San Carlos had been chosen because it reduced the threat from submarines and air launched Exocets, but at the cost of being in range of land-based aircraft. The Navy was now caught in an operating environment far removed from the one for which they planned during the Cold War. They were geared to dealing with Soviet submarines operating in the high seas (a bias evident in the predominance of submariners among the British high command). Preparations for anti-aircraft warfare were far less satisfactory. Few vessels carried dedicated anti-aircraft guns, although in the confines of San Carlos they would have been more use than missiles. The long-range Sea Dart was geared to dealing with missile carrying aircraft, probably Soviet Bears and Badgers, coming over the open seas rather than actions close to the shore. The short-range Sea Wolf was still a relatively new system.
The evident problems coping with Argentine aircraft had been mitigated by the survival of the most vulnerable and important units, and in particular Canberra, but few would wish to gamble on such a prominent target surviving a second day. It was decided to get as much as possible out of the range of Argentine aircraft. If Buenos Aires grasped the sense of attacking amphibious ships, the next day could be much more difficult. It seemed prudent to get them out of the danger area. Although not yet fully unloaded, Canberra, Norland, Europic Ferry and Stromness left overnight. Norland and Stromness would return the next night after taking the stores required from the other two. This meant that 3 Commando Brigade’s logistics had to become totally land-based earlier than anticipated. In particular, instead of the planned use of Canberra as a floating Main Dressing Station, this facility was established in short order at Ajax Bay, using an abandoned mutton refrigeration factory. A Brigade Maintenance Area (BMA) was established close by, making it possible to get ammunition, fuel and stores off the LSLs. At the end of the first day, and despite the limited assets available, some 3,000 men and over 1,000 tons of stores had been safely landed. There was a lot more to be done, however, especially as the merchant ships could barely unload at a quarter of the rate of the RN’s own amphibious ships.
As to how the landing force should be configured and the unloading organised on to the beachhead Woodward was inclined to leave matters to the two relevant commanders, Clapp and Thompson, who had developed a close and effective working relationship. Thompson’s Tactical HQ was ashore. Clapp would have preferred Thompson to continue to manage the landing operation together on Fearless, but Thompson both wanted to be with his men ashore and also to escape from the cramped and noisy headquarters on the ship. The space was so small that Clapp was having to work with a far smaller staff than he needed for the complex operations he was trying to manage. The main differences would be between Clapp and Thompson on the one hand and Woodward on the other. Personalities played a part, as did the lack of opportunities to talk directly and plan together. Problems of distance and differential priorities would test the ability of any commanders to appreciate each other’s needs and co-ordinate their efforts. The basic source of the disputes, however, was the limited defensive resources available. The most testing issue of all was the provision of air cover. Sea Harriers had flown 54 sorties. With Sidewinder they had been extremely effective whenever they were able to get enemy aircraft in view. But because of the need to keep the carriers out of harm’s way the aircraft were operating at the edge of their range, short on fuel and so pressed to get any engagements over quickly and then restrain themselves when tempted to chase too far from home.
Clapp and Thompson wanted Woodward to bring his carriers much further forward the next day, so that the Harriers could engage Argentine aircraft before rather than after they reached the Sound (although six of the ten mainland based aircraft shot down on 21 May had been caught before weapon release). Woodward once again rejected this option. He would not `risk half our long term air defence force by coming further forward’. Broadsword was also arguing for the adoption of a more offensive anti-air posture, after finding its Sea Wolf useless in circumstances of confined waters, so that targets could be intercepted as they closed from the west. As a compromise Woodward agreed that Coventry would work with Broadsword as a 42/22 air defence combination at a point northwest of the Falklands, from where most of the raids appeared to be arriving. All this he still hoped was a stopgap until the Rapier batteries could relieve his escorts.
22 May
Argentina claimed that on the day of the landing five British ships had been attacked and damaged, which was true, that two Harriers had been shot down, which was only half true, and that the landing had been resisted with many British casualties, which was not true at all. It was assumed that the Junta could rely on popular support so long as it could claim credibly to be fighting back against the British, but intelligence staffs in London hoped that as the extent of Argentine losses became apparent, calls for a political solution could gain strength. On 22 May, whatever the Argentine press was saying about the British beachhead being precarious, the Argentine command on the Islands knew that the enemy position was strong and included artillery and air defence, and that considerable and urgent air support would be required to dislodge it. As the Argentines were recovering from the previous day’s exertions, with many aircraft needing repair, only two raids against the landing force were launched on 22 May and then quite late in the day. At 1120Z an Argentine Coastguard craft, Rio Iguazu, was spotted in Choiseul Sound and strafed. She was beached and abandoned, 12 miles from Darwin.
Just after 2000Z two Daggers, shortly followed by three A4Bs, attacked ships in San Carlos after approaching from the south. One aircraft ditched its bomb load at the entrance and the second did not press home its attack. Nonetheless, the raids were hardly confidence boosting in terms of British air defences. Neither had been detected until the last minute nor successfully engaged by ship defences or Rapiers. Earlier that morning there had been another otherwise inconsequential incident that indicated the unreliability of the air defences. At 0645Z an Argentine Hercules was detected by Invincible at 175 miles but was away before Sea Harriers could intercept. Coventry detected the same aircraft. It was acquired for Sea Dart as it came within range but a launcher defect prevented firing. At 1540Z HMS Cardiff, approaching the TEZ about 1500nm north-east, had engaged a Boeing 707 shadower with a salvo of two Sea Dart at 30nm; one missile missed and one ran out of power just short.
