GERMAN COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST AIRLIFT OPERATIONS
By Army and
Counterintelligence Agencies
Attacks on Partisan
Airfields.
The Army security troops and police units committed in the
rear areas of Army Group South, Center, and North were’ often supported by
aircraft and antiaircraft units provided by the Luftwaffe as well as by air
force headquarters troops employed for ground combat. In the course of their
anti-partisan operations, these troops attempted to seize the airfields used
for resupplying the partisans. Since these airfields were located in
partisan-infested areas in fairly inaccessible forests and swamps, and since
they were furthermore well secured and defended, they could usually not be
attacked on the ground. By the time a major German unit, after serious
fighting, finally succeeded in penetrating to such an airfield, the aircraft and
installations had already been destroyed. Destruction by artillery fire usually
failed because of the difficulty of bringing the guns sufficiently close to the
target or because of a shortage of ammunition. Sometimes, however, a major
operation of this type was rewarding, as when the Germans succeeded in
capturing an airfield in the Lepel area on which there were more than 100
Soviet cargo gliders.
Deceptive Measures.
The German ground forces had a certain amount of success in
imitating landmark beacons of the Russians by setting up similar fires and
flares. In this manner the Germans succeeded in several instances in seizing
air-dropped supplies or in making Russian aircraft land within their territory.
For example, during an anti-partisan operation conducted south of Lake Ilmen in
the winter of 1941–42 by a reinforced German infantry regiment, the troops
fired the same flares as the partisans, whereupon Russian supply aircraft
dropped parachute containers enclosing ammunition, rations, and PX supplies. The
principal achievement, however, was that the Russians grew far more careful
after that.
In February 1942 counterintelligence agents of Eighteenth
Army captured a sabotage detachment composed of 8 men near Tosno (59° 33’N 30°
53’E). During his interrogation one of the radio operators stated that they
were expecting an aircraft with a new commander and a new radio operator.
Moreover, he informed his interrogators that the light signal to be given at
the time of arrival of the plane above a small lake was the Russian letter “G.”
Upon request from the Germans, the radio operator contacted the Leningrad
station and found out that the plane would arrive the following night. At the
indicated time the area was surrounded by German troops. The aircraft landed on
the ice with four men aboard. While the two pilots were able to shoot
themselves, the two passengers were captured alive.
But the Russians did not always fall into such traps, as is
shown in the following case. In the spring of 1943 the 318th German Counterintelligence
Group staged a similar operation in the Surash forest, some 20 miles north-east
of Vitebsk (20), hoping to seize an aircraft that supported the Partisan
Brigade Sokolov. The plane actually arrived, but instead of landing it strafed
the area and dropped bombs. On their return trip the Russians who were working
for the Germans on this mission fell into an ambush prepared by Sokolov’s
partisans. The cause of this failure was never established. Although the
Germans had used proper signals and code messages, the central partisan staff
probably became suspicious because the clearing in the forest indicated by the
Germans had not yet been used for landing operations. The Germans could not
have used the customary airfield because all access roads were mined and the
field was too close to the camp of Brigade Sokolov.
The German counterintelligence agents were able to obtain
some of the partisan-destined supplies by playing German-prepared codes into
partisan hands.
Such deceptive measures probably did not interfere much with
the airlift of supplies to the partisans. Interference from the air was far
more promising.
By Luftwaffe Agencies
Attacks on Jump-off Bases and Partisan Airfields. The
Russian advanced landing fields, generally known to the Germans, were in the
principal sector of Army Group Center as follows:
“1941–43: Kaluga (about 100 miles south-west of Moscow),
Sukhinichi (approximately 70 miles north-west of Bryansk), and Kalinin (about
95 miles north-west of Moscow);
1943–44: Konotop (about 110 miles north-west of Kiev) and
Sechniskoya (between Bryansk and Roslavl).“
The German Air Force units did not launch any mass attacks
on these airfields; they made nuisance raids instead, mainly because they
lacked sufficient strength to do better. These units also had other targets in
the combat zone that had higher priority than airfields serving partisan
support.
Again because of the shortage of forces the Germans were
unable to launch planned offensives against partisan airfields, even in the
central sector of the Russian theater.76 They were forced to improvise measures
against these targets. Nuisance bombers had orders to drop bombs in their raids
on these well-known airfields, if such action promised results. Bombers were
also ordered to attack such airfields as a secondary-mission. But only in a few
instances did the Germans score successes in bombing raids on partisan air-drop
points, and the number of Russian aircraft shot down in such raids was small.
