Capture of a French regiment’s eagle by the cavalry of the Russian guard, by Bogdan Willewalde (1884)
Northern Flank: Austerlitz
2 December 1805
While Vandamme’s division dispersed the final remnants of IV
Column from the plateau, Saint-Hilaire’s battle for control of the Pratzeberg
still raged. At about 11.00am Langeron, still personally involved in the
fighting, received word from adjutants despatched from IV Column, advising him
with stark simplicity of the collapse of this force. Langeron ordered these
messengers to pass on the shocking news to Buxhöwden, who remained inactive
about a mile away on the hillock overlooking the Goldbach. Having been away
from the rest of his command, fighting in Sokolnitz, for an hour and a half,
and with no sign of help coming from Buxhöwden, Langeron realised he must find
reinforcements himself. Leaving Kamenski to continue the fight, Langeron
galloped off back to Sokolnitz.
At around the same time Weyrother, Kolowrat and Kutuzov
approached the Pratzeberg, following the defeat of the other half of IV Column,
doing their best to encourage the Austrian troops. Kutuzov, accompanied by a
staff officer, Prince Dmitry Volkonsky, then reached Kamenski’s brigade just as
it was in danger of being broken by a French attack, but Volkonsky rallied the
Phanagoria Regiment by grasping their standard and leading them forward: order
was again restored.
As Langeron headed off to find reinforcements, the Austrian
battalions recovering from their attack on Thiébault’s line reformed within
reach of Kamenski’s brigade. Their brigade commander, Jurczik, anchored his
position on a small rise, where he concentrated some of his artillery. Major
Mahler brought his battalion of IR49 Kerpen to the rise and drew the battalion
of IR58 Beaulieu in to protect the flank. At the same time he moved two guns to
a position from where they could enfilade the French line, which brought their
fire to a halt for a while. Jurczik applauded his actions shouting, ‘Bravo!
Major Mahler!’ Shortly afterwards Jurczik fell to the ground, fatally wounded
by a French musket ball. He died two weeks later.
Once the Austrian battalions had recoiled from the French
artillery, Thiébault joined his men with the rest of the division and together
they attacked Kamenski’s brigade, driving them back and capturing a number of
limbered Russian guns as well as retaking their own previously lost guns. Their
impetus took them right to the summit of the Pratzeberg, and it was only with
some difficulty that the officers managed to control the ardour of their men
and halt the line. In fact, the infantry had now left their supporting
artillery behind and with no word from Maréchal Soult or imperial headquarters,
Saint-Hilaire felt his isolation keenly. Recognising the urgent need to drive
the French off the plateau, and aware of their current exposed position, the
Allies prepared to make:
‘a general and desperate attack at the point of the bayonet.
The Austrian Brigade, with that under General Kamenski, charged the enemy; the
Russians shouting, according to their usual custom; but the French received them
with steadiness, and a well-supported fire, which made a dreadful carnage in
the compact ranks of the Russians.’
But the Russians pressed on. Thiébault, close to the centre
of the action, watched as the Russians:
‘charged on all sides, and while desperately disputing
the ground, we were forced back. It was only by yielding before the more
violent attacks that we maintained any alignment among our troops and saved our
guns … Finally after an appalling melee, a melee of more than twenty minutes,
we won a pause; by the sharpest fire and carried at the point of the bayonet.’
According to the notes kept by Thiébault, this ‘twenty
minute bayonet battle’, claimed the lives of both Colonel Mazas, 14ème Ligne,
and Thiébault’s ADC, Richebourg. Thiébault was fortunate to escape injury
himself when his horse fell to a Russian shot. But as both sides recovered
their breath, Général de division Saint-Hilaire rushed up to his brigade
commanders, Thiébault and Morand, saying: ‘This is becoming intolerable, and I
propose, gentlemen, that we take up a position to the rear which we can
defend.’ Almost before he finished speaking, Colonel Pouzet of the 10ème Légère
interrupted: ‘Withdraw us, my General … If we take a step back, we are lost. We
have only one means of leaving here with honour, it is to put our heads down
and attack all in front of us and, above all, not give our enemy time to count
our numbers.’ Pouzet’s stirring words did the trick, and reinvigorated, the
French clung tenaciously to the ground they held, repelling all Russian
attacks.
