USS Wainwright (CG-28); survived an Iranian Harpoon attack thanks to SRBOC during Operation Praying Mantis
Captain Chandler ordered the group to spread out line abreast with a 6,000-yard spacing between ships. This gave a broad baseline for using their electronic support measures (ESM) systems to cross-fix the approaching Iranian ship for over-the-horizon targeting. The idea was that if a single ship picked up a radar signal from the Iranian warship, it would have a bearing on the signal’s source but not its position or range along that bearing. If another ship picked up the signal, it could provide a different bearing. When the bearings were laid across each other, their point of intersection would mark the location of the source of the radar signal. Moving the U.S. ships farther apart for the search allowed them to obtain more distinct bearings and hence a more accurate cross-fix on the target. In effect, the Surface Action Group had cast a 12,000-yard-wide electronic net to catch and locate the source of radar emissions from the reported Iranian warship.
As the group swept toward the Iranian ship at 25 knots, it was preceded by the Bagley’s SH-2F LAMPS Mk I and the Simpson’s SH-60B LAMPS Mk III helicopters, which were searching ahead of the ships. A surface haze forced the helicopters to approach contacts a little closer than was desirable to visually identify them. The Army Blackhawk, which had two high rate of fire machine guns, flew along to escort the Navy choppers, which only had one door-mounted M-60 machine-gun each. At 11:13 A.M., the Bagley’s helicopter, call sign “Magus 42,” reported that it was taking small arms fire from the trail Boghammer in a group of three of the Iranian speedboats. The Army MH-60 was in the air at the time and could clearly see the Iranians firing at the Navy chopper. The TF-160 pilots were amazed to see that, even while taking enemy fire, the Navy helicopter still had its bright anti-collision lights on. That helicopter was able to dodge out of the area without taking any hits. The Wainwright was ordered to take any Boghammers in the area under fire. At the time, the U.S. ships were about 13 nautical miles from the Iranian small boats.
After the helicopter had been fired on, with the Surface Action Group en route to intercept the Boghammers, the Wainwright picked up and held an ESM reading for what was described as a “Mk 92 Fire Control System Radar.” This was the U.S. designation for the Dutch Signaal radar system employed both by certain U.S. ships and the sought-after Iranian missile boat. The Wainwright got an ESM cross-fix from the other ships and then directed the Bagley’s SH-2F Seasprite to the indicated location of the Iranian ship. The Bagley’s helicopter initially reported that the contact was “a frigate-sized Iranian warship with a mast and a radar amidships. It has two missiles astern of the mast.” However the helicopter crew was able to use gyro-stabilized binoculars to visually identify the ship; it was not a frigate, but the smaller Iranian missile patrol boat Joshan. The ship was a French-built 275ton Combattante-II patrol boat, known as the “Kaman” class in Iranian service.
The missile boat had completed escorting an Iranian tanker convoy from Kharg Island to Lavan Island and had been ordered into the southern Gulf to try to determine exactly what was going on in the vicinity of the Sirri platform. The helicopter crew hadn’t initially been sure of the ship’s identity, but the Wainwright already knew, thanks to its communication intercepts. The Wainwright not only knew the ship’s name, but Captain Chandler even had a photograph of its captain in his intelligence file. The JTFME also warned the U.S. ships that the Iranian ship might possess a lethal sting. They were told that, if the Iranians retained any operational U.S.-made Harpoon anti-ship missiles in their inventory, this particular warship had them. After identifying the Joshan, the Seasprite helicopter cleared to the west to get out of the line of fire between the Surface Action Group and the Iranian warship.
The U.S. ships were in a line of bearing formation, with three nautical mile spacing between ships. The Wainwright was to the west, the Bagley in the center, and the Simpson to the east. The Wainwright was located about 24 nautical miles southwest of Sirri Island and about 13.5 nautical miles from the Joshan. At this point, the U.S. surface action group only intended to keep the Iranian ship away from the area. They did not intend to engage it, but were taking no chances. Captain Chandler had the ships take a weaving course as they closed on the Joshan, sometimes running directly toward it, sometimes running parallel. The idea was to make it more difficult for the Iranian ship to arrive at a fire control solution for targeting the U.S. ships.
