Royal Marine commando raiding Port Said during
Operation Musketeer- Suez Crisis 1956
The Suez Crisis was one of the major events of the Cold War. It ended Britain’s pretensions to be a world superpower, fatally weakened its hold on what remained of its empire, placed a dangerous strain on U. S.-Soviet relations, strengthened the position of Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, and distracted world attention from the concurrent Soviet military intervention in Hungary.
The Suez Crisis had its origins in the development plans of
Nasser. The Egyptian president hoped to enhance his prestige and improve the
quality of life for his nation’s growing population by carrying out
long-discussed plans to construct a high dam on the upper Nile River at Aswan
to provide electric power. To finance the project, he sought assistance from
the Western powers. But he had also been endeavoring to build up and modernize
the Egyptian military. Toward that end, he had sought to acquire modern weapons
from the United States and other Western nations. When the U. S. government
refused to supply the advanced arms, which it believed might be used against
Israel, in 1955 Nasser turned to the communist bloc. This step incurred the
displeasure of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, as did Nasser’s recognition of
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and his frequent denunciations of the U.
S.-supported Baghdad Pact.
Resentment over Nasser’s efforts to play East against West
and especially his decision to turn to the communist bloc for arms led the
Eisenhower administration to block financing of the Aswan Dam project through
the World Bank. U. S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had earlier assured
Nasser of U. S. support, but on 19 June 1956, Dulles announced that U. S.
assistance for the Aswan Dam project would not be forthcoming. The British
government immediately followed suit.
Nasser’s response to this humiliating rebuff came a week
later, on 26 July, when he nationalized the Suez Canal. He had contemplated
such a move for some time, but the U. S. decision prompted its timing. Seizure
of the canal would not only provide additional funding for the Aswan project
but would also make Nasser a hero in the eyes of many Arab nationalists.
The British government regarded the sea-level Suez Canal,
which connected the eastern Mediterranean with the Red Sea across Egyptian
territory, as its lifeline to Middle Eastern oil and the Far East. The canal,
built by a private company headed by Frenchman Ferdinand de Lesseps, had opened
to much fanfare in 1869. It quickly altered the trade routes of the world, and
two-thirds of the tonnage passing through the canal was British. Khedive Ismail
Pasha, who owned 44 percent of the company shares, found himself in dire
financial straits, and in 1875 the British government stepped in and purchased
his shares. In 1878 Britain acquired the island of Cyprus north of Egypt from
the Ottoman Empire, further strengthening its position in the eastern
Mediterranean north of Egypt. The British also increased their role in Egyptian
financial affairs, and in 1882 they intervened militarily in Egypt, promising
to depart once order had been restored. Britain remained in Egypt and in effect
controlled its affairs through World War II.
In 1952, a nationalist coup d’état took place in Egypt that
ultimately brought Nasser to power. He was a staunch Arab nationalist,
determined to end British influence in Egypt. In 1954 he succeeded in
renegotiating the 1936 treaty with the British to force the withdrawal of
British troops from the Suez Canal Zone. The last British forces departed the
Canal Zone only a month before Nasser nationalized the canal.
The British government now took the lead in opposing Nasser.
London believed that Nasser’s growing popularity in the Arab world was
encouraging Arab nationalism and threatening to undermine British influence
throughout the Middle East. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden (1955-1956)
developed a deep and abiding hatred of the Egyptian leader. For Eden, ousting
Nasser from power became nothing short of an obsession. In the immediate
aftermath of Nasser’s nationalization of the canal, the British government
called up 200,000 military reservists and dispatched military resources to the
eastern Mediterranean.
The French government also had good reason to seek Nasser’s
removal. Paris sought to protect its own long-standing interests in the Middle
East, but more to the point, the French were now engaged in fighting the
National Liberation Front (NLF) in Algeria. The Algerian War, which began in
November 1954, had greatly expanded and had become an imbroglio for the
government, now led by socialist Premier Guy Mollet (1956-1957). Nasser was a
strong and vocal supporter of the NLF, and there were many in the French
government and military who believed that overthrowing him would greatly
enhance French chances of winning the Algerian War.
