB-45 sustained a number of hits, but it
successfully returned to base. On June 1, all unescorted Bomber Command
aircraft were prohibited from operating in the vicinity of the Yalu and MiG
Alley. Then in October, all RB-29s were prohibited from operating in northwest
Korea, and the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TRW) assumed that
photoreconnaissance responsibility. All RB-45 daylight operations ceased after
another close call from MiGs on November 9.
During the early part of the Korean War, just two squadrons
were performing the tactical missions of visual reconnaissance and
photoreconnaissance: the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance, Photo-Jet; and the 12th
TRS, Night-Photo, operating from Taegu. By December 1950, the 45th TRS (flying
RF-51 Mustangs) joined the reconnaissance effort.
As the demand for reconnaissance grew, it became apparent
that the effort had to be coordinated. Some of the supporting units were in
Japan. Col. Karl L. “Pop” Polifka, a noted reconnaissance expert from
World War II, was brought in to form the newly activated 67th TRW on February
25, 1951. The 8th TRS was redesignated the 15th TRS, while the 12th TRS
continued on, as did the 45th TRS. The support elements making up the wing were
brought in from Japan.
The 15th TRS was responsible for covering all airfields and
lines of communication in the northern part of North Korea, responding to tasking
by the Army as well as the USAF. The 12th TRS had the same responsibility, but
it was limited to night operations. The 45th TRS provided reconnaissance
forward of the Army’s front lines. Their job was to learn the features and
terrain in front of Army units and, from that familiarity, identify changes
signifying enemy movement and emplacements.
In March 1951, Fifth Air Force devised a target location
system implemented by the 45th TRS which operated at first light every morning.
Night operations would suggest possible locations of enemy trucks and troops
that would be trying to conceal themselves as dawn broke. The RF-51s would then
be on hand to direct fighter-bomber attacks. These were called Circle 10
missions because the Mustangs flew in a circle roughly ten miles in diameter
around the suspected area. When the Mustangs identified the targets, they
called in F-80 and F-84 attacks.
By mid-April, RF-51s flew in pairs with one providing top
cover to clear the lower-flying aircraft and provide early warning on any enemy
antiaircraft fire. This useful tactic was later employed by the 15th TRS and
was continued by the 45th TRS when they relinquished their Mustangs for RF-80s.
Throughout February, March, and April, reconnaissance
confirmed that North Korean airfields had been readied for aircraft arriving
from Manchuria. Photo interpreters discovered that the North Koreans were
destroying buildings on either side of a paved road running through Pyongyang and
turning it into a 7,000-foot runway. The RF-80s also identified a rapid effort
to improve the airfield at Sinuiju. Attacks soon left the runways cratered.
On July 1, Colonel Polifka was killed while flying a combat
mission. In his short time as wing commander, he had coordinated the various
tactical reconnaissance elements, enhancing their ability to respond rapidly to
the reconnaissance requirements called for by the USAF and U. S. Army. In late
August, the 67th TRW was able to deploy to Kimpo AB from Taegu, from southern
to central Korea, which reduced the time and distance it needed to operate in
the northern reaches of the peninsula, up to the Yalu. This reduction was of
particular significance for the jet aircraft.
One squadron, the 15th TRS flying the RF-80, was now
conducting all the daylight photography in North Korea above the battle line.
The missions in MiG Alley to determine the status of airfields were
increasingly hazardous despite escorts of sometimes as many as sixteen F-86s.
The faster F-86s would provide top cover by weaving back and forth over the
slower RF-80s, but MiG-15s diving from higher altitude often penetrated the
protective screen of F-86s and were able to fire upon the RF-80s. Additionally,
FEAF was tasking the 15th TRS with Top Secret missions which required
overflights of Manchuria and mainland China across the Yellow Sea.
By June 1951, the communists realized the futility of
operating aircraft from their airfields in North Korea and proceeded to build
additional airstrips near Antung, just north of the Yalu River. Soon, some 300
MiG fighters were operating from these bases. Intelligence, based on
photography, determined that the MiG-15 buildup of 445 aircraft in June 1951
had increased to 525 by September. For comparison, only 89 F-86s were based in
Korea at the same time. By December, however, 127 F-86s were in Korea, the 51st
Fighter Wing now having joined the 4th Fighter Wing in combat.
In July 1951, fighter-bombers, though escorted by F-86s,
were attacked by MiGs. They escaped, but that same month one RF-80 was badly
damaged during an attack. Photo missions were rescheduled time and again to
secure coverage in MiG Alley. In November, pilots of the 15th TRS were attacked
eleven times by MiGs, all, while being escorted by F-86s. In September, an
RF-80 pilot spotted construction of a new airfield at Samcham, about thirty
miles northeast of the Sinanju airfield, and the new airfield was immediately
targeted for attack by B-29s. RF-80 pilots of the 15th TRS were taking prestrike
photos and following up with poststrike photography immediately after bombing
missions. The processed film was delivered immediately, with mission results,
to allow for a subsequent air strike the same day, if one were needed.
It is difficult today to appreciate the conditions that
reconnaissance pilots were subjected to when flying the RF-80. The engine
thrust was just over a paltry 3,800 pounds. Additional thrust was obtained
during takeoff by spraying a water-alcohol mixture over the centrifugal flow engine,
but this lasted for only a few seconds. Navigation was strictly
nap-of-the-earth piloting, with pilots using map of various scales to locate
assigned targets; the scales included 1:500,000, 1:250,000, and 1:62,500. A
radio compass was useful for navigation over South Korea and Japan. Some of the
RF-80s had manual canopies; others had no ejection seats. At times, the sliding
canopies had to be closed by the crew chief. Cabin pressurization was
notoriously poor with these older aircraft, and the cabin pressure at times
gave a higher reading than the altimeter. There were no viewfinders to identify
targets; pilots aligned themselves directly over the target by banking the
aircraft, looking down, and maneuvering the aircraft visually for alignment.
Pilots used forecast winds at altitude to determine ground
speeds and to establish the intervalometer settings for the camera to provide
adequate overlap of exposures. All this required excellent pilotage to reach
the target and good aircraft handling. The requester determined the scale of
photography. This required that the necessary focal length of the camera be
selected as well as the altitude flown. Usually another pilot, in a companion
RF-80 or F-80, would fly above and slightly behind to spot enemy aircraft and
antiaircraft artillery fire.