The JTFME told Captain Chandler to “warn away” the Iranian missile boat. As the Joshan neared the American ships, the Wainwright got on VHF Bridge to Bridge Channel 16 and warned the Iranian ship that it was standing into danger and advised it to change course and depart the area. Warnings were also made on the Military Air Distress Channel. A Farsi linguist on the Wainwright delivered some of the warnings; others were made in English by Captain Chandler. The Wainwright’s initial warning was acknowledged by the Joshan, which replied that it would not commit any provocative actions and requested that the Wainwright not lock its fire control system on it. The Joshan claimed that it was conducting a routine passage and that it had no hostile intentions. The Wainwright issued another warning to stop or the Joshan would be standing into danger. The Joshan kept coming.
At 12:09 P.M., the Iranian ship still had not heeded the request to stop. The Wainwright, Bagley, and Simpson all locked their fire control radars on the Joshan. On board the Simpson, Lieutenant Commander Richard Rush, the Executive Officer, used the ship’s “big eyes” observation binoculars to peer through the Gulf haze and visually confirm the approaching Iranian missile boat, now only around 9–10 miles from the Simpson. Rush caught a brief glimpse of Joshan before it disappeared into the haze. On its stern, he saw two Harpoon missile canisters. Lieutenant Commander Rush told Captain McTigue, who passed the word to Captain Chandler.
The U.S. ships had approached the Joshan bow-on. There were around 25 or so dhows in the area, and the Iranian warship appeared to be deliberately using them for cover, moving in and out among them. The Iranian ship still refused to change course. Its captain determinedly told Captain Chandler, “I’m carrying out my mission.” Chandler now had no choice. The Wainwright issued a third warning to stop, not proceed further or “I will sink you.” There was no response. Finally, around 12:13 P.M., the Wainwright issued its fourth and final warning: “Stop, abandon ship, I intend to sink you.” There was no radio response from the Joshan, but a reply came in another form: the patrol boat locked its fire control radar on the Wainwright.
Captain Chandler had been ordering course changes for the Surface Action Group and even issuing his warnings to the Joshan in a very calm voice. That voice stayed amazingly calm as he radioed, “Simpson, this is Wainwright. I am presently launching chaff. I am being locked-on with fire control radar…. You have batteries released.” Simpson had a Standard SM-l missile mounted on its launcher and was ready to go. McTigue turned to his Tactical Action Officer (TAO) and said, “Shoot!” The TAO turned to the weapons control officer and said, “Shoot!” That officer in turn relayed the order to the petty officer operating the weapons control console. The Standard missile streaked into the sky within three seconds of McTigue receiving the “batteries released” order. One of the U.S. helicopters reported seeing the white smoke of a suspected missile launch from the Joshan and radar operators on the Simpson and the Wainwright were able to see the separation of a missile from the Iranian ship on their radar video displays. In the air, the Army MH-60 pilots could see the Harpoon fired by Joshan skimming across the surface of the Gulf toward the U.S. ships. Iranian and U.S. missiles were now both in the air heading for their intended targets.
The U.S.-made Harpoon fired by the Iranian ship was flying a low, sea-skimming attack profile. The Standard missile fired by the Simpson was launched on a trajectory that took it up at a high angle before screaming down toward its target. The Standard missile was about three times as fast as the Harpoon. It had a relatively small (65-lb) proximity fused warhead, which would detonate in the near vicinity of a target, shredding it with fragments. The Harpoon had a much larger (500-lb), high explosive warhead, which would detonate either on contact or after penetrating a ship’s hull. The supersonic Standard anti-aircraft missile launched by the Simpson did not slowly fly off the ship, majestically gathering speed like a space shuttle launch. Instead, the rocket’s booster motor ignited with a terrific explosion, which hurtled the Mach-2.5 missile into the air. The U.S. ships had been taking a weaving approach to the Joshan. At the time the action commenced, Simpson had turned to the northwest, so its target lay to starboard and behind it. The Simpson’s launcher was thus turned for an “over the right shoulder” shot, over the starboard bridge wing where Lt. Commander Rush and around nine other men were stationed.
