In London, steps were being taken that were to transform the
whole conduct of the air war. On 17 August 1917, a committee presided over by
Lieutenant General Jan Smuts had presented a report on air organization to the
War Cabinet. It recommended the formation of an Air Ministry ‘to control and
administer all matters in connection with air warfare of every kind and that
the new Ministry should proceed to work out the arrangements for the
amalgamation of the two Services and for the legal constitution and discipline
of the new Service.’ It went on to point out that ‘The day may not be far off
when aerial operations with their devastation of enemy lands and destruction of
industrial and populous centres on a vast scale may become the principal operations
of war, to which the older forms of military and naval operations may become
secondary and subordinate.’
This remarkably far-sighted report resulted in the creation
of an Air Ministry on 2 January 1918, although its birth was not accomplished
without a considerable amount of inter-Service wrangling. On the following day
the first Air Council was formed, with Lord Rothermere as the first Secretary
of State for Air. The Chief of the Air Staff was Major General Sir Hugh
Trenchard, who was succeeded as General Officer Commanding the Royal Flying
Corps in France by Major General J. M. Salmond on 18 January. The first moves
had been made towards the creation of the Royal Air Force, the first
independent force of its kind in the world.
This same period, the winter of 1917–18, also saw a
reorganization of Britain’s air defences. The day of the large-scale Zeppelin
raids on Britain was over, hampered by the weather and lack of navigational
skills from the beginning, and finally crippled by the growing proficiency of
the RFC’s night-fighter crews and the anti-aircraft defences. But from the
summer of 1917 a much greater threat emerged with the beginning of sustained
attacks on British targets by the Gotha bombers of Kagohl 3 (the unit’s
designation being an abbreviation of Kampfgeschwader der Obersten
Heeresleitung) of German High Command Bomber Wing.
Powered by a pair of 260 hp Mercedes DIVa liquid-cooled
in-line engines, the Gotha GIV could carry a typical bomb load of six 110-lb
bombs. Its maximum speed was about 85 mph, which even so was faster than some
of the fighter aircraft sent up to intercept it, and its attack altitude of
16,000 feet made it a difficult target, unless defensive fighters had ample
warning of its approach. The first attack on the British mainland, mounted by
twenty-three Gothas in daylight on 25 May 1917, killed 95 civilians and injured
195 in Folkestone. More than seventy home defence aircraft were sent up to
intercept, but the only ones to make contact were flown by two ferry pilots.
Several Gothas were destroyed in subsequent raids, but these mostly fell to
anti-aircraft fire or failed to regain their base because of adverse weather.
The few home defence aircraft that did get close enough to intercept were
usually beaten off by the Gotha’s substantial defensive armament of three
Spandau machine-guns.
In September 1917 the Gothas switched to night attacks, and
they were now joined by an even more formidable bomber: the Zeppelin (Staaken)
R Type, known as the Riesenflugzeug (giant aircraft). This monster was capable
of carrying a 2,200-lb bomb at 14,000 feet at 80 mph under the power of its
four 260 hp Mercedes engines; moreover it was defended by five machine-guns,
which made it a much tougher target than the Gotha. Only a small number of R
Types were built, but they presented an immense threat to British targets. To
meet this threat, the War Office implemented a new defence scheme whereby
anti-aircraft guns and patrolling aircraft were allocated separate operating
zones. In addition, balloons trailing steel cable ‘curtains’ floated in
barriers up to 8,000 feet, theoretically forcing any attacking aircraft to fly
above that height to a level where fighters would be patrolling.
The first German bombing raid of 1918 was mounted on the
night of 28/29 January, when thirteen Gothas and two Giants were despatched to
attack London. In the event seven Gothas and one Giant succeeded in doing so,
killing 67 civilians, injuring another 166, and causing damage of nearly
£190,000. The raid was thwarted to some degree by fog, as far as the Gothas
were concerned, while one of the Giants had engine trouble and was forced to
turn back, having jettisoned its bombs into the sea off Ostende.
Crossing the English coast at intervals from 8.00 pm between
Harwich and the North Foreland, three Gothas bombed London and the remaining
four attacked Ramsgate, Margate, Sheerness and Sandwich. The Giant also reached
London just after midnight, and one of its two 660-lb bombs caused the worst
single bombing incident of the war when it hit the Odhams Press building in
Long Acre, killing 38 people and injuring 85.
