HMS Cossack attacks the MV Altmark by Norman Wilkinson. National Maritime Museum Greenwich.
Just before dawn on 14 February 1940, a large sleek vessel
entered Norwegian territorial waters off the Helgeland coast. After rounding
the white-painted Halten Lighthouse she took an easterly course across Frohavet
before turning south into the Leads. Her freeboard was low fore and aft of the
central bridge structure, but both forecastle and stern were built higher, with
a single funnel aft, giving her the characteristic shape of a contemporary
motor tanker. The dark hull and light grey superstructure gave the ship a
sinister look. As the cold light of dawn rose from the snow-clad mountains in
the east, the name Altmark could be seen in white letters on both sides of the
stern.
Kapitän Heinrich Dau had taken Altmark to sea from
Wilhelmshaven in early August and loaded 9,414 tons of diesel oil in Port
Arthur, Texas, while the world was still at peace. In the Atlantic on his way
back, the signal `Steurbord Lampe brennt nicht mehr’ – `Starboard lantern is
out’, arrived on 25 August, meaning `extreme danger of war, keep away from all
traffic’. A few days later, instructions followed to head for a point off the
Cape Verde Islands to rendezvous with the Panzerschiff Graf Spee. En route,
Kapitän Dau ordered his ship to be primed in black and grey with a yellow
funnel, changing her name to Sogne of Oslo. Completing the disguise, a
Norwegian flag was hoisted on the stern, while red, white and blue stripes were
painted on the sides, as was the word `NORGE’ on the bridge.
Altmark met up with Graf Spee in the morning of 1 September,
just as the German troops marched into Poland. During the day, two 20-mm A/A
machine guns were transferred from Graf Spee together with twenty naval men,
two wireless operators, a purser officer to handle the stores and a prize
officer. Thus Altmark had a crew of 133 men, all told. The two ships sailed
into the South Atlantic while Europe went to war. After a while, Graf Spee took
off to do her business as a raider while Altmark vanished into the southern
vastness, constantly on the alert to avoid being sighted. They met again on 14
and 28 October and 6 December. Each time, the Panzerschiff was fuelled and
resupplied. As Graf Spee mounted her score, captured seamen were transferred to
Altmark when they met. This had not been planned for at all and came as a
challenge to Kapitän Dau. Storerooms had to be changed to cells, some of the
crew had to be assigned to guard duty, and water and food had to be shared
between far more men than expected.
Second Engineer Herbert Saville of Newton Beach, intercepted
off Cape Verde on 5 October, was first taken on board Graf Spee then
transferred to Altmark, where he was to spend a total of 135 days:
[On board Graf Spee],
we were treated as officers and gentlemen, while on the prison ship we were
looked upon as prisoners. [.] Though we were not ill-treated on the Altmark, we
were sleeping on the iron deck with carpets to keep us warm and we were definitely
referred to as the prisoners. I think the worst thing we had to suffer was the
monotony and the mental torture of not knowing what was going to happen. Our
exercise on the ship was very limited. We were only allowed three-quarters of
an hour every 48 hours, and often not that. Very rarely did we see the light of
the day and often were not allowed to wash for days.
The accounts of the prisoners from Altmark are fairly
positive shortly after they had been rescued. Treatment had been fair, without
direct mistreatment, and boredom and inactivity seemed to have been the
greatest tests, as well as a scarcity of tobacco. Later, the stories became
more nuanced and in particular Kapitän Dau and his prison officer,
Sub-Lieutenant Schmidt-Burchardt, were described as `brutal’ and `unfriendly’.
The food was criticised by some and the lack of sanitary rooms and washing
facilities was awkward, but Altmark was not designed to hold prisoners and
everything related to them had to be improvised. Most accounts hold the
original crew of Altmark as far more amenable than those transferred from Graf
Spee and some point to considerable friction between the two groups.
