A group of partisans stand by the remains of a supply train. They are
wearing what appear to be paratrooper jump suits. NKVD and army partisan
formations wore as much uniform clothing as they could to help distinguish
themselves from the civilian population; it was also a matter of pride in their
appearance.
Formation and
Composition
Partisan warfare—an old Russian method of combat—has always
played a major part in the domestic and foreign conflicts of the Russian
people. The Communist state long recognized the importance of employing
partisans in the wide-open, sparsely-populated Russian spaces. Soviet
leadership, therefore, made partisan warfare an important combat arm, centrally
controlled from Moscow. Basing their planning on the extensive experience
obtained in the civil war (1918–21), the Russians, prior to the Second World
War, made certain preparations which linked partisan organization to the
framework of the secret police. During this same period they carried these
preparations a step further by publishing service regulations on partisan
warfare.
The extensive pre-military training of Russian youths of
both sexes, and the control exercised over factory labor forces, facilitated
the formation of partisan units. The number of men and women thus trained was
so great that at the beginning of World War II—even after mobilization and
evacuation of entire labor force—there were still sufficient numbers of trained
civilians left in the theater of operations to form the nuclei of partisan
units. Soldiers who had lost their units during the initial engagements, as
well as entire combat units that had escaped capture during the major battles
of encirclement in 1941, joined partisan units or formed new ones. Even
completely untrained persons were enrolled in the partisan units, either
voluntarily or by force. The winter of 1941–42 marked the beginning of a
large-scale organization, although small bands were active before that time.
During the course of the war the partisan units grew to such
an extent that they could be considered elements of the Red Army. Staff
officers, specialists, agents, radiomen, and other important key personnel were
brought to the partisan units either through gaps in the frontline or by air.
The mission of these units was to disrupt the German supply system and to
harass the German combat forces by attacks from the rear in order to facilitate
the combat operations of the regular Russian forces.
Personal initiative played an important part in partisan
warfare, and the individual partisan leaders were given unusually extensive
authority. Highly centralized control of the partisan units was considered
undesirable. Wherever a person suitable for leading a partisan unit stayed
behind after the withdrawal of the Red Army, a band would form. It was mainly
the capabilities of these leaders which determined the strength and combat
effectiveness of the partisan units and their organization, rather than the
available manpower, local conditions, or the equipment that could be found.
The organization and strength of the many partisan units
varied greatly. There were bands of a few men adjacent to units numbering
several thousands. The designations given to some of the units were no
indication of their strength. The preferred designation of “brigade” was used
even for small bands of platoon strength. Small units with less than 50 men
needed no special organization. Normally, they assembled for a specific
operation, after which they dispersed and continued with their everyday chores
or disappeared from sight. Mobile, large, combat-effective partisan units of
from 50 to 1,000 men were organized according to military principles. Only
these large units or well-camouflaged small bands could afford to operate on a
continuous basis.
Weapons and
Ammunition
The partisan groups that formed in 1941–42 gathered their
initial supply of weapons and ammunition from the battlefields where great
quantities were scattered. Large partisan units even had heavy infantry weapons
which they recovered in quantity from the battlefields. Because of their rapid
advance, the Germans had been unable to recover or destroy this matériel. The
partisans were also able to recover some of the Russian weapons and ammunition
used for pre-military training in peacetime, which had been distributed all
over the country in many small, well-hidden dumps at the beginning of the war.
During their withdrawal the regular Russian forces had often hidden weapons,
ammunition, and equipment for the use of the partisans. In one instance, the
11th Kalinin Partisan Brigade even had several tanks, which had been dug in and
hidden in the Idritsa forests [east of the Latvian border] by regular Soviet
troop units. Russian mines that had been employed in great quantities and had
not been disarmed by the Germans during their rapid advance, were removed by
the partisans and reused. They also improvised mines from duds and explosives.
When the partisans left their territory, they hid weapons,
ammunition, and in fact everything they were unable to take along. Such hidden
depots, containing large quantities of weapons and ammunition, were uncovered
quite frequently.