Israel formed the third leg in the triad of powers arrayed
against Nasser. Egypt had instituted a blockade of Israeli ships at the Gulf of
Aqaba, Israel’s outlet to the Indian Ocean. Also, Egypt had never recognized
the Jewish state and indeed remained at war with it following the Israeli War
of Independence during 1948-1949. In 1955, Israel mounted a half dozen
crossborder raids, while Egypt carried out its own raids into Israeli territory
by fedayeen, or guerrilla fighters.
During the months that followed Egyptian nationalization of
the Suez Canal, the community of interest among British, French, and Israeli
leaders developed into secret planning for a joint military operation to topple
Nasser. The U. S. government was not consulted and indeed opposed the use of
force. The British and French governments either did not understand the
American attitude or, if they did, believed that Washington would give approval
after the fact to policies undertaken by its major allies, which the latter
believed to be absolutely necessary.
The British government first tried diplomacy. Two
conferences in London attended by the representatives of twenty-four nations
using the canal failed to produce agreement on a course of action, and Egypt
refused to participate. A proposal by U. S. Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles for a canal “users’ club” of nations failed, as did an appeal
to the United Nations (UN) Security Council. On 1 October, Dulles announced
that the United States was disassociating itself from British and French
actions in the Middle East and asserted that the United States intended to play
a more independent role.
Meanwhile, secret talks were going forward, first between the British and French for joint military action against Egypt. Military representatives of the two governments met in London on 10 August and hammered out the details of a joint military plan known as MUSKETEER that would involve occupation of both Alexandria and Port Said. The French then brought the Israeli government in on the plan, and General Maurice Challe, deputy chief of staff of the French Air Force, undertook a secret trip to the Middle East to meet with Israeli government and military leaders. The Israelis were at first skeptical about British and French support. They also had no intention of moving as far as the canal itself. The Israelis stated that their plan was merely to send light detachments to link up with British and French forces. They also insisted that British and French military intervention occur simultaneously with their own attack.
General André Beaufre, the designated French military
commander for the operation, then came up with a new plan. Under it, the
Israelis would initiate hostilities against Egypt in order to provide the
pretext for military intervention by French and British forces to protect the
canal. This action would technically be in accord with the terms of the 1954
treaty between Egypt and Britain that had given Britain the right to send
forces to occupy the Suez Canal Zone in the event of an attack against Egypt by
a third power.
All parties agreed to this new plan. Meanwhile, unrest began
in Hungary on 23 October, and the next day Soviet tanks entered Budapest to put
down what had become the Hungarian Revolution. French and British planners were
delighted at the news of an international distraction that seemed to provide
them a degree of freedom of action.
On 29 October, Israeli forces began an invasion of the Sinai
Peninsula with the announced aim of eradicating the fedayeen bases. A day
later, on 30 October, the British and French governments issued an ultimatum,
nominally to both the Egyptian and Israeli governments but in reality only to
Egypt, expressing the need to separate the combatants and demanding the right
to provide for the security of the Suez Canal. The ultimatum called on both
sides to withdraw their forces 10 miles from the canal and gave them twelve
hours to reply. The Israelis, of course, immediately accepted the ultimatum,
while the Egyptians just as promptly rejected it.
On 31 October, the British began bombing Egyptian airfields
and military installations from bases on Cyprus. British aircraft attacked four
Egyptian bases that day and nine the next. When Eden reported to the House of
Commons on events, he encountered a surprisingly strong negative reaction from
the opposition Labour Party.
Following the British military action, the Egyptians
immediately sank a number of ships in the canal to make it unusable. The
Israelis, meanwhile, broke into the Sinai and swept across it in only four days
against ineffective Egyptian forces. Finally, on 5 November, British and French
paratroopers began an invasion of Port Said, Egypt, at the Mediterranean
terminus of the canal.
