Many of the details of Israeli capabilities had limited importance as long as Israel did not face a regional threat with nuclear weapons and could rely on a nuclear monopoly as an undeclared deterrent. Israel now faces the possibility, however, that it may lose its present nuclear monopoly to Iran. Estimates differ sharply as to how soon Iran might get such a weapon if it continues to proliferate, although most put this time frame well after 2010.
Experts also differ over how serious a threat Iran would really be to Israel. Some experts feel that Iranian rhetoric calling for the destruction of Israel is more a smokescreen and an excuse for creating an Iran nuclear monopoly in the Gulf than a sign of any serious willingness or desire to engage Israel. Others have said the opposite.
Moreover, even if Iran’s nuclear ambitions are mainly centered on the U. S. presence in the Gulf and other Muslim and Arab states, this may not deter Israel from preventive or preemptive action in dealing with what it views an existential threat. Former Prime Minister Rabin made it all too clear long before the present tensions with Iran that one or two nuclear ground bursts centered on Tel Aviv and Haifa could virtually destroy Israel as a state.
Israeli officials like Prime Minister Olmert have stated that Israel cannot tolerate a nuclear-armed Iran. Such views are scarcely new. A number of Israeli officers, officials, and experts have said that Israel must not permit the Iranians to acquire nuclear capabilities, regardless of Tehran’s motivations. Ephraim Inbar, the President of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, said in 2004, “For self-defense, we must act in a pre-emptive mode.”
General Moshe Ya’alon, the Israeli Chief of Staff, was quoted as saying in August 2004 that Iran must not be permitted to acquire nuclear weapons. He added that Israel must not rely on the rest of the world to stop Iran from going nuclear because he said a nuclear Iran would change the Middle East where “Moderate States would become more extreme.” General Ya’alon also indicated that Israel might conduct such attacks without using its aircraft, triggering a wide range of speculation about Israeli and U. S. covert operatives and Special Forces conducting such strikes.
Israel bought 500 bunker busters from the United States in February 2005. Experts speculated whether the purchase was a power projection move or whether Israel was, in fact, planning to use these conventional bombs against Iranian nuclear sites. These speculations were further exacerbated with the Israeli Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Dan Halutz, was asked how far Israel would go to stop Iran’s nuclear program; he said, “2,000 kilometers.”
Israeli military officials were quoted in press reports in January 2006 as saying that the IDF got the order to get ready for a military strike against Iranian nuclear sites by March 2006. It is unclear what type of military strikes Israel may choose, if it decides to respond preemptively. Some have argued that Israel may declare its nuclear weapons and establish a mutually assured destruction: deterrence. While the impact of an Israeli declaration remains uncertain, it is likely to have little impact on Israel’s strategic posture in the region, since most states factor Israel’s nuclear weapons into their strategic thinking.
Some Israeli experts have argued, however, that Israel does not have viable military options. They argue it does not have U. S. targeting capability and simply cannot generate and sustain the necessary number of attack sorties. Some argue that Israel might do little more than drive Iranian activity further underground, provoke even more Iranian activity, make it impossible for diplomatic and UN pressure to work, and make Israel into a real rather than a proxy or secondary target. Brigadier General Shlomo Brom warned that Israel’s capabilities may not be enough to inflict enough damage on Iran’s nuclear program:
any Israeli attack on an Iranian nuclear target would be a very complex operation in which a relatively large number of attack aircraft and support aircraft (interceptors, ECM aircraft, refuelers, and rescue aircraft) would participate. The conclusion is that Israel could attack only a few Iranian targets and not as part of a sustainable operation over time, but as a one time surprise operation.
Even if Israel had the attack capabilities needed for the destruction of the all elements of the Iranian nuclear program, it is doubtful whether Israel has the kind of intelligence needed to be certain that all the necessary elements of the program were traced and destroyed fully. Israel has good photographic coverage of Iran with the Ofeq series of reconnaissance satellites, but being so distant from Iran, one can assume that other kinds of intelligence coverage are rather partial and weak.
Covert action demands different kinds of operational capabilities and intelligence. There is no indication that Israel has capabilities of covert operations in Iran. The recent information about the development of the Iranian program indicated that it reached a status of being independent of external assistance. Moreover, the assistance Iran got was mostly from Pakistan, another place which is not a traditional area of operations for the Israeli secret services, like Europe or South America. It seems that there is no real potential for covert Israeli operations against the Iranian Nuclear program.
Israel would face operational problems in attacking. Israel does not have conventional ballistic missiles or land-/sea-based cruise missiles with the range or accuracy to carry out such a mission from Israel. The shortest flight routes would be around 1,500-1,700 kilometers through Jordan and Iraq, 1,900-2,100 kilometers through Saudi Arabia, and 2,600-2,800 kilometers in a loop through Turkey.
Israel has configured its F-15s and F-16s for long-range strikes and has refueling capability. It is doubtful, however, that it has enough refueling capability to do more than send a strike force that would have to defend itself without a significant fighter escort or support from electronic warfare aircraft. Even then, forward area refueling would probably be required, and backup refueling and recovery would be an issue.
