The U. S. Navy guided-missile frigate Stark limps to port after being hit by two Iraqi-fired Exocet air-to-surface missiles. The ongoing hostilities between Iran and Iraq affected other nations in the Persian Gulf region, and the U. S. Navy provided a measure of stability and protection to international shipping there, although not without price.
Iraqi cruise-missile attack on the U. S. Navy Perry-class frigate Stark (FFG-31) on May 17, 1987, in the Persian Gulf. The attack occurred during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), which saw Iraq and Iran attacking each other’s ships and then routinely firing on cargo and tanker vessels in the Persian Gulf. The Iranians sought to attack ships belonging to Iraqi ally Kuwait, while the Iraqis sought to destroy Iranian tankers and prevent seaborne trade with Iran. More than 200 ships had been attacked since the beginning of the war. Fearing that such activity would disrupt oil supplies to the West, the Ronald Reagan administration dispatched U. S. Navy warships to escort the tankers in the Persian Gulf.
On the night of May 17, 1987, a French-made Iraqi Mirage F-1 fighter aircraft launched two AM-39 Exocet antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) at a radar contact 36 nautical miles distant. Two minutes later, the missiles struck their target, which turned out to be the Stark. Although only one of the missiles detonated, the two severely crippled the frigate and killed 37 crew members and injured another 50.
The Iraqi Mirage involved had departed Iraq’s Shaibah Air Base at 8:00 p. m. on a routine antishipping patrol. A U. S. Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft with a combined U. S.-Saudi crew detected the Mirage as it broke over the Persian Gulf 10 minutes later, flying at 5,000 feet and 550 knots. The Stark was informed via a tactical link system and itself detected the Mirage at 9:40 p. m., when it was 200 nautical miles distant from the ship. The ship’s crew considered it a routine night strike against Gulf shipping. No American warship had ever been attacked, and the crew of the Stark did not expect this raid to be any different.
Captain Glenn Brindel of the Stark was informed of the missile launches, but no special watch or combat conditions were in effect. At 10:09 p. m., the ship’s crew warned the Iraqi aircraft that it was approaching an American warship. The Mirage was 12 nautical miles away at that time. What neither Captain Brindel nor his crew realized was that the Mirage had already launched its missiles. The AWACS crew noted that the Mirage made a breakaway maneuver at 10:10 p. m. and was heading for home. A few seconds later, one of the ship’s lookouts detected the incoming missiles and notified the ship’s Combat Information Center (CIC). By then, it was too late for the crew to take action.
Both of the radar-guided missiles, traveling at Mach 0.8, slammed into the ship’s port side. One hit beneath the bridge and the other just aft of the first missile, almost in the superstructure’s center. The single warhead detonation all but destroyed the ship’s CIC, eliminating most of its combat systems and electronics, and one-third of its firefighting equipment. The crew fought fires throughout the night and ultimately saved the ship. They then took it to Bahrain under its own power.
Twenty-nine men were killed in the explosion and fire, and eight sailors died later of wounds. Twenty-one others were wounded. Of the thirty-seven dead, two Americans were lost at sea.
The subsequent U. S. Navy investigation found several problems with the ship’s design and several shortcomings in the ship’s operating and training procedures. For example, the ship’s electronic countermeasures system had a blind zone off the bow, and it had been facing the Iraqi fighter at the time of the Exocet launch. However, the failure to detect the incoming missiles was as much due to complacency as systems shortcomings. Two critical weapons stations were not manned during the incident, one of them because the assigned watch stander had departed his station to run personal errands. The ship’s captain was not called to the CIC, nor kept constantly informed of the situation, until the final moments before the missile struck. More importantly, the ship’s executive officer was present in the ship’s CIC and neither noticed the empty weapons control stations nor took any action to increase the ship’s combat readiness until the incoming missile had been detected.
The Stark incident illustrated the deadliness of antiship cruise missiles and proved the “win big or die” nature of modern sea combat. It also triggered political debate in Washington about the wisdom of operating U. S. warships in the Persian Gulf when Europe and Asia received a far greater proportion of their oil from that region than did the United States. However, the Ronald Reagan administration perceived that U. S. credibility was at stake and continued the naval patrols and tanker escorts in the Persian Gulf, soon to be dubbed Operation Earnest Will, which would endure until December 1989.
As for the Stark, the poststrike investigations forced Brindel’s retirement and resulted in letters of reprimand for the executive officer and the tactical action officer on watch that evening as well as disciplinary proceedings against the individual who had departed his assigned watch station. U. S. Navy warships intensified their “quick reaction drills” and other combat readiness training for ships destined for Persian Gulf duty. Also, the Perry-class frigates received upgrades to their electronic warning and countermeasures systems to eliminate blind zones. The severity of the damage to the Stark precluded it from returning to service for more than 18 months, and it had to be dispatched onto a special heavylift ship and be taken back to a U. S. shipyard for extensive repairs.
References Cooper, Toni, and Farzad Bishop. Iran-Iraq War in the Air: 1980-1988. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 2000. Karsh, Efraim. The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988. Oxford, UK: Osprey, 2002. Levenson, Jeffrey L., and Randy L. Edwards. Missile Inbound: The Attack on the Stark in the Persian Gulf. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Wise, Harold L. Inside the Danger Zone: The U. S. Military in the Persian Gulf, 1987-1988. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007.
