Typhoon Louise Strikes
“Was it Louise,” asked one, “was it the October typhoon that
killed the plan?”
“Ultimately, yes. It had been a hard sell to begin with. The
shipping crisis that had come to a head at Leyte had never been completely
solved and there was a legitimate concern that if too much was lost during
Bugeye we would be hard-pressed to fulfill our needs during Majestic. We
received the go-ahead for Bugeye only after certain numbers of assault ships of
every category had been pulled from the operation. Vessels like the
thirty-eight to be used as blockships for Coronet’s ‘Mulberry’ harbor would
have been completely satisfactory for the feint, and yet though many were
virtual derelicts, we were nevertheless required to preserve them for Tokyo. I
need not remind you that construction of the artificial harbor carried a priority
second only to development of the atom bomb, and that we were producing seven
unique, heavy-lift salvage ships in two classes especially for the invasion. As
things turned out, four of the six that had arrived in-theater survived Typhoon
Louise and were fully employed with salvage operations at Okinawa till nearly
Thanksgiving.
“Everyone in this room is painfully aware of the disaster at
Okinawa. Every plane that could be gassed up was sent south [to Luzon] and most
were saved. The flat bottoms [assault shipping and craft designed to be
beached] weren’t so lucky. Six-hours’ warning was not enough. Shifting cargoes
in the combat-loaded LSTs sent sixty-one of 972 LSTs to the bottom; 186 of
1,080 LCTs went down or were irretrievably damaged; 92 of 648 LCIs—the list
goes on. Plus a half-dozen Liberty ships and destroyers. At least they couldn’t
blame this one on Bill. This storm took on mystical proportions to the Japanese
war leaders who had defied the Emperor and taken over the government when he tried
to surrender during the first four atomic attacks in August.” Harkening back to
the original “Divine Wind,” or kamikaze, that destroyed an invasion force
heading for Japan in 1281, they saw it as proof that they had been right all
along. Their industrial base in Manchuria was gone because of the Soviet
invasion, their cities were in ashes, but the Japs were even more certain that
we would sue for peace if they just held out.
“Any chance of carrying out the feint was gone. With a
little more time, the shipping losses—greater in tonnage than Okinawa—could be
made up. But there was no time. The Joint Chiefs originally set December 1,
1945, as the Kyushu invasion date with Coronet, Tokyo’s Kanto Plain, three
months later on March 1.
“What I’m about to say is an important point and I’ll be
returning to it in a moment. To lessen casualties, the launch of Coronet
included two armored divisions shipped from Europe that were to sweep up the
plain and cut off Tokyo before the monsoons turned it into vast pools of rice,
muck, and water crisscrossed by elevated roads and dominated by rugged,
well-defended foothills.
“Now, planners envisioned the construction of eleven
airfields on Kyushu for the massed airpower which would soften up the Tokyo
area. Bomb and fuel storage, roads, wharves, and base facilities would be
needed to support those air groups, plus our 6th Army holding a 110-mile stop
line one-third of the way up the island. All plans centered on construction of
the minimum essential operating facilities, but most of the airfields for heavy
bombers were not projected to be ready until ninety to 105 days after the
initial landings on Kyushu, in spite of a massive effort. The constraints on
the air campaign were so clear that when the Joint Chiefs set the target dates
of the Kyushu and Tokyo invasions for December 1, 1945, and March 1, 1946,
respectively, it was apparent that the three-month period would not be
sufficient. Weather ultimately determined which operation to reschedule,
because Coronet could not be moved back without moving it closer to the
monsoons and thus risking serious restrictions on all ground movement— and
particularly the armor’s drive up the plain—from flooded fields, and the air
campaign from cloud cover that almost doubles from early March to early April.
MacArthur’s air staff proposed bumping Majestic ahead by a month, and both my
boss, Admiral Nimitz, and the Joint Chiefs immediately agreed. Majestic was
moved forward one month to November 1.
“The October typhoon changed all that. A delay till December
10 for Kyushu, well past the initial—and unacceptable— target date was forced
upon us, with the Tokyo operation pushed to April 1—dangerously close to the
monsoons. We were going to get one run, and one run only, at the target. No Bugeye.
One of the greatest opportunities of the war had been lost.”
