The reconnaissance battalion started its movement along the
Vistula in the direction of Graudenz at 0400 hours. The armored cars and
motorcycles moved without regard for the scattered enemy elements, which were
still offering a defense from out of individual farmsteads and barns. The men
of the division had only one objective: to establish contact with their East
Prussian comrades as soon as possible. Whoever fell back had to fend for
himself. The disabled vehicles had to be repaired with only the means
available. Fortunately, the Poles were no longer in a position to offer
energetic resistance. Most of them automatically raised their hands in the air
as the vehicles raced past them. Only a burst of machine-gun fire was necessary
to fish them out of their hiding places—trenches, haystacks, houses, and
gardens—where they had spent the cold night in order to try to find a place
that morning to get over the river somewhere and head south.
The movements of the reconnaissance battalion took place on
the right wing of the division; the main effort of the day’s efforts was to be
in the center, however. The armored brigade, reinforced by the motorcycle
battalion and the 2nd and 4th Batteries of the divisional artillery while it
staged during the night, received orders to cross the Matave quickly and attack
the Grupa Training Area from the west along a broad front. The enemy was to be
driven east to the Vistula, where Oberst Angern, with elements of the rifle
brigade and the reconnaissance battalion, had been directed to interdict him.
Oberst Rothenberg was entrusted with the screening of the division north of
Schwetz. In addition to Panzer-Regiment 6, he had the I./Schützen-Regiment 3,
the 1./Pionier-Bataillon 39, the I./Artillerie-Regiment 75, and the
6./MG-Bataillon 59 at his disposal. Of those forces, the 2nd Battalion of the
armored regiment (Major Burmeister) would face a few dangerous situations over
the course of the next few hours.
The elements of the division that were still hanging back
were collected into a Kampfgruppe under the command of Oberst Kleemann. It was
directed for Kleemann’s elements to move as expeditiously as possible to follow
the armored brigade, ferreting out the Polish forces still hiding in the woods
and fields in the process. Since the movement of the entire force was delayed,
Hauptmann Beez decided to race forward with a hastily assembled advance party.
That small element, to which Leutnant Behrend, Leutnant Franzke, and Inspektor
Tries were also a party, collected almost 300 prisoners in a short period.
Leutnant Behrend ensured the prisoners were properly transported to the rear,
while the rest continued moving toward the increasingly loud sounds of fighting
coming from Grupa.
The armored brigade moved out around 0400 hours and portions
crossed the creek in their first attempt. The Poles did not open fire until the
following elements arrived. The brigade suffered considerable casualties,
particularly in the streets of Grupa proper, where the enemy had barricaded
himself in houses and set up strong antitank-gun positions. Oberstleutnant
Wimmer assumed command of the motorcycle, antitank, and artillery elements left
behind. Despite the more unified command of those forces, the Poles still
thwarted every attempt to cross the creek by means of well-placed artillery
fire. It was not until four light tanks of the armored brigade turned around
and rolled up the Polish positions from the rear that it was possible to cross
the water obstacle.
Hauptmann Hinniger’s 2nd Battery was the first unit that
could be guided through. It was high time, since the tanks and riflemen that
were attacking Grupa had run into a bind. The Polish forces—later, it was
discovered that there were nearly 20,000 men there—were attacking with the
courage of desperation in order to break out of the encirclement.
Oberst Angern led the forces of the division that were
arrayed around Grupa. The tank attack on the training area was not making any
progress due to heavy and well-aimed antitank-gun fire. The friendly companies
needed to be pulled back. The 1st Company of the motorcycle battalion also bogged
down in the Polish fires. The company commander, Oberleutnant von Cochenhausen,
was badly wounded.
The 3rd Company of the motorcycle battalion (Oberleutnant
Adler) pulled back from the crossroads east of Grupa and worked its way back in
the woods to the south as far as Hill 87. The company was subjected to an
intense infantry attack. The numerically superior enemy approached the company,
which was fixed in place, by leaps and bounds. If the position were broken
through there, then the enemy would create a gap from which to escape.
Oberst Angern gave responsibility for the southern portion
of the sector to Oberstleutnant Wimmer, who arrived in Grupa-Dola at 0745
hours. At the time, the 3rd Company of the rifle regiment, the 3rd Company of
the motorcycle battalion and elements of two tank and one machine-gun company
were positioned there. Wimmer brought the heaviest firepower with him—his 2nd
Battery. To the right of the road leading from Grupa to the training area, the
battle group had contact with the 2nd Battalion of the rifle regiment
(Oberstleutnant Dr. Ehlermann). That battalion’s 7th Company was widely
dispersed in the vicinity of the observation posts of the 2nd Battery and was
exchanging fire with Polish snipers.
