Initial Border and
Railway Security Operations in the West and the Occupation of Luxembourg
At the start of the war, the German General Staff believed
that the French—possibly even before war was declared—would attempt to disturb
German mobilization and deployment by systematically blasting railway bridges
and tunnels, by initiating air attacks against railway buildings and trains
(especially those travelling across the Rhine bridges), and by conducting
surprise dashes using standing or quickly mobilized troops, especially cavalry.
A coup de main against the defensive works on Metz’s western front near the
frontier and Fort Kaiser Wilhelm II did not seem out of the question. It would
be the task of German troops assigned to border and railway security to ward
off such attempts. Furthermore, these troops were tasked with securing the
areas required for the deployment of the Field Army, with obscuring their own
measures, and, if possible, with gaining a glimpse of the enemy’s activities.
It was therefore very important, in the event of war, that German border and
railway security personnel be put into action in time and with sufficient
strength.
At the instigation of the Prussian War Minister, and acting
under the authority of special provisions initiated during times of heightened
political tension, on 28 July, Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg increased
railway supervision in frontier districts, as well as for railway employees
under the jurisdiction of the Berlin Railway Division Authority
(Eisenbahndirektion Berlin). This was the first protective measure taken at the
behest of the central military authority. On the same day, the Ministry of War
ordered the recall of those troops who were absent from their garrisons, who in
the event of mobilization were to be “immediately” or quickly ready to march,
for purposes of border security and for certain special tasks. Also, members of
the public safety service were to guard the large wireless stations. Late on
the night of 29 July, orders were sent out to recall to their garrisons all
troops on manoeuvres and training grounds and to protect the air corps
establishments as well as important structures along railway lines and
waterways in the frontier districts. During the night of 29–30 July, the
construction of armed positions for frontier defence was ordered as long as
they were on German soil.
The state of “Sentinel Duty,” ordered on 30 July for the
German Navy, required that the land army only put into readiness the active
troops destined for the protection of the islands of Borkum, Pellworm, and
Sylt—a total of five and a quarter infantry battalions, a company of engineers,
and a foot artillery battalion including artillery equipment, ammunition, and
provisions.
The deployment of frontier protection, which XVI Corps
Headquarters intended to begin on 31 July, was abandoned after the Minister of
War objected.
Only when the “State of Imminent Danger of War” was declared
on 31 July at 13:00 did all measures prepared in peacetime for the military
protection of frontiers, railways, and the coast come into force. Passenger and
mail traffic across the frontiers was placed under more strict control,
international telephone traffic and non-official wireless dispatches were
prohibited, and public freight traffic in the border districts was suspended.
The troop mobilization, however, was not connected with these moves. No
reserves were called up, nor were units conveyed from the interior of the
Empire to its borders; instead, the men of the frontier corps—who were still on
their peacetime footing—took over protection of the frontiers as well as that
of the railways within the jurisdiction of their corps.
Simultaneously with the Decree of Mobilization for the Army
and Navy, promulgated on 1 August at 17:00 hours, the Landsturm was called out
in the jurisdictions of fifteen separate corps (I, II, V, VI, VIII, IX, X, XI,
XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII, XX, XXI, and Bavarian II Corps).
At first, protection of the western deployment fell to the
frontier corps (VIII, XVI, XXI, XV, and XIV Corps), according to the
instructions for border and railway security issued by the Chief of the General
Staff of the Field Army in peacetime. As hostilities were to commence only upon
orders of the OHL, even patrols, small detachments, and aircraft were strictly
prohibited from crossing the frontier into French or Belgian territory. This
prohibition, however, would become immediately invalid if the enemy entered or
overflew German territory. Notwithstanding these peacetime regulations, on the
night of 1–2 August, the Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army enjoined
the general commanding XVI Corps again, in a personal telephone call, to
maintain the strictest restraint among his border guards. He stressed that any
trespassing on enemy territory was to be strictly avoided, as were any
hostilities. On the afternoon of 2 August the same instruction was telegraphed
again to the headquarters of the five corps on the Western frontier. Only the
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg was exempt from these rules, since it was in a
customs union with Germany. Luxembourg was scheduled to be occupied immediately
upon the Decree of Mobilization and was to be included in the deployment
territory; this was in order to take possession of its important railways.