To restrict Soviet night flying activities that were
constantly increasing, the security divisions of Army Group Center were each
issued three close reconnaissance aircraft, model Focke-Wulf. After a slow
start they proved very effective. They succeeded, for instance, in identifying
the well-camouflaged and forest-hidden emergency airfield at Zezersk
[Chechersk], north-west of Gomel, at a time when a plane was on the field. It
was destroyed on the ground and another one was later shot down while landing.
The airfield was then destroyed during a special operation and made
inaccessible, after bombing from the air had proved of little lasting effect.
At the end of 1943 the close reconnaissance units of the 1st
Air Division committed in the Central Army Group sector at Mogilev were
employed in the partisan-held area to the west with orders to fire at every
light signal. If the pattern of light signals indicated the existence of a
landing field, the German planes were to wait for Russian aircraft to land,
then drop flares and set the enemy planes on fire.
During the period 1 September 1943 to the summer of 1944 an
air commander (Brig.-Gen. Punzert) on the Sixth Air Force staff was responsible
for committing his auxiliary bombing units not only for night nuisance raids on
nearby enemy forward areas but also for supporting anti-partisan operations of
the ground forces and attacking Russian supply aircraft. These auxiliary units
received their personnel and equipment from flying schools. They were organized
as follows:
(1) 1st Night Ground Attack Group with 5 squadrons, equipped
with the following model aircraft: Arado 66 (single-engine school and training
planes of an old type), Heinkel 45 and Henschel 126 (antiquated, single-engine
reconnaissance aircraft), and Focke-Wulf 189 (twin-engine close reconnaissance
planes).
(2) Combat Command Liedtke, consisting of 3 squadrons,
equipped with Junkers F 13 (single-engine, commercial aircraft), Henschel 123
and 126 (antiquated, single-engine close reconnaissance aircraft), Heinkel 111
and Dornier 17 (antiquated, twin-engine bombing and long-range reconnaissance
aircraft), and Messerschmitt 109 (single-engine, single-seat fighter).
(3) Special Squadron Gamringer (for reconnaissance and
combat) composed of 12 planes of the following models: Arado 66 (single-engine
school and training planes of an old type), Junkers 87 (dive bomber), and
Messerschmitt 109 (single-engine, single-seat fighter).
The armament of these planes was improvised with machine
guns, while the Focke-Wulf 189’s and Heinkel 111’s also had cannon. Bombs were
dropped by hand, except for the Heinkel 111’s which were equipped with bomb
release and bomb sight devices.
The commitment of the few aircraft suitable for night
fighting against the approaching supply transports failed, although not through
any lack of personnel. The aircraft were insufficiently equipped with
navigational aids, their armament was unsatisfactory, and the pilots had not
had enough training in firing guns. The aircraft warning net did not offer
sufficient coverage and the Russians adroitly exploited this weakness. For
these reasons the Germans had to be satisfied with keeping the areas through
which the Russian aircraft entered their territory under surveillance. This was
achieved by tracing the fiery glare of the engine exhaust until the landing of
the aircraft and then bombing the landing ground. This procedure was only
rarely successful, because the partisans improvised an antiaircraft defense of
the landing fields. At first they responded with immediate and intensive rifle
and machine gun fire; after a while, they also used light antiaircraft guns
with considerable success. Only in 2 or 3 instances were the Germans able to
establish that they had destroyed Russian aircraft on the ground.
The 1st Night Ground Attack Group was committed along the
northern sector of the Russian front, under the command of the 3rd Air
Division, from the beginning of 1943 to 6 July 1944. The group flew night
bombing missions against nearby targets such as troop assemblies, tank-staging
areas, motor-vehicle columns, and artillery positions. Originally designated as
a nuisance bombing group, the group was equipped with inferior and partly
unarmed school and training aircraft and antiquated close reconnaissance
planes, and could therefore be employed against these targets only by night.
When partisan activities in the immediate rear of the combat zone, especially
in the partisan-infested area south-west of Leningrad around Luga, required
anti-partisan operations in September 1943, individual planes of this group
were committed as reconnaissance and bombing planes in support of the ground
forces in daytime missions.
South of Luga the partisans had prepared a landing field for
supply transports—model U 2—in virtually inaccessible terrain. The borders of
the landing surface were surrounded by piles of twigs that were lit when
Russian supply planes were expected. One of the Heinkel 46 aircraft succeeded
in arriving at precisely that moment and attacked a U 2 with machine-gun fire
as it was landing. The crashed aircraft was sighted the next day. Constant
disruption of their supply system must have created great difficulties for this
partisan unit, since the Germans intercepted radio messages indicating that the
partisans were unable to operate for lack of supplies.