The steadily increasing need and consumption of weapons,
ammunition, and explosives could not possibly, however, be satisfied for any
length of time by thefts from German supply installations and by raids on
German troops, supply columns, and supply trains. Such items had to be
resupplied regularly. In addition to such small arms as rifles, especially
automatic rifles and rifles with silencers, light machine guns, pistols,
submachine guns, and daggers, the partisans needed heavy infantry weapons, such
as mortars, light antitank guns, and dismounted guns, as well as ammunition and
weapons spare parts. They also had a very great need for mines and explosives
used in sabotage operations.
Without air transport, it would have been impossible for the
Russians to supply the partisans with weapons, ammunition, mines, and
explosives. Airlifting these items over the battle front was the primary
mission of the air transport supply system.
Personnel
Since there was no general shortage of manpower in the
partisan-dominated areas, only partisan command and staff personnel,
specialists and agents had to be brought in by air. Regular troops were,
however, continually being moved in by airlift to raise the combat efficiency
of the partisans. They had been trained as lower-echelon commanders,
indoctrinated as communists, and possessed special qualifications. In addition,
regular training cadres were assigned to partisan units from among the officers
and NCO’s of the Red Army. This strengthened the units and put their training
under partial control of the Red Army. Other replacements sent to the units
included sabotage and reconnaissance detachments. Such specialists as radio
operators, technicians, doctors, and nurses were also airlifted to the partisans.
Rotation of personnel also took place by airlift. Highly
successful partisans were brought to the zone of interior for rest and
recreation as well as to receive decorations. In addition, propaganda officers
and top-echelon officials were flown on brief visits to the partisans to
strengthen their morale in general and to decorate deserving personnel. (Other
areas of morale-building were not neglected, for even psychological warfare
pamphlets, political writings and propaganda movies were airlifted to the partisan
areas. The delivery of mail to the partisans was most important for morale
purposes. This function was accomplished by the army postal organization of the
Red Army, and all mail was strictly censored.)
Another major airlift mission was to deliver airborne troops
to partisan-held airfields and to maintain the flow of supplies to the
airlanded forces. Messengers and agents were flown between Moscow and the
partisans, carrying orders and directives and taking back reports and
information.
On return flights the supply transports served as personnel
carriers. They transported wounded partisans, Russian prisoners of war who had
escaped from German camps, Russian flying crews who had bailed out and reached
the partisans, important German prisoners who were taken to higher Russian
headquarters for questioning, and draftees for the Red Army.
Missions, Combat
Methods, Command Functions
The overall mission of the partisans was to combat the
Germans with every means and wherever possible without getting involved in any
action that would reduce their own strength.
Their sphere of activity was behind the German front. They
concentrated on destruction by demolition and mining (mainly railroads, roads,
bridges, and other construction works, plants of any kind, airfields,
communications installations, ammunition, POL, and supply dumps of all types,
and billets), poisoning wells, attacks on individual soldiers and small units,
transport columns, motor vehicle convoys, etc., as well as all types of
sabotage and espionage. In addition to destructive activities, the partisans
were charged with the preparation of landing fields for supply aircraft and
airborne troops.
Whereas at the beginning of partisan activities the
relationship of such operations behind the German lines to the strategic
objectives of the Red Army was not obvious (each band attacking wherever it had
an opportunity to do so), this relationship became clearly recognizable during
the winter of 1941–42, when German Army Group Center was forced to withdraw. At
that time the partisan operations carried out in the rear of the German combat
zone to prevent the flow of replacements and supplies to the front obviously
fitted into the overall Red Army strategy. In addition, major strategic tasks
were assigned to the large partisan units, which had to liberate or control
entire areas behind the German lines so that the Red Army could use such
territories for unimpeded thrusts. Indeed, the actions of the partisans often
permitted the Germans to draw conclusions regarding the Russian plan of
operations.
The areas in which the partisans remained and operated had
not been prearranged according to a military plan. Rather, the availability of
personnel was the determining factor. But particular local conditions also were
of great significance since the partisans needed hideouts, preferably in
inaccessible terrain such as deep forests and swamps. (Eventually, many bands
were transferred from the areas where they had been organized to other areas
where they were to be committed; in some instances bands moved away on their
own.) Within their camp areas the partisans usually built well-camouflaged
shelters, posted guards, and sent out reconnaissance patrols. To be able to
escape unnoticed if necessary, they prepared new paths that were kept secret
from the civilian population. However, even in densely populated areas partisan
bands were able to maintain themselves if they were protected by the civilian
population. Ruins of bombed cities were good hideouts. During daylight hours,
the partisans remained in their hideouts, almost all movements being carried
out at night. Indeed, so mobile were these groups that the Germans repeatedly
found instances where they had traveled as much as 44 miles in one night.
