At the moment of the landings, there were no garrison troops
in Tunis, and the German and Italian High Commands were taken completely by
surprise. But Axis reaction was swift, and effectively assisted by the conduct
of Admiral Esteva, the French Resident-General. The first German troops arrived
by air at El Aouina airfield, near Tunis, on November 9, only a day after the
Allied landings.
They seized the key points of the two cities; they executed
or imprisoned the known and suspected Allied sympathizers; they took over the
ports of Sousse, Sfax and Gabes and the inland town of Kairouan. Within a week
there were 5,000 front-line troops in and around Tunis and Bizerte; they had
tanks; and they were still flying in Messerschmitt and Focke-Wulf fighters.
The landings at Algiers were not only the most crucial to
the Operation TORCH strategy. They were the most risky, and no-one knew what
the Vichy French authorities would do. The French possessed dangerous squadrons
of both fighters and bombers at their Algiers airfields of Blida and Maison
Blanche. In addition, while the Allied ships and troops were going ashore, they
would be within range of Luftwaffe bombers.
When a French Douglas DB-7 bomber from the Blida air force
base threatened the invasion fleet, two Seafire fighters from the aircraft
carrier HMS Formidable shot it down. Successive flights of Martlet fighters
from HMS Victorious then attacked Blida airfield in waves, shooting up aircraft
on the ground and those attempting to take off. Around 0830, when the Blida air
base signalled its surrender, naval fliers landed and took control.
Luckily bad weather had kept many French aircraft grounded,
such as fifty Dewoitine fighters, and six Potez bombers, preventing them from
causing mayhem amongst the invading forces. The French Air Force base of Maison
Blanche, where there had been no order to hold fire, was captured by 0900.
Apart from a failed attempt to capture Algiers harbour, troop landings along
the coastal beaches went well. Many Vichy French army units had been ordered
not to resist.
During the morning of 8 November Hurricanes of No. 43
Squadron RAF, and Spitfires of 81 and 242 Squadrons RAF, flew from Gibraltar
and landed at Maison Blanche. But, as the day neared its end, a Luftwaffe raid
of fifteen Junkers Ju88 bombers attacked the ships off Algiers, damaging three
Seafires on a carrier.
On the ground at the Maison Blanche air base, relations
between Allied forces and the Vichy French were tense. British troops stood
guard over parked French fighter planes. The newly landed Hurricanes and
Spitfires remained on the tarmac for lack of fuel. Cold and hungry, their
pilots huddled by their planes facing a Tunisian winter’s night.
Next day, 9 November, fighters of both 43 and 81 Squadrons
had enough fuel left in their tanks to scramble against another Luftwaffe raid
and were joined by Spitfires of 242 Squadron, already aloft, to disrupt and
fight off the German bombers. When the fighter pilots returned to Maison
Blanche their combat stress was no doubt quickly forgotten when the first food
since their earlier arrival from Gibraltar was awaiting them.
The decisive impact of Allied air power in support of the
Operation TORCH landings has not been well recognized. Even with a large number
of inexperienced pilots, within two days Allied air forces had overwhelmed
their French counterparts across Morocco and Algeria. Most important of all,
the airfields at Maison Blanche and Blida near Algiers, and soon after at Bone,
the closest to the Tunisian border, were captured with little damage. French
ground forces, with their air support eliminated, and their leaders in disarray
with conflicting loyalties, were left with no options. Allied forces were
pouring in by air and sea. On 13 November General Eisenhower reached a final
agreement with French authorities in Algeria under Admiral Darlan and
hostilities came to an end.
The Royal Navy aircraft-carriers lost a total of forty-five
aircraft over Oran and Algiers – fifteen Sea Hurricanes, eight Martlets, eight
Albacores, two Fulmars and at least twelve Seafires. Despite a large number of
inexperienced pilots, they had destroyed or driven the Vichy Air Force from the
skies. Allied air power was clearly a huge factor not only in protecting the
invasion fleets and troop landings, but also in gaining air superiority to
force the early ceasefire by Vichy French Authorities.
Although it was not known at the time, the early successes
in Morocco and Algeria had a consequence. By the end of November there would be
some 20,000 Axis troops in Tunis, specifically the 334th Infantry Division, the
Italian 1st Division, and 10th Panzer Division. The Germans continued building
up and, on 8 December, General von Arnim arrived in Tunis to take command of
their forces which, on that date, were designated the Fifth Panzer Army.
Perhaps the German reaction to Operation TORCH had been foreseen by the Allies
as a possibility, but with a hope that it would not happen so fast.
In contrast, the Allies’ initial attacking force from 78th
Division with the two brigade groups and Blade Force to make the first thrust
at Tunis totalled only 12,300 men. It was recognized as a gamble. With air
bases close to Tunis, as anticipated the Luftwaffe quickly established air
superiority in Tunisian airspace. It meant that Allied ground forces came under
regular attack from enemy fighters and dive-bombers.