In general, the borders of the corps districts were treated
as the lateral operational boundaries for the areas to be defended. After entry
into Luxembourg, the southern frontier of that country was to be divided
between VIII and XVI Corps. The commanding generals were to direct the troops
and formations within their own jurisdictions for the execution of their tasks.
The 16th Infantry Division of VIII Corps was assigned to occupy Luxembourg. Its
troops, which had been hurriedly put into readiness, were to turn out
immediately after reporting themselves ready to march. Otherwise, during the
“State of Imminent Danger of War,” VIII Corps’ border security operations in
the relatively safe area between Kaldenkirchen and Echternach were to be
carried out only by the Gendarme, customs officers, forestry officers, and road
police, and, after mobilization, by Landsturm forces. On the Swiss border, too,
the Landsturm was viewed as able to provide satisfactory security. However, in
the section from Luxembourg to the Swiss frontier, active troops were stationed
from the very start. Protection of the railways in the areas of XVI, XV, XXI,
and Bavarian II Corps (Palatinate) was likewise assigned to active troops,
while in the jurisdictions of VIII and XIV Corps this was left mostly to
Landsturm troops.
The special difficulties attached to border and railway
protection lay, first, in the speed at which the troops assigned to it had to
ready themselves, and, second, in the steady change of troops and responsible
commanding authorities during the first days of deployment. It was imperative
that such protection come into force as rapidly as possible, on all points that
could be threatened in any way. The first active troops to be employed had to
be those stationed in the nearest peacetime garrisons. They were especially fit
for this duty on account of their knowledge of local conditions. Of course,
these troops were not already on a war footing and had to turn out before
mobilization was completed. Some of them were not even stationed within the
jurisdictions of the headquarters to which they had been assigned under the war
organization.
Border security arrangements were executed in part on 31
July, the remainder on 1 August, without any disturbances and without serious
contact with the enemy. Beyond the frontier, French guards and frontier
sentries were identified at many points. At first, active patrols were made
only in the Vosges and at the Burgundian Gate, where some frontier violations
did occur in spite of the strict prohibitions that had been issued. These were
the result of the understandable but ill-timed impulsiveness of eager patrol
leaders. Against these, it is true, stood a considerably greater number of
French frontier violations. Only after Germany declared war against France on 3
August at 18:00 was cross-border reconnaissance permitted.
In the meantime, 16th Infantry Division had already occupied
the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. The completion of this mission, however, was at
first delayed by the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, who telephoned on
1 August at 18:40 to prohibit the crossing of the Luxembourg border on the
orders of the Kaiser. According to its deployment instructions, 16th Infantry
Division was to have entered Luxembourg immediately on receipt of the
mobilization order, but it was only permitted to do so after a new instruction
was issued at 12:45 the next morning. Elements of Infantry Regiments 29 and 69,
which had assembled at different points, although their units were not yet
fully mobilized, rushed forward by armoured train, in railway cars and
automobiles, and on bicycles, to secure the railway lines
Wasserbillig–Luxembourg and Duedelingen–Luxembourg–Diekirch–Wallendorf.
Luxembourg City was occupied on the afternoon of 2 August. The bulk of 16th
Infantry Division under Generalleutnant Fuchs followed at 07:00 the next
morning from Zewen via Wasserbillig–Manternach, without waiting for
mobilization to be completed. The deployment occurred without incident. The
Luxembourg government limited itself to a diplomatic protest and behaved with
restraint. The population was quiet, sometimes even obliging. The occupied
railway lines were left fully intact and fit for operational use. There was no
contact with the French. On 3 August the main forces of 16th Infantry Division
remained on the German side of the Alzette River, while smaller forces
entrenched on the far bank. In spite of a number of reports to the contrary, it
was ascertained that the French had not crossed the Luxembourg frontier.
On the evening of 3 August, XVIII Corps’ 50th composite
Infantry Brigade, composed of hurriedly mobilized troops, was conveyed by rail
to Koenigsmachern and Sierck. These troops arrived as reinforcements in the
area of Bettembourg. There they took over the tasks of border and railway
security in the southernmost part of Luxembourg. The 15th and 16th Cavalry
Brigades, seconded to 16th Infantry Division, were pushed forward to Dippach and
Pontpierre. Only once beyond the French and Belgian borders did they come into
contact with enemy frontier guards; repeated clashes followed between reconnaissance
parties over the ensuing days.
