Strategic Preference #3: Mao Zedong, Meet Alfred Thayer
Mahan
The strategic preferences we are discussing are not fixed;
they are leanings. As the PLA Navy approaches parity with the U.S. Navy, Mao’s
grammar of active defense will come to resemble the Mahanian scheme for
concentrated fleet-on-fleet engagements. Recall that the third and final phase
of Mao’s strategy of the weak is the conventional counteroffensive that brings
about final victory. What comes before—the strategic defensive, the strategic
equilibrium—are transitory expedients, not desirable states. If Beijing
believes the PLA is now the stronger contender, it can skip the phases that
presuppose China is outmatched and proceed straight to a conventional
offensive.
Mao’s endgame was a conventional battlefield victory. Mahan
hoped to open with a fleet-on-fleet engagement that likewise yielded victory.
Both strategists agreed on the imperative to vanquish the foe’s main force in
decisive combat at some stage. The only difference was how to sequence
operations and engagements to bring about a fleet action.
Hughes’ third scenario, massed attack, thus may now be part
of the PLA commanders’ portfolio of options. As noted before, some Chinese
strategists look directly to Mahan for strategic insight. The well-known pundit
Zhang Wenmu cites Mahan’s maxim that economic prosperity hinges on deploying
stronger naval forces at strategic locations. From this Zhang concludes that
China must “build up our navy as quickly as possible” in preparation for the
“sea battle” that constitutes the “ultimate way for major powers” to resolve
economic disputes. Zhang, it seems, foresees decisive fleet actions.
How might such an engagement come about? One plausible
scenario: a sequential PLA strategy could unfold by increments, climaxing in a
Mahanian test of arms. Small-scale engagements would progress stepwise toward
the ultimate reckoning. Or, if the PLA felt the balance of forces favored it
from the outset, Beijing might seek a decisive battle with the U.S. military
right away rather than progress through Mao Zedong’s phases of war. The strong
have little need for the strategies of the weak.
Venturing everything to gain everything is not so dramatic a
break with Mao as it seems. Mao enjoined weaker powers, not stronger ones, to
give ground and concentrate against isolated enemy units. Once Chinese forces
build up to parity or relative superiority over their foes, they will enjoy far
more operational and tactical options, including the option of inaugurating the
conventional counteroffensive Mao believed they must eventually prosecute to
achieve victory. If the strategic setting favors offensive action, then, there
is no reason for the PLA not to get right to it.
Indeed, Mao departed from his own pattern when circumstances
warranted. Despite grave reservations among his comrades, Mao prevailed on them
to intervene decisively in the Korean War, convinced that a massive initial
blow would push UN forces off the peninsula. His gamble failed miserably.
Still, such logic—perhaps compounded by wishful thinking—could again grip
Chinese commanders. Below we discuss some factors that might impel them to risk
a fleet action early.
Maoist Operational Grammar Isn’t So Different from
Mahan’s After All
As we noted above, offensive Mahanian battle is compatible
with Maoist traditions when conditions suit. Having ensnared U.S. forces deep
inside China’s contested zone, the PLA can assume the exterior lines, applying
Mao’s operational logic far more broadly than he anticipated. Mao himself
contemplated globe-spanning exterior lines, albeit in a diplomatic rather than
an operational sense. His contemporary followers might apply his theory in
ambitious ways, pursuing a counteroffensive promising outright naval victory.
Maoist theory would converge with Mahanian theory, urging them on.
Death Ground
The CCP regime could find its survival at stake in some
Taiwan or South China Sea contingency. Self-preservation is the top priority
for the CCP, as it is for the rulers of any state. A cross-strait war, to name
the most obvious contingency, would call Chinese national unity into
question—and the legitimacy of the regime along with it. U.S. intervention thus
might summon forth an all-out PLA assault. If the communist regime’s longevity
hinged on victory, self-restraint would recede in importance. Or a similar
calculus could take hold should the United States mount a blockade of Chinese
resource shipments, endangering China’s economic vibrancy and thus standards of
living for the populace. All bets are off should some U.S. action place China’s
leadership on what Sun Tzu dubs “death ground”—where it is imperative to fight
to the utmost or perish.