The 2nd Battery then opened well-aimed fire on identified
Polish positions. That enabled Oberleutnant Adler and his men to disengage from
the enemy. His company left behind three dead (Unteroffizier Bruns,
Unteroffizier Fiss, and Unteroffizier Petreins), as well as four men missing
(two Gefreite and two Schützen). Wimmer employed the freed-up motorcycle
infantry on the right, where the Poles also attacked.
The battery fired off all but twenty of its rounds. In the
broken terrain, the machine gunners had no fields of fire and had to allow the enemy
to approach to pointblank range. Fortunately, elements of the two tank
companies arrived at that point. But they also had little ammunition left. The
enemy recognized his advantage and pressed ever more energetically by the
minute against the German positions. Both of the brigade commanders,
Generalmajor Stumpff and Oberst Angern, had to employ their messengers in the
defense of Grupa. The time moved inexorably forward . . . if a miracle did not
happen soon.
And miracles do happen.
The 4th Battery of the artillery regiment arrived from the
Matave just in time and unlimbered at the edge of the woods. Its fires forced
the enemy to call off his attacks for the time being. Fortunately, the
ammunition section of Inspektor Tries also arrived. The guns once more had
ammunition and started to fire with everything they had. Hauptmann Lorenz, the
commander of the 1st Battalion, then arrived with the 1st Battery.
At that point, the Poles gave up on their intent of breaking
out in the direction of Graudenz. The Poles only conducted limited attacks, but
they were all turned back, since large portions of the rifle regiment had also
arrived and started to get committed to the fighting. On that afternoon of 4
September, the division had also passed its baptism of fire in the defense.
Generalmajor Stumpff was able to report that to the commanding general, who
arrived late in the afternoon. Because Stumpff became ill, however, he had to
give up command of the armored brigade temporarily. Oberst Rothenburg assumed
acting command, with Major von Lewinski taking over Panzer-Regiment 6. The
commander of the latter regiment’s 1st Battalion, Major von Boltenstern, also
took ill and had to be relieved by Major Schmidt-Ott.
The motorized elements were gradually withdrawn from the
encirclement over the next few hours and replaced by infantry, since the other
divisions of the corps had closed up to the division by then and established
contact. They assumed responsibility for finishing the encirclement of the
Polish Corridor Army.
The ethnic German villages between Graudenz and Schwetz
served as the quartering area for the division. The cannoneers and riflemen
were especially warmly welcomed in Wiag. The rear-area services, supply
elements, and maintenance companies were brought forward through Swiekatowo to
Stanislawie. The tanks, trucks, and motorcycles were in desperate need of
maintenance, but it could only be conducted hastily, since the fighting in the
corridor was not yet over.
The majority of the division did not see action on 5
September. The neighboring infantry divisions did not allow the Poles to break
through and forced them to give up the fight that day. The first battle of
encirclement of World War II was over.
Despite the “peaceful” hours of that day, the division was
not idle. The artillery occupied positions to assist in fending off any
potential enemy attacks. The maintenance companies were brought up closer to
the motorized elements and quartered in the former Polish military facilities
in Schwetz. The engineer battalion, which was never employed as a complete
entity up to that point—it had been parceled out to all of the battle groups of
the division—built a bridge over the Vistula at Weisshof. The motorcycle
battalion combed the bottomlands of the river for scattered Polish elements.
Its 3rd Company screened along the embankment, while a reinforced platoon under
Leutnant Schmidt became the first element of the division to cross the Vistula
to Graudenz.
On 6 September, the first German formations were moved to
the eastern portions of East Prussia. They were to conduct a new assault from
there. The XXI. Armee-Korps took Graudenz. In the next two days, the XIX.
Armee-Korps (mot.) was to follow, crossing the bridges at Käsemark (north of
Dirschau), at Mewe, and at Topolno.
The corps situation on the evening of 6 September was as
follows. The 20. Infanterie-Division (mot.) was already marching across the
bridge at Käsemark in the direction of Elbing and had already reached
Bartenstein with its lead elements. The 2. Infanterie-Division (mot.) was
preparing to cross at Mewe, while the 3. Panzer-Division remained west of
Graudenz behind the latter motorized infantry division.
