The Gallic War II –
The Battle of Telamon (225 BC)
It is only during the Gallic retreat northwards that
Polybius reintroduces the second Consul, C. Atilius Regulus. We have no details
of his activities in Sardinia, and only know that he was detained long enough
to leave eastern Italy under-defended, allowing the Gallic tribes to push
through unopposed. We must assume that when the Gallic army did invade western
Italy, messengers were sent to him at the same time as Aemilius in the east.
Again, Polybius does not provide us with a timescale, but whilst events were
transpiring at the Battle of Faesulae, Atilius seemingly ended his campaign in
Sardinia (though we are not told with what level of success) and transported
his army across the Tyrrhenian Sea to the city of Pisa. Polybius states that
Atilius marched south towards Rome, which he must have assumed was the intended
objective of the Gallic force. At this point it is clear that he did not know
of the events of Faesulae or that the Gauls were heading directly towards him.
He naturally sent scouts out ahead of the main force and it was they who first
encountered the retreating Gallic army near the city of Telamon (modern
Talamone) on the Etrurian coast:
When the Celts were
near Telamon in Etruria, their advanced foragers encountered the advance guard
of Caius and were made prisoners. On being examined by the Consul they narrated
all that had recently occurred and told him of the presence of the two armies,
stating that the Gauls were quite near and Lucius behind them. The news
surprised him but at the same time made him very hopeful, as he thought he had
caught the Gauls on the march between the two armies.
The Battle of Telamon
(225 BC) – Polybian Version
Thus, through a change of circumstance Atilius found his
fortunes drastically changed; from having been held too long in Sardinia and
missing the Gallic invasion, he now found that he was in prime position to
fight and defeat the Gauls, and set his army to give battle. We are fortunate
to have a detailed narrative of the battle preserved in Polybius, probably
based on a first-hand account from Fabius Pictor:
He ordered his
Tribunes to put the legions in fighting order and to advance thus at marching
pace in so far as the nature of the ground allowed the attack in line. He
himself had happily noticed a hill situated above the road by which the Celts
must pass, and taking his cavalry with him, advanced at full speed, being
anxious to occupy the crest of the hill before their arrival and be the first
to begin the battle, feeling certain that thus he would get the largest share
of credit for the result.
It seems that Atilius was over-eager to claim the glory of
defeating the Gauls for himself and neglected to link up with the army of
Aemilius, which was trailing the Gauls. Once again two Roman commanders failed
to link up properly and deliver a decisive blow to the Gauls, and utilise the
numbers of both armies catching the Gauls in a pincer. Nevertheless, Atilius’
decisiveness had allowed him to select his own battle site and occupy the high
ground. The first clash of the battle was a light skirmish between an advance
force of Gallic cavalry and infantry and Atilius’ cavalry on the top of the
hill:
The Celts at first
were ignorant of the arrival of Atilius and imagined from what they saw, that
Aemilius’ cavalry had got round their flank in the night and were engaged in
occupying the position. They therefore at once sent on their own cavalry and
some of their light-armed troops to dispute the possession of the hill. But
very soon they learnt of Caius’ presence from one of the prisoners brought in.
Although Polybius gives us no details of this first skirmish
between the two sides at Telamon, his narrative does indicate that the Gauls
were able to take prisoners and thus ascertain the nature of the threat they
faced, and were able to make the appropriate tactical decisions. Thus Atilius
seems to have lost some of the initiative:
[the Gauls] lost no
time in drawing up their infantry, deploying them so that they faced both front
and rear, since, both from the intelligence that reached them and from what was
happening before their eyes, they knew that the one army was following them,
and they expected to meet the other in their front.
Whilst the fighting was continuing for the hill between
Atilius’ cavalry and the Gauls, fortune again favoured the Romans, as Aemilius
was now close enough to learn of Atilius’ disposition and lend aid:
Aemilius, who had
heard of the landing of the legions at Pisa but had not any idea that they were
already so near him, now, when he saw the fight going on round the hill, knew
that the other Roman Army was quite close. Accordingly, sending on his cavalry
to help those who were fighting on the hill, he drew up his infantry in the
usual order and advanced against the foe.