Partisan units attempted for the most part to avoid combat.
Inferior German forces that came too close to them, however, were usually
assaulted from ambush. If the partisans were faced by superior forces, they
rarely put up a serious defense, even if their camp had been prepared for sustained
defense. By the stubborn defense of a few well-camouflaged centers of
resistance they attempted to fight a delaying action in order that the bulk of
the unit might have an opportunity to escape. Breakout was attempted either by
strong forces concentrating in a small area or by individual partisans slipping
through the ring of encirclement.
Radio equipment was essential for the maintenance of
communications, especially with the central command staff at Moscow. Radiomen
who had been specially trained, and equipped with special sets, were flown into
the partisan infested areas. Female partisans were preferred as personal
messengers: dressed as innocent peasant women they often covered long distances
cross-country and, if necessary, even crossed the two frontlines.
The conduct of partisan forces in combat corresponded
closely to infantry tactics. Typical characteristics were the use of ruse and
deception, skill in camouflage, extreme mobility in every situation, and the
exploitation of all terrain features. The frugality and kinship with nature of
the average partisan were great advantages. The combat effectiveness of a small
partisan group usually equalled that of a strong reconnaissance squad. Major
units were equal to an infantry battalion or even a regiment equipped with
heavy weapons.
The exercise of command functions within partisan units was
very strict. The leaders, who operated independently, exercised their functions
without restrictions and with brutal force. Even the smallest infraction was
almost invariably punished by death, if such an infraction was contrary to the
interests of the group or if it resulted from internal intrigues or
insubordination. Whoever was under the slightest suspicion of treason was
simply eliminated, and joint family liability was an accepted fact. In this
manner the leader maintained close control over the members of his group and
assured secrecy. The groups were not correlated and regional chains of command
were not introduced, probably because any such action would have harmed the
prestige of the individual partisan leaders.
The central command staff—the partisan warfare command
staff—was located in Moscow. At first, it was commanded by an important
political leader, later on Marshal Voroshilov was appointed chief of staff of
the partisan movement. Under his leadership guerrilla warfare was developed
according to a planned program and became a centrally organized means of
combat.
Principal Partisan
Areas
Army Group Center. Whereas the territory of Army Group South
(Ukraine) and Army Group North (Baltic States) offered no very favorable
conditions for partisan warfare, Army Group Center was very soon forced to
engage in anti-partisan warfare, since it entered White Russian territory
immediately after crossing the Polish-Russian border.8 Typical of partisan
activities at the beginning of the campaign was an action which occurred along
the northern flank of Army Group Center. On the first day of the offensive
against Russia, 22 June 1941, a partisan group appeared in the rear of advancing
German forces in Lithuania. The spearhead division of the German V Corps
invaded Russia from the area east and north-east of the pre-war Polish city of
Suwalki, (1) which had been occupied by the Germans after the Polish campaign.
The division broke through the Russian border positions, and by evening German
elements formed a bridgehead across the Niemen River [15 miles south of
Alytus], near Kristoniai, Suddenly, armed civilians appeared to the rear, at
the village of Seirijai—six miles west of the bridgehead—ambushed a German
bridge column, and fired from houses in the village on passing German troops. A
reinforced regiment had to be committed against this partisan group that was
apparently hiding in a forest near Seirijai. It took an entire day to flush the
forest, and even so the 400 to 500 men belonging to the unit were not
completely annihilated since some 25 percent escaped. After the fighting was
over, the Germans found that while the majority of the force consisted of
Russian civilians of the upper class who had settled in the area after the
U.S.S.R. had occupied Lithuania, the nucleus of the force was formed by Russian
soldiers who had been cut off by the German breakthrough and had put on
civilian clothes.