Around the fortresses of Thionville and Metz, border security
was assigned to XVI Corps Headquarters. Besides the measures taken to increase
the preparedness and readiness for action of firing positions in the outer
works and to secure the connections between them, headquarters pushed Infantry
Regiment 144—reinforced by some artillery and cavalry—into the area of Rorabach
on 31 July. From here the regiment marched across the border on 4 August to
reconnoitre, occupying Briey the following day after a light skirmish with
French frontier guard detachments. A more serious clash occurred on 8 August,
when a company standing near Valleroy repulsed an attack by superior forces
(French 16th Chasseurs) from Labry. Parts of the regiment, together with a
battery, made a dash for Labry and Conflans in the afternoon, returning to
their positions in the evening with a number of prisoners.
As in Luxembourg, German border protection forces in the
Rhineland and Lorraine received welcome reinforcements on the evening of 3
August. This relief came with the arrival of hurriedly transported mixed
infantry brigades consisting generally of six battalions, one squadron, and
three batteries each. These units had already been made ready to march in their
peacetime garrisons on the first day of mobilization and had to have their
remaining complements sent after them into the field. As a rule, they were
employed in the future deployment areas of those corps to which they belonged
according to the wartime organization and were subordinated to the commanding
generals of the frontier corps until the arrival of their own corps
headquarters.
On 3 August the composite 53rd Infantry Brigade (XIII Corps)
took over protection of the right wing of the section of XVI Corps north of
Thionville while XXI Corps’ 42nd Infantry Division took up border security duty
alone in the 75-kilometre-wide gap between Metz and the Vosges. The 42nd was
given significant relief by bringing forward three mixed Bavarian infantry
brigades. Of these, the 11th marched into the area of Rémilly, the 7th to
Moerchingen, and the 3rd to Saarburg. From then on, 42nd Infantry Division
could limit its own patrols to the section of Dieuze. The enemy was not very
active along this entire front. After 7 August the German infantry guards were
pushed forward over the border, with the left wing (Bavarian 3rd Infantry
Brigade), in connection with the movements of the GHQ Cavalry—which was making
light contact in places with a weak enemy—advancing to the line Blâmont–Cirey.
In addition to the gains made in border skirmishes in
Luxembourg and Lorraine, beginning on 3 August early assistance was provided by
the assembly of the cavalry, with I Cavalry Corps (Senior Cavalry Commander 1)
arriving on the Eifel, IV Cavalry Corps (Senior Cavalry Commander 4) in the
southern part of Luxembourg and north of Thionville, and III Cavalry Corps
(Senior Cavalry Commander 3) in Lorraine. In addition to its primary task of
gathering strategic intelligence, along with the Jägerbattalions allocated to
it, the cavalry was to concurrently provide security along the borders and
lines of communication.
From the beginning, it was anticipated that the planned
German deployment in the Vosges and the Burgundian Gate would be eventful and
difficult. In XV Corps sector—encompassing the northern part of the Vosges from
Donon to the Rheinkopf south of Schlucht Pass—several infantry regiments and
Jägerbattalions, reinforced by artillery and cavalry, guarded the border; in
XIV Corps’ sector (adjacent to the Swiss border) the task fell under the
unified leadership of the commander of the composite 58th Infantry Brigade.10
After the first two days in which border violations described above occurred,
nothing of importance happened along this front. The situation determined by
the reconnaissance carried out after the start of the war was that the entire
frontier was safeguarded by chains of French posts behind which larger
detachments were situated in reinforced positions. From 5 August onwards,
however, combat patrols were sent out in many areas owing to the enemy’s
increased activity. Of a more serious nature was an engagement at the Schlucht
Pass and at the Hohneck on 5 August. Strong French detachments advancing from
Gèrardmer with machine guns and artillery pushed the German pickets back, and
the Germans blew the tunnel through the Schlucht Pass. The enemy did not press
after them any further. The activity of the French border guards increased over
the following days along the Vosges Front and was closely connected to the
first large military action on which the enemy command had decided: the strike
at Mulhouse.