Now or Never
China often deprecates America’s political staying power,
but it may fear a repetition of December 1941, when an Asian sea power last
underrated America’s will and capacity to fight across the Pacific and paid the
price for it. Chinese commanders resigned to armed strife against U.S. forces
might aim a knockout blow at U.S. naval task forces that venture into the China
seas. If Chinese forces did not achieve a solid victory, however, Beijing might
provoke the kind of massive U.S. counterstroke that followed Imperial Japan’s
attack at Pearl Harbor. But there is a major difference: today’s counterpart to
“Pearl Harbor” sits within reach of strike forces based on the Chinese
mainland. The PLA need not replicate the long, tortuous voyage the IJN
undertook to assail Oahu in 1941. It can rain missiles on U.S. Seventh Fleet
bases such as Yokosuka and Sasebo from nearby. And unlike IJN carrier aviators
operating at the end of their logistical tether, PLA rocketeers can sustain
their bombardment until the job is done thoroughly. A killing stroke would
foreclose the prospect of massive American retaliation, and such a stroke is
increasingly thinkable for Beijing.
Dare All to Gain All
Should the PLA offer decisive battle and win, its triumph
would hasten China’s rise to regional and world eminence, reordering the Asian
and perhaps global systems. America would not quickly rebuild its navy—or
regain its superpower status, which turns on supremacy in the maritime
commons—following a catastrophic defeat. We doubt that Beijing would initiate
war solely to knock out the U.S. Navy. Chinese thinkers grasp the political,
economic, and military costs of great-power war and evince little appetite for
it. Still, the allure of a final reckoning might prod Chinese commanders to
risk the fleet if they were already leaning that way for the reasons discussed
above.
That Chinese decision makers could hazard a climactic fleet
action does not mean they are fated to do so. Much will depend on how they
estimate the military balance in Asia. Thus, monitoring how Beijing appraises
its comprehensive national power relative to that of the United States and
other rival powers will supply important clues to Chinese maritime strategy and
tactics.
Can the United States Preserve Its Naval Mastery?
U.S. officials, commanders, and shipwrights must exercise
foresight, refine training and doctrine for Asian sea combat, and pay constant
attention to upgrading the material dimension of strategy. Military
professionals like to point out that they traffic in capabilities rather than
intentions. How should U.S. naval commanders prepare for Chinese integrated
attacks at sea?
By embracing Wayne Hughes’ advice, for one thing. Hughes
urges ship designers to extend the range of U.S. missiles while bolstering U.S.
Navy expeditionary forces’ detection and targeting ability. Constant work on
ships, planes, and armaments is crucial. So is constant work on the human
factor. Hughes enjoins commanders to refine their tactics so as to preserve or
restore their advantage over prospective adversaries such as China. In
particular, American seafarers need to regain the Navy’s proficiency at
electromagnetic emissions control (EMCON), which manages electromagnetic
emissions such as radar and radio to keep enemy forces from detecting U.S. task
forces. It means muffling the force’s electronic signature or silencing it
altogether. Properly done, EMCON hobbles enemy scouting and targeting.
Aggressive electronic warfare is likewise central to U.S. information
superiority.
Who holds the edge in weapons range and scouting
effectiveness at present? To date, China has won the contest for greater range.
Every one of its antiship missiles outranges the U.S. Navy’s Harpoon, granting
PLA Navy captains multiple engagement opportunities before American ships can
close the range enough to fire back. The PLA’s YJ-18 boasts four times the
Harpoon’s range. The U.S. Navy and defense firms are now competing in the range
war, however. The Pentagon’s Strategic Capabilities Office has repurposed the
SM-6 interceptor for surface-warfare engagements, a new long-range antiship
missile is under development, and engineers have fitted the Tomahawk
land-attack cruise missile with sensors and software to conduct surface
engagements. If pursued, the latter in particular will boost vessels’ striking
reach into the hundreds of miles. Naval commanders will sleep more soundly once
such weaponry reaches the fleet. Faster is better when fielding these
armaments.