While the Russians doggedly continued to attack, the
Austrian battalions were being pressed back, despite the best efforts of
Weyrother and Kolowrat. Having reformed close to a small rise, supported by
their artillery, the battalions reformed and engaged the 36ème in a firefight,
halting an enemy advance with volley fire. However, the French recovered and
attacked again, driving IR58 Beaulieu back. Mahler attempted a counter-attack
with his battalion of IR49 Kerpen and that of IR55 Reuss-Greitz but reported
coming under ‘a very severe fire’ that caused many casualties. With his left
flank now exposed to attack due to the repulse of IR58, his position was
becoming extremely dangerous. However, he managed to keep his men together and
prevented them from falling back for a while with the help of his adjutant,
Fähnrich Jlljaschek. Moreover, by maintaining volley fire, he was able to
remove his wounded safely to the rear.
But elsewhere, the Austrians were gradually being forced
back. Mahler started the battle with only 312 men in his battalion and was now
reduced to around eighty, through casualties and men lost as prisoners. There
was little more his tiny force could achieve and as the battalion of IR55 on
his flank began to retreat he ordered his men away down the eastern slopes of
the plateau.
The odds were now stacked against Kamenski’s resolute
brigade as more French troops approached the Pratzeberg. Released by Vandamme,
the 43ème Ligne moved to rejoin Saint-Hilaire’s division and Boyé’s brigade of
cavalry (5ème and 8ème Dragons) was also on its way to add their support. The
weight of French numbers now began to tell on the Russian line. On his left,
the threat of an attack on his open flank by the French dragoons forced
Kamenski to wheel back the extreme left-hand battalion of the Ryazan
Musketeers. Having soaked up all the preceding Russian attacks, Saint-Hilaire,
judging that the time was right, ordered the French line forward, in what
turned out to be the decisive charge. This time Kamenski’s men had little left
to offer as the French poured forward over ‘ground strewn with the dead’,
leaving no wounded Russians in their wake, capturing the Russian battalion
artillery and retaking the highpoint of the Pratzeberg. Yet even in this moment
of victory on the Pratzeberg the Russians inflicted another notable casualty:
Saint-Hilaire was wounded and forced to retire to Puntowitz to have his wound
dressed.
Having arrived back at Sokolnitz, Langeron sent for General
Maior Olsufiev, who was fighting in the village and informed him of the need to
send reinforcements to the plateau. The only troops immediately to hand were
the two battalions of the Kursk Musketeers, held in reserve just outside
Sokolnitz. With no time to lose, Langeron directed these to the plateau. He
then attempted to extract his other battalions from the village but only
succeeded in pulling back 8. Jäger and the Vyborg Musketeers. The remaining
battalion of Kursk Musketeers and the Permsk Musketeer Regiment, now so completely
entangled with III Column and its battle for the village, could not be
withdrawn. But even as the two Kursk battalions began their march, unknown to
them, they were marching to their destruction.
Kutuzov recognised that any further resistance by Kamenski’s
brigade, after two hours fighting, would lead to their total destruction, so he
ordered the retreat. Abandoning the plateau, they descended the south-eastern
slopes to the valley of the Littawa, where they reformed. All along the valley
other Allied units that had been driven off the plateau took up defensive
positions or retreated to better ground. Before he left the plateau, Kutuzov
despatched a hurried note to Buxhöwden, who still had not moved, ordering him
to extract his three Columns from their bottleneck and retire. Soult’s two
divisions were complete masters of the Pratzen Plateau, having swept away
Allied IV Column along with Kamenski’s brigade of II Column by the sheer
determination of their attacks. The time was probably around noon when, into this
killing ground, marched the two lone battalions of the Kursk Musketeers, sent
from Sokolnitz.
Believing the troops ahead of them to be Russian, they
approached confidently but as they closed, Thiébault turned his exhausted men
to face them and another firefight exploded. At the same time, Lavasseur’s
brigade of Legrand’s division (IV Corps), which was occupying Kobelnitz,
marched southwards presenting a possible flank threat to the Kursk battalions.
