There are several historical instances of the problems
caused when equipment is rushed in production and fielded too soon. A great
example of this was the German rush to field the new Panther tank at the Battle
of Kursk. Here one finds mechanical difficulties, degraded training, and new
tactics were not formulated to capture the advantage of the new equipment.
New equipment is developed to meet certain operational needs
and you can’t understand the employment of the Panther tank unless you
understand that it was developed to meet the threat posed by a new Russian
tank. This Russian tank was the T-34. The T-34 was an excellent tank design
that had a far-reaching impact on tank development throughout the world. The
Russians have long had a reverent appreciation for the T-34.
On the other hand, the Germans thought their tank designs
were superior and in fact during the early years of the war (1939—1941) there
was no reason for them to think otherwise. During this time the Germans put
their future tank designs on hold since they ran into no significant obstacle
for their PzKpfw IIIs and IVs in Poland or France. At the outset of Operation
Barbarossa the Germans faced Russian tanks that were not as sophisticated as
the German equipment nor were the tactics for the employment of these tanks as
developed as the Wehrmacht. The Russians greatly outnumbered the Germans with
some 22,000 tanks, mostly T-26s, BTs, T-28s and T-35s. The Russians, however,
had been working on improving their tanks since 1936. Unknown to the Germans,
the Russians had developed and had produced about 1000 T-34s prior to the
commencement of Barbarossa. The T-34 was first used in mass against the Germans
at the Battle of Borodino in October of 1941. Not only were the T-34s used in
mass but the Russian armor tactics had begun to improve and there were early
signs that the “happy times of the Panzers was at an end”.
At an Art of War Symposium which took place at Carlisle
Barracks, Pennsylvania from 26 to 30 March 1984, General Lingenthal described
his regiments first contact with the T-34.
“By chance our regiment met on the second day of the
Russian war the first regiment of T-34s that had been in the Russian Army; and
we, of course, had no knowledge at all of this tank; and, in the first phase of
this battle, my tank was shot; and my driver was killed. Four tanks were in our
group, and they all suffered the same fate. … We had further fighting in the
morning and in the afternoon, and then we finally burned some of these tanks by
using 76mm high explosive shells with delay fuses (one-fourth second). So
because they had all tanks with fuel on the rear we could make them burn. Then,
of course, when we approached the wrecks I remember very well that we saw what
terrible strength of armor they had, and we were very impressed. I can tell you
we reported this immediately to higher echelons, but I do not know how they
distributed this information to other divisions.”
The terrible strength of the armor General Lingenthal
mentions could be the sloping of the armor. This is one design feature of the
T-34 that is retained today because sloped armor increases the amount of
protection. The T-34 also had a good amount of fire power, speed and mobility.
These tanks made a great impression on the Panzertruppen; many thought the T-34
should be taken back to Germany and mass-produced for the Wehrmacht. Another
thing the Russians did to make the T-34 an extremely reliable vehicle was to
standardize the relatively simple design, thus enabling the Soviets to mass produce
the T-34. The standardization not only in design, but also in production,
enabled the Soviets to produce great numbers of interchangeable parts such as
the engine, armament, transmission, periscopes. The tank was conventional in
its design with the engine and transmission in the rear. It also used a
Christie suspension system. The turret presented a low silhouette, a condition
which reduced the overall height of the tank, and also limited the depression
of its gun. In true Soviet, fashion, the aims were mechanical simplicity and
the ability to mass produce the vehicle. These objectives were both
successfully achieved.
A testament to the design and durability of the T-34 was its
long use after the Second World War. The North Koreans used the T-34 very
effectively at the opening of the Korean Conflict. In the Sinai during the 1967
Six Day War, the Israeli Army was still facing the T-34s of the Egyptian Army.
In fact, many were captured by the Israeli Army during this war.
As already stated, the development of the Panther was
spurred by the appearance of the Russian T-34 tank in July of 1941, and until
then, the German Army High Command saw no reason to develop a heavier tank.