Nevertheless, when and if the PLA perfects its ASBMs, U.S.
forces will be forced to operate within the DF-26 or DF-21D threat envelopes,
especially if developments bear out the upper estimates of those missiles’
reach. These figures exceed the maximum range advertised for any U.S.
land-attack cruise missile or for any ship-launched aircraft armed with
antiship or land-attack missiles. Depending on the variant, the U.S. Navy’s
Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles boast ranges officially reported at
1,600–2,500 kilometers. The F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, the mainstay of today’s
carrier air wings, has a combat radius of 723 kilometers with a standard bomb
load and external fuel tanks. Add another 321-plus kilometers for the Super
Hornet’s joint air-to-surface standoff missiles (JASSMs) and 804-plus kilometers
for the extended-range variant (JASSM-ER).
At extreme range, then, the F/A-18 can hit targets roughly
1,500 kilometers away. That is almost precisely the low-end estimate for DF-21D
range and deep within DF-26 range. The F-35C Lightning II stealth fighter will
improve on the Super Hornet’s range, clocking in with a combat radius estimated
at 1,111 kilometers. For the F-35, that makes the extreme striking range 1,915
kilometers—beyond the minimum estimate for the DF-21D’s range but well within
the maximum. If the DF-26 proves out, carriers would have to venture deep
within the ASBM envelope to do their work. Beijing’s buildup of its fleet, and
of its shore-based sea-power arsenal, is pushing the culminating point of the
attack farther offshore for U.S. task forces, raising the costs of entry for
the U.S. military into Asian waters.
With regard to manned aircraft, the PLA Navy’s J-11
fighter/attack aircraft, a derivative of the Russian Su-27 and Su-30, boasts a
tactical radius of 2,000 kilometers if refueled in flight. In theory, it could
hold U.S. vessels at risk up to 2,400 kilometers distant from its base if armed
with YJ-12 ASCMs which boast a range estimated at 250 to 400 kilometers. This
pushes the engagement zone well beyond the inner island chain, supporting
China’s goal of sea denial in and around Taiwan and the approaches to the South
China Sea. And this discussion leaves aside the contributions China’s J-15
might make. The J-15, under development for use on board PLAN carriers, has a
combat radius of around 1,500 kilometers, and a family of stealth aircraft is
under development that appears able to operate out to the second island chain.
The favorable balance of aircraft and missile ranges now
allows Chinese strategists to look beyond the Taiwan impasse. They appear
comfortable that they can deny the United States access to the waters shoreward
of the first island chain. Now look at the American side. For close-in
encounters like one off Taiwan, which could involve landing U.S. Marines or interdicting
Chinese landing forces, U.S. forces must venture within the cruise missile
envelope and well within range of missile-armed aircraft flying from airfields
on the mainland. Layered defenses for carrier and amphibious groups will be
thinner and more permeable in these cramped quarters. Response times for U.S.
defenders will plummet as a result. This is what it means to operate within
range of Fortress China and its fortress fleet.
Shipboard defenses will take on new importance under these
circumstances. The U.S. Navy’s premier self-defense system, the RIM-162 Evolved
Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM), is a semiactive radarguided missile fired from
vertical launch systems or deck-mounted launchers. Its range is reported to be
only forty-five kilometers, however, compressing reaction times for U.S. task
forces against Chinese antiship weaponry like the Sunburn, with its
sea-skimming cruise altitude, maximum velocity of Mach 3, and capacity for
radical evasive maneuvers in the terminal phase. The YJ-18 cruises at subsonic
speeds but accelerates to Mach 3 when approaching its target.
One study estimates the probability of a hit for a Mach 2.5
missile at 40 percent against a carrier group screened by Aegis combatants. The
window for multiple ESSM engagements, then, will shut quickly under battle
conditions. The Close-In Weapon System (CIWS), U.S. Navy warships’ point
defense against aerial attack, is a radar-guided Gatling gun able to fire up to
4,500 penetrating rounds per minute. The range of CIWS mounts is so short,
though, that their rate of fire provides cold comfort for shipboard defenders
against airborne threats. The Navy is upgrading point defenses with “SeaRAM,” a
defense system that marries CIWS radar and fire control with rolling airframe
missiles to engage incoming missiles farther off board. The system’s range is
classified but appears to be around eight kilometers. This represents an
improvement over gunfire, but again, it amounts to short range when coping with
supersonic missiles trying to evade shipboard defenses.