After the Germans had consolidated their situation during
the winter of 1941–42, the Russians massed strong partisan units in German rear
areas in order to cause a decisive disruption of the German build-up and supply
system. The principal partisan areas were the forests of Uzda (2), those areas north,
north-east and east of Slutsk (3), the area east and south-east of Minsk (4),
and the forests astride the Minsk-Bobruysk railroad (5). These partisan groups
were at that time in the formative stage and rarely operated at strengths above
100 to 300 men. They disrupted railroads, without however blowing up bridges or
raiding German strong points along the tracks. They did not blow up road
bridges, but they did mine roadbeds by night and ambush isolated motor
vehicles.
Major partisan centers, where several thousands of men were
operating, existed in the forest areas south of the Bryansk-Vigonishi line (6),
and in the forests around Kletnya (7), where groups of one thousand men or more
were hiding. These strong groups were very active, blowing up railroad tracks,
firing at trains, and attacking German strong points along the tracks. The
partisans built airfields west of Kletnya and along the northern fringe of the
forest area east of Zhukovka (8). Other partisan airfields were situated at the
point about half-way between Bryansk and Roslavl where the rail-line crosses
the Desna River (8), in the area west of Karachev (6), and about ten miles
south of there.
One of these very active partisan groups—the so-called Force
Ruda, composed of some 500 men—led by a particularly audacious man, operated
mainly west of Bryansk, attacking the Bryansk-Gomel railway and highway.
Several German attempts to eliminate Force Ruda failed. The base camp of the
force was located deep in a forest surrounded by swamps in an area west of
Bryansk. Finally, in December 1942 the base camp was captured. Although Ruda
was killed, some of the force escaped after heavy losses. An extensive camp
with tons of ammunition, quantities of small arms and equipment of all kinds,
and sufficient rations for several months were captured.
From January to March 1942, during the withdrawal from the
outskirts of Moscow, the German armies lost contact with one another at several
points. Russian troops streamed through the large gaps in an effort to outflank
the Germans and get into their rear areas. These Russian forces, in conjunction
with the partisan groups in German rear areas, attempted to cut the few
remaining lines of communication. By airlifting regular troops and supplies,
the Russians reinforced these partisans, who were particularly active in the
west and south-west of Vyazma (9, 10) in the extensive forests of Bogoroditsk
(11), and in the Yelnya (12) area. They were probably part of the major
partisan force operating in conjunction with the Russian I Cavalry Corps (Corps
Belov) that fought in the Yelnya-Dorogobuzh-Yartsevo (12) area in the rear of
the German Fourth Army.
Part of the large concentration of partisans in the area
south-west of Rzev near Olenino (13) was probably the Grishin force which later
moved into the area south-west of Smolensk (14). This group, numbering from
1,000 to 2,000 men, was pursued throughout the entire army area from north to
south and then again to the north, during which time the force apparently split
up. But the Grishin force, after it had suffered losses and had been exhausted
by extended periods of fighting, always had access to the large, almost
inaccessible and well-equipped partisan camps located in the Mamayevka forest
north of Pocher (15), in the forests south-west of Mogilev (16), north-east of
Bobruysk(17), and in the Tschetschessk (18) area north-west of Gomel. In these
refuges the partisans could rest and re-equip themselves without being
disturbed. The Grishin force operated in the Orsha (19) area until the end of
1942, conducting above all demolition raids along the Smolensk-Vitebsk-Polotsk
(20) railroad, attacking strong points, and raiding villages. Strong German
countermeasures eventually led Grishin to move to the area south of Smolensk
(21). The partisan group probably split up in the process, with one element
remaining in the Smolensk area while the other moved to the south-east. This
latter group was believed to have reorganized its forces in the Mamayevka
forest, where shelter and supplies were available and where German troops found
access difficult. At least two partisan airfields were identified in this
general area, one being located south-west of Rzev near Olenino (13) and the
other south-east of Smolensk.
In January 1943 a strong and well-equipped partisan group
traveling on sleds—this was the Grishin force again—crossed the Iput river and,
advancing from the north-east, raided the German strong points along the
Surazh-Klimovichi (22) railroad. The partisans were repelled, but succeeded in
breaking through to the west. They were traced to west of Gordeyevka (23),
where they had stopped to recruit among the hitherto fairly quiet population of
this area. A battalion of German security troops, that had been specially
equipped for winter commitment and issued sleds, finally tracked down the
partisans, numbering about 1,000 men, in deep snow near Isavinka, north-east of
Gomel (24). Forced to fight, the partisans suffered heavy losses before they
were able to escape to the south.