During the peacetime years the German Army looked at a few drawings for heavier
tanks, but none had ever made it past the design of a prototype stage. The T-34
changed the German way of thinking. The Germans found that the T-34 was
superior in almost every way to the current Panzerkampfwagen (PzKpfw) IV. The
T-34’s higher power-to-weight ratio, lower ground pressure, higher muzzle
velocity, and greater range was enough to shatter the idea of German armor
superiority. The problem for the Germans was much greater than mere pride. The
panzerwaffe was desperate to continue the fight against the Russians, but it
needed superior equipment. Without this superior equipment, the clear decisive
victory over the Soviets was in danger. If the panzertruppen were surprised and
shaken by the appearance of the T-34, the German command was more surprised
that the Russians could produce a tank superior to the PzKpfw IV in such a
short period of time. In fact the Germans had enjoyed such success with their
medium tanks from 1939 to 1941 that they had put plans for a heavier tank on
the shelf. The T-34 made the Germans realize the error of their ways.
To get a first-hand look at the strengths of the T-34, the
Germans sent a team to evaluate the situation and send back recommendations to
the Ministry of Armaments. This team was composed of representatives from the
Army Ordnance Office, the armaments industry, tank designers and tank building
firms. They visited the 2nd Panzer Army in November of 1941. The team examined
captured T-34s and talked with panzer troops to get their insights from doing battle
against the Russian tank. The great respect the troops had for the Russian tank
was evident when they suggested that the evaluation team take the T-34 back to
Germany and copy it bolt for bolt. This was a high compliment to the Russian
tank building industry, but it was not the German way. Germany would design and
build its own tank that would be superior to anything the Russians would build.
At the time of the team’s visit, the 2nd Panzer Army was
commanded by General Heinz Guderian. He too acknowledged that officers in the
2nd Army thought that just copying the T-34 was the thing to do. General
Guderian pointed out several production and material reasons why this could not
happen. He stated that,
“It was not the designers natural pride in their own
inventions, but rather because it would not be possible to mass-produce
essential elements of the T-34—in particular the aluminum diesel engines—with
the necessary speed. Also, so far as steel alloys went, we were at a
disadvantage compared to the Russians owing to our shortage of raw materials.
It was, therefore, decided that the following solution be adopted: the
construction of the Tiger Tank, a tank of some 60 tons, which had recently been
started would continue: meanwhile, a light tank, called the Panther, weighing
between 35 and 45 tons, was to be designed.”
As early as spring of 1941 some Germans must have had a
premonition that the Russians had the edge on them in tank technology. Guderian
mentioned that Russian delegation had visited German tank production
facilities, and as he related it, he (Guderian),
“… was quite startled, however, by an unusual event in
connection with the tank in question (PzKpfw IV). In the spring of 1941 Hitler
had given his express permission that a Russian officer’s commission be
permitted to visit our tank training schools and armor production facilities,
and had ordered that the Russians be allowed to see everything. During this
visit, the Russians, when shown our Panzer IV, simply refused to believe that
this vehicle was our heaviest tank. They repeatedly claimed that we were
keeping our newest design from them, which Hitler had promised to demonstrate.
The commission’s insistence was so great that our manufacturers and officials
in the Waffenamt finally concluded that the Russians had heavier and better
types than we did. The T-34 which appeared on our front lines at the end of
July 1941 revealed the new Russian design to us …”
Once it was clear that there was a need for a new tank, the
design and production of the Panther went forward. Two designs were considered
for production. The first design was submitted by the Daimler-Benz (BD)
company. This design resembled the T-34. The weight of the BD design was about
39 tons, roughly the same as the T-34 and this tank would mount a 75mm gun. The
second design was from the Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nürmberg (MAN) company.
This tank would be heavier, weighing 49 tons and also mounting a 75mm gun, but
this gun would have a longer barrel giving it a higher muzzle velocity. Both
designs copied some features of the T-34 such as wide tracks and the sloped
armor. Both also used interleaved road wheels mounted on torsion bars.
A Panther committee headed by representatives from the
Inspector of the Panzer Troops was established to review the drawings and ensure
the requirement could be met by the two companies. The committee concentrated
on two prerequisites. The first requirement was the ability of the company to
place the vehicle into mass production by December 1942. This date was critical
if the war industry was to get the tank to the troops in the field. The
committee thought this ability to start production was so important it became
the number one consideration. The second consideration was for the tank to be
of “superior quality to counter the numerical material superiority of the
enemy.” Early in the war with Russia this was a reasonable prerequisite.