#
Unlike the Desert Air Force (DAF), which had been based in
Egypt, and had experience in extending its supply lines and moving to temporary
airfields with Eighth Army, the air force squadrons sent from the USA and
Britain to support Operation TORCH had to be self-sufficient on arrival. In
comparison, the Germans were flying in ground forces and aircraft from Sicily,
only about 100 miles distant from Tunis, to all-weather airfields close to the
port of Bizerte and the Tunisian capital, such as Blida and Maison Blanche.
In early-December winter rain and mud made many dirt
airfields inoperable. To support the army’s advances with air support and get
within range of Tunis, Allied squadrons had to make use of temporary landing
grounds and often had to roll out a dirt strip themselves. As the British First
Army moved to within striking distance of Tunis, their closest operable air
base was 114 miles to the rear at Bone. This meant that Spitfires were at the
limit of their range, resulting in restricted patrol time over Tunis and German
positions before having to turn for home.
RAF photo reconnaissance flights on 12 November revealed at
least 120 Luftwaffe aircraft at Tunisian airfields, including forty Stukas and
some Fw190s at Bizerte and Tunis. The Focke-Wulf Fw190 was fast, with a maximum
speed above 380mph, well-armed and, apart from the Spitfire, superior at that
time to other Allied fighters in North Africa. In addition there were some 270
German bombers based in Sicily and Sardinia that were raiding Algiers every
night.
Basing themselves at first at the Maison Blanche airfield
outside Algiers, the Spitfire pilots of No. 154 Squadron RAF, led by New
Zealander Squadron Leader Don Carlson, quickly made their name known. On 15
November Carlson shot down a Ju88 bomber. Adding this to his four victories
with 74 Squadron in 1941 it made Carlson one of the first Spitfire ‘aces’ over
North Africa. In their first two weeks, 154 Squadron claimed nineteen Luftwaffe
bombers shot down, and nine more at least hit and damaged.
In mid-November 81 and 111 RAF Squadrons, with Spitfires,
were able to move farther east to Bone, 275 miles from Algiers but only fifty
miles from the Tunisian border. The Bone airfield, not much more than a landing
ground, had been captured on 12 November by 300 British paratroopers, flown in
by C-47 transports of the USAAF 64th Group. Next day more C-47s brought in
anti-aircraft guns and fuel, which enabled the escorting P-38 Lightning
fighters to land and base themselves at Bone. The airfield was very basic and
under continual bombing and strafing attacks from the Luftwaffe bases at
Bizerte.
For the Spitfire pilots the arrival of winter rain, together
with the Spitfire Mk VC’s inferior performance to the Bf109, made the life or
death struggle in the air even worse. The fight for supremacy of the skies was
a tenacious struggle which would have profound consequences for the armies on
the ground.
On 14 November Canadian Flying Officer Harry Fenwick of 81
Squadron RAF began a momentous five days of dogfights when he was shot up by a
Bf109. Luckily, he managed a forced landing with a leg wound. On 16 November he
was back in the air, first inflicting damage on a 109, only to be shot up
himself again by another 109. Once more he found a way to return safely to
base. The next day he made his first kill with a Macchi 202 and on 18 November
his revenge was complete when he shot down a Bf109.
Although two Spitfires at any one time were required to be
in constant patrol over the Bone airfield, and two more fuelled with pilots in
the cockpit ready to go, not all Axis air raids could be countered. Soon after
arriving at Bone on 19 November, No. 72 Squadron RAF lost eight Spitfires to a
bombing and strafing attack by twelve Bf109s. On 20 November thirty Ju88s
bombed Maison Blanche airfield heavily, destroying the RAF reconnaissance
aircraft.
On patrol on 28 November over an Allied convoy near Algiers,
Flying Officer ‘Paddy’ Chambers of 154 Squadron sighted five Italian
Savoia-Marchetti SM.79 Sparviero aircraft, which were beginning a bombing run
at the ships. Chambers closed with the SM.79s from behind and above. One by one
he picked them off, to send four spiralling into the sea. Out of ammunition and
his plane damaged, Chambers broke away. Flying Officer Alan Aikman shot down
the remaining bomber, so that in this engagement both pilots reached their
fifth victory and became Spitfire aces.
On 3 December, close to Tebourba and Djedeida and about
twenty miles from Tunis, 78th Division was being driven back by German Panzers.
Over the battle area Pilot Officer ‘Robbie’ Robertson of 72 Squadron spotted
some approaching Fw190 fighter-bombers. Diving to attack them he was shot at
mistakenly by an American P-38 Lightning fighter. Despite the friendly fire
Robertson shot down an Fw190 for his fifth victory. His success in becoming an
ace seemed to continue on 18 December when he accounted for another Bf109. Soon
after on the same sortie he took a hit from a cannon shell in the cockpit.
A splinter penetrated one of Robertson’s eyes, leaving him
bleeding and half-blinded. Somehow, Robertson kept control of the Spitfire to
make a forced landing, but he lost the eye to finish him as a fighter pilot.
Yet Robertson and the other pilots of 72 Squadron had taken a toll of the Axis
air forces. In four weeks the squadron had racked up a score of twenty-one
enemy aircraft destroyed, and another eight damaged or worse.