Israeli air or missile strikes would probably be detected relatively quickly by the radars in the countries involved, and very low-altitude penetration profiles would lead to serious range-payload problems. The countries overflown would be confronted with the need to either react or have limited credibility in claiming surprise. An overflight of Iraq would be seen in the region as having to have had a U. S. “green light.” Iran would almost certainly see Jordanian, Turkish, and/or Saudi tolerance of such an IAF strike as a hostile act. It might well claim a U. S. green light in any case in an effort to mobilize hostile Arab and Muslim (and possibly world) reactions.
Israeli strike aircraft would probably need close to maximum payloads to achieve the necessary level of damage against most targets suspected of WMD activity, although any given structure could be destroyed with one to three weapons. (This would include the main Buhsehr reactor enclosure, but its real-world potential value to an Iranian nuclear program is limited compared to more dispersed and/or hardened targets).
The IAF’s mix of standoff precision-guided missiles-such as Harpoon or Popeye-might not have the required lethality with conventional warheads. (Wildly differing reports exist about the range of the Popeye, which is deployed in the United States as the Have Nap missile. The base system has a range of around 60-70 kilometers. Popeye II has a range of 150 kilometers. Reports have been made about improved “turbo” versions with ranges of 200-350 kilometers.) There have even been reports of air- or submarine-launched versions with ranges of 1,500 kilometers. (One report notes that “Israel is reported to possess a 200kg nuclear warhead, containing 6kg of plutonium, that could be mounted on cruise missiles.”
Israel’s purchase of 500 BLU-109 Have Void “bunker busters” has given it 2,000- pound weapons that are far less effective against deeply buried targets than the much larger U. S. weapons described earlier. The standard version is a “dumb bomb” with a maximum penetration capability of 4 to 6 feet of reinforced concrete. An aircraft must overfly the target and launch the weapon with great precision to achieve serious penetration capability.
It is possible to fit the weapon with precision guidance and convert it to a guided glide bomb and the United States may have sold such a version or Israel may have modified them. The Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) GBU-31 can be fitted to the bomb to give it a nominal range of 15 kilometers with a Circular Error Probable (CEP) of 13 meters in the GPS-aided INS modes of operation and 30 meters in the INS-only modes of operation. Open source reporting, however, does not provide any data on such capabilities. It is possible, however, that Israel purchased the BLU-116 Advanced Unitary Penetrator (AUP), GBU-24 C/B (USAF), or GBU-24 D/B (Navy) which has about three times the penetration capability of the BLU- 109.
Iran has at least 20 suspect facilities and over 100 potential aim points. Multiple strikes on the dispersed buildings and entries in a number of facilities would still be necessary to ensure adequate damage without restrikes. Restrikes would require repeated penetration into Arab airspace and do not seem feasible planning criteria for Israeli commanders to use.
Yet, these are problems to be solved, not insuperable barriers. Israel has the capabilities to carry out at last one set of air strikes, and senior U. S. officials have warned about this capability. Vice President Richard Cheney suggested on January 20, 2005, that, “[g]iven the fact that Iran has a stated policy that their objective is the destruction of Israel, the Israelis might well decide to act first, and let the rest of the world worry about cleaning up the diplomatic mess afterwards.’
POSSIBLE IRANIAN RESPONSE
Iran has considerable capability to retaliate and has threatened retaliation if attacked by Israel. Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki has been quoted as saying that an attack by Israel or the United States would have “severe consequence,” and threatened that Iran would retaliate “by all means” at its disposal. Mottaki added: “Iran does not think that the Zionist regime is in a condition to engage in such a dangerous venture and they know how severe the possible Iranian response will be to its possible audacity. . .Suffice to say that the Zionist regime, if they attack, will regret it.”
Iran has several options to respond to an Israeli attack:
- Multiple launches of Shahab-3 including the possibility of chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) warheads against Tel Aviv, Israeli military and civilian centers, and Israeli suspected nuclear weapons sites.
- Escalate the conflict using proxy groups such Hezbollah or Hamas to attack Israel proper with suicide bombings, covert CBR attacks, and missile attacks from southern Lebanon and Syria.
- Covert attacks against Israeli interests by its intelligence and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps assets. This could include low-level bombings against Israeli embassies, Jewish centers, and other Israeli assets outside and inside Israel.
An Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities might also strengthen the Iranian regime’s stance to move toward nuclear capabilities and drive many neighboring states to support Iran’s bid for nuclear weapons. The United States will be seen as having given the green light for such Israeli strikes, which could lead to further escalation of the Iraqi insurgency, increase the threat of asymmetric attacks against American interests and allies in the region, or, even worse, be used as a justification cry for attacks against the U. S. homeland with CBR weapons by proxy groups or through an alliance with groups such as Al Qa’ida.
On the other hand, Israeli officials have expressed the concern that if Iran is allowed to acquire nuclear weapons, and the means to deliver them, this will lead to further proliferation in the region. They feel Iran’s actions would lead to a race to acquire such capabilities around the Middle East and greatly increase the threat of CBRN attacks against Israel and the entire region. They feel that waiting also has its penalties.