However, after Stalingrad the Germans could never build a tank of the quality
necessary to overcome the numerical superiority of the Russians. The
standardization of the T-34 allowed the Soviets to mass produce the tank in
huge numbers. Russia suffered from no lack of raw material or production
capacity as did the Germans.
The following excerpt of General Guderian’s memoirs shows
why Germany had production problems with not only the Panther but all tank
production.
“On January 23rd, 1942, the design(s) for this (Panther)
tank was submitted to Hitler. It was at this conference that Hitler ordered
that German tank production be increased to a capacity of 600 units per month.
In May of 1940 our (Germany’s) capacity, inclusive of all types, had been 125
units. So it can be seen that increased in productivity of an industry making
one of the most vital weapons of war had been extraordinarily small during this
period of almost two years of war; this surly provides proof that neither
Hitler nor the General staff correctly estimated the importance of the tank to
our (German) war effort. Even the great-tank victories of 1939-41 had not
sufficed to change this.”
Not only would surging production of the PzKpfw III/IV’s
been difficult, but Hitler was telling the tank producing industries to take
the plans, produce the new tank, and do it in numbers five times that of the
current production. This was a Herculean feat for any industry, much less for
one at war and facing the shortages as noted by Guderian.
On 11 May 1942 the committee made their choice. Professor
Dr. Porsche announced the design choice stating “the committee evaluating the
designs of the Panther tank…unanimously favors the proposal of the firm of MAN…
and recommends that the Panzertruppe be equipped with the selected tank.” On 13
May 1942 the design was sent to Hitler and he agreed with the committee’s
recommendation with some comments. He also ordered the construction of railroad
flat cars capable of transporting the heavy tanks being produced, showing a
good deal of forethought in getting the tank to the battlefield. In June 1942,
Hitler was already asking about changing the requirements of the Panther. He
wanted to change the frontal armor on the Panther from 80mm to 100mm and he
ordered that all vertical armor on the tank be 100mm. In the meantime, the
production numbers for the following May were fixed at 250 Panthers. In
September 1942 production numbers for the spring of 1944 were set at 600
Panthers.
When Guderian warned of using the Panthers too soon he did
this from a foundation of experience. He told of the first employment of the
Tigers in September of 1942. “A lesson learned from the First World War had
taught us that it is necessary to be patient about committing new weapons and
that they must be held back until they are being produced in such quantities as
to allow their employment in mass. In the First Would War the French and
British used their tanks prematurely, in small numbers, and thereby failed to
win the great victory which they were entitled to expect.” He went on to talk
about how Hitler, aware of these facts, could not wait for the production of
the Tiger in mass before employing them. After urgings, Hitler did agree to
employ the limited number of Tigers in a “quite secondary operation”. The first
attack with the Tigers occurred near Leningrad and the results foreshadowed
what was to happen to the Panther at Kursk. The Tigers suffered not only
“heavy, unnecessary casualties” but the Germans also lost the secrecy of the
new weapon system. This same pattern was seen prior to Operation Citadel, but
that time Guderian made his fears of employing the Panther too soon known to
all who would listen.
Although General Guderian made his fears known to all, he
still was not able to convince Hitler that the Panthers should not be employed.
With the World War I historical example of how the French and British employed
their tanks and the German experience of the Tigers, Hitler still let his
fondness for new and bigger weapons get in the way of reason—of course this was
not unusual for Hitler.
If production was rushed to get the Panther to the field,
then the training had to suffer. Training in the field during war is difficult
but must continue. At the Art of War Symposium mentioned earlier, when asked
about what training was conducted prior to the Operation Citadel, Colonel
Ritgen replied “… during the war, we actually used every free minute of the day
to train the men and the crews again as soon as there was a little bit of
rest.” Replacements “were distributed amongst the other crews so that never did
a green crew come together. A crew had just one or two green people.” General
Lingenthal answered the same question.
“We had, before ‘Citadel,’ three months when we were not
involved in battle. Only part of our units were close to the front near
Tomorovka and Golovchino as a reserve for the infantry divisions which had been
there in their position. We could not move at this time because of a lack of
fuel so we were forbidden to exercise with our tanks, and were forbidden to
have full wireless training because of the Russian ability to hear our wireless
transmissions. But we did firing exercises in training gunners and loaders and
even to a certain extent training of tank drivers. We especially conducted training
in map reading and orientation, and we made what I think is a very basic thing
for all of us: we conducted maintenance on our equipment. It was not new
equipment like in the Waffen SS but rather old equipment, and we brought it up
to good standards so that it would work–all of our equipment, the tanks, guns,
lorries, and so on. And then we had terrain exercises led by the divisional
commander but only for the officers. One aim of this training and work in these
three months was to bring the replacements from our reserve armies from home
into our companies so that they became real members of tank crews and infantry
companies. So after three months we had been very prepared at least at a level
that could be reached at that time. We had all we needed. I believe we were
correctly equipped, full with personnel, and most of the personnel were
experienced in combat.”