The Eisenhower administration had already entered the
picture. On 31 October, President Eisenhower described the British attack as
“taken in error.” He was personally furious at Eden over events and
is supposed to have asked when he first telephoned the British leader,
“Anthony, have you gone out of your mind?” The United States applied
immediate and heavy financial threats, both on a bilateral basis and through
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to bring the British government to heel.
Eisenhower also refused any further dealings with Eden personally.
A threat by the Soviet government against Britain on 5
November to send “volunteers” to Egypt proved a further embarrassment
for the British government, but it was U. S. pressure that was decisive.
Nonetheless, the world beheld the strange spectacle of the United States
cooperating with the Soviet Union to condemn Britain and France in the UN
Security Council and call for an end to the use of force. Although Britain and
France vetoed the Security Council resolution, the matter was referred to the
UN General Assembly, which demanded a cease-fire and withdrawal.
Israel and Egypt had agreed to a cease-fire on 4 November.
At midnight on 6 November, the day of the U. S. presidential election, the
British and French governments were also obliged to accept a cease-fire, the
French only with the greatest reluctance. A 4,000-man UN Emergency Force
(UNEF)- authorized on 4 November and made up of contingents from Brazil,
Colombia, India, Indonesia, and the Scandinavian countries-arrived in Egypt to
take up positions to keep Israeli and Egyptian forces separated. At the end of
November, the British and French governments both agreed to withdraw their
forces from Egypt by 22 December, and on 1 December Eisenhower announced that
he had instructed U. S. oil companies to begin shipping supplies to both
Britain and France.
Nasser and Arab self-confidence were the chief beneficiaries
of the crisis. The abysmal performance of Egyptian military forces in the
crisis was forgotten in Nasser’s ultimate triumph. He found his prestige
dramatically increased throughout the Arab world. Israel also benefited. The
presence of the UN force guaranteed an end to the fedayeen raids, and Israel
had also broken the Egyptian blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, although its ships
could still not transit the Suez Canal. The crisis also enhanced Soviet prestige
in the Middle East, and the UN emerged from the crisis with enhanced prestige,
helping to boost world confidence in that organization.
The Suez Crisis ended Eden’s political career. Ill and under
tremendous criticism in Parliament from the Labour Party, he resigned from
office in January 1957. Events also placed a serious, albeit temporary, strain
on U. S.- British relations. More importantly, they revealed the serious
limitations in British military strength. Indeed, observers are unanimous in declaring
1956 a seminal date in British imperial history that marked the effective end
of Britain’s tenure as a great power. The events had less impact in France.
Mollet left office in May 1957 but not as a result of the Suez intervention.
The crisis was costly to both Britain and France in economic terms, for Saudi
Arabia had halted oil shipments to both countries.
Finally, the Suez Crisis could not have come at a worst time
for the West, because the crisis diverted world attention from the concurrent
brutal Soviet military intervention in Hungary. Eisenhower believed, rightly or
wrongly, that without the Suez diversion there would have been far stronger
Western reaction to the Soviet invasion of its satellite.
References Beaufre, André. The Suez Expedition, 1956. Translated by Richard Barry. New York: Praeger, 1969. Cooper, Chester L. The Lion’s Last Roar: Suez, 1956. New York: Harper and Row, 1978. Eden, Anthony. The Suez Crisis of 1956. Boston: Beacon, 1968. Freiberger, Steven Z. Dawn over Suez: The Rise of American Power in the Middle East, 1953-1957. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1992. Gorst, Anthony, and Lewis Johnman. The Suez Crisis. London: Routledge, 1997. Hahn, Peter L. The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991. Kelly, Saul, and Anthony Gorst, eds. Whitehall and the Suez Crisis. London: Frank Cass, 2000. Kingseed, Cole C. Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995. Kyle, Keith. Suez. New York: St. Martin’s, 1991. Louis, William R., and Roger Owen, eds. Suez, 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. Lucas, W. Scott. Divided We Stand: Britain, the United States and the Suez Crisis. Rev. ed. London: Spectre, 1996.
SUEZ CAMPAIGN, OPERATION MUSKETEER, November to December 1956