At first there were no hands appearing above the audience
since they were still absorbing everything that Admiral Turner had said. A navy
captain in the second row was the first to break the silence.
“Sir, was there reconsideration at this time of switching to
the blockade strategy that we, the navy, had been advocating since 1943?”
Turner’s host that evening, Admiral Spruance, had been
outspoken in his belief that such a move was the best course but, like Turner,
had followed orders to the fullest of his ability and beyond. Turner knew that
he had already said far more than he should on Bugeye and moved to wrap things
up.
“I can’t tell you what others were advocating. All I can say
is that I was fully, very fully, engaged in carrying out my orders. On a
personal note, I would have to say that I believe that the change in plans
regarding the use of atom bombs during Majestic was fortuitous. After the first
four bombs on cities failed in their strategic purpose of stampeding the
Japanese government into an early surrender, the growing stockpile of atom
bombs was held for use during the invasion. Initially, though, we did not
intend to use them as they were eventually employed against Japanese formations
moving down from northern Kyushu. Initially we were going to allot one to each
corps zone shortly before the landings.”
Audible gasps and a low whistle could be heard from some in
the audience, who immediately recognized the implications of what the admiral
was saying.
“Yes,” Turner acknowledged “the radiation casualties we
suffered in central Kyushu were bad enough, but they were only a fraction of
what would have happened if we had run a half-million men directly into
radiated beachheads—and all that atomic dust being kicked up during the base
development and airfields construction! The result hardly bears thinking about.
It was clear, after the initial bombs in August, that the Japs were trying to
wring the maximum political advantage from claims that the atom bombs were
somehow more inhuman than the conventional attacks that had burnt out every
city with a population over 30,000. At first their claims about massive radiation
sickness were thought to be purely propaganda. However, over the next few
months it was determined that there was enough truth to what they were saying
to switch the bombs to targets of opportunity after the Jap forces from
northern Kyushu moved down to attack our lodgment in the south. They had to
concentrate before they could launch their counter-offensive, and that’s when
we hit ’em. As for the original landing zones, repeated carpet bombing by our
heavies from Guam and Okinawa produced the same results that the atom bombs
would have, and besides, the big bombers had essentially run out of strategic
targets long before the invasion. The carpet bombing gave them something to
do.” This remark elicited laughter.
“The Jap warlords were unmoved when atom bombs were employed
over cities, but the extensive use of the bombs against their soldiers is what
finally pushed them to the conference table. Yes, they changed their tune when
they faced the possibility of losing their army without an ‘honorable’ fight,
but so did we when it became undeniably clear that our replacement stream would
not keep up with casualties.”
Turner looked over at General “Howlin’ Mad” Smith, and
continued “One man in this room tonight served in the trenches of World War
One. An incomplete peace after that war meant that he and the sons of his
buddies had to fight another war a generation later. We can only pray that the
recent peace will not end in a bigger, bloodier, perhaps atomic, war with Imperial
Japan in 1965. Thank you.”
The Reality
The coup attempt by Japanese forces unwilling to surrender
was thwarted by Imperial forces loyal to Emperor Hirohito, and the Japanese
government succeeded in effecting a formal surrender before the home islands
were invaded. Occupation forces on Kyushu were stunned by the scale of the
defenses found at the precise locations where the invasion was scheduled to
take place. The U.S. military government eventually disposed of 12,735 Japanese
aircraft.
On October 9-10, 1945, Typhoon Louise struck Okinawa.
Luckily, Operation Majestic had been canceled months earlier. There was
considerably less assault shipping on hand than if the invasion of Kyushu had
been imminent, and “only” 145 vessels were sunk or damaged so severely that
they were beyond salvage.
Bibliography
Asada, Sadao, “The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan’s
Decision to Surrender—A Reconsideration,” Pacific Historical Review 67,
November 1998.
Bartholomew, Charles A., Captain, USN, Mud, Muscle and
Miracles: Marine Salvage in the United States Navy (Department of the
Navy, Washington, D.C., 1990).
Bix, Herbert P., Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan
(Harper Collins, New York, 2000), 519.
Bland Larry 1. (ed.), George C. Marshall Interviews and
Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue (George C. Marshall Foundation,
Lexington, 1996).
Brown, Anthony Cave, Bodyguard of Lies, vol. 2 (Harper &
Row, New York, 1975).