While these commanders and their units took time in the
operational pauses to continue the training of men and maintenance of equipment
in the field, the Panther battalions were far from coming together as a unit.
In February 1943, the trickle of Panthers being delivered to the Grafenwöfr
training site continued with the arrival of twelve Panthers. A firing
demonstration, with Panthers, was conducted for Albert Speer, Germany’s
Minister for Armaments and War Production. “Both standing and towed targets
were fired upon, but due to inadequate turret ventilation only a few rounds
could be fired when the turret hatches were closed.” Poor ventilation in a tank
is a significant problem. The smoke and fumes become oppressive very rapidly
and the crew loses effectiveness after only one or two shots are fired. This
has a negative impact on a crew’s ability to sustain a rate of fire required in
the heat of battle. Because this ventilation problem in the Panther, gunnery
training of tank crews was degraded. With the deployment date of the Panthers
only five months away, the crews should have been working on their crew drill
and proficiency and instead of conducting test demonstrations so close to the
combat employment of the tank.
Another example of the training distracters faced by the
Panther crews at Grafenwöfr occurred during visits from General Guderian
between 1 and 15 June 1943, less than a month before the opening of Operation
Citadel. Guderian visited both Panzerabteilung 51 and 52. He discovered that
the Panther’s “final drive and engine still displayed serious deficiencies. Of
the roughly 200 Panther tanks already produced, only 65 had been accepted as
technologically sound.” To fix these and other lingering problems some of the
tank’s components had to be sent back to the manufacturers. Other repairs were
made in the Reichsbahn repair facility in the nearby town of Weiden. The crews
of both Panzerabteilungens assisted in the overhauling of the vehicles and were
once again taken away from their training on the vehicle.
The two examples above illustrate how the individual crew
training suffered from the Panther being rushed through production. It should
also be pointed out that it was not only the individual crews that suffered.
Shooting and maneuvering a tank is difficult, but the ability to plan for and
control the movement of a battalion takes more intensive training as the
individual tank crews. With the testing of the vehicle continuing throughout
the spring, only 65 Panthers had been accepted by the German Army as fully
operational. Moreover, with over hauling of the vehicles taking place less than
a month before deployment, the battalion’s staff never had a real opportunity
to train. Sources documenting the training of the individual battalions during
this time period are scarce, however, it is evident that the staffs went
through a great deal of training prior to deployment. Neither the staffs, nor
the companies for that matter, had the opportunity to maneuver and conduct
training exercises on a large scale. Nothing matches actual exercises with the
individuals and equipment one plans to fight with. Due to the testing nature of
the training and the constant maintenance problems with the Panther, the
Panther battalions staff were not optimally trained prior to their deployment
to Russia.
At this point it is necessary to move from the Panther to
the historical and strategic setting of Kursk. OKW (Armed Forces High
Command—who ran the German war effort everywhere except for Russia) wanted to
conduct a strategic defense on the Eastern Front during 1943. This would reduce
the number of forces required in the east and allow the Germans to shift the
then extra forces to the west in expectation of the Allied landings. OKH (Army
High Command—who ran the German war in Russia) agreed with the reasoning for
going on the strategic defense, but only after a major offensive had been
successfully concluded in order to spoil any planned Soviet offensive for the
summer of 1943. Hitler agreed with OKH on the need for an offensive before
turning to the defensive. However, Hitler had additional political reasons for
a victory in the east during the summer of ‘43. He wanted to show the world
Germany was not beaten, that she still had the resolve to fight on. He also
needed to quiet the fears of Germany’s allies and ensure them they had not
backed a loser. All during the war, Germany made a practice of cutting off Russian
thrusts into the German lines and trapping thousands of Russian troops. An
assault on the Kursk salient seemed to be the place where the desire of OKW,
OKH and Hitler could all be achieved. The German attack would depend on the
speed at which they could mass, arm, and launch their troops. However,
Operation Citadel was not Blitzkrieg in its planning. Citadel was originally to
take place in April, but Hitler kept delaying the offensive for several
reasons. These reasons ranged from shifting of units along the Russian Front to
positions to launch the attack to the fielding of additional Panthers. The
operation would also depend on secrecy, but the Soviets would have almost the
complete plan for Citadel prior to the start of the offensive.