To combat this move, the Podolsk Musketeers, part of III Column reserve,
advanced to oppose them. Even without this intervention, the French troops on
the Pratzeberg were in overwhelming numbers and soon began to surround the
isolated Kursk battalions, who fought on for a while before collapsing amidst
massive losses.
The victorious Thiébault, now mounted on his third horse – a
small grey liberated from a captured Russian artillery limber – surveyed the
destruction all around him. His own brigade had lost about a third of its
strength, while another of his regimental commanders, Houdard de Lamotte of the
36ème Ligne, joined the growing list of wounded.
While this final struggle to clear the Allies from the
Pratzen Plateau had reached its climax, elsewhere on the battlefield matters
were also coming to a bloody conclusion.
Grand Duke Constantine, at the head of the Imperial Guard,
had received no orders since a request arrived for him to send a battalion of
infantry up onto the plateau. Since then his Guard Jäger had fallen back from
Blasowitz, along with a supporting battalion of Semeyonovsk Guards. With only
limited military experience, Constantine considered his options. To his right,
masses of French infantry and cavalry were pressing aggressively towards
Bagration, while to his left the Austrian cavalry, which had offered some
protection on that flank, were withdrawing, having temporarily held back the
advance of a massed infantry formation (Rivaud’s division of Bernadotte’s I
Corps). Further to the left, up on the plateau, he could see that the French
were driving back at least part of IV Column. Having surveyed the position,
Constantine elected to pull back to his left rear (south-east), towards the
Austrian cavalry and hopefully a junction with a reforming IV Column somewhere
near Krzenowitz. At around 11.30am he turned his force, deploying the Guard
Jäger as a flank guard.
In fact, he had not moved very far when he realised that the
French troops previously held in check by the Austrian cavalry were now slowly
advancing towards him. Up until now, Bernadotte had shown a marked reluctance
to move forward since he crossed the stream at Jirschikowitz earlier that
morning. Napoleon sent his aide, de Ségur, to ensure that Bernadotte carried
out his orders, but the imperial messenger found the commander of I Corps agitated
and anxious. Bernadotte indicated the Austrian cavalry to his front and
bemoaned the fact that he had no cavalry of his own with which to oppose them,
begging de Ségur to return to Napoleon and obtain some for him. De Ségur did as
he requested but Napoleon had none to offer. However, now that the Austrian
cavalry had withdrawn, Bernadotte cautiously advanced his corps, Rivaud edging
slowing forward between the plateau and with Blasowitz to his left front, while
Drouet led his division onto the lower slopes of the plateau in support of
Vandamme.
Aware now of this forward movement, Constantine halted the
Guard and faced them to confront this new threat. Behind him, the single bridge
over the Rausnitz stream represented a very dangerous bottleneck. To gain time
for his crossing, Constantine decided to strike a blow at the advancing French
in an attempt to halt their advance. Forming the two Guard fusilier battalions
from both the Preobrazhensk and Semeyonovsk Regiments for the attack, he held
back the battalion of Izmailovsk Guards in reserve and organised the cavalry in
a supporting role. Hohenlohe’s three Austrian cavalry regiments took up
positions protecting the left and right rear of the Russian Guard: 5.
Nassau-Kürassiere to the left with 1. Kaiser and 7. Lotheringen-Küirassiere to
the right. The four battalions leading the attack advanced with much
confidence, roaring ‘Oorah! Oorah! Oorah!’ and when still 300 paces from the
opposing French line, they broke into a run that their officers were unable to
control. Although facing a withering barrage of musketry, the Russian guardsmen
did not halt and smashed straight through the first line of massed skirmishers,
pushing them back onto a formed second line of infantry, which they attacked
with the bayonet. These too gave way, but although elated with their success,
the Russian attack ground to a halt and when French artillery opened up on them
they began to fall back in disorder. But the threatening presence of the
Russian Guard cavalry prevented any attempt at pursuit and kept Rivaud’s
division firmly anchored to the spot.