One of the Gothas involved in the London attack, crewed by
Lieutenant Friedrich von Thomsen (navigator and commander) and Sergeants Karl
Ziegler (pilot) and Walther Heiden, dropped its bombs on Hampstead at 9.45 pm
and was then tracked by searchlights as it flew over north-east London. The
beams attracted the attention of two patrolling Sopwith Camel pilots of No 44
Squadron from Hainault – Captain George Hackwill and Lieutenant Charles Banks –
who at once gave chase and independently picked up the glow from the Gotha’s
exhausts as it passed over Romford at 10,000 feet. Banks was flying a Camel
with an unconventional armament; in addition to its normal pair of Vickers guns
it also carried a Lewis, mounted on the upper wing centre section and using the
new RTS ammunition. Designed by Richard Threlfall and Son, this combined
explosive and incendiary qualities.
It was Banks who attacked first, closing from the left to
about thirty yards beneath the Gotha and opening fire with all three guns.
Hackwill meanwhile closed in from the right and also opened fire, effectively
boxing in the German bomber and presenting an impossible situation to its
gunner, whose field of fire was restricted. After ten minutes or so the Gotha
caught fire and dived into the ground near Wickford, where it exploded. It
would almost certainly have crashed anyway, even if it had not caught fire, for
a subsequent examination of the crew’s bodies revealed that the pilot had been
shot through the neck. Hackwill and Banks were each awarded the Military Cross
for their exploit.
Other Gothas were also attacked that night, briefly and
without result, by pilots of Nos 39, 50, 61 and 78 Squadrons RFC, and by a
Sopwith 1½-Strutter of the RNAS from Dover.
An hour after the last Gotha had cleared the coast, the
Riesenflugzeug was over Sudbury, having made landfall over Hollesley Bay, east
of Ipswich, and was droning towards London via a somewhat tortuous route. By
this time, at least forty-four fighters were searching for it. It was sighted
by two of them, from an unidentified squadron, not long after crossing the
coast, but they lost contact with it and it was next sighted by the crew of a
No 39 Squadron Bristol Fighter at about 11.00 pm near Harlow. The pilot of the
Bristol, Lieutenant John Goodyear, positioned himself behind the Giant and
fired a long burst from his Vickers, but was then hurled aside by the
slipstream; this Giant, an R.12, was fitted with six coupled engines driving
three propellers, and the wash they created was enormous.
He tried again, and the same thing happened. On the third
attempt, with the Bristol now running through heavy defensive fire, he tried to
position underneath the Giant so that his gunner, 1st Air Mechanic W. T.
Merchant, could bring fire from his Lewis gun to bear. At that moment a burst
of fire from one of the German gunners shattered the Bristol’s petrol tank and
wounded Merchant slightly in the arm. A few moments later the engine stopped
and Goodyear glided down to make a faultless engine-off landing at North Weald,
whose flarepath he had seen in the distance.
Shortly after it had released its bombs over London, the
Giant was picked up east of Woolwich by a Sopwith Camel of No 44 Squadron flown
by Lieutenant Bob Hall, a South African. Hall followed it as far as Foulness,
cursing in helpless frustration all the way because he could not get his guns
to work. The Giant got clean away.
The anti-aircraft barrage scored one success that night, but
unfortunately its victim was a Camel of No 78 Squadron flown by 2nd Lieutenant
Idris Davies, whose engine was stopped by a near shell burst at 11,000 feet
over Woolwich. Davies tried to glide back to Sutton’s Farm, but he hit
telegraph wires near the Hornchurch signal box and was catapulted out of the
cockpit. He fell between the railway lines, amazingly without injury, but the
Camel was a complete loss. Forty minutes later Davies was sitting in another
Camel, ready to take off if need be. Mostly, the anti-aircraft gunners
co-operated very well with the RFC, and held their fire when friendly fighters
were known to be overhead.
The following night witnessed the most remarkable night
battle of the First World War, when three Giants out of four despatched
attacked southern England. The fourth, having developed engine trouble over the
Channel, bombed fortifications near Gravelines before returning to its base,
while the others crossed the English coast between Southend and The Naze. Of
these, one, the R.26, developed engine trouble soon after crossing the coast
and began losing height, so its crew jettisoned the bomb load and limped back
across the Channel on two engines, eventually landing at Ostende.