The division moved out on 7 September with its lead
elements. The columns once again experienced the “beauty” of the Polish road
system under their wheels. It seemed to the soldiers that ever since that area
had come under Polish control, not a single spade had been turned to maintain
the roads. The deep sand and the broad craters made the march difficult. Many
vehicles became disabled, because the gas lines or the suspension springs
broke. The men of the maintenance companies were not idle.
The movement led north. In the shadow of the Ordensburg at
Mewe, all of the divisional elements crossed on a pontoon bridge constructed by
the engineers over the broad, calm waters of the Vistula. At Kurzebrack, to the
west of Marienwerder, most of them saw for the first time in their lives the
four-meter-wide access to the Vistula provided to the Germans. At that point,
the men of the division were in East Prussia, a beautiful province with large
tracts of woods, broad hills, vast fields, and quiet lakes.
The movement took place under magnificent sunshine through
the resplendent cities of Marienwerder, Rosenberg, Auerswald, Deutsch-Eylau,
Osterode, the Tannenberg Memorial, Allenstein, Guttstadt, Lötzen, and Arys. The
long route of 380 kilometers was covered in three days. But no one felt the
hardships. The weather put on a sunny face. The reception in the individual localities
was indescribable. All people, especially the youth, could not contain
themselves in decorating the vehicles with flowers and cheering the soldiers.
Guderian requested that his corps be directly allocated to
the field army group. He intended to range far to the east on the left wing of
the 3. Armee, reach the Bug at Brest, and encircle the Polish field armies in
Eastern Poland. Generaloberst von Bock picked up on the idea; in the end, the
Army High Command approved the operation.
When the Polish front in front of the 3. Armee started to
waver, the XIX. Armee-Korps (mot.) was employed on the left wing to conduct a
bounding pursuit. Guderian gave his divisions the following intermediate
objectives:
20. Infanterie-Division (mot.)—through Zambrow to the Bug
crossing at Nur
10. Panzer-Division—to Bielsk via Bransk
3. Panzer-Division—to the area north of Bielsk
2. Infanterie-Division (mot.)—to be brought forward into the
area around Zambrow–Bielsk
The long-range objective for all of the formations remained
the fortress of Brest-Litowsk.
Sunday, 10 September, was a day of rest for the division at
the large training area at Arys. The sun smiled warmly on the soldiers. As it
started to disappear behind the hills and woods, marching orders arrived. The
individual formations left the training area one after the other until about
midnight and headed to the southeast to the border. That same night, Polish
territory was entered for the second time by the forward elements of the
division. The main body of the division crossed the border at Szczuczyn.
Panzer-Regiment 6 followed the next day. It had moved out with the following
vehicles: 55 Panzer I’s, 55 Panzer II’s, 3 Panzer III’s, 6 Panzer IV’s, 132
trucks, 60 staff cars, and 114 motorcycles.
That meant that the time for cursing had started all over
again for the drivers of the tanks, staff cars, trucks, prime movers, and
especially the motorcycle riders. “Roads” was not the right word, and the
entities that were so marked on the maps would not even have qualified as routes
of the worst order back in the homeland. But there was to be no rest. There was
only one objective and one mission: Forward!
Wasosz and Przytuly were a few of the places on the route
before the columns reached the broad bottomlands of the Narew. The terrain came
across as monotonous and bleak; there was something of the unearthly quality of
the steppes of the Far East about it. The whitewashed wooden houses of the
villages came across as simple structures and the people there as poor and
raggedy. For the first time, the soldiers saw faces that expressed neither joy
nor sorrow, just a resignation to fate.
The engineers had already constructed a pontoon bridge over
the Narew at Wizna, since the large bridge there had been blown up, and its
remnants were lying in the water. The crossing went very slowly, since the
heavy prime movers had to be guided individually. The planks were only as wide
as the heavy vehicles, and it cost a lot of sweat on the part of those drivers
to make it across in one piece.
The lead elements—the reconnaissance battalion and the
motorcycle battalion—crossed the river in the course of the day, while the
artillery crossed during the night. The supply elements were still far to the
rear. Moving from Schwetz, they did not follow up until 13 September, when the
fighting elements were already deep in Poland. They quickly closed up with the
fighting elements, however.
The division did not remain in the Wizna area; it ordered
the immediate continuation of the march in the direction of Jedzewo, the large
transportation hub south of the river. There was nothing to be seen of the
enemy yet. Only the destroyed bunkers, the wire entanglements, the foxholes,
and the artillery and bomb craters gave witness to the fact that the 10.
