World War II German surprise attack and Allied defense and counterattack in the Ardennes region of southwestern Belgium and northern Luxembourg from 16 December 1944 to 16 January 1945. The battle caused many problems for Allied commanders. The German planners scheduled the attack to take place during poor weather, which would limit the effects of Allied tactical airpower. Additionally, the German Luftwaffe concentrated significant air resources in an attempt to provide direct support to the offensive and to counter Allied air capabilities.
Although fog and snow limited air operations during much of the fighting, Allied airpower made significant contributions to the outcome of the battle. Even during bad weather, Allied pilots strove to provide reconnaissance support and to attack German targets through breaks in the weather.
When relatively clear conditions occurred, such as between 23 and 28 December and on 1, 2, and 5 January, the Allied air forces conducted extensive attacks on German forces and supply lines. The USAAF Ninth Air Force and the RAF Second Tactical Air Force provided direct support to Allied ground forces, conducted armed reconnaissance missions, waged an aggressive interdiction campaign, and defended against Luftwaffe operations. Senior Allied commanders also shifted elements of RAF Bomber Command and USAAF Eighth Air Force heavy bomber forces from the strategic bombing offensive against Germany to interdiction targets and airfield attacks. Both sides conducted airdrops- Luftwaffe air transport units supported the initial offensive with an airborne assault and with limited resupply drops, and USAAF air transport units provided support to the isolated American forces at Bastogne.
On 1 January 1945, the Luftwaffe conducted its last significant offensive operation of the war with a counter- air strike against 17 Allied airfields in Belgium, Holland, and France. Although Operation BODDENPLATTE (BASE PLATE) inflicted significant damage on some airfields, the Luftwaffe suffered heavy losses of aircraft and pilots that it could not afford at this point in the war. Although the Battle of the Bulge is normally remembered as exclusively a ground operation, airpower made important contributions to the ultimate success of the Allied forces.
XIX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND – Patton’s Air Force
The Headquarters of XIX Tactical Air Command was always established conveniently near to HQ Third Army, both headquarters working closely together at all times. HQ XIX TAC worked closely with both the Air sub-sections of the G-2 and G3 Sections of HQ Third Army.
The mission of XIX TAC was simply to provide air support for Third Army and it was the G-3 section which provided the connecting link between the two headquarters. Examples of the type of support given during the month of August 1944 were:
- Attacking ground targets in direct support of armour and infantry columns.
- Air cover for columns and assaults.
- Armed reconnaissance.
- Area patrols, for both ground and air targets (especially air).
- Railroad reconnaissance and attacks on rail targets.
- Pre-planned point target attacks (dive-bombing).
During August and September 1944, they rendered devastating damage to the enemy. The pace of activity continued high, but tailed off as the months passed and fewer targets existed once ground forces reached Germany and the enemy was on the verge of defeat. Most casualties during this latter period were from enemy AA, as there were few air-to-air engagements. XIX TAC consistently provided all that Third Army asked for, and its commander was highly thought of by GSP and all ranks of his Army. Patton once wrote to General George C. Marshall, US Army Chief of Staff: ‘The co-operation between the Third Army and the XIX Tactical Air Command … has been the finest example of the ground and air working together that I have ever seen.’ He had the highest regard for Brigadier General Otto P. Weyland (nicknamed ‘Opie’) who always loyally supported Third Army. For example, Weyland took part in a high-powered conference at SHAEF at which a Group plan to allocate most of the air bomber force to First and Ninth Armies was dis-cussed. Despite the fact that Weyland was the only one-star general pre-sent he protested vigorously: ‘Third Army,’ he told Eisenhower, ‘has fought for months with very little bomber support. Under this plan it would continue to get only what First and Ninth Armies can’t use. That is not only unfair, but unsound tactically.’ For a few moments the silence was so thick that it could have been cut with a knife. Then Eisenhower spoke: ‘Weyland is absolutely right. The plan needs revision to insure that our Air power is used in a manner to obtain maximum results.’ This completely changed the meeting and in a few minutes Group’s plan was ‘junked’ and Third Army was guaranteed full-scale bomber support.