Up on the plateau, Maréchal Soult studied the ground, now
that Vandamme had cleared Miloradovitch’s men from his front. He noticed the
movement of a large body of troops from high ground near Blasowitz towards the
Rausnitz stream, imagining them some of Lannes’ men moving to cut off the
Allied retreat, but then, near Krzenowitz they turned and headed west. The
movement puzzled him and he ordered Vandamme to send a battalion out to the left
flank of the division to observe it. Selecting 1/4ème Ligne, Vandamme sent
their commanding officer, Major Auguste Bigarré, at their head to investigate,
detailing his own ADC, Vincent, to accompany him. The undulations of the
plateau hid the lower ground from view and Bigarré had advanced about 1,200
yards when Vincent, who preceded him with a few scouts, came galloping back and
warned him of the presence of a large body of enemy cavalry. Bigarré instructed
the battalion to move to its left and then returned with Vincent to see the
enemy formation for himself. As he approached the vantage point, five squadrons
of Russian cavalry began to accelerate towards his battalion that now moved
into view. Bigarré and Vincent galloped back to the battalion and hurried it
into square to receive the inescapable charge.
The Russian Guard cavalry had kept a watchful eye on their
infantry as it fell back from the French lines, which presented a formidable
obstacle to a cavalry attack. But then, descending from the plateau, a lone
infantry battalion appeared. As the cavalry moved towards this tempting target,
the battalion scrambled into square formation. The cavalry halted at what
Bigarré described as long musket range, and instead of charging, unmasked a
battery of six guns, which opened canister fire on the square, creating havoc
in the packed ranks. Observing this from the high ground, Vandamme ordered the
two battalions of 24ème Légère forward to support the 1/4ème, but they were too
late, for the cavalry was already on the move.
Considering that the artillery had done enough damage to the
square, two of the five squadrons of Horse Guards charged. The leading squadron
rode into a hail of musketry and veered away, but the second squadron reached
the square before the men had time to reload and smashed their way in, hacking
and slashing at the infantry, who defended themselves furiously. The squadron
swept right through the square, turned and rode back though it again.
Two previous bearers of the 1/4ème’s eagle standard already
lay dead on the ground: now, gripped desperately by the battalion’s sergeant
major, a soldier of twelve years’ experience named Saint-Cyr, it was under
attack again. Three horsemen surrounded him and hacked it from his grasp
leaving him with five sabre wounds to the head and right hand. By now the
1/4ème had collapsed and those still standing were fleeing back towards the
plateau leaving about 200 dead and wounded on the ground. The two squadrons of
Horse Guards retired eastwards to reform. Even before the battalion
disintegrated, the 24ème Légère arrived, advancing in line. The remaining three
Horse Guard squadrons spurred forward, and despite receiving a close range
volley, smashed through the thin infantry line and sent them reeling backwards
too. In the confusion and panic that followed, a soldier of the 1/4ème picked
up a fallen eagle standard of 24ème Légère believing it to belong to his
battalion and carried it to safety. It was now perhaps around noon as Napoleon
arrived on the Pratzen Plateau to oversee the next moves.
Napoléon at the Battle of Austerlitz, by François Gérard (Galerie des Batailles, Versailles)
No sooner had he arrived than those accompanying him
observed a great dark mass of men coming towards the plateau in some disorder.
Maréchal Berthier commented, ‘what a splendid crowd of prisoners they are
bringing back for you.’ But Napoleon was not so sure and ordered one of his
aides, Général de brigade Jean Rapp, to investigate. Leading two squadrons of
the Chasseurs à cheval of the Garde Impériale, supported by a squadron of the
Grenadiers à cheval and a half squadron of the Mameluks, Rapp advanced down
from the plateau towards the site of the Russian Guard cavalry attacks. As soon
as he cleared the plateau he saw that:
‘The cavalry was in the midst of our squares and was
cutting down our soldiers. A little to the rear we could see the masses of
infantry and cavalry which formed the enemy reserve. The Russians broke contact
and rushed against me, while four pieces of their horse artillery come up at
the gallop and unlimbered. I advanced in good order, with brave Colonel Morland
on my left, and [Chef d’Escadron] Dahlmann to my right. I told my men: “Over
there you can see our brothers and friends being trodden underfoot. Avenge our
comrades! Avenge our standards!”’