Buell, Thomas B., The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral
Raymond A. Spruance (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1987).
The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, vol. 1: Reports
of General MacArthur (General Headquarters, Supreme Allied Command, Pacific,
Tokyo, 1950).
Cannon, M. Hamlin, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines
(Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 1954).
Cline, Ray S., Washington Command Post: The Operations
Division (Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 1954).
Coakley, Robert W, and Leighton, Richard M., The War
Department: Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943-1944 (Department of the Army,
Washington, DC, 1968).
Coox, Alvin D, “Japanese Military Intelligence in the
Pacific: Its Non-Revolutionary Nature,” in The Intelligence Revolution: A
Historical Perspective (Office of Air Force History, Washington, D.C., 1991).
, “Needless Fear: The Compromise of U.S. Plans to Invade Japan in 1945,”
Journal of Military History, April 2000.
Drea, Edward J., MacArthur’s Ultra: Codebreaking and the War
Against Japan, 1942-45 (University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 1992).
Dyer, George Carroll, Vice Admiral, USN, The Amphibians Came
to Conquer: The Story of Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner (U.S. Navy Department,
Washington, D.C, 1972).
Frank, Bemis M., and Shaw, Henry I., Jr., History of U.S.
Marine Corps Operations in World War II, vol. 5: Victory and Occupation
(Historical Branch, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1968).
Gallicchio, Marc, “After Nagasaki: General Marshall’s Plan
for Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Japan,” Prologue 23, Winter 1991.
Giangreco, D. M., “Operation Downfall: The Devil Was in the
Details,” Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 1995.
, “The Truth About Kamikazes,” Naval History, May-June 1997.
, “Casualty Projections for the Invasion of Japan, 1945-1946:
Planning and Policy Implications,” Journal of Military History, July 1997.
Hattendorf, John B.; Simpson, B. Michael, III; and Wadleigh,
John R., Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the Naval War College
(Naval War College Press, Newport, Rhode Island, 1984).
Hattori, Colonel, The Complete History of the Greater East
Asia War (500th Military Intelligence Group, Tokyo, 1954).
Huber, Thomas M., Pastel: Deception in the Invasion of Japan
(Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, 1988).
Inoguchi, Rikihei, Captain, UN, and Nakajima, Tadashi,
Commander, UN, The Divine Wind: Japan’s Kamikaze Force in World War II (Naval
Institute Press, Annapolis, 1958).
Interrogations of Japanese Officials, vol. 2 (United States
Strategic Bombing Survey, Tokyo, 1946).
“The Japanese System of Defense Call-up,” Military Research
Bulletin,no. 19, 18 July 1945.
Kendrick, Douglas B., Brigadier General, USA, Medical
Department,United States Army: Blood Program in World War II (Office of the
Surgeon General, Washington, DC, 1964).
Morison, Samuel Eliot, Rear Admiral, USN, History of United
States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 12: Leyte, June 1944–January 1945
(Little, Brown, Boston, 1958).
, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 13, The
Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas, 1944–1945 (Little,
Brown, Boston, 1959).
, History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 14:
Victory in the Pacific, 1945 (Little, Brown, Boston, 1960).
, The Two Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second
World War (Little, Brown, Boston, 1958).
Oil in Japan’s War: Report of the Oil and Chemical Division,
United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Pacific (United States Strategic
Bombing Survey, Tokyo, 1946).
O’Neill, Richard, Suicide Squads: Axis and Allied Special
Attack Weapons of World War II, Their Development and Their Missions
(Ballantine Books, New York, 1984).
Potter, E.B., Nimitz (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis,
1976).
Roland, Buford, Lieutenant Commander, USNR, and Boyd,
William B., Lieutenant, USNR, U.S. Navy Bureau of Ordnance in World War II
(U.S. Navy Department, Washington, DC, 1955).
Sakai, Saburo; Caidin, Martin; and Saito, Fred, Samurai
(Bantam Books, New York, 1978).
Sherrod, Robert, History of Marine Corps Aviation in World
War II (Presidio Press, Bonita, 1980).
Stanton, Shelby L., Order of Battle, U.S. Army, World War II
(Presidio Press, Novate, 1984).
Walker, Lewis M., Commander, USNR, “Deception Plan for
Operation Olympic,” Parameters, Spring 1995.