Thus a third force of cavalry entered the battle on the
hill, to join Atilius’ cavalry and the Gallic cavalry supported by Gallic
infantry. Away from the hill, it seems that Aemilius was in fact closer to the
main body of the Gallic army than Atilius’ main force, which must have been
further ahead. Polybius presents us with a detailed disposition of the Gallic
force:
The Celts had drawn up
facing their rear, from which they expected Aemilius to attack, the Gaesatae
from the Alps and behind them the Insubres, and facing in the opposite
direction, ready to meet the attack of Caius’ [Atilius’] legions, they placed
the Taurisci and the Boii from the right bank of the Po. Their wagons and
chariots they stationed at the extremity of either wing and collected their
booty on one of the neighbouring hills with a protecting force round it. This
order of the Celtic forces, facing both ways, not only presented a formidable
appearance, but was well adapted to the exigencies of the situation. The
Insubres and Boii wore their trousers and light cloaks, but the Gaesatae had
discarded these garments owing to their proud confidence in themselves, and
stood naked, with nothing but their arms, in front of the whole army, thinking
that thus they would be more efficient, as some of the ground was overgrown
with brambles which would catch in their clothes and impede the use of their
weapons.
Despite the Gauls being caught between two Roman armies, the
lack of Roman co-ordination and the skirmish on the hill had allowed them time
to make adequate dispositions to face both Roman armies with confidence. Facing
the north and Atilius’ army were the Boii and Taurisci, and to the south and
facing Aemilius’ army were the Gaesatae and the Insubres.
As before, the initial phase of the battle was between the
cavalry of all three armies and focussed on gaining control of the hill, though
we do not know the number involved:
At first the battle
was confined to the hill, all the armies gazing on it, so great were the
numbers of cavalry from each host combating there pell-mell. In this action
Caius [Atilius] the Consul fell in the mêlée fighting with desperate courage,
and his head was brought to the Celtic kings; but the Roman cavalry, after a
stubborn struggle, at length overmastered the enemy and gained possession of
the hill.
Thus, the Romans emerged victorious in this initial phase,
but lost the Consul Atilius. It is difficult to know what to make of Atilius’
tactics. He seems to have made the decisive move to offer battle at Telamon and
chose his ground well, but we must question his decision to take the fore with
his cavalry on the hill. From the information we have, it does seem that he
struck out too far from his main army and made himself a tempting target sat on
top of that hill. At first the Gauls were able to attack him in force,
capturing prisoners, and thus learn of the nature of the force that awaited
them, avoiding any attempt at ambush.
Furthermore, his force seems to have been overwhelmed on
that hill, leading to his death in battle. Ultimately, his decision not to link
up with the army of his Consular colleague appears to have cost him at least
his life, but not the battle; an outcome which was only avoided by Aemilius’
timely arrival rather than any co-ordination between the two men.
With the cavalry battle concluded and the Romans victorious
on the hill, the main armies moved to engage. Despite the loss of the Consul
Atilius Regulus, it seems that the Romans armies were able to co-ordinate their
actions, possibly thanks to the cavalry of the two Roman armies intermingling
on the hill. We have no timescale for the lapse between the cavalry battle and
the advance of the main armies. Now, however, the Gauls found themselves
attacked on two fronts:
The infantry were now
close upon each other, and the spectacle was a strange and marvellous one, not
only to those actually present at the battle, but to all who could afterwards
picture it to themselves from the reports. For in the first place, as the
battle was between three armies, it is evident that the appearance and the
movements of the forces marshalled against each other must have been in the
highest degree strange and unusual. Again, it must have been to all present,
and still is to us, a matter of doubt whether the Celts, with the enemy
advancing on them from both sides, were more dangerously situated, or, on the
contrary, more effectively, since at one and the same time they were fighting
against both their enemies and were protecting themselves in the rear from
both, while, above all, they were absolutely cut off from retreat or any
prospect of escape in the case of defeat, this being the peculiarity of this
two-faced formation. The Romans, however, were on the one hand encouraged by
having caught the enemy between their two armies, but on the other they were
terrified by the fine order of the Celtic host and the dreadful din, for there
were innumerable horn-blowers and trumpeters, and, as the whole army were
shouting their war-cries at the same time, there was such a tumult of sound
that it seemed that not only the trumpets and the soldiers but all the country
round had got a voice and caught up the cry. Very terrifying too were the
appearance and the gestures of the naked warriors in front, all in the prime of
life, and finely built men, and all in the leading companies richly adorned
with gold torques and armlets. The sight of them indeed dismayed the Romans,
but at the same time the prospect of winning such spoils made them twice as
keen for the fight.