On 6 December Flying Officer Fenwick, with fellow Canadian
James Waller, shared a kill of an Italian Reggiane Re.2001 Falco II fighter.
Fenwick then shot down a Bf109 of his own. These two victories took both
Canadians to ace status. Every sortie could end in a life or death struggle,
with the incidence of death or maiming of aircrew increasing on both sides. A
pilot could become an ace one day, and then be dead or invalided out on the
next.
#
It is a common but false perception that the Tunisian
campaign was fought in the desert. In fact, the major part of the fighting took
place in the mountains and valleys of northern Tunisia. Much of it was in the
cold and rain of winter, and the icy winds of the Atlas Mountains. The bad
weather also disrupted the Allies’ longer-range bombers, which were using
airfields even farther away in Algiers.
Unaware of the enemy’s gathering strength, by 27 November
leading elements of 78th Division and Blade Force had advanced down the
Medjerda River valley, through the strategically placed market town of Medjez
el Bab to Tebourba. They were literally within sight of Tunis, no more hills could
be seen, only a flat plain less than twenty miles wide lay between them and the
Tunisian capital. Major General Evelegh, the 78th Division commander, hoped to
be reinforced very quickly and even had thoughts of entering Tunis on the next
day.
Before noon on 28 November such thoughts were gone when 10th
Panzer Division counter-attacked with some fifty tanks. Also the Luftwaffe’s
near freedom of the skies at this time enabled their Stuka dive-bombers to hit
troops of the spearhead 11 Brigade of 78th Division at will. As well as
defending their build-up in and around Tunis, the Germans were also intent on
driving the Allies back beyond Medjez. Although by 4 December the superior
German armour with unchecked air support sent the Allies reeling back from Tebourba,
a week of stubborn resistance by 78th Division, and the American forces, gave
First Army time to withdraw, and consolidate stronger forces at Medjez el Bab.
In response to the Army’s desperate plea for urgent air
support, on 4 December Wing Commander H.G. Malcolm led off ten Bisley light
bombers of No. 18 Squadron RAF, in daylight without any fighter escort, to bomb
a Luftwaffe airfield. They were intercepted and also outnumbered by Bf109s. The
ten Bisleys, obsolete, slow and poorly armed, were all lost. It was an
illustration of the many selfless efforts by Allied airmen to stem the German
ground onslaught. Wing Commander Malcolm received the posthumous award of the
VC.
A lack of forward airfields, and almost non-existent
co-operation processes between the Army and RAF spelled disaster. That same
day, 4 December, twelve other Allied aircraft were lost, five P-38 Lightnings,
a Boston bomber and six Spitfires destroyed on the ground. To add to the
Allies’ setbacks, on 6 December the rains came. ‘It rained for three days and
three nights,’ said Cyril Ray the official historian of 78th Division. ‘There
was no cover for the men and the slit trenches filled with liquid mud.’
Despite the Tebourba setback the Allies regathered in Medjez
and planned another assault on Tunis. Political pressure intensified and the
festive season was ignored. The offensive was to resume on the night of 23
December 1942 with a plan to capture Djebel el Ahmera, a mountainous ridge some
six miles north of Medjez, known as Longstop Hill. Until it was seized nothing
could move down the valley to attack Tunis.
The torrential rain swamped airfields, grounding planes. At
times the mud was too heavy for even mules to move supplies. The Tunis
offensive was cancelled. Even so it was decided that an attack on Longstop Hill
must go ahead. During the night of 23 December and all of the next day,
Christmas Eve, the Coldstream Guards and the US 18th Infantry Division fought
in waves to gain Longstop’s peak. And like the ebb and flow of the tides, they
first gained the summit, lost it, recaptured it, and lost it again. On
Christmas morning, after the second German counter-attack, the Allies withdrew
to Medjez with over 500 casualties, and another bitter, and costly defeat.
This failure to take Longstop Hill, combined with the rain
and mud, brought the Allied advance to a shuddering halt. To add to that was
the lack of close air support. It all meant that any further move on Tunis was
impracticable. The forced back down from the plan to capture Tunis and the
nearby port of Bizerte before the end of December meant that Rommel’s
Panzerarmee Afrika, which was retreating across Libya to Tunisia from the
pursuing Eighth Army, was likely to join up with von Arnim’s growing Fifth
Panzer Army. The only option was for the Allies to build up their strength
during the winter.
Air Vice Marshal Tedder knew that the Allies must first win
the air war before a spring offensive on the ground could succeed. In their
gamble to capture Tunis by the end of December 1942, the Allies’ lack of air
superiority in Tunisia had been a major contributory factor in the failure. Or
in the converse perspective, if the Allies had enjoyed air superiority, the
outcome may well have been different.
The battle for air superiority also now had to be fought and
won on two fronts, over Tunisia and the Libyan desert. The DAF was continually
on the move in step with Eighth Army, from one isolated desert airstrip to
another. While the Allies had lengthening supply lines and temporary airfields,
the Axis had permanent airfields in Tunisia, Sicily and Sardinia. To undermine
this advantage, air power and interdiction were seen as the key by choking off
the enemy’s supply routes, whether by sea freight or air transport across the
Mediterranean.