On 19 December, when the news of the battle of River Plate
and Langsdorff’s scuttling of Graf Spee off Montevideo reached Altmark, almost
300 men were locked away in the hull of the tanker. Most masters and senior
officers of the sunken ships had been kept on board Graf Spee and were
eventually released in Uruguay. When interrogated by British Navy officers, they
revealed the existence of the supply ship and the prisoners on board her, and a
wide-ranging hunt was initiated. Few had actually seen Altmark, though, and
there was uncertainty about her appearance and whether she was armed or not.
Informed by radio from Berlin that the Royal Navy was
searching for him, Dau kept the Norwegian identity of Altmark, but changed name
to Haugesund. Later still, she appeared as Chirripo, flying an American flag.
Dau remained far south-west of Cape Town for several weeks, hoping the hunt
would cool down. At least once, British ships were sighted in the horizon, but
Altmark slipped away at full speed without being recognised. During January
fresh water started to run low and on the 24th Dau decided to make a bid for
home. Eluding the Northern Patrol, Altmark passed south of Iceland on 12
February and two days later entered Norwegian waters. The two machine guns
transferred from Graf Spee had been stowed away below deck. She was flying the
official German Reichsdienstflagge, a large red-andwhite flag with a black
swastika in the centre and a golden eagle in the upper corner, indicating a
non-naval vessel in official service.
During the night, before entering Norwegian territory,
Kapitän Dau sent a lengthy signal to the SKL, informing that all was well on
board and that he expected to be home in a few days. It was also added that she
had `22(?) British, 67 Indian and 8 Negro prisoners on board, all healthy’.
This was the first news from Altmark in months and it was greeted with enthusiasm
in Berlin. At the German Embassy in Oslo, Minister Bräuer and Naval Attaché
Korvettenkapitän Richard Schreiber had been notified some weeks earlier that
Altmark was to be expected. Now, at 11:30 on 14 February, they received an
encrypted telephone message with information that Altmark had entered Norwegian
waters and that they should ensure that Norwegian naval authorities gave her a
safe passage through the Leads, including pilots as needed.
The sixty-five-year-old Kapitän Dau was undoubtedly weary
after the long, perilous journey. Radio messages from Germany warned repeatedly
that the Royal Navy used vast resources hunting him, but when he reached
Norwegian territorial waters, he must have thought the worst was over. Even if
Norwegian authorities were aware of the nature of his ship, he should be
allowed to proceed down the Leads and slip across the Skagerrak during the
night of 15/16 February when the moon would be down early, giving ample hours
of darkness to reach shelter in Danish waters, behind the German minefields.
Dau knew there would be British consuls in most Norwegian ports and Altmark
would undoubtedly be observed and reported to London within hours. He had less
belief in the British ability to react quickly to the sighting reports, though,
and if he could reach Skagerrak within thirty-six hours, he reckoned there
would be no immediate danger.
The prisoners, no longer permitted to come up for daily
exercises, knew they were under land as one sailor had been allowed briefly on
deck to empty a washing bucket and guessed correctly it must be Norway. Able
Seaman Thomas Foley, a prisoner from Doric Star, wrote:
One of the German
guards burst into our room, dashed up to the porthole and clamped it shut, then
fixed some iron bars across it, so that we could not see anything. Then he
dashed off again and later we heard that the Germans had hung a piece of canvas
in front of the entrance. We were virtually buried in the ship’s bottom. We
were sick with excitement. And we were almost physically sick as now the
porthole and the entrance were completely blocked up we did not get any air at
all, and the atmosphere of our prison became more stifling every minute. We
knew we could not bear it for long, and several of the boys became ill. We
existed like this for a whole day and night; vainly complaining to the guard.
