Bonaparte defeated the Mameluke forces at the ‘Battle of the Pyramids’ (fifteen miles distant) on 21 July and entered the capital in triumph three days later.
Napoleon’s desert-crossing force (100-mile march) reached
the Nile on July 10 but not before threats of mutiny broke out in the desert on
July 8 and 9, which Napoleon dealt with effectively and decisively. Arriving on
July 10, Napoleon’s vanguard led by Desaix’s division came under attack by 300
horsemen under Muhammad Bey el-Elfi near El Rahmaniyah. Probably dispatched as
a scouting or probing exercise, it would be reasonable to assume that el-Elfi was
interested in whether Napoleon’s force, after a 100-mile desert hike in 110
degree heat—in wool uniforms and heavy packs and weapons—would have suffered a
debilitating loss in combat readiness. The French, however, repulsed the
Mamluk’s probing attack without loss, and Napoleon issued orders that the army
would rest for two days, swim in the river, and enjoy any surrounding food
supplies, which apparently included an ample amount of watermelon.
Now joined by the forces under Dugua and Murat, the combined
Army of the Orient proceeded south on July 13, 1798, along the shores of the
Nile after Napoleon received intelligence that Mamluk leader and joint ruler of
Egypt Murad Bey’s forces were in the vicinity of the village of Shubra Khit,
eight miles south of El Rahmaniyah. At the Battle of Shubra Khit, Murad had
perhaps 4,000 Mamluk cavalry and 10,000 peasant militia (or fellahin). Each
Mamluk cavalryman carried two or three pistols, a short musket, javelins, and a
scimitar sword (or two). The fellahin were armed with an assortment of more
rudimentary weapons, including maces, clubs, spears, knives, and if one were
fortunate, a sword. Mamluk river gun boats had arrived in the vicinity and were
aligning to take on the French flotilla that had followed Napoleon’s forces as
well as lending fire support to Murad Bey’s forces against the French army.
Napoleon’s Army of the Orient, somewhat reduced since
beginning the journey from Malta, still totaled nearly 27,000 infantry armed
with muskets arrayed in five divisions. The French infantry were supported by
nearly 2,500 artillerymen and engineers manning 171 assorted howitzers,
mortars, and field guns, firing shells, canister, and ball shot. Napoleon’s
cavalry had been reduced by logistical difficulties in the transport and
movement of horses, as perhaps as many as 30 percent of the 2,400 cavalrymen
were now on foot, awaiting the capture of additional mounts. The Mamluks had
committed only about a third of their forces when Murad Bey appeared with about
14,000 troops. About 30,000 Mamluk troops were taking up positions down the
river at the capital city of Cairo.
Murad Bey’s cavalry paraded out of gun range in order to
display their colors and their valor. This went on for an extended period of
time, and Napoleon ordered his band to strike up several French patriotic tunes
while they waited for the Mamluk cavalry to do what they had done throughout
history, charge the enemy after trying to intimidate them with parade
maneuvers. After a rousing version of “La Marseillaise” in honor of the
anniversary of Bastille Day, the French were soon at the height of patriotism
and spirit. The Mamluks shortly thereafter initiated the expected cavalry
charge. Napoleon’s soldiers had orders to hold fire until the Mamluks came
within 50 feet and then let loose with multiple volleys from muskets and field
guns.
Napoleon’s troops used multiple tactics and formations:
Depending on the engagement, the infantry were formed into
columns for attacking in-depth, lines to concentrate firepower, or squares
several ranks deep.
If a square was charged by cavalry, the outer ranks would
kneel, those directly behind them would crouch, and the hindmost soldiers would
remain upright.
The result was a fearsome and impenetrable wall of bayonets.
Few horses could be induced to breach a mass of deadly 15 inch spikes.
Murad Bey’s forces, to their credit, charged the French
battle squares again and again. Each time they were repulsed with significant
casualties. After about 400 casualties and only a handful of French killed or
wounded, the Mamluk-Egyptian forces withdrew and prepared to make a stand at
the outskirts of Cairo. The result at the Battle of the Pyramids (defense of
Cairo on June 21, 1798) produced the same result, however, with a greatly
increased Mamluk-Egyptian casualty count. The Mamluk-Egyptian-Ottoman force
(about 30,000) suffered thousands killed and wounded, with many drowning in the
Nile River after being pushed back by the French.
After observing Mamluk attacks at El Rahmaniyah and Shubra
Khit, Napoleon positioned cannon at the corners of his infantry battle squares,
essentially taking away any advantage a cavalry force might enjoy by being able
to attack the formation from the flanks or from the rear. In a classic instance
of Flaechen-und Luecken, gunpowder weapons essentially eliminated the tactical
maneuver advantage enjoyed and practiced for centuries by the nomadic steppe
cavalry tribes, including the Mongols, the Turks, and the Mamluks. Now, as the
early stages of the modern era unfolded, gunpowder weapons and infantry drill,
organization, and discipline continued to eclipse the tradition of the heroic
and gallant horseman as the ultimate arbiter of political, economic, and
religious disputes.
Muscle, steel, arrow barrage, and courage combined with
effective cavalry maneuver, long practiced by steppe warriors in Central Asia,
the Middle East, and North Africa, fell by the wayside as the modern era dawned
at the end of the eighteenth century. Following Napoleon’s operations along the
Nile River in the summer of 1798, 700 years of Mamluk rule in Egypt collapsed.
After the successful conclusion of the Battle of the
Pyramids, Napoleon and the French army marched into Cairo on July 25, 1798
(following the July 22 arrival of an advance element consisting of two French
infantry companies and five officers). Murad Bey, who had been wounded in the
face during the battle, fled to Upper Egypt, and his partner Ibrahim Bey,
fulfilling the old adage that discretion was the better part of valor by
waiting safely on the far side of the Nile during the climactic battle for
Cairo, evacuated with the Ottoman viceroy along with the remnants of the Mamluk
army to Syria. From Syria follow-on operations against the French could be
coordinated. While Napoleon had served notice as to the proficiency of French
arms by defeating Mamluk power within a month and capturing their capital city,
the real campaign for Egypt was just beginning. Whereas Napoleon controlled the
Nile Delta and Cairo, the Mamluks and their Bedouin allies controlled Upper
Egypt, and the Ottomans were soon in consultation with the British to
coordinate efforts against the French Army of the Orient.
After the Mamluk-Ottoman loss at the Battle of the Pyramids,
the Ottoman Sultan asked other great powers for assistance. The Russian Czar,
who sought Ottoman territory in general and the key port city of Constantinople
in particular, offered Russia’s assistance. He ordered Russia’s Black Sea fleet
to the Bosporus, and a combined Ottoman-Russian naval force began operating in
the vicinity of Constantinople. Concurrently, the Sultan enlisted the aid of
the British and the Austrians. While the 29-year-old Napoleon was maneuvering
brilliantly on the battlefield, the revolutionary French government was being
outmaneuvered in international politics and diplomacy.