Rapp led his Guard cavalry straight towards the Russian Horse
Guard squadrons that had just cut up 24ème Légère. The Russians, disordered by
their attack on the infantry, turned away and galloped off after a brief
struggle leaving the chasseurs à cheval to ride on into the ranks of the
reforming Preobrazhensk and Semeyonovsk Guard battalions, as these infantrymen
defended themselves with the bayonet. The French cavalry soon received support
from the half squadron of Mameluks, who slashed their way into the ranks of the
Preobrazhensk battalions, currently dispersed as skirmishers in the vineyards
and already engaged with Rapp’s chasseurs. But now Rapp’s formations were
disordered and Constantine took the opportunity to send in the leading three
squadrons of the Russian Chevalier Garde to break their attack and free his
beleaguered infantry. The charge met with success, causing Rapp to withdraw and
reform while allowing the Russian battalions to draw back. But their respite
was brief, as the rest of the French Garde Impériale cavalry now joined Rapp.
The great cavalry battle – Imperial Guard against Imperial Guard – that
followed is difficult to recount in much detail from the accounts that survive.
Indeed one observer, Coignet, a soldier in the Grenadiers à Pied of Napoleon’s
Guard, described how: ‘For a quarter of an hour there was a desperate struggle,
and that quarter of an hour seemed to us an age. We could see nothing through
the smoke and dust.’
The Russian Guard cavalry drawn from the Horse Guards,
Chevalier Garde and Guard Cossacks mustered about 1,800 men – the Guard Hussars
appear not to have become directly involved in the fighting. Against them the
French Garde mustered about 1,100 men, from the Chasseurs à cheval, Grenadiers
à cheval and Mameluks. Although short on numbers, the well-disciplined French
cavalry were able to withdraw from the fighting and fall back on their nearest
infantry formations, reorganise and re-enter the fray in formed bodies. The
Russians did not have this luxury, as their own Guard infantry battalions were
caught up in the mêlée and unable to fire for fear of shooting their own
horsemen. It became clear that the French were gaining the upper hand and
Russian casualties mounted alarmingly, particularly in the Chevalier Garde. In
particular, the fourth squadron of this elite formation was all but destroyed –
only eighteen men reputedly making good their escape – and its wounded
commander, Prince Repnin-Volkonsky, captured and presented to Napoleon.
Russian reports claim that the Chevalier Garde lost sixteen
officers, 200 men and 300 horses killed and wounded. The Guards battalions
extracted themselves from the maelstrom and fell back on the support of the
Izmailovsk battalion, then all continued back towards Krzenowitz. The battered
Russian cavalry also broke off the engagement and fell back too, their retreat
protected by the Guard Hussars who hovered threateningly to the north, and the
stand made by Hohenlohe’s three Austrian cavalry regiments. The belated
appearance above Krzenowitz of the three battalions of Russian Guard
Grenadiers, numbering almost 2,000 men, but suggesting to the French the
arrival of a new strong Russian formation, limited any further significant
advance in this direction.
While the great cavalry battle to their front delayed
Rivaud’s movements further, Drouet had finally led his division up onto the
plateau to the rear of Vandamme. The retreating battalion of 4ème Ligne, which
had fled back onto the plateau and streamed past Napoleon without stopping,
eventually rallied when they rejoined Vandamme’s division, and despite their
recent traumas, took an active part in the latter stages of the battle, unaware
they had lost an eagle.
With the Pratzen Plateau secured by the gradual arrival of
Bernadotte’s corps, Napoleon turned his back on the northern flank. It was now
clear that his grand plan to swing Lannes and Murat unopposed into the rear of
the Austro-Russian army had failed, but it was also clear that the attacks by
Saint-Hilaire and Vandamme had split the Allied army in two. Leaving Lannes and
Murat to drive Bagration back, Napoleon issued new orders that he hoped would
lead to the destruction of the left wing of the Allied army, which still
remained locked in the Goldbach valley.