The Linnesoy coast guard station at Fosen sighted Altmark at
03:40 on 14 February and sent a standard report to Trondelag Sea Defence Sector
in Trondheim. From there, the report was forwarded to Lieutenant Franz Münster
of the torpedo boat Trygg in Kristiansund with orders to meet the vessel and
check her credentials. Approaching the German tanker in the afternoon, off the
island of Tustna, Lieutenant Münster observed her through his binoculars. In
addition to the Reichsdienstflagge, Altmark had a smaller white flag with a
central swastika in the main mast, but showed no signs of being armed or any
other irregularities. Münster, who was not aware of Altmark’s true identity,
decided to treat the ship as a regular merchantman and, after instructing
Altmark to stop, the first officer, Fenrik Evju, was sent across for an
inspection.
Rear Admiral Carsten Tank-Nielsen, C-in-C of SDD2 in Bergen,
had issued a note to his subordinate commanders summarising what was known
about Altmark and instructing that, if she entered Norwegian territory, he
should immediately be informed. For some reason, the admiral’s note had not
been distributed among the ships in Trondelag Sea Defence Sector and neither
Münster nor Evju realised that they had just intercepted a ship that the Royal
Navy had been chasing for almost two months.
Boarding Altmark at 14:45, Evju was taken to the bridge and
introduced to Kapitän Dau, whom he later remembered as an austere formal sailor
in uniform with a characteristic, grey goatee beard. Dau immediately stated
that Altmark was a `state ship’ belonging to the German Navy and thus not
obliged to accept inspection. He added that she was on her way from Port Arthur
to Germany with fuel oil, carrying a crew of 133 but no passengers. Dau did not
reveal that a good part of the fuel oil from Port Arthur had already been
transferred to Graf Spee in the South Atlantic. Questioned about armament, Dau
answered that the two 20-mm A/A guns carried for defence had been stowed away
before entering Norwegian waters. Evju was satisfied with this, believing the
ship to be a regular tanker in official service, and following the neutrality
regulations, saw no reason to request a more thorough check. When he commented
that it had taken an awfully long time to get from Port Arthur to Norway and
that the log book, which he had been allowed to study upon request, showed
positions in the South Atlantic, a prickly Dau answered that the ship belonged
to the German Navy and the Norwegian officer `should not have seen that’.
Fenrik Evju sensed he was on difficult ground and let the matter drop. He was
shown around the bridge, map room and radio room, noted the visitation in
Altmark’s log, and went back to Trygg to report after handing Dau a copy of the
neutrality regulations in German, underlining the ban on the use of radio while
in Norwegian waters.
The prisoners guessed from the stopping of the engines that
somebody had come on board. Able Seaman Foley continued: The ship stopped.
There was the sound of tremendous bustle from the top deck. We guessed the ship
was being searched. Now or never! Unless we succeeded in attracting the
attention of the examiners, we would be taken to Germany. [.] Gathering all the
strength we had left we started to make the most deafening din we could manage,
kicking the door, stamping our feet and whistling. [.] But it was all in vain,
no one seemed to have heard us. Was it possible that the Norwegians really did
not hear us or was it that they did not want to?
The Germans were prepared and, once the commotion began,
steamwinches on deck were started up with a comment that it was routine to
prevent them from freezing up. This was practice on many ships, and there is no
mention whatsoever in Evju’s report that he or his men heard or suspected
anything suspicious. Based on Evju’s assessment, Lieutenant Münster decided to
give Altmark permission to continue southward. Although her master had admitted
the tanker was in service with the German Navy, no guns were on deck and she
appeared to be harmless; in which case the neutrality regulations did not
require a full inspection. Trygg had a local pilot on board, and on a request
from Dau, he was transferred to the German tanker to assist her to Ålesund,
where regular pilots could take over. While escorting Altmark across the open
Hustavika, Münster sent a report of the inspection to SDD2 via Trondelag Sea
Defence Sector, adding that everything appeared in order. With the tanker back
inside the Leads again, Trygg turned back at 18:00, leaving Altmark to continue
alone, according to standard procedure.