A significant disclaimer is in order. The technical
specifications of China’s armaments appear imposing, but missile ranges are
contingent on the PLA’s ability to detect, identify, and track U.S. warships at
extreme distances. The Pacific Ocean is big, and the biggest fleet is
vanishingly small by comparison. This factor imposes a deterrent to long-range
surface engagements. U.S. Navy doctrine frowns on very long-range antiship
strikes for fear of hitting noncombatants. There is little reason to think the
PLA Navy, which has never been tested in high-seas combat, has leapfrogged this
intricate technical and doctrinal challenge. Nor is there reason to think PLA
commanders would cut loose indiscriminately, heedless of the danger to civilian
shipping or the waste of expending scarce munitions against
non-combatants—except as a desperation measure should the CCP regime find
itself treading on death ground.
For now, our diagnosis is this: China holds the advantage in
long-range antiship weaponry, but the United States is beginning to field
systems that will cut into that advantage. U.S. naval commanders should no
longer expect to strike with impunity at Chinese military assets, ashore or at
sea, while keeping their own high-value platforms—carriers, amphibious landing
ships, and Aegis cruisers and destroyers—out of harm’s way. Commanders should
also realize that the fleet relies to an unhealthy degree on the carrier air
wing for its offensive punch against sea and shore targets. These facts add up
to a compelling brief not just for new shipboard armaments but also for
initiatives such as “distributed lethality,” which will disperse firepower
throughout the surface force. Once every ship is a fighting ship, the fleet’s
dependency on a few squadrons of fighter/attack aircraft should ease.
How far offshore the PLA Navy will operate is a function of
how confident Chinese commanders are in their anti-access defenses, how much
risk Chinese commanders and party leaders are willing to assume, how much seamanship
and tactical prowess Chinese mariners and airmen exhibit, and the technical
feasibility of such systems as the ASBM. Together these factors will govern the
point at which U.S. task forces will come under threat when approaching the
Asian seas.
If our diagnosis is correct, the United States and its
allies are in a danger zone. If American engineering stands at the verge of
evening the range imbalance, and if Chinese commanders know that, the Chinese
may be tempted to act before their advantage disappears. This may be why
Beijing has shown signs of urgency in the South China Sea by dredging up
seafloor to create military installations. Beijing has taken the risk of
uniting a hostile coalition—but perhaps the CCP leadership rates that risk as
less than the risk of taking a leisurely approach that soothes animosities but
lets the United States recover its maritime supremacy in Asia. The region could
be in for a bumpy ride in the coming decade or so.
Looking ahead, it is safe to say that the PLA’s tactical
reach already extends beyond the first island chain. It is also safe to say
that Beijing will soon be able to dispute U.S. command of the waters and skies
between the two island chains, if indeed it cannot already. How far offshore
China’s navy conducts exercises and what Chinese officers and pundits say about
their doctrine will provide the best indicators available.
For planning purposes, the soundest assumption is that U.S.
forces will face surface, subsurface, and aerial threats along more than one threat
axis, especially as they close on Chinese shores. Within China’s contested
zone, the PLA will fight on tactically exterior lines, mounting dispersed
attacks to overpower U.S. antiair, antiship, and antisubmarine defenses.
Accordingly, U.S. commanders must think about how American units can lend one
another mutual support and make the expeditionary force a single, cohesive
force. This will help balk Maoist strategies predicated on defeating an
oncoming force bit by bit, picking off isolated units and annihilating them.
Hughes terms this mutual-support strategy “massing for defense.”
The martial balance may continue shifting toward the PLA in
the coming years as Chinese forces expand, improve their arsenal, and refine
their tactics to make the best use of the contested zone. It will certainly
continue shifting if the United States declines to make the conscious political
choice to remain the world’s predominant sea power and guarantor of freedom of
the sea. Primacy requires resources. Admiral J. C. Wylie points out that
Congress makes strategic decisions all the time through the budgetary process.
Indeed. No amount of seamanship or tactical wizardry will carry the U.S. Navy
to victory in the Far East if U.S. mariners have too few implements for the fight.