There was no time to warn the exposed men on the bridge wing, so the shattering blast of the launch took them completely by surprise. Spitting flame and smoke, the Standard missile was launched at a steep angle right over the men, slamming them with the concussion of its booster ignition and gagging them with thick exhaust fumes. Lieutenant Commander Rush later told McTigue that the men’s reaction to the unexpected missile launch did prove that ten guys could fit through one door at the same time.
The Wainwright’s missile fire control system had been put in the surface engagement mode to fire on the Iranian ship, and might have been used to try to shoot down the incoming Harpoon. However, it was unable to lock-on to the aerial target presented by the missile in time to attempt to shoot it down. The problem was that the Wainwright had been equipped with an experimental automatic target designation system. It started automatically designating targets all right. Only they were the radar “blooms” of the decoy chaff the Wainwright itself was firing, and not the Iranian warship or the Harpoon.
The Wainwright was now in a real pickle. The Joshan had targeted it, and a Harpoon missile was in the air. Although its launcher was pointed right at the Iranian ship, the Wainwright couldn’t fire its own missiles at either the Joshan or at the incoming Harpoon. Captain Chandler had positioned Wainwright almost bow-on toward Joshan. Given the wind conditions, that position provided for optimum chaff coverage. Wainwright had both rear-mounted and forward-mounted Phalanx gun systems. The latter was mounted off the centerline of the ship. Unfortunately, the Harpoon launched by the Iranian missile boat was coming in on the wrong side of the ship. The guns were set to the anti-aircraft automatic mode, but both were masked and neither could fire without seeing a target.
All of the American ships launched chaff and activated their electronic warfare systems to jam the Iranian missile. On board the Simpson, when McTigue had ordered chaff fired, the electronic warfare technician immediately fired all twelve tubes, putting up a huge cloud of chaff in the air. As far as McTigue was concerned, that was the right decision. Navy chaff doctrine, however, called for sequenced firing of chaff tubes in order to maintain continuous coverage against incoming missiles. Later, when curious officers asked McTigue about the chaff doctrine he had employed during the engagement with the Joshan, he told them: “All of it, all at once!” The incoming Harpoon was sighted by the signal bridge and starboard lookout on the Wainwright as it streaked by, forward to aft, 100 feet off the starboard side of the ship. Anxious crewmen on the ship heard the missile loudly roar by. The missile then landed downrange, falling harmlessly into the water.
Meanwhile, McTigue and his CIC crew had been following the flight of Simpson’s SM-l to its target on their radarscopes. McTigue wasn’t sure if it had actually hit the Joshan. The proximity-fused missiles did not usually strike their targets with “skin to skin” contact, but rather detonated near to them. McTigue called Chandler and requested permission to fire another missile. Chandler’s response was, “Well, all I can tell you is that his radar doesn’t work anymore. Something happened, but go ahead and fire another one. “
The Simpson followed up its first missile shot with a second SM-l. Both of the supersonic SM-l anti-aircraft missiles fired from the Simpson exploded close to the Joshan. The helicopters confirmed that the missiles were “hits.” Fragments from the first Standard’s warhead detonation had probably shredded the Joshan’s fire control radar. One of the U.S. helicopters reported seeing smoke on the horizon. The Simpson fired a third SM-l missile for insurance and recorded another hit. The Wainwright was finally able to fire a single Standard SM-l ER (extended range) missile which also recorded a hit on the Iranian ship.