At this point, the German tanker was observed from a ship
coming out of the Leads, heading north. The ship was the British freighter
Helmond and on its bridge Captain D F Harlock became suspicious:
The Norwegian Pilot I
had onboard had Nazi sentiments. I happened to remark to him that the Russians
were not giving Germany much oil, as the Altmark was half-light. He replied
that the ship had been out four months. This remark and the speed with which
the Altmark was travelling made me suspicious, so next day, Thursday 15th February,
on arrival at Muirivik, I took the train to Trondheim and reported the ship to
the [British] Naval Control there.
Captain Harlock did not know what ship he had sighted, but
the British naval control officer in Trondheim did and immediately sent a telegram
to London. For the first time since the outbreak of the war, the whereabouts of
Altmark was known by the Admiralty. The net was tightening.
Also recognising Altmark for what she was once he received
Münster’s report, Rear Admiral Tank-Nielsen, the C-in-C of 2nd Sea Defence
District in Bergen, gave orders for her to be escorted at all times inside
Norwegian waters. There was no definition of a `state ship’ in the Norwegian
neutrality regulations; a vessel was either a warship or not. Claiming immunity
to inspection, Captain Dau would by default declare Altmark a warship, in which
case she could not pass through the exclusion zone or krigshavn around Bergen.
Kaptein Nils Simensen of the torpedo boat Snogg was ordered to meet the tanker
off Ålesund, where she picked up new pilots, to verify the refusal of
inspection and to find out more about the guns Altmark carried. An irritated
Dau had to accept being boarded again but Simensen, who came on board at 21:30
with the two pilots, found everything to be in order. He asked about the guns
and got the same answer as Fenrik Evju: there were two A/A machine guns stowed
away in the hull. Simensen was shown around above decks, but no attempts were
made to go below. Dau asked about the passing of Bergen krigshavn and was
(incorrectly) told that he could do so during daylight hours, even if he had
not been inspected. Close to midnight, Altmark headed southward again, slowly
at first to pass some narrows after first light. Snogg followed and, a short
while later, the destroyer Draug also joined the escort.
Things were still not to Rear Admiral Tank-Nielsen’s
satisfaction. He was convinced that the only way to keep Norway out of the war
was a consistent, uncompromising enforcement of the neutrality without favours
to either belligerent and, while Altmark was inside the area where he was in
charge, the neutrality regulations would be followed to the letter. A signal
was sent to Snogg with orders for another visitation the following morning. In particular,
Tank-Nielsen wanted precise details of Altmark’s armament, her assignment and
if there were any naval personnel on board. At 11:15 on the 15th, Altmark was
signalled from Snogg to lie by again, this time near the mouth of Sognefjorden,
and the first officer, Loytnant Frits Andersen, went on board. Dau kept his
frustration in check and answered more or less the same questions as he had
been asked before, but in more detail: Altmark was going home to Germany with a
load of fuel oil, the guns were stowed below deck, and there were no passengers
or persons from another country on board. The rather large crew was explained
through Altmark being used for training, and some of the men, it was acknowledged,
belonged to the navy. Since it said so in the log book, Dau admitted having
left Port Arthur on 19 August the year before, but would not reveal Altmark’s
whereabouts since. Lieutenant Andersen left Altmark after about half an hour,
and the German tanker continued southwards.
Rear Admiral Tank-Nielsen remained uncomfortable with the
situation and decided to have a look for himself. Accompanied by his acting
chief of staff Kaptein Stamso, he boarded the destroyer Garm, intercepting
Altmark at 12:30 in Hjeltefjorden north of Bergen – inside the krigshavn. Snogg
was called alongside and Kaptein Simensen questioned on his inspections of the
tanker. When it became clear that nobody had been below deck and that it was
only Dau’s word that she was not carrying any concealed guns or prisoners,
Admiral Tank-Nielsen promptly ordered Stamso and Simensen on board Altmark
again.