The Soviets knew of the German tendency for cutting into
salients with concentric pincer moves. They also knew that Kursk was a prime
target. Their concerns proved justified as the Soviet “Lucy” spy ring passed
the concept and tentative start date of Operation Citadel to the Soviets in
early April. This information was confirmed by sources in England by the
decoding of “enigma” messages. In the spring and early summer, reconnaissance
of the northern and southern shoulders of the salient confirmed the massive
troop build-up. Thus, the strategic surprise so critical for German success was
never achieved. The Germans could only hope for tactical surprise such as the
time and location of the main effort and this would even be denied them. More
importantly, the Germans never knew to what extent they had lost the element of
surprise. In fact, because of the advanced warning, the Soviets threw out their
planned offensive for the spring of 1943 and went on the defense expecting to
bleed the Germans white.
In April 1943, Marshall of the Soviet Union Georgi Zhukov
recommended to Stalin and the Soviet High Command (STAVKA), that based on
intelligence, a spoiling attack or pre-emptive offensive was unnecessary. The
Soviets could turn the Kursk salient into a fortress and wear down any German
assault by concentrating on the destruction of the German armor. Once the
Germans were defeated at Kursk, the Soviets would immediately use their
reserves to launch an all-out offensive. Stalin reluctantly agreed with
Marshall Zhukov. Thus the Soviets would use the Clausewitzian concept of the
defense being the stronger form of war, but then immediately shift to the
offense to exploit the advantage gained by the defensive operations.
To understand the degree of defensive preparation by the Soviet
Army, one only needs to look at numbers. More than 20,000 guns and mortars were
emplaced. Anti-tank guns numbered over 6,000 and 920 Katyusha rocket battery
positions were prepared. All positions were oriented on specific avenues of
approach and the positions could support each other with interlocking fires.
Channeling the panzers into these killing fields were 40,000 mines laid out in
the early spring allowing the sunflowers and wheat to grow around them. The
density of the minefields was staggering, an average of 2,400 anti-tank mines
per square mile, and during the battle the minefields were repaired or replaced
with great efficiency by the Russians. Moreover, these numbers of weapons and
mines do not show the great number of individual tank positions dug in to hide
the tank from the turret down. Soviet tanks moved from prepared position to
prepared position and were immediately able to fire on any German penetration.
On the 24th and 25th of June 1943, the Panther Battalion 51
was loaded on trains and sent to Russia for Operation Citadel. Panther
Battalion 52 followed on the 28th and 29th. A regimental headquarters was
organized with eight Panthers and moved east with Panther Battalion 52. The
Regiment was placed under the command Major von Lauchert and assigned to the
XLVIII Panzer Corps.
As would be expected, moving out of Germany did nothing to
change the luck of the new Panther Regiment. The Regiment arrived in Russia and
closed into their assembly area near the town of Kosatscheck on 3 July 1943. The
Battle of Kursk began on 5 July. One day does not allow a unit to prepare. With
no appreciation of the enemy, friendly situation, terrain, or other elements,
this time crunch had the potential of negatively affecting the coming battle.
On 4 July the Regiment was assigned to the Grossdeutschland Panzer Grenadier
Division. Oberst Decker took command of the Regiment which was redesignated as
the 10th Panzer Brigade. The two battalions arrived only two days before the
battle began and it appears this commander had only one day with his unit
before leading it into battle. This was barely time to meet the staff, let
alone work out procedures. More importantly, it appears this commander may not
have had an appreciation for the capabilities and limitations of the new tank.
The XLVIII Panzer Corps may have had a premonition of what
was to come with the new Panthers as the Corps war diary for 2 July 1943
remarked “that deficiencies existed in the Panther units. They hadn’t conducted
tactical training as a complete Abteilung and radio sets hadn’t been tested.