As was custom, the Romans opened with a volley of pila,
which seemed to have a particularly devastating effect on the Gaesatae facing
Aemilius’ army:
But when the
javelineers advanced, as is their usage, from the ranks of the Roman legions
and began to hurl their javelins in well-aimed volleys, the Celts in the rear
ranks indeed were well protected by their trousers and cloaks, but it fell out
far otherwise than they had expected with the naked men in front, and they
found themselves in a very difficult and helpless predicament. For the Gallic
shield does not cover the whole body; so that their nakedness was a
disadvantage, and the bigger they were the better chance had the missiles of
going home. At length, unable to drive off the javelineers owing to the
distance and the hail of javelins, and reduced to the utmost distress and
perplexity, some of them, in their impotent rage, rushed wildly on the enemy
and sacrificed their lives, while others, retreating step by step on the ranks
of their comrades, threw them into disorder by their display of
faint-heartedness. Thus was the spirit of the Gaesatae broken down by the
javelineers.
With the volleys of pila exhausted, the two sides met head
on:
…but the main body of
the Insubres, Boii, and Taurisci, once the javelineers had withdrawn into the
ranks and the Roman maniples attacked them, met the enemy and kept up a
stubborn hand-to hand combat. For, though being almost cut to pieces, they held
their ground, equal to their foes in courage, and inferior only, as a force and
individually, in their arms. The Roman shields, it should be added, were far
more serviceable for defence and their swords for attack, the Gallic sword
being only good for a cut and not for a thrust.
It seems, however, that the two sides were evenly matched
until the decisive move was made by the Roman cavalry on top of the hill,
attacking the Gallic force from the flanks:
But finally, attacked from higher ground and on their flank
by the Roman cavalry, which rode down the hill and charged them vigorously, the
Celtic infantry were cut to pieces where they stood, their cavalry taking to
flight.
Thus it seems that both Consuls had a hand in the tactics
that led to the Roman victory; Atilius for recognizing the importance of taking
control of the hill top which would give the Romans access to the Gallic flank,
and Aemilius for having the presence of mind to send reinforcements to the hill
top when it seemed that Atilius had overreached himself and placed his position
in jeopardy. In the end, despite the disjointed start to the battle, the Roman
emerged totally victorious, with the defeated Gauls trapped between three Roman
forces and annihilated. Polybius, supported by other sources, places the total
Gallic dead at 40,000, with 10,000 taken prisoner; the most comprehensive Roman
victory over the Gauls in Roman history to date. Given that our sources stated
that the Gallic forces were 70,000 strong (50,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry,
see above), this must mean that some 20,000 Gauls escaped. Of the Gaesatae
chieftains, Concolitanus was taken prisoner and Aneroëstus fled, but committed
suicide rather than be taken prisoner.
The Battle of Telamon
(225 BC) – Non-Polybian Versions
Although Polybius preserves by far the best account, written
less than 100 years later and based on first-hand accounts, a number of other
sources provide shorter versions of the campaign, some of which add some
interesting details or variations. Both Diodorus and Orosius offer short
accounts of the campaign and the Battle of Telamon; both are remarkably
similar:
The Celts and Gauls,
having assembled a force of 200,000 men, joined battle with the Romans and in
the first combat were victorious. In a second attack they were again
victorious, and even killed one of the Roman Consuls. The Romans, who for their
part had seven hundred thousand infantry and seventy thousand cavalry, after
suffering these two defeats, won a decisive victory in the third engagement. They
slew forty thousand men and took the rest captive, with the result that the
chief prince of the enemy slashed his own throat and the prince next in rank to
him was taken alive.
Battle was joined near Arretium [modern Arezzo]. The Consul
Atilius was killed and his 800,000 Romans, after part of their number were cut
down fled, even though the slaughter on their side ought not to have panicked
them, for historians record that only 3,000 of them were killed.
After this a second battle was fought against the Gauls in
which at least 40,000 of them were slaughtered.