Panzer-Division, moving ahead of the 3. Panzer-Division, had to take this area
in a fight.
Once again, the reconnaissance battalion and the motorcycle
battalion, reinforced by engineers and artillery, had taken the point. The
objective for both battalions was Sokoly. But soon after it had moved out, the
motorcycle battalion was pivoted sharply to the west.
“Polish forces are attacking the corps headquarters in the
vicinity of Wysokie-Masowieki!”
The motorcycle infantry did their utmost to come to the aid
of Guderian. When they reached Zambrow late in the afternoon, their efforts had
been overcome by events. The commanding general was unharmed and was happy to
see the enthusiasm of his soldiers.
Despite that, the battalion did not get any rest, even
though the night brought rain with it. The battalion was employed by Guderian
against Wysokie, where it was to throw down the gauntlet and cut off the enemy
fleeing from the direction of Lomscha. When Oberstleutnant von Manteuffel and
his men entered the completely destroyed village of Wysokie, they were too
late. The battalion then returned to the command and control of the division.
The 20. Infanterie-Division (mot.) had thrown back the enemy
south of Zambrow and pushed him right into the arms of the 21.
Infanterie-Division and the 206. Infanterie-Division, which were advancing from
the west on Andrzejewo. The Polish 18th Infantry Division met its end there.
The general situation for the XIX. Armee-Korps (mot.) on the
evening of 11 September was as follows: the 20. Infanterie-Division (mot.) was
south of Zambrow and fighting; the 10. Panzer-Division was advancing from
Bransk in the direction of Bielsk; the 3. Panzer-Division was still right to
the north of it; and the 2. Infanterie-Division (mot.) was rolling in the
direction of Bielsk from the north.
In order to protect its open flank, the division formed a
Kampfgruppe composed of engineers and the platoon of Wachtmeister Rademacher of
the 5th Battery of the artillery regiment and employed it at Jedzewo. The
terrain was completely open and flat. The remaining elements assaulted in
generally southerly direction. The reconnaissance battalion, supported by the
6th Battery, advanced as far as the area southeast of Sokoly. The advancing
armored cars were suddenly attacked from some woods by Polish cavalry and had
to halt. The battery went into position in some vegetated terrain in the nick
of time and shot the attacking Poles to pieces at 2,500 meters. When snipers
appears during the continued advances in some woods, fire was opened for the
second time under the direction of Oberleutnant Kersten and Leutnant Krause,
allowing the battalion to continue its march. During its move through Sokoly,
the rifle regiment was fired upon by civilians in ambush positions. The
riflemen immediately searched the poverty-stricken houses.
Bielsk was reached on 12 September and taken in the face of
weak resistance on the part of the Polish 35th Infantry Division. The tanks
moved to the Brest–Bialystock rail line and blocked all traffic. Elements of
other formations took up the mission of guarding the east flank of the
division, which was growing ever longer. The primeval forests of Bialowieza
spread out on the far side of the rail line. The czar located his hunting lodge
there once, and the last bison of Europe lived in its thickets.
The motorcycle battalion sent two patrols into that area.
Unteroffizier Voutta moved into the thick woods with his men, and Gefreiter
Steffen was sent to Hainowka. Steffen’s group was lured into an ambush, but it
was able to fight its way out and establish contact with the 1st Company of the
rifle regiment, which was screening the road east of Bielsk. Hauptmann von
Bosse, the commander of the rifle regiment’s 1st Battalion, immediately
initiated a reprisal operation against Hainowka. The 4th Battery of the
artillery regiment went into position against Hainowka with one of its
platoons, under the direction of the battery commander, Hauptmann Nebel. It
returned to Halody toward noon.
The advance over the next few days headed toward
Brest-Litowsk. The motorcycle battalion was once again in the lead, with its
3rd Company the tip of the spear. The motorcycle infantry rattled carefree into
the village of Zabinka, only to find themselves confronted by an armored train
at the rail station. Before Leutnant Schmidt could issue orders, the armored
trains started spewing fire. At the same moment, things turned lively in the
town. Machine guns and carbines started hammering away from the houses. The
motorcycle infantry had no other choice but to turn and pull back as quickly as
possible. The accompanying artillery forward observer, Leutnant Jaschke, and
his men were also fired upon. Vehicles exploded, wounded moaned, and the radio
equipment ripped apart. It was a devilish situation. The situation went from
bad to worse when four Polish tanks appeared out of nowhere and enemy antitank
guns also started firing.
The 6th Battery then raced in and took the town under fire.