Since their assembly areas were so close to the front, permission couldn’t be
granted for them to test and practice with the radio sets.”
There seems to be some conflict as to how the Brigade was
actually employed during Operation Citadel. Most historians of the Battle of
Kursk say the Brigade acted as a unit consisting of the two battalions;
however, in his book Panzer Battles, General von Mellenthin states the “Gross
Deutschland was a very strong division with a special organization. It mustered
about 180 tanks, of which 80 were part of a ‘Panther Detachment’ commanded by
Lieutenant Colonel von Lauchert, and the remainder were in the panzer
regiment.” Another historian of Kursk, Robin Cross (Citadel: The Battle of
Kursk) also speaks of Lieutenant Colonel von Lauchert but not Colonel Decker.
This is not to create a command controversy, but it is important if Oberst
Decker took command of the Brigade one day before the commencement of Operation
Citadel. At least Lieutenant Colonel von Lauchert had been with the units at
the Grafenwöhr training site.
The first losses of Panthers in Russia did not come from the
vaunted T-34 for which the Panther was designed to counter, but instead from
the continuing problems with the design of the motor. While unloading from the
train, two Panthers were destroyed by motor fires and were classified as total
losses. Robin Cross writes of the difficulties of the Panther just prior to its
first combat appearance.
“Great hopes were placed in the Panther with its
well-sloped armor and powerful 75mm gun. But the mechanical problems which had
plagued the Panther’s development pursued it to the front. As they moved up to
their start lines, the panzer grenadiers of Grossdeutschland saw jets of flame
belching from the exhausts of the division’s Panthers. Several of them caught
fire while rolling slowly down the road and their crews were extracted with
some difficulty as the new ‘wonder weapons’ were reduced to blackened hulks.”
In his book Kursk 1943: The Tide Turns in the East, Mark
Healy gives as good of an account of what happened to the 10th Panzer Brigade
in their initial employment as I have found.
“The key to the success of General Otto von
Knobelsdorff’s XLVIII Panzer Corps, in breaking through the Soviet defenses on
each side of Butovo and executing a swift advance to the south bank of the
Pena, was the massive concentration of power that lay with the 10 Panzer
Brigade, equipped with the new Panther. On paper these 200 machines gave the
Panzer Corps an unprecedented concentration of armour and firepower. In the
wake of the barrage, Panther Brigade ‘Decker’ moved off from Butovo, but almost
immediately ran into a minefield that immobilized many of the vehicles. Others
attempting to extricate themselves set off more mines. In front of
Cherkasskoye, the initial objective of the offensive and a key position in the
first Soviet defense line on their part of the front, more than 36 Panthers lay
immobile. The Russians brought down intense artillery fire on the stationary
tanks and on the engineers who went into the minefields to clear paths for
those Panthers not too badly damaged and able to extricate themselves. In the
meantime the infantry, who had been waiting for the Panther support, had
attacked the Soviet positions, only to be thrown back with heavy casualties.”
After the first day of fighting the Panther was not employed
in mass. The operational status of the Panthers during Operation Citadel began
at 184 Panthers on 5 July. This dropped to 166 Panthers on 6 July but plummeted
to 40 operational Panthers on 7 July. By 10 July there were only 10 operational
Panthers in the front lines. Maintenance crews were able to increase the
operation rate to 43 by 13 July, but one can see from these numbers why the
Panther was not able to be used in mass after the first day of battle.
General Guderian made an inspection to Kursk to see the
Panther and submitted a report on the operations of the Panthers. In his report
he describes the status of the Panthers on the 10th of July as follows:
“By the evening of 10 July there were only 10 operational
Panthers in the front line. Twenty-five Panthers had been lost as total
write-offs (23 were hit and burnt and two had caught fire during the approach
march.) One hundred Panthers were in need of repair (56 were damaged by hits
and mines and 44 by mechanical breakdown). Sixty percent of the mechanical
breakdowns could be easily repaired and were on the way to the front. About 25
still had not been recovered by the repair service.”
General Guderian goes on in the report to find mitigating
reasons for the large number of losses. Some writers suggest this may be an
attempt by Guderian to save face as the Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen and
for the entire tank production industry.
“The deep, heavily mined, main battle field of the
Russians must result in above average losses of material through hits and
mines. The fact that the Panther appeared for the first time on the
battlefield, focused general interest. Comparison against losses of other
Panzer units were not made. Therefore the high command and troops quickly
jumped to the conclusion: The Panther is worthless!”