This time, a furious Kapitän Dau protested bitterly to the
Norwegian officers. It was the fourth time he had been stopped, and every delay
increased the chances of interception by the Royal Navy. He had to pass Bergen
as soon as possible should he have any chance of crossing the Skagerrak as
planned. Kaptein Stamso explained that Altmark was now some 8 miles inside
Bergen krigshavn and before she could proceed, every room of the ship would
have to be inspected. Horrified, Dau explained that this would not be possible.
Altmark belonged to the German Navy and had equipment on board that the
Norwegian officers could not be allowed to see. As a `state ship’ inspection
was denied `by order of the German government’. Stamso replied that if this was
the case, it would be impossible for Altmark to continue. Dau would have to
turn back, leave the krigshavn and take his ship outside Bergen. The boundary
of the exclusion zone extended to the territorial limit, and Altmark would have
to pass into international waters and proceed southward just outside the
boundary. Defeated, Dau accepted this, provided he was allowed to wait until
dusk before heading outside. This was agreed and the matter seemed settled,
even if the Norwegian pilots refused to stay on board if the tanker was to go
outside territorial waters. Maps were produced and the boundaries to the
krigshavn pointed out to Dau as well as the best routes around, to avoid
further misunderstandings.
After studying the maps for a while, Dau excused himself and
left the bridge, allegedly to talk to the pilots. Instead, he went to the radio
room and ordered a telegram to be sent via the nearest coastal radio station to
the German Embassy in Oslo, complaining about the treatment the Norwegian Navy
was giving him. Garm intercepted the message and Stamso was hailed with
instructions to give the German master a reprimand for using his radio inside
Norwegian waters. Dau meekly excused himself, saying he `did not realise he was
still inside the restricted area’. After some further clarifications, Stamso
and Simensen returned to Garm to report.
In the meantime, the prisoners, who realised that Norwegians
were on board again, started a riot, using empty shrapnel boxes as battering
rams. Again, the Germans started the winches, beating back the rebels with
steel bars and jets of icy water. This time, though, the signalling and
commotion was heard by the Norwegians and Kaptein Stamso reported to
Tank-Nielsen that there with certainty were more than just the crew on board.
The prisoners, some of whom had been on board for nearly four months, were
desperate and understandably not happy with the Norwegian Navy, which they
could see departing in spite of their signals and noise-making. The Norwegian
officers needed a decision from their government before they were able to
initiate any direct actions other than forcing the tanker outside Bergen
krigshavn.
With prisoners on board Altmark, Admiral Tank-Nielsen
concluded categorically that Altmark could not pass through the krigshavn but
would have to go outside, as already agreed. The decision was passed to
Altmark, from which Kapitän Dau shortly after hailed Garm, asking if it would
be possible to have a telegram brought to shore and sent to his embassy over
the public network. The answer was that if the master had something he wished
to discuss, he was welcome on board the destroyer. Dau, more frustrated than
ever, came across in his whaler. Some politeness was exchanged between the two
officers, after which Dau protested at the delays imposed on his ship.
Tank-Nielsen explained once again that a `state ship’ was not recognised either
by the Hague Convention or the Norwegian neutrality regulations and unless Dau
allowed proper inspection, including below deck, she could not pass Bergen
krigshavn. Some more civility was exchanged between the two officers before the
telegram was handed over and Dau returned to his own ship. The telegram, which
of course was read by the Norwegian officers, had a similar content to the one
Dau had attempted to send from Altmark earlier. He complained about the
inspections and informed the embassy that as he had refused inspection, he had
been forced to pass outside Bergen and would not be able to cross the Skagerrak
as planned. Altmark headed north again to wait for darkness in Hjeltefjorden,
accompanied by the minelayer Olav Tryggvason, which had arrived on the scene
and been ordered to take charge of the escort.
Leaving the Inner Leads, going around Bergen krigshavn,
Altmark would have to proceed down the coast, very close to and partly outside
the territorial limit for about 20 miles. These waters contain many treacherous
shallows and depending on how close to these Dau would be willing to steer in
the darkness would decide how exposed to British interception he would come.