Both sources seem to make the same mistake on the Roman
numbers, interpreting Polybius’ figures for total available manpower as the
number of soldiers Rome had in the field, and Orosius seems to believe that all
eight hundred thousand Roman soldiers fled the field. Diodorus interestingly
has three battles in his campaign; two Roman defeats and a victory. However he
states that a Consul (Atilius) was killed in the second battle, which indicates
that both sources, or their source, separated the Battle of Telamon into two
separate battles; the cavalry action on the hill and the infantry clash, the
former of which he believes to have been a Roman defeat. Similarly Orosius has
separated the battle into two, with Atilius being killed in a defeat, followed
by a victory.
It is interesting to see how the narrative of this battle
has evolved over time, with Atilius’ action evolving into a Roman defeat, which
was then avenged at Telamon, rather than being seen as two parts of the same
battle. Ancient historians seemed to have judged Atilius poorly, mostly for
being killed in battle, which then discredited his actions on the hill. As it
was, it was his tactical move to secure the hill for the Roman cavalry which
proved to be the turning point of the battle, securing Roman victory, though he
needed Aemilius’ force to secure control of the hill, having seemingly
overstretched his own position. Despite his short and garbled account, Orosius
is the only one to provide us with a figure for the Roman dead; three thousand
as opposed to the forty thousand killed on the Gallic side.
The theme of Atilius’ role being downgraded as time passed
can be seen in the account preserved by Eutropius, who erases him altogether:
When Lucius Aemilius
was Consul, a vast force of the Gauls crossed the Alps; but all Italy united in
favour of the Romans; and it is recorded by Fabius the historian, who was
present in that war, that there were eight hundred thousand men ready for the
contest. Affairs, however, were brought to a successful termination by the
Consul alone; forty thousand of the enemy were killed, and a triumph decreed to
Aemilius.
Here Eutropius goes out of his way to state that it was
Aemilius alone who was responsible for the Roman victory. Florus too has a
short account of the war, which although severely lacking in detail, states
that it was Aemilius who defeated the Gauls.¹⁷ The only exception to this trend
is Pliny, who does not provide detail of the campaign, but does comment on
Aemilius and Atilius raising nearly 800,000 men (again a misreading of
Polybius, who stated that that number were available, not mobilized. Plutarch
comments on the early years of the war without even mentioning either Consul of
225 BC:
The first conflicts of
this war brought great victories and also great disasters to the Romans, and
led to no sure and final conclusion.
The figure of 40,000 Gallic dead is a common one throughout
all accounts of the battle. Even Jerome preserves the figure in an entry. Dio
has a fragment on the Gallic character, which may reveal some small additional
detail about the battle:
The Gauls became
dejected on seeing that the Romans had already seized the most favourable
positions.
Zonaras, however, preserves an interesting variation on the
campaign, no doubt mirroring the original account of Dio:
The barbarians
plundered some towns, but at last a great storm occurred in the night, and they
suspected that Heaven was against them. Consequently they lost heart, and
falling into a panic, attempted to find safety in flight. Regulus pursued them
and brought on an engagement with the rear-guard in which he was defeated and
lost his life. Aemilius occupied a hill and remained quiet. The Gauls in turn
occupied another hill, and for several days both sides were inactive; then the
Romans, through anger at what had taken place, and the barbarians, from
arrogance born of their victory, charged down from the heights and came to
blows. For a long time the battle was evenly fought, but finally the Romans
surrounded the others with their cavalry, cut them down, seized their camp, and
recovered the spoils.
Here we have some significant differences. The first notable
one concerns the early Gallic campaigns, which ignores the Roman defeat at
Faesulae and has the Gauls turning back due to divine omens. Next we have the
role of Regulus, who again is relegated to a supporting role, killed fighting
the Gallic rearguard, which is interesting as he actually lay in the path of
the Gauls and was attacked by an advance contingent of Gallic cavalry, whilst
it was Aemilius who was to their rear. Dio again separates the two engagements,
this time inserting a number of days between the clashes. During the final
battle, again unnamed, both sides occupied opposing hills and then charged at
each other, though again the battle is won by the Roman cavalry.
This is a fascinating example of the divergences we see in the ancient sources. If we did not have the account of Polybius, then it would be Zonaras who provided the most detail. We would conclude that there were indeed two final battles to the campaign, separated by a period of time, with Atilius and Aemilius not joining up their forces and Atilius dying in battle first. Given this disparity, it does beg the question how many other accounts of Roman battles and campaigns we have which are similarly skewed towards one version without us even being aware of it.