Soon afterward the Grishin force was identified in the
swamps south to south-east of Zlynka (25). This time the partisans were flushed
from their hideout, leaving behind their sick and wounded, their equipment and
personal belongings. They escaped southward and disappeared from the Army Group
Center area for the time being, remaining for several months in the Sozh-Dnepr
triangle (26) without being active. An increasing number of incidents in the
area between Bobruysk and Mogilev, especially demolitions along the
Rogachev-Mogilev railroad (16a), brought the Grishin group once more to the
attention of the Germans. Grishin and his men were identified in the almost
inaccessible swamps north-east of Bobruysk (17), appearing once again in great
strength and fully equipped. It was not until August 1943 that very strong
German troop units succeeded in encircling the Grishin force and in inflicting
very heavy losses. But Grishin and combat effective elements of his group broke
the ring of encirclement and escaped eastward across the Dnepr. The
considerably weakened group reassembled north of Propoysk [70 miles north of
Gomel] in the Pronja swamps. In the following month, however, the Grishin force
was again active in its new location north of Propoysk and east of the Pronja
river. Attacks were made on 30 miles of highway between Krichev and Propoysk.
The partisans were encircled and pinned down in a narrow area where most of the
group was destroyed, although Grishin and some of his men escaped westward
across the Dnepr.
In the early summer of 1943 the Germans obtained information
that the partisan staff planning the attacks against the rail line near Borisov
(28) had its headquarters at Daliki, in the forests and swamps 10 miles south
of Lepel (29). This staff was destroyed during a well-prepared operation.
The large forest area south of Bryansk (6) was also a
jump-off area for partisan raids. During the spring of 1943, when the Germans
assembled forces for the Kursk offensive and moved many trains along the
Smolensk-Bryansk and Minsk-Gomel-Bryansk lines, the partisans continuously
disrupted transports by blowing up tracks. In even more effective raids, they
overcame the German guards and blew up the two railroad bridges across the
Desna river close to Bryansk in March and demolished the Besed river bridge
along the Krichev-Unecha line (22) in April. The attacks on secondary rail
lines in the Kursk area continued even after the German offensive on Kursk had
failed in the summer of 1943, when German reinforcements had to be moved up to
stem the Russian assaults against the Orel salient. The large partisan units
operating along the Minsk-Gomel and Orsha-Mogilev tracks also resumed their
activities.
There was evidence that large partisan bands were located
two hundred miles to the west during the winter of 1943–1944. These groups had
even built airfields near Mozyr, south of Bobruysk, and north of Slutsk.
During the first six months of 1944, partisan attacks
against troop transports and supplies moving up to stop the Russian offensive
on both flanks of Army Group Center increased from month to month as the
weather improved. The points of main partisan effort were the rail lines
Brest-Kovel in January, Brest-Minsk-Orsha in March, and the area around Lepel
(29) in May. On the night of 19/20 June a tremendous number of demolitions were
carried out along the lines Pinsk-Luninets, Borisov-Orsha, and
Molodechno-Polotsk in preparation for
the major Russian offensive against Army Group Center. These attacks resulted
in an almost complete stoppage of railroad traffic along the crucial lines
leading to the army group area. And at the end of June, strong partisan units
interfered with the withdrawal of the German Fourth Army from the Dnepr on both
sides of Mogilev. These groups operated out of the extensive forests and swamps
of the Pripyat, in the triangle of Minsk-Bobruysk-Mogilev which during three
years had been dominated by strong partisan units and had never been cleared,
let alone occupied, by German troops. Operating in conjunction with regular Red
Army units, the partisans obstructed the German withdrawal across the Pripyat
swamps toward Minsk.
Army Group Center—Anti-partisan Warfare
Army Group South.
As early as 1941, shortly after the capture of the Crimean
peninsula, partisan units appeared in the Yaila Mountains (36). During 1943–44
the Russians organized very strong partisan units in the Crimea and supplied
them by airlift. Even though the Germans employed several divisions, they were
unable to capture the partisans. Indeed, the Germans never established firm
control over the Yaila Mountains area before they withdrew from the Crimea, and
motor vehicles could cross these mountains only under convoy protection.
