It quickly became apparent in the first period of the war
that logistics was the least thought-through element of Soviet military theory.
Rear services (i.e., logistic) units were cumbersome, immobile, and unable to
adapt to fluid conditions. Planning was fragmented, ineffective, and often
disconnected from the operational concept it was supposed to support.
Some Principles of Logistic Support
By the end of the second period of the war, the Red Army was
realizing in practice the demands of theory, conducting progressively deeper
operations at a steadily rising tempo.37 During the third period, these
operations were planned to achieve their goal in two to three weeks, though if
they were developing successfully, provision was made for a transition to
subsequent operations without any (or only the briefest) operational pause.
Characteristically, an operation would start with a fierce battle—expensive in
men, materiel, ammunition, and fuel—to penetrate the tactical zone of defense.
Once the breakthrough had been achieved and the participating armies were
conducting exploitation, logistic demands would fall dramatically, reflecting
the reduced effectiveness of the defense (although there would be occasional
smaller peaks in expenditure as enemy reinforcements arrived or obstacles had
to be forced in the operational depth). The exploitation phase of the operation
would not develop linearly. Rather, the breaching of the once continuous front
line would lead to very fluid, dynamic combat spread over a considerable area.
Formations would thrust deep into the enemy’s operational rear, bypassing
centres of resistance, and the Germans would endeavor to cut off and destroy
the spearheads, even as these were seeking to complete an encirclement or
destroy retreating forces in parallel pursuit. Sudden, dramatic changes in the
situation, with shifts in emphasis from one axis to another or even sometimes
from attack to defense, would be common. In such circumstances, attrition would
not take place relatively evenly across a defined front. Rather, there would be
areas of intense but localized fighting and destruction and large passive
sectors where logistic demands would be much lighter. The traditional logistic
system would not be appropriate for such a battle space. Forward divisions or
corps could not indent for supplies and collect them from dumps in secure rear
areas, nor could they evacuate their casualties and damaged equipment rearward
to semistatic hospitals and workshops. Formations would be unable to rely on
constant resupply and would have to live off mobile stocks for at least a few
days at a time. Medical and repair facilities would have to move well forward
and set up in the areas that had seen heavy fighting and where casualties were
concentrated. This understanding of the nature of combat led to the adoption of
some principles of logistics that were contrary to Western understanding and
practice.
The bulk of logistic assets was held at army and front
levels. Such centralized control was seen as essential to operational
flexibility. Centralized control enabled operational-level commanders to tailor
their logistic allocations to conform to the importance of the mission, their
forces’ strength, and the ground allocated to their subordinate formations.
Commanders of higher formations who were familiar with the overall operational
concept and situation could quickly shift resources from burned-out, stalled,
or merely less successful divisions, corps, and armies and reallocate them to
others that were making better progress. They also held transport reserves with
which they could reinforce success and ensure that it did not become ephemeral
because of insufficient supply to exploit it. Changing the emphasis from one
axis to another would be far more difficult and slower in a decentralized
system in which the “ownership” of transport and supplies was jealously
guarded, whatever the operational vision of the higher commander.38
It was the responsibility of the higher commander to keep
his subordinates supplied in accordance with the demands of the operational
situation. The basic concept of resupply was not, in other words, “demand
pull,” which in the first period of the war had resulted in excessive
expenditure on less important missions, to the detriment of the main effort. It
became one of “supply push,” whereby consumption rates were laid down by the
front for each stage of an operation in accordance with the priorities it had
established; allocations changed as and when the exigencies of battle led to
modification of plans. This concept of forward delivery was easy to implement,
as the bulk of transport was controlled at the operational level. Thus, a
divisional transport company possessed only 45 trucks, a combined-arms army’s
three to four battalions had up to 600, and a front’s three to five regiments
mustered 3,500 to 4,500. This made it easier to switch emphasis between axes,
open a new one, or simply cope with ever-lengthening lines of communication by
re-allocating front assets according to shifting priorities. The system also
enabled shortcuts to ensure a speedy response to pressing needs: for instance,
tank army trucks could skip an echelon by delivering direct to brigades,
bypassing corps. The system was hard on units and formations that were
achieving success but only on a secondary axis; it was even harder on those
that ran into difficulties and were accordingly de-prioritized. But it ensured
the economical use of both stocks and transport in furthering the operational
aim.
Successful operations inevitably ran into problems as supply
lines lengthened, turnaround times and breakdowns increased, and cargo capacity
ran short. Air resuppply could provide limited lift in an emergency, but
suitable aircraft were lacking for any major, sustained effort. The Red Army
insisted that formations improvise with self-help measures rather than simply
relying on the senior commander to repair deficiencies. Some artillery units,
for instance, had to give up their prime movers, and motorized infantry their
trucks (riding instead on the tanks and SAUs). There was often large-scale
reliance on impressing local animal-drawn transport. A typical example happened
in the L’vov-Sandomir Operation when Third Guards Army’s dirt-road supply line
to its railhead grew from 60 to 200 km (37 to 125 miles) between 20 July and 1
August; it supplemented its resources with around 7,000 supply-days of farm
horses and carts. Thirteenth Army had much the same experience, and in each
case 1 Ukrainian Front allocated 200 to 220 trucks from its reserve to assist until
a new railhead could open at Rava-Russkaya.39 On occasion, peasants were
compelled to carry artillery rounds or roll fuel barrels from one village to
the next; Fifty-Third Army of 2 Ukrainian Front used locals and the personnel
of a reserve rifle regiment to carry 340 tonnes of shells when it looked like
the batteries would run short.