In the southern part of the Russian theater the Germans also
had to improvise. Thus, in 1943–44 Russian aircraft, even twin-engine types,
landing on partisan-prepared airfields on the high plateau of the Yaila
Mountains, were attacked by German auxiliary units equipped with school and
training planes.
Attacks on Transports in Flight. Since the supply aircraft
flew only under cover of darkness, it was difficult to combat them with flak
and fighters. In contrast to Western Europe, the Germans in the Russian theater
had a weak night-fighter organization.
In the Sixth Air Force area in the central sector, the II
Corps and the 1st Air Division had improvised a night-fighter intercept
organization against Russian supply transports. Radar intercept detachments
were installed on railroad cars and thus given the necessary mobility for
commitment at enemy points of main air effort in accordance with German air and
railroad capabilities. These detachments were instrumental in scoring the
greatest number of night kills; but their number was insufficient to achieve
more than very limited local coverage.
Deceptive Measures.
The small U 2, a slow but maneuverable aircraft, used by the
Russians to carry supplies into areas close to the front, was suitable for
night missions because the German night fighters could not easily shoot it
down. Moreover, it could take off from and land on small airstrips that could
be found in great number. It could also land on skis wherever such landings
were possible. These airstrips were known to the German Air Force and new ones
could rapidly be identified by air reconnaissance units. The Soviet command,
however, did not have to make frequent switches in landing, supply, or airdrop
fields because the German ground forces were too weak to seize them and the
German night fighters were not very effective in attacking them.
By constant surveillance the German command sometimes
succeeded in identifying the signal markers on landing grounds. Night fighter
and reconnaissance aircraft provided data for deceptive measures to mislead
Russian supply aircraft approaching by ground orientation markers. Along a
frequently used Russian air-supply route in the Sixth Air Force area the
Germans reconnoitered a landing field at the rear border of an area of the
front that was firmly controlled by the German ground forces. This field was
“prepared for landing,” and occupied by an air force liaison detachment and one
light antiaircraft platoon. On the basis of frequently observed landing signals
at partisan airfields, a list of signals was established for the liaison
detachment and the night reconnaissance aircraft that was to observe and radio
the proper signal for the respective night to the liaison detachment. The
personnel of the latter thereupon set up the lamps in the proper pattern so
that the approaching Russian supply transports would assume that they had
arrived at destination and would land.
The success of this type of deception depended on the
following:
(1) The “trap” had to be along the approach route because
the Soviet aircraft had sufficient means of ground orientation to detect major
deviations from their course.
(2) The trap could not be too far ahead of the destination
since the crews would notice major differences in flight time. On the other
hand, it had to be sufficiently far from the point of destination so that the
two signals could not be seen simultaneously from the air.
(3) The light signals could not be made up of the customary
flashlights, but had to consist of lanterns or straw fires as used by partisans
at their airfields. The strong while light of electrical flashlights would have
aroused the suspicions of the Russian crews.
Because of the requirement that such traps be set up close
to the real landing field, the successful use of this deceptive measure was
limited. Use of this measure was also limited to clear nights during which such
navigational aids as ground orientation markers consisting of fires would
permit the moderately trained and primitively equipped Russian crews to fly
such missions. Nevertheless, such traps were at times successful;86 in one
instance, six aircraft of a U-2 squadron landed at short intervals and were
captured by the Germans. A seventh plane escaped, the pilot probably becoming
alarmed because the preceding aircraft had not been brought under cover with
sufficient speed.
Radio was sometimes, though more rarely, utilized. The
following report pertains to a case of particularly successful radio deception:
“As I remember, Army
Group Center in 1944 maintained a separate situation map on the partisan-held
area west of Mogilev and around Lepel, where German police units and Hungarian
elements operated. These partisans regularly received airlift supplies,
according to these situation reports. For this purpose, the partisans had built
several airfields in the midst of extensive forests, where aircraft landed at
night under improvised illumination. The Russians used mainly R-5 model
aircraft. I can remember an experience report, of which we received a copy,
describing an operation against several of these airfields. An Air Force
officer had discovered the airfields and had captured one after the other so
that he could signal down the arriving aircraft during subsequent nights, using
the prearranged code signal for landing. He then seized the aircraft and their
cargo. The officer was decorated with the Knight’s Cross for this action. It
must have been in the spring of 1944.”