Vehicles driving to and from the south coast were attacked in very skillfully
staged surprise raids during which the partisans used all types of small arms
and, after 1943, mortars of various calibers.
In 1944, after the Crimea had been cut off from the mainland
and the Russians had secured a foothold on the Kerch peninsula (36a), partisans
became active in this hitherto quiet area. They attacked motor vehicles and
isolated soldiers in broad daylight along the Kerch-Feodosiya road. After
several unsuccessful attempts to find their hideout, the partisans were found
to be located in several underground quarries south-west, west, and north of
Kerch. Only after all exits had been blocked and several determined breakouts
had been frustrated, was it possible to exterminate the group by starvation
following a final breakout attempt during which the majority of the partisans
were killed.
In September 1943, partisans were active on the northern
wing of Army Group South.30 In the Dnepr bend south of Pereyaslav-Khmel
‘Nitskiy (37) a partisan unit that had existed there for some time suddenly
made its presence felt while the northernmost units of the German Eighth Army,
withdrawing westward, were crossing the Dnepr about 75 miles south-east of Kiev
near Kanev. These partisan groups, which maintained constant signal and
messenger communications with the approaching Red Army units, received the
Russian paratroopers who were dropped on 24 September west of the Dnepr Bend
and north-west and south-west of Kanev in order to form an enlarged bridgehead
in conjunction with the Russian attacks out of the Dnepr Bend. Another partisan
unit operating in the primeval-like forests west of Cherkassy (38) was also
supposed to receive airborne troops at the same time. These troops, however,
were not committed, probably because of the failure of the paratroop operation.
The partisan-infested area west of Cherkassy was an open sore in the German
lines of communication. It often became acute and could never be completely
eliminated by the Germans, who lacked the necessary forces.
In addition to the partisans operating in the Dnepr area
from Kanev to Cherkassy, the southernmost reaches of the river were also
infested. Indeed, centers of partisan resistance existed all along the western
bank of the Dnepr in the extensive forests up to the Kremenchug (39) area.
Army Group North.
During the indecisive fighting of the second half of the
winter of 1941–42, confusion reigned along the northernmost sector of the
German front (Sixteenth and Eighteenth Armies). Terrain conditions were ideal
for partisan activities. From the German lines south of Lake Ilmen there was a
narrow passage to the Demyansk pocket, in which the Russians had encircled
German troops some 50 miles south-east of Lake Ilmen. Behind the pocket a thinly
occupied line of strong points led southward to Kholm (41) which was also
encircled. Behind that line sparsely settled swamp land covered some 30 square
miles and extended westward to the railroad hub of Dno, the main railhead of
Sixteenth Army. This no-man’s-land was absolutely dominated by the partisans
around Kholm who, when the snow melted in the spring of 1942, directed part of
their efforts against the Dno railhead. Most of their activity, however, was
concentrated against the rear area of the weak German strong points, the only
line of communication from Staraya Russa, just below the southern shore of Lake
Ilmen, to Kholm. Because of a chronic shortage of troops the Germans, despite
all their efforts, never succeeded in exterminating the partisans. In the late
summer of 1942 a reinforced infantry regiment, on a two-week expedition,
attempted to capture the supposed main supply dump—so designated by deceptive
partisan messages—but the guerrillas evaded the trap and moved northward to the
forests of Luga (42). The Sixteenth Army was rid of its partisans, who then
became the worry of Eighteenth Army. But by the following autumn Sixteenth Army
had them back again.
During their withdrawal from the Leningrad area at the
beginning of 1944, the German forces moving across the Luga area encountered
strong and unexpected resistance from partisan units. Indeed, not only the
areas around Luga, but also those of Pskov (43) and Nevel-Bezhanitsy-Idritsa
(44) were infested with partisans until the Germans evacuated these areas in
February 1944. German anti-partisan operations in these areas were never more
than temporarily successful.
As the examples on the past few pages so clearly
demonstrate, the scope and effectiveness of partisan warfare were such that it
became a major factor in the campaign in the East. Without airlift, however,
the logistical difficulties of the partisans would have been insurmountable.