Tank-Nielsen and Stamso believed that one of two things could happen. With
luck, Altmark would be intercepted by British warships, as City of Flint had
very nearly been in November. If so, the prisoners would be released and
Altmark would be out of the way. A protest would have to be made to the British
if they had been inside the territorial limit but the potential for conflict seemed
low. If nothing happened, Altmark would return inside the Leads south of Bergen
the next day. By then, however, the government and Foreign Office would have
had time to consider the right way of reacting to prisoners being held on board
the German tanker. Kaptein Sigurd Årstad, one of Admiral Tank-Nielsen’s staff
officers, outlined a third alternative in a letter to his father:
The ship would
probably have been attacked [by the British] outside Norwegian territorial
waters, and would probably have fled inside again. Then we could have interned
it and freed the prisoners, without anybody saying that Norway had not followed
international law.
Heading back to Bergen in the afternoon, Tank-Nielsen sent a
preliminary signal to the Admiral Staff and commanding admiral from Garm
informing them that the master of Altmark had refused inspection and
consequently been ordered outside Bergen krigshavn. He added that he believed
Altmark `most likely’ had prisoners on board. A more detailed report for the
Admiral Staff was composed by Kaptein Stamso on the way back, including
information that several of the men in Garm and Snogg had seen and heard SOS
signals from the foreship, in spite of German attempts to stop it, ascertaining
that there were prisoners on board. The report was submitted as soon as Garm
had docked at the naval base in Bergen.
In Oslo, the first report of Altmark having entered
Norwegian waters, reached Admiral Diesen by telephone in the evening of the
14th, after the first inspection. During the next day, he was regularly updated
and forwarded the information he received to Under-Secretary of State Jens Bull
at the Foreign Office by telephone. Bull expressed concern that a different
procedure was followed now than was the case with Westerwald a few months
earlier. Diesen answered that in his opinion it had been `an error of
judgement’. Altmark was a warship and it would be best `to get rid of her as
soon as possible’ even if this meant allowing her to pass Bergen krigshavn.
Bull agreed and when he shortly after informed Foreign Minister Koht by
telephone, the latter had no additional comments.
Having spoken to Bull, Admiral Diesen decided to overrule
Admiral Tank-Nielsen and sent a telegram to SDD2 at 17:30. `Let the vessel pass
through. It is a state-ship. Escort.’ Contrary to Admiral Tank-Nielsen, Diesen
was a careful, political officer. He was conscious that the Navy should not
cause problems for the government and feared British warships intercepting
Altmark west of Bergen would lead to severe diplomatic problems.
Coming back to his office at Marineholmen in Bergen, Rear
Admiral Tank-Nielsen found the telegram from his superior and promptly called
him at 18:00 with a protest, claiming this would be against the Norwegian
Neutrality Regulations. Diesen maintained his order and stated he would take
the full responsibility. He also criticised Tank-Nielsen strongly for having
left his office and gone to sea and for not having allowed Altmark to pass
Bergen krigshavn straight away. At this stage, Diesen knew from his report that
Tank-Nielsen believed there were prisoners onboard Altmark. He had not yet
received Kaptein Stamso’s detailed report but stated later that if he had, it would
not have changed his decision. Tank-Nielsen and Stamso discussed the
instructions and shared their frustrations in the admiral’s office, but could
do little other than signal Snogg and Olav Tryggvason in Hjeltefjorden with
orders to escort Altmark past Bergen as soon as possible. Rear Admiral Tank Nielsen
did not leave any personal notes, but one must assume he was not very pleased
with his commanding officer.
Later in the evening Naval Attaché Schreiber contacted
Admiral Diesen, requesting that Altmark should be allowed to pass Bergen
krigshavn. He was informed that such permission had already been granted and
expressed `great satisfaction’ over the news that Altmark was being escorted
southwards. Only in the morning of the next day, Friday 16th, did Diesen inform
his superiors in the Ministry of Defence of the events and his decision with a
copy to the Foreign Office. By then, Altmark had already passed Bergen
krigshavn.
