The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) had a large carrier force at
the start of the war, the air groups of which were weighted toward attack
aircraft rather than fighters. Its aircraft were lightly built and had very
long range, but this advantage was usually purchased at the expense of
vulnerability to enemy fire. The skill of Japanese aviators tended to
exaggerate the effectiveness of the IJN’s aircraft, and pilot quality fell off
as experienced crews were shot down during the Midway and Solomon Islands
Campaigns.
When it first appeared in mid-1940, the Mitsubishi A6M Zero
was the first carrier-based fighter capable of beating its land-based
counterparts. It was well armed and had truly exceptional maneuverability below
about 220 mph, and its capabilities came as an unpleasant shock to U. S. and
British forces. It achieved this exceptional performance at the expense of
resistance to enemy fire, with a light structure and no armor or self-sealing
tanks. Its Achilles heel was the stiffness of its controls at high speed, the
control response being almost nil at indicated airspeed over 300 mph. The Zero
was developed throughout the war, a total of 10,449 being built.
The Aichi D3A (“Val”) carrier-based dive-bomber entered
service in mid-1940, and it was the standard Japanese navy dive-bomber when
Japan entered the war. It was a good bomber, capable of putting up a creditable
fight after dropping its bomb load. It participated in the attack on Pearl
Harbor and the major Pacific campaigns including Santa Cruz, Midway, and the
Solomon Islands. Increasing losses during the second half of the war took their
toll, and the D3A was used on suicide missions later in the war. Approximately
1,495 D3As were built.
The Nakajima B5N (“Kate” in the Allied designator system)
first entered service in 1937 as a carrier-based attack bomber, with the B5N2
torpedo-bomber appearing in 1940. The B5N had good handling and deck-landing
characteristics and was operationally very successful in the early part of the
war. Large numbers of the B5N participated in the Mariana Islands campaign, and
it was employed as a suicide aircraft toward the end of the war. Approximately
1,200 B5Ns were built.
Japan relied on three primary reconnaissance floatplanes
during the war. The three-seat Aichi E13A, of which 1,418 were produced, was
Japan’s most widely used floatplane of the war. Entering service in early 1941,
it was employed for the reconnaissance leading up to the attack on Pearl
Harbor, and it participated in every major campaign in the Pacific Theater,
performing not only reconnaissance but also air-sea rescue, liaison transport,
and coastal patrol operations. Introduced in January 1944 as a replacement for
the E13A, the two-seat Aichi E16A Zuiun offered far greater performance
capabilities but came too late in the war to make a significant difference,
primarily because Japan’s worsening industrial position limited production to
just 256 aircraft. Based on a 1936 design that underwent several modifications,
the two-seat Mitsubishi F1M biplane, of which 1,118 were produced, proved to be
one of the most versatile reconnaissance aircraft in Japan’s arsenal. Operating
from both ship and water bases, it served in a variety roles throughout the
Pacific, including coastal patrol, convoy escort, antisubmarine, and air-sea
rescue duties, and it was even capable of serving as a dive-bomber and
interceptor.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered the U. S. Pacific
fleet moved to this shallow harbor in Hawaii in May 1940, thousands of miles
from its base at San Diego. The idea was to deter a Japanese assault on
Southeast Asia. Instead, American-Japanese relations continued to deteriorate
toward war over the course of 1941. An Imperial Conference convened on
September 6 made the decision for war. Japanese forces immediately mobilized
and the Navy began planning the attack on Pearl. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto
ordered preparations for the attack on November 1. A final peace effort by
Japanese diplomats failed in late November. A powerful warfleet, Strike Force
Kido Butai, sortied from the Kurils on November 26. It comprised six aircraft
carriers and many heavy escorts, destroyers, and submarines. The flagship of
Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo flew the famous “Z” flag, which fluttered above
victories over Russia at Port Arthur in 1904 and the Tsushima Strait in 1905.
After 12 days undetected at sea, facilitated by refueling
from tankers, the carriers received the attack signal: “Climb Mount Niitaka.”
Washington had broken the Japanese diplomatic code but not the naval code.
Earlier in the day the War Department sent warnings to Pearl and Manila of an
anticipated Japanese assault. The attack, if it came, was expected to fall on
the Philippines; no one considered that the Japanese might be so daring as to
hit Pearl. In any event, the warning to Pearl was delayed by a black comedy of
technical and human errors and did not arrive in time. The battleships of the
U. S. Pacific Fleet were therefore still neatly docked on a quiet Sunday
morning and caught wholly unawares by the Japanese naval air attack. The first
attack wave achieved total surprise just after 7:00 A. M. on Sunday morning,
December 7th, 1941. It began before the official Japanese declaration of war
was delivered: it was delayed by lengthy transcription and slow decoding by the
Japanese Embassy in Washington. The declaration of war belatedly delivered to
Secretary of State Cordell Hull accused the United States of conspiring “with
Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan’s efforts toward the
establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia, and
especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and
China at war.” Americans later made much of the “sneak attack” at Pearl, though
in Japanese operational terms the achievement of surprise was desirable and
effective
Surprise over Hawaii was total. The attack was designed by
Commander Mitsuo Fuchida, a brilliantly innovative planner. It had as
historical inspiration the stunning sinking of the Tsarist fleet at anchor at
Port Arthur in 1904. Its spiritual inspiration and icon was even older: a
famous samurai sword maneuver, the “i-ia” stroke that gutted or crippled an
enemy before combat began. Its immediate progenitor was the RAF assault on the
Italian fleet at Taranto. Fuchida led in the first wave, comprising 183
bombers, torpedo planes, and fighters. Splitting into four attack groups, the
Japanese hit U. S. Army and Marine Corps air fields and bombed the ships lined
up in “Battleship Row” in the harbor at Ford Island. A second wave of 170
planes attacked into more opposition, yet Japanese losses remained light.
Within hours of the first explosions much of the Pacific Fleet was afire, sunk,
or badly damaged. Among major capital ships, the battleship “Arizona” was
gutted while the “Oklahoma” turtled. The battleships “California,” “Nevada,”
and “West Virginia” were also sunk at anchor. On these and other ships, at the
airstrips and elsewhere in Hawaii, the U. S. suffered 3,695 casualties, including
2,340 military personnel killed. Of the dead, 1,177 were aboard the “Arizona.”
Another 48 civilians were killed. The USN saw 12 of its warships sunk or
beached and another 9 badly damaged, while 164 Navy, Marine, or Army aircraft
were destroyed and 159 more damaged. The Japanese lost a mere 29 planes and 64
men, including 9 navy crew killed on 5 midget submarines. However, the U. S.
fleet carriers, the primary targets sought by Yamamoto and Fuchida, were
fortuitously at sea on exercises and thus were spared. The “USS Enterprise”
took some pilot casualties as it stretched its planes out from a distance to
intercept the Japanese second wave. Admirals Nagumo and Yamamoto then clenched
and refused to launch a third strike wave to destroy Pearl’s fuel and repair
facilities. Had they done so, that action would have done more long-term damage
to the Pacific Fleet even than dropping battleships in the shallow harbor.