On the extreme right of the Allied line, General Maior
Prince Bagration, like Constantine, received no fresh instructions from army
headquarters. His original orders, which he viewed with little enthusiasm,
required him to hold his position until, becoming aware of progress by the
Allied left wing, he was to advance directly ahead and, initially, capture the
Santon. Accordingly, he had pushed forward at about 10.00am but encountered
extremely strong and determined opposition from Lannes’ V Corps and Murat’s
cavalry. His attempt on the Santon had failed and now the French cavalry had
pushed his own horsemen back after a series of ferocious mêlées. The French had
secured the village of Blasowitz and the Russian Imperial Guard appeared to be
moving further away, cutting his last tenuous link with the rest of the army.
Bagration abandoned any offensive plans and looked to the preservation of his
command.
With the Russian cavalry driven back behind their infantry
to reform once more, Lannes ordered his two infantry divisions forward: Suchet
on the left, Caffarelli on the right. In the face of this advancing wall of
infantry, Bagration ordered all eighteen guns of his battalion artillery to
open fire, along with twelve from a horse artillery battery. The brunt of this
bombardment fell on the 34ème and 40ème Ligne of Suchet’s division and 30ème
Ligne from Caffarelli’s, while also mortally wounding GB Valhubert, who
commanded a brigade in Suchet’s second line.
With the French infantry brought to a halt by this concentrated
firepower, Lannes drew all his available artillery together and focused on
knocking out the Russian guns. The more powerful French artillery came out on
top in this duel and after a deadly exchange, the Russian horse battery was
forced to withdraw with mounting casualties, leaving just the Russian battalion
guns to support the infantry against the increasing threat. Lannes pushed his
infantry on once more but now Suchet’s division became the target for a series
of desperate cavalry charges by Bagration’s reformed horsemen.
However, assailed by musketry, canister fire and then French
cavalry countercharges, all they could manage was to slow this advance.
Caffarelli’s division, operating south of the Brünn-Olmütz road, encountered
less opposition and pushed ahead of Suchet’s men to threaten Bagration’s left
flank, secured on the villages of Krug and Holubitz. In fact, the garrison of
these villages was not strong, both defended by the men of 6. Jäger under
General Maior Ulanius – who had already suffered considerably at Schöngrabern –
with recovering cavalry formations to their rear. Sometime around noon, GB
Demont’s brigade (17ème and 30ème Ligne) and part of Général de brigade
Debilly’s brigade (61ème Ligne), advanced determinedly against the two villages.
Up until now the jäger had managed to repulse any French
cavalry showing an interest in their position, but heavily outnumbered by
Caffarelli’s infantry – and despite an initial stout resistance – French troops
drove 6. Jäger out at the point of the bayonet. However, despite a lack of
support, Ulanius did manage to extricate some of his men and reach safety.
With the villages of Krug and Holubitz now in French hands,
Caffarelli redirected 17ème and 30ème Ligne against the left flank of Bagration’s
threatened line. To oppose them the Russian commander sent his reserve
infantry, the Arkhangelogord Musketeer Regiment, commanded by General Maior
Nikolai Kamenski II. Although the French and Russian infantry were fairly
evenly matched, the French were always able to bring up supporting cavalry and
artillery to disrupt the Russian lines whenever their own infantry fell back to
reform for a fresh assault. At times the Arkhangelogord Musketeers were under
attack from all sides, and at one point faced a charge by d’Hautpoul’s 5ème
Cuirassier, suffering horrendous casualties in the process. This regiment,
which marched into battle with about 2,000 men, later showed losses of 1,625.
Kamenski II had his horse shot from under him and only escaped capture when another
officer gave up his own mount.
With Suchet’s division pressing him more and more from the
front, Caffarelli making inroads on his left flank and Murat’s cavalry ready to
exploit any opportunity, Bagration gave the order to retreat. Despite constant
French cavalry attacks, the Russian infantry held together, supported by
self-sacrificing charges by the exhausted Russian horsemen, and fell back
steadily, abandoning the road to Austerlitz and reoccupying the high ground
north of the Posoritz post house. However, this constant pressure eventually
caused a split and the Russian cavalry of V Column, commanded by
General-Adjutant Uvarov broke away. In his report Uvarov wrote:
‘we continued to fight with fervour, from which the
losses on both sides were substantial. At the same time artillery and infantry
of the enemy, moving on my flanks, opened such a fire that even with all the
courage of the regiments which were under my command, we had to retreat across
the river situated behind us.’