“In closing, it should be remarked that the Panther had
been proven successful in combat. The high number of mechanical breakdowns that
occurred should have been expected since lengthy troop trials have still not
been accomplished. The curve of operational Panthers is on the rise. After
correcting deficiencies in the fuel pumps and the motors, the mechanical
breakdowns should remain within normal limits. Without consideration of our own
mistakes, the disproportionally high number of losses through enemy action
attests to especially heavy combat.”
After highlighting the short comings of the Panther in its
development and production, one finds it easy to agree with what Brigadier H.
B. C. Watkins wrote about the Panther:
“The design was put to Hitler on January 23, 1943. This
shows that the Germans knew how to cut corners when the need arose. Even more
remarkable was the fact that the first production model was to appear in
November of the same year. Despite many teething troubles, this was very
competitive timing indeed by a tank building industry that was already bowed
down under the strain of equipping new divisions, up-armouring and up-gunning
existing models, and creating numerous SP variants. Whilst much of this work
had to be under the weight of Allied bombing, work was gradually moved to safer
areas in Austria so that it could gain some degree of immunity. Later, the
production to both Panther and Tiger B was to owe much to the use of slave
labour in the Krupp and Daimler-Benz factories.”
Many battlefield lessons were learned from sending the new
Panther into this massive Soviet defensive. Certainly changes or adjustments in
tactics will occur as a new piece of equipment is employed. Fighting will
reveal things the planners and engineers never thought of in the design and
development phases. The operational value of any tank is never established
until it is tested or employed under combat situations.
The striking parallel between the Panther and the M-1 Main
Battle Tank in Desert Storm will illustrate this point. Military circles
wondered how this “new” tank would perform in combat even after nearly ten
years of initial fielding by the U.S. Army. The M-1 had proven itself
consistently on tank ranges from Grafenwöhr, Germany to Texas yet people were
still leery of this “new” piece of equipment because it had not been battle
tested. Civilians and reporters remembered the M-1 not performing well in
desert environments because sand affected the performance of the tank’s turbine
engines. This defect and several other problems were identified and corrections
made to the tank, but the M-1 remained suspect until it could prove itself in
on the field of battle. The same can be said for the M-2/3 Bradley Fighting
Vehicle. Although the M-2/3 was not designed to take a blow from a large
caliber weapon like a tank, people still remembered the RAND Corporation’s
report that the M-2/3’s armor was too thin and could easily be penetrated by a
direct hit from a Soviet tank. Some soldiers even doubted the reliability of
the 25mm chain gun used on Bradley. Nothing provides confidence in equipment
like success in war and the M-1 and M-2/3 performed very well.
The M-1 and the M-2/3 had something the Panther did not.
These newer vehicles had almost ten years to work together and evaluate how
best to compliment each other. In fact the two vehicles were designed to work
together. This was a luxury not afforded to the Panther. Unlike the M-1 and the
M-2/3, the Panther crews had no chance to train with and test the current
Panzer tactics to best exploit the Panther’s strengths and minimize its
weaknesses. In addition, time was not allocated for exercises with other equipment
the Panther would be required to fight along side by side. The Panther had a
range and speed of 125 miles and 29 miles per hour. The PzKpfw IVs could range
71 miles at speeds of 24 miles per hour. The ranges of their main guns were
also quite different. The Panther’s gun could reach out and pierce the frontal
armor of a T-34 at 800 meter (side and rear at 2800 meters). The Panther could
also pierce the frontal armor of the American Sherman at 1000 meters (side and
rear at 2800 meters) while the PzKpfw IV gun had a much shorter range.
Without conducting exercises with both vehicles the tactics
did not change with the employment of the new tank. The units were still using
the standard tank wedge spearheaded by the heavy tanks. Recall there was no
time to train with the other equipment used alongside the Panther, hence no
adjustments were made to the tactics. New equipment is developed to fill a need
and to fill this need the use of the new equipment must be well thought out.
The thought process must include the tactics. The Panther was employed in the
same manner as the PzKpfw IIIs and IVs. The placement of the Panther at the
lead spearhead of the wedge ignored and therefore did not take advantage of the
new tank’s longer-range gun. Placing the Panther behind the older tanks would
have enabled the tank to fire on the Russians from greater ranges and provide
some protection to the other tanks spearheading the wedge.