Leutnant Jaschke, Unteroffizier Killat, and Gefreiter Mieritz directed the fires
of the battery by means of a radio set that had been brought quickly forward.
The armored trains steamed away. When the first shells destroyed the enemy’s
pockets of resistance, he gave up. The motorcycle infantry were able to take
Zabinka by 1400 hours. Once again, the town appeared to be dead. Only the four
disabled tanks and the burning houses indicated the severity of the fighting.
The 7th Company of Panzer-Regiment 6 arrived in time to fend off an immediate
counterattack by Polish cavalry. The entire 2nd Battalion then cleared the
battle area.
The motorcycle battalion assumed the mission of securing the
town and formed a bridgehead over the Muchawiec. The forward observers from the
artillery, Leutnant Meyer and Oberwachtmeister Berlin, appeared there. They
directed the fires of the friendly batteries against a Polish battery at
Zamoszany, which was protecting the rail line.
The division did not allow itself to be distracted from its
objective, the fortress of Brest. By the afternoon of 14 September, Panzer-Regiment
5, the reconnaissance battalion, and the 3rd Battery of the artillery regiment
were east of the city, in an effort to cut it off from that side. (Fate would
have it that the division would once again move out from the same spot on 22
June 1941.)
Guderian’s intent was to attack Brest with his division on
15 September. He led his four major formations up to the fortress in a night
march, leaving only the 2. Infanterie-Division (mot.) to protect the broad
flank of the corps in the direction of the Bialowies Forest. The lead elements
of both the 10. Panzer-Division and the 20. Infanterie-Division (mot.) made it
to the fortress on 14 September.
The division moved out to attack from the east. To that end,
it formed a Kampfgruppe consisting of elements of Panzer-Regiment 6, the
motorcycle battalion, the engineer battalion, the 6th Battery of the artillery
(Oberleutnant Kersten), and a platoon from the 4th Battery (Leutnant Stiller).
The battle group moved out around 0345 hours in its attack
on Brest. Its mission was to take Fort III. The city was reached without a shot
being fired. The Poles did not defend Fort III, either. The 2nd Company of the
motorcycle battalion (Hauptmann Pape) rested in the fort. The forces continued
unscathed as far as the central train station and occupied the high rail
overpass.
From the overpass, the enemy was nowhere to be seen in the
immediate area; however, the guns at the citadel were firing with everything
they had and there was a lively exchange of fire at the rail yards. The
motorcycle infantry screened the southern part of the city, where they were
also under constant fire from the citadel.
Contact was established with the 20. Infanterie-Division
(mot.), which was attacking from the north. The III./Infanterie-Regiment 86 of
that division maintained the contact. The batteries of the 3. Panzer-Division
were attached to Oberst Weidling—former commander of Artillerie-Regiment 75 and
current commander of the divisional artillery of the motorized infantry
division—in an effort to provide unity of command for fire support.
The first attack of the 20. Infanterie-Division (mot.)
around 1430 hours against the citadel did not succeed. A bit later, the
III./Infanterie-Regiment 86 and Pionier-Bataillon 39 attempted an attack with a
limited objective against the eastern edge of the fortress. The Polish
defensive fires also forced the German attackers to ground there as well. Small
groups from Schützen-Regiment 3—for example, the 2nd Platoon of the 1st
Company—attempted to conduct reconnaissance-in-force efforts against the
southern part of the fortress, but they were also turned back. The 2nd
Battalion of Panzer-Regiment 6 attacked the citadel, which was being placed
under heavy German artillery fire, from the east. The 2nd Company (Hauptmann
Schneider-Kostalski) and the 4th Company (Hauptmann Weiß) approached the
fortress from the southeast. Around 2200 hours, the armored regiment received
orders to call off the attack. Both battalions disengaged from the enemy during
the night.
The motorcycle battalion remained in the city that night to
screen its southern sector. The 1st Platoon of the 3rd Company (Leutnant von
Brauchitsch) screened the prison, where civilian and military prisoners taken
the previous day were being housed. The battalion was pulled out of Brest on
the morning of 16 September and quickly returned to direct divisional control.
The division proper was moving in the direction of Wlodawa. As a result, only
two batteries of the divisional artillery remained behind. They continued to
support the attack of the motorized infantry division on the citadel. Their
fires were directed by Leutnant Meyer, assisted by his radio operators,
Unteroffizier Göhler and Kanonier Elsholz. The fires were so effective that all
three men later received the Iron Cross, Second Class.