CONCLUSIONS
The preceding description of Russian partisan warfare
against the German invaders indicates that this type of warfare inflicted heavy
damage, both in personnel and matériel, on the German Armed Forces. It also
tied down strong forces that had to be denied to the frontline fighting proper.
Partisan warfare may have contributed considerably to the German defeat.
The conditions which made the successful conduct of partisan
warfare possible were as follows:
(1) Russia’s tremendous size, bad roads, and the many
possibilities for hiding in the extensive forests and swamps that were
available even to large partisan units.
(2) German inability to capture the numerous Russian
soldiers, whose units were dispersed after the initial battles and the armored
breakthroughs which followed. These men went into hiding behind the German
lines and rapidly formed large combat-effective partisan units.
(3) The ability of the first partisan units to arm and equip
themselves from the enormous quantities of matériel that had remained on the
battlefields; also their ability to live off the land.
(4) The abundant energy and brutality demonstrated by
partisan leaders of all ranks.
(5) The Russians’ highly developed ability to improvise,
their primitiveness and their frugality.
(6) The Russians’ patriotism, which is so great that they
will make any sacrifice; their fatalistic attitude; the conviction, inculcated
into them, that their communist “achievements” were endangered; all these
characteristics contributed to their self-sacrificing spirit.
(7) Last but not least, the false propaganda and poor
treatment of the Russian civilian population by German political leaders
created resistance instead of maintaining and exploiting the advantage of the
initial confidence displayed by many elements of the population, as for
instance in the Ukraine, where the Germans were received as liberators.
The partisan units could not have continually increased and
improved their arms and equipment or have fought and trained and carried out increasingly
complicated missions, however, without airlift operations. These assured a
steady flow of weapons, ammunition, explosives, fuses, and, wherever necessary,
rations, clothing, signal equipment, POL supplies, staff and headquarters
personnel, training personnel, specialists, and agents. The airlift also
provided courier service for written and oral orders and directives, propaganda
for the partisans and the civilian population, military mail service, and other
means of maintaining combat effectiveness and morale.
This leads to the conviction that impeding or at least
strongly-hampering airlift operations would have stopped partisan warfare
altogether or weakened it to such an extent as to obviate its significance in
the struggle.91 As described in the preceding pages, the Germans did not
succeed in disrupting the airlift operations to a degree that would have put
the flow of partisan supplies in question. Despite a few partial successes in
anti-airlift operations, the Germans were generally no more successful in this
field than in anti-partisan warfare on the ground. What were the reasons for
this failure?
The Germans had neither sufficient fighter nor antiaircraft
units at their disposal properly to combat the Russian air force units in the
German rear areas. In order to combat the supply transports flying exclusively
under cover of darkness, the Germans needed night-fighter units for
interception and the necessary equipment for the direction of interception from
the ground. Such auxiliary measures as have been described caused a certain
amount of disruption, but did not lead to any decisive success because the
“auxiliary units” had neither the planes nor the training, nor were there
enough of them. Efforts to hamper the Russian airlift operations by attacking
take-off and landing fields in partisan-held areas could be carried out only by
emergency units and were therefore doomed to failure. Combat units were
urgently needed in the combat zone itself and could be made available only
occasionally and then only for nuisance raids.
The command for anti-partisan operations was unsatisfactory
and ineffective because no top-level staff was in charge of the Army and Air
Force elements, the SS and police forces, the counterintelligence, and other
units used for anti-partisan operations. Although the Germans were aware of
certain Russian preparations for partisan warfare even before the outbreak of
hostilities, no timely preparations were made except for the activation of Army
security divisions to protect the lines of communication and the organization
of special SS and police forces. But no individual or staff was responsible for
the overall command of anti-partisan operations. Whereas the Russians had put
one man in charge of the entire partisan warfare operation, the Germans
suffered from internal difficulties and overlapping responsibilities. Neither
local nor specific spheres of responsibility had been established, let alone
general ones.
The so-called rear area commanders of each army group were
responsible for securing and pacifying the occupied territories and
administering and exploiting their areas. Only too late, in autumn of 1943, was
the rear area commander of Army Group Center, which suffered most from partisan
activities, redesignated “Armed Forces Commander.” Whether he actually was
given command over all units that were to be committed against partisans in the
area under his jurisdiction seems doubtful. But to fight partisans successfully
when they become as powerful and as numerous as in the Russian campaign, one
must have absolute command authority over all security, reconnaissance, and
combat units that are needed for anti-partisan operations. Moreover, these
units must be available in sufficient number and strength.
1942- One Last Opportunity: The German Experience with Indigenous Security Forces