When he received the new instructions from Snogg just before
19:00, Captain Dau immediately changed course again with a sense of relief. It
would be too late to cross Skagerrak the coming night and another day increased
the risk of British interception, but at least Altmark was still inside the
Leads. Speed was set so that Norwegian territorial waters could be departed
late next evening east of the Naze for the last dash home across the Skagerrak.
The voyage continued uneventfully and at midday on the 16th, the auxiliary
Fireren took over the escort as the German tanker passed from SDD2 to SDD1
south of Stavanger. The two pilots from Ålesund were replaced by new ones at
Kopervik.
Following the first sighting report from Captain Harlock in
the forenoon of 15 February, at least two more reports arrived at the Admiralty
during the day. First, the British naval control service officer in Bergen
reported in the afternoon that Altmark was rumoured to be near that city and in
the evening, the British naval attaché in Oslo, Rear Admiral Hector Boyes,
forwarded information from the French Embassy that Altmark had been sighted
inside the Leads near Ålesund in the morning. Churchill instructed the
Admiralty to let:
cruiser and destroyers
sweep northward during the day up the coast of Norway, not hesitating to arrest
Altmark in territorial waters should she be found. This ship is violating
neutrality in carrying British prisoners of war to Germany. Surely another
cruiser or two should be sent to rummage the Skagerrak to-night? The Altmark
must be regarded as an invaluable trophy.
In the evening of the 15th, a summary of the sighting
reports was forwarded to Philip Vian, Captain (D) of the 4th Destroyer
Flotilla, at sea on board Cossack, accompanied by Sikh, Nubian, Ivanhoe,
Intrepid and the cruiser Arethusa. The flotilla had departed Rosyth earlier in
the day, allegedly on an `ice reconnaissance’ in the Skagerrak (Operation DT).
The destroyers had embarked boarding parties before sailing, though, and below
deck it was common knowledge that they were looking for the `Nazi prison ship’.
The sighting reports carried the addition that they should not hesitate to
intercept Altmark, even if encountered inside Norwegian territorial waters.
Vian was one of the most outstanding officers of the Royal
Navy. As Cin-C of 4th Destroyer Flotilla, he usually had his command on board
the flotilla leader Afridi. In January, Afridi went to the yards and Vian
decided that Captain Sherbrook of Cossack was due for a break. Once he had
departed, Vian moved over to Cossack with his staff. By all accounts Vian was a
challenging man to serve under. Lieutenant Commander Reginald Whinney had known
him since long before the war:
Vian had always been
spare. He was tallish and fair with heavy bushy eyebrows. [.] His face never
showed much expression – perhaps the hair hid it. PLV was a man who lived on
his nerves – and very resilient they must have been. [.] He was not, though, a
gentle gentleman. [.] As a Captain, he was unbelievably rude, hot tempered and
frequently needlessly offensive; one had to stand up to him and be right – or
make him think so. In action he was quiet, calm and very quick. Anyone who
raised his voice unnecessarily at any time did not do so twice. Otherwise, some
distance beneath his ferocious exterior, he could be a man of surprising
kindness. In some ways he was a genius.
Considering the incoming sighting reports, Vian found it
improbable that Altmark could have reached beyond Kristiansand. Hence, he
spread his ships line-abreast some six miles apart, steering west and north
from Lindesnes during the night. At 00:48 on the 16th, a signal from Admiral
Forbes made it clear what they were looking for: `Altmark your objective. Act
accordingly’. At 04:37, a signal from the submarine Seal indicated that Altmark
had not yet passed Skudeneshavn and, after gathering on Cossack at daylight on
the 16th, the force remained in the vicinity of the Norwegian coast to the
south of Seal’s patrol area. During the forenoon, several vessels were stopped
and searched, also inside Norwegian territorial waters, but there was no sign
of the elusive Altmark.