This was discouraging, given that, with Broadsword, Coventry’s task was to patrol some 50 miles west of the northern entrance to Falkland Sound to use their Sea Dart/Sea Wolf combination to intercept and destroy incoming Argentine aircraft. Considerable progress was made that day in getting the 12 Rapier fire units into position, except that they had suffered with the sea passage and landing, and were days away from being fully operational. The first Rapier ashore on the bridgehead had not performed well: only one missile had been fired and it malfunctioned. The concern about Rapier was reflected in requests back to London for every available spare part, especially those known to suffer higher failure rates, to be got to the front line as soon as possible, even if this meant cannibalisation of UK-based Rapiers, and if necessary by air drop. Woodward’s diary entry saw the quieter day as `an invaluable opportunity to consolidate ashore while getting the RAPIER defence on line.’ His confidence in Rapier, which had never been shared by Thompson, was still undented.
The Sea Harriers were much more active over the skies, with 59 sorties flown. At 1730Z four GR3’s attacked Goose Green, but found no Pucaras. Later at 2030Z, returning from an unsatisfactory photo-reconnaissance mission over West Falkland, a GR3 sighted the Falkland Islands vessel, MV Monsunen. This was being used by the Argentines for inter-island supply and Clapp decided that he could make use of the capability. He ordered that the boat be captured. Brilliant and Yarmouth embarked an SBS detachment, and then, rather later than intended, at 0330Z launched a Lynx to find the vessel, which it did on being fired upon at 0400Z. When the vessel failed to stop when ordered, Yarmouth fired rounds ahead of her. Monsunen then beached herself on the west side of Lively Sound. As it was unclear whether it was armed and had troops embarked, it was decided not to mount an assault but to leave her for later recovery.
West Falkland appeared to be used increasingly for resupply, which would not be wholly surprising because of the easier access from the mainland, although there was no actual evidence of this from either observation by photographic reconnaissance or Special Forces. Nonetheless it was decided to attack one of the likely airstrips, Dunnose Head, at first light on 23 May using a GR3. In fact an SBS team had visited this but the report of no Argentine activity had not got through. A disagreement between Woodward and Clapp, who would have preferred an attack against the radar on Pebble Island, led to delays. Woodward appeared particularly exasperated by this. He signalled both Thompson and Clapp:
Late change of plan this morning without any explanation or intelligence support resulted in lost opportunity for first light attack and confusion and frustration here. This is clearly unacceptable. Request you state reason and priority for mission in future. I may know something you do not. Your ground attack assets are ready and willing to help but they require notice, intelligence and all available targets details to obtain useful benefit.
This was, however, in part a reflection of the systemic problem in the tasking arrangements for the GR3s.
The system on board Hermes for tasking the RAF’s Harrier GR3 effectively was inadequate. There was, as already noted, no RAF officer on Woodward’s staff. Captain Middleton of Hermes was performing the role of air adviser. A squadron leader was sent as a liaison officer but was outranked in any debate. The air operations room on Hermes was at full stretch and was geared to defending the Task Force rather than mounting offensive air operations. There was no means for allocating the aircraft when faced with competing demands from Woodward, Middleton and the land commanders, none of which were eased by the regular difficulties with communications with Fearless, where Clapp, and later Moore had their HQ. Hermes would become aware of requests from battalions to the land HQ for air support and start to prepare for the operations. They were supposed to wait for authorisation from the HQ. Sometimes they launched before the authorisation which then failed to materialise; sometimes they waited and the delay meant that the moment when they would have made the maximum impact had passed.
The attack on the Dunnose Head airstrip was heavy but pointless as there were no Argentines present. The main effect was to damage settlement buildings and injure the farmowner, Tim Miller, who lost an eye. An attack on Pebble Island airstrip destroyed several of the Pucaras already put out of action by the SAS raid. Reconnaissance missions elsewhere over West Falkland were more helpful, pinpointing the activity at Port Howard. Four Sea Harriers launched to attack Stanley at 2254Z. One exploded in a fireball one minute after take-off. Brilliant was detached to search the area but the pilot was not found. The other aircraft had problems releasing their bombs. More successful was an opportunistic attack at 1335Z by a combat air patrol over the Falkland Sound that saw two Pumas and an escorting Agusta A-109 gunship proceeding south along the western shore of the Sound in the vicinity of Shag Cove carrying ammunition. Their attack caused the leading Puma to crash into the hillside and explode. The Agusta landed but was set on fire by gunfire. The other Puma also landed and was engaged but damage could not be assessed.
It was of some comfort that the Argentine Navy still appeared to be failing to react to the British landing. The Argentine 209 submarines were still absent. Though the San Luis might return soon to the TEZ, it now seemed that the Salta had never even reached the area. The many opportunities to cause mayhem with so many British ships moving around a limited area had been missed. Nor was there much evidence that the Argentine Garrison was stirring itself to deploy against the bridgehead; lack of tactical airlift capability restricted the Commander’s options to harassing attacks mounted from Darwin, holding back his main force as a reserve to defend Stanley. Because Menendez had not appreciated the full size of the San Carlos landing at five battalions, he had thought that another landing elsewhere was still a possibility, probably close to Stanley. He was placing his hopes in action against the carriers as a means of denying the British local air superiority. If they could be disabled then a whole series of options would suddenly be opened up. The Argentine Air Force was not unwilling to do this, and was holding Canberras and Super Etendards in reserve for the right opportunity. Their problem was in locating the carrier force.