A second Giant, the R.39, came inland via the Blackwater
estuary just after 10.00 pm, and ten minutes later it was sighted by Captain
Arthur Dennis of No 37 Squadron, who was flying a BE12b. The latter, developed
from the older BE2c, had enjoyed some success in the night-fighting role, one
of No 37 Squadron’s aircraft having shot down Zeppelin L48 in June 1917. It was
armed with a single Lewis gun, mounted on the port side of the cockpit and
synchronized to fire through the propeller. Dennis opened fire from close
range, braving fire from two of the Giant’s machine-guns, and scored hits on
the bomber’s fuselage before drawing off to change his ammunition drum. On the
second approach, however, he was buffeted by the Giant’s slipstream, and on
recovery found that he had lost contact with the target.
The R.39 approached London from the north-west at 11,000
feet and was next sighted by Bob Hall of No 44 Squadron, who pursued it until
it became lost in the haze near Roehampton. Once again, Hall’s guns gave
trouble and he had no opportunity to open fire. Meanwhile, the Giant had
dropped its bombs on residential areas between Acton and Richmond Park, the
crew having apparently mistaken Hammersmith Bridge for Tower Bridge, which was
several miles to the east. South of the Thames, the R.39 was attacked briefly
and with no visible result by Captain F. L. Luxmoore of No 78 Squadron, flying
a Sopwith Camel. He fired fifty rounds on his first pass, but as he made a
second firing run one of his bullets struck the Camel’s propeller and the
brilliant tracer element flew back into his face, temporarily blinding him. By
the time his night vision was restored, the bomber had vanished.
Shortly after this the R.39, now down to 9,500 feet and
travelling very fast, was located by Captain G. H. Hackwill of No 44 Squadron,
who was also flying a Camel. Hackwill gave chase and fired 600 rounds from long
range before shortage of fuel compelled him to break off. The Giant was last
seen as it crossed the coast near Hythe by 2nd Lieutenants F. V. Bryant and V.
H. Newton, the crew of an Armstrong Whitworth F.K.8 of No 50 Squadron. They too
gave chase, but lost the bomber in haze.
The third Giant, the R.25, crossed the coast near Foulness
at 10.50 pm and was almost immediately attacked by 2nd Lieutenant F. R. Kitton
of No 37 Squadron, flying a BE2e. Diving his aircraft at a shuddering 100 mph,
he got under the Giant’s tail and fired a complete drum of ammunition at it,
observing several hits, but lost the bomber while he was busy rearming. The
R.25 was next attacked by Bob Hall of No 44 Squadron at 11.15 pm over Benfleet,
but his guns kept on jamming as he pursued it. He was joined by 2nd Lieutenant
H. A. Edwardes, also of No 44 Squadron, who fired three long bursts before his
guns also jammed.
By this time the R.25 was taking violent evasive action. The
battle had now attracted three more Camels, all from No 44 Squadron; the first
on the scene was 2nd Lieutenant T. M. O’Neill, who fired 300 rounds before his
guns jammed too. Next came the squadron commander, Major Murlis Green, who was
flying a Camel equipped with two Lewis guns using RTS ammunition. He had
already made one run, only to break away when he almost flew into O’Neill’s
fire. Now he closed in again to be greeted by the full attention of the Giant’s
rear gunner. Undeterred, he fired three-quarters of a drum at the bomber before
suffering a stoppage which he was unable to clear. As his second Lewis also refused
to function, he had no choice but to return to base to have the trouble put
right.
The R.25 was now in trouble. The Camels’ fire had put one of
its engines out of action and some of its instruments had also been smashed.
Although unable to maintain height with a full bomb load, and with their speed
down to about 60 mph, the crew decided to press on to London. The Giant’s bombs
fell in open ground near Wanstead. Up to this point the R.25 had been harried
by Bob Hall, who was able to fire only five rounds before each stoppage; he now
lost his target, but encountered the R.39 a few miles to the west.
The R.25 scraped home to Ostende, having survived successive
attacks by five fighters. They had collectively fired over 800 rounds at her,
and after landing she was found to have taken no fewer than 88 hits. Had the
fighters not suffered continual gun stoppages, there seems little doubt that
they would have brought down the bomber. However, there were other factors in
their failure to do so; analysing the action later, the Camel pilots of No 44
Squadron realized that the Giant’s sheer size had led them to believe that they
had been firing from a much closer range than was actually the case. Instead of
closing to within 50 yards, as they had thought at the time, they must have
been anything up to 250 yards away.