Placing the Panther further back in the wedge would have
also taken away the Russians’ ability to minimize the German advantages of the
Panther. The Russians learned quickly that charging at the new Panthers (and
Tiger tanks as well), and then swarming them with their numerical advantages
erased the advantage of the Panther’s 75mm gun. The T-34’s gun was more than
capable of opening up a hole in the side of the Panther from close range. This
Soviet tactic worked very well since there was never a shortage of T-34’s, and
with Marshall Zhukov following his creed “of no casualties are too great if the
objective is accomplished” the will was there to send in as many T-34s as were
needed to take care of the attacking Germans.
Any tank with a tread blown off by a mine can almost always
be repaired for battle once again. At Kursk the Panthers had two things working
against them. First operational orders given to the tankers for this battle
were “…in no circumstances will tanks be stopped to render assistance to those
who have been disabled…”. The second thing working against the Panthers was
that the only vehicle powerful enough to pull a Panther was another Panther or
a Tiger tank. Without another tank stopping to retrieve the disabled vehicle,
the tank was forced to wait on the tank retrieval equipment from the tank
maintenance company. The Germans would position the tank maintenance companies
as far forward as possible in order to retrieve tanks as soon as possible. In
the case of the Panther this tactic was not very successful, because the
maintenance company could not pull the vehicle back to its work area. The
standing orders of no other tank stopping to render aid made matters worse for
the Panthers disabled by the mines and impacted the ability to maintain
operational tempo. A Panther stuck in the minefield soon found the Russians bringing
devastating fires on the vehicles in the sprawling minefields all along the
Kursk front. The Russians had carefully planned to ensure the minefields were
covered by fire where any disabled Panthers became easy targets for the Russian
Pakfronts.
If the Panther was pulled from the minefield, maintenance
continued to be a problem as there was a shortage of spare parts for the tank.
Today when the U.S. Army fields a new piece of equipment, particularly a new
end item such as a new vehicle, radio, or weapon system, that piece of
equipment comes complete with a fifteen day supply of spare parts at the
organizational level. Spare parts are an extremely important part in fielding
any new equipment. There is expected to be a shakeout period whenever something
new hits the motor pools. During this period you will find that certain parts
wear out faster than others and frequently some parts not expected to wear out
are the first to go. Without the spare parts, the new equipment will not be
able to perform the functions it was designed for. This is why it is so
important to test the new equipment and have an idea which spare parts need to
be included in the fielding package at the organizational level as well as the
direct support level. By packaging spare parts which need replacing on a
regular basis, a system is created for keeping the new equipment mission
capable. At least the problem of expected break downs has been thought through
and lessons from the shake down period will be incorporated in the future parts
stockage and preventive maintenance programs.
The Germans, however, sent the Panther to the field and did
not accompany it with the required spares to keep it running. In fact, because
of the lack of testing, they did not know which parts were more likely to wear
out. Even if they did have an idea on which parts would need replacing, the
spare parts were not available. The tank production industry was not able to
build spares in sufficient amounts even had the parts been identified. There
were simply not enough spares for the Panther when first sent to the front.
The Department of the Army Historical Study German Tank
Maintenance in World War II reinforces the problems encountered by the panther
units concerning the lack of spare parts.
“A similar mistake (not enough parts) with even more
far-reaching consequences took place a few months later when the new Panther
tanks game off the assembly line. In a desperate attempt to speed up
production, the Ministry of Armaments had ordered the mass production of this new
tank model before it had been properly tested. Early in 1943 the first Panther
tanks arrived in the Russian theater and were immediately committed. Almost at
once major defects in design and construction—particularly of the steering and
control mechanism—were discovered with the result that all 325 Panther tanks
had to be withdrawn and returned to the zone of interior for complete
rebuilding. To perform the necessary work, a special tank-rebuild plant was
established near Berlin. By the time the initial deficiencies had been
corrected, the engine proved inadequate. It was not until the autumn of 1943
that a fully satisfactory engine became available. Under these circumstances it
was hardly surprising that most of the Panther tanks shipped to Russia arrived
without sufficient spare parts. Many a Panther was lost because of the shortage
of some elementary spare part or because it could not be repaired in time.”