Podpolkovnik Ermolov of the horse artillery recalled the
confusion that then prevailed:
‘Our losses multiplied even more when the men crowded
together at the very boggy stream, over which there were very few bridges, and
it was not possible to cross it in any other way than via a bridge. Here our
fleeing cavalry plunged in wading, and a lot of men and horses drowned, while
I, abandoned by the regiments to which I was assigned, stopped my battery,
attempting by the means of a short range action to stop the cavalry pursuing us.
The first pieces of ordnance that I was able to release from the press of our
own cavalry, making several shots, were captured, my men were cut down and I
was captured as a prisoner. The division of General-Adjutant Uvarov, crowding
at the bridge, had the time to look around and see that it was running away
from a force small in number and that the majority of the forces were
concentrated on the heights and were not coming down into the valley. Those who
pursued us were then forced to retreat and exterminated, and my freedom was
returned to me shortly, when I was already close to the French line.’
When Ermolov returned and crossed the Rausnitz stream he
found Uvarov’s command still in great disarray at the foot of the hill held by
the Russian Guard Grenadiers. With them now stood the tsar, prompting Ermolov
to observe that ‘there were no confidants present, on his face there was a look
of supreme grief, and his eyes were filled with tears.’
Bagration continued his withdrawal in the face of ceaseless
French cavalry attacks and artillery bombardment, drawing back across the
Brünn-Olmütz road onto high ground overlooking it between Welleschowitz and
Rausnitz. The Pavlograd Hussars suffered at the hands of the French cavalry as
they protected this final move, but their sacrifice gained enough time for
Bagration to take up this new position. Lannes and Murat now advanced to occupy
the position abandoned by Bagration north of the Posoritz post house and found
themselves in possession of row upon row of Russian knapsacks. It was the habit
of the Russian soldier to take off his knapsack before entering battle to allow
more freedom of movement, leaving behind him all his meagre personal
belongings. But if the French soldiers expected to find luxuries and warm clothing
they were disappointed. Captaine Lejeune, Berthier’s ADC, reported that each
bag contained only:
‘triptych reliquaries, each containing an image of St
Christopher carrying the infant Saviour over the water, with an equal number of
pieces of black bread containing a good deal more straw and bran than barley or
wheat. Such was the sacred and simple baggage of the Russians!’
Bagration must have been wondering just how long he could
continue to hold his force together against these constant French attacks when
help arrived. Advancing down the road from Olmütz with all speed appeared an
Austrian artillery officer, Major Frierenberger, at the head of a column of
twelve guns. As he came level with Welleschowitz he turned off and positioned
his guns on the high ground rising to the north of the road. The official
Austrian account of the incident continues the story:
‘The army he faced was a victorious one. It had deployed
at the Posoritz post house, and was now in full advance, firing with its
powerful artillery against whatever Russian troops and batteries came into
view. The Austrian battery now opened up in its turn against the main battery
of the French and their leading troops. The Austrians shot with such
extraordinary skill that they compelled the enemy to pull back their batteries
in a matter of minutes. Some of the hostile pieces were silenced altogether,
and the advance of the whole French left wing was held back.’
The battle on the northern flank now ground to a halt.
Lannes and Murat had expected an almost unopposed advance but became embroiled
in a lengthy and costly duel that had lasted almost three hours. In the face of
the resolute defence now offered by these fresh Austrian guns, with their own
ammunition supplies almost completely expended and their cavalry exhausted, the
two corps forming the French left wing halted, and like Bernadotte’s I Corps,
awaited developments elsewhere on the battlefield.
Granted this unexpected respite, the survivors of
Bagration’s Army Advance Guard and to the south, IV and V Columns, and the
Russian Guard, did what they could to instil some sense of order in their
greatly depleted ranks. These latter formations nervously occupied the eastern
bank of the Rausnitz stream, anticipating a renewed French assault at any moment,
but it never came. Napoleon saw a greater prize elsewhere.
* Captured Russian cavalry officer to Lieutenant Octave
Levasseur, of the French horse artillery, 2 December 1805.