As with transport, most other rear services were
centralized. Tactical formations held only enough organic rear services units
to cope with routine, light combat situations. This conferred two advantages.
With light logistic tails, they were more agile and maneuverable than if they
had been encumbered with masses of vulnerable noncombat vehicles and personnel.
It also ensured that specialist and scarce service support elements were used
economically and to maximum effect. For instance, there was no point in giving
a rifle division the means to deal with high levels of casualties if it was in
reserve or deployed on a passive sector; a small medical battalion would
suffice for day-to-day needs. If, however, that division and the rest of its
corps were advancing in the expectation of carrying out an opposed river
crossing in the near future, army and, if necessary, front would ensure the
concentration of sufficient resources from their medical reserves to cope with
the anticipated flow of casualties. The same applied to the recovery and
restoration of damaged equipment. Mobile corps possessed enough technical
support to cope with routine maintenance and some breakdowns. When they were
committed to battle, higher-echelon recovery and repair units were directed to
the area of the most intense fighting to collect and then repair damaged
hardware in situ.
Calculating and Meeting Requirements for Supply
The Red Army made sustained and, in time, largely successful
efforts to calculate and then update operational and battlefield norms, which
if implemented effectively, would increase the chances of success.40 By the
summer of 1943, they were generally successful in assessing the material needs
of offensive operations. Plainly, these were determined by the strength of the
formation, the scope and duration of its mission, and the level of resistance
encountered. However, on average, front requirements in 1944 were assessed as
follows: 3.5 to 4.0 units of fire per artillery weapon, tank, or SAU; four to
six refills for vehicles and fifteen to twenty for aircraft fuel;41 and fifteen
to twenty-five daily rations per soldier and horse. To achieve such an
accumulation of supply, three to four weeks preparation time was allowed (a
lengthy period that posed challenges to the maskirovka plan). To give an idea
of the sheer volume and weight involved in such a buildup, the preparations of
1 Belorussian Front for the Belorussian Operation can be used as an example.
The front amassed 2.5 to 7.7 units of fire (depending on caliber), four to
seven refills for its vehicles and aircraft, and ten to fifteen days of food
and forage. Moving these stocks required 17,939 rail wagons (the four fronts
together needed 44,111 wagonloads). In the event, the operation exceeded its
planned scope, as did its successors, and an additional 15,518 wagonloads were
dispatched to Rokossovskiy’s front to sustain combat into August (the four
together receiving 48,280).42 Accumulating the logistic resources required to
accomplish front near missions required much work on infrastructure (which,
like movements, had to be concealed) and impressive staff work, bearing in mind
the simultaneous concentrations of troops and equipment. These problems,
however, paled in comparison with the difficulties of supplying formations once
the centre of gravity had shifted into the operational depth in pursuit of
distant missions.
At issue was the rear services’ ability to keep pace with
the tempo of the advance. The most efficient, most rapid means of moving large
quantities of fuel and ammunition was by rail. Of course, the retreating
Germans, whenever they were given the opportunity, did their usually efficient
best to rip up track and demolish bridges. As the Soviets advanced, each
front’s Directorate for Reconstruction and Obstacle Work used its three to four
railway brigades and two to three mechanized battalions to restore one or two
lines. By 1944, the rate of repair work had doubled compared with the second
period and averaged 7 to 12 km (4 to 7 miles) of track per day; the rate was
only 3 to 5 km (2 to 3 miles) per day through areas where the enemy had
prepared defenses but went up to 20 km (12 miles) in the operational depth.
Higher rates were a consequence of deploying more resources and also of an
increased tempo in the advance. Combined-arms armies on principal axes averaged
around 8 to 10 km (5 to 6 miles) per day in the L’vov-Sandomir Operation, 12 to
18 km (7 to 11 miles) in the Belorussian Operation, and 16 to 20 km (10 to 12
miles) in the Yassi-Kishinev Operation. In those same operations, tank armies
averaged 23 to 27 km (14 to 16 miles), 22 to 30 km (13 to 18 miles), and 44 km
(27 miles) per day, respectively, but with maximum daily rates up to twice
those figures. The higher the rate of advance and the more active the Red Air
Force, the more the enemy was deprived of the opportunity and time to inflict
serious damage on the transport infrastructure and the faster rehabilitation
proceeded. However, bridge repair, especially over sizable rivers, usually
lagged days behind the reconstruction of track and accounted for the uneven
pace of restoration between fronts. Moreover, getting a railway up and running
at even minimal capacity involved more than the physical restoration of lines;
stations, refueling facilities, signaling and communications, and other
essential infrastructure features had to be provided. The switch from broad
gauge to standard gauge further complicated matters once the offensive
penetrated into East Prussia and Poland.
In the more successful operations of the third period,
mobile formations advanced 300 to 350 km (185 to 220 miles) within ten to
fourteen days—almost double that in the thrust from the Vistula to the Oder. Higher-formation
dumps were left far behind. It would usually be many weeks before each front
would achieve the required level of development for a forward relocation of its
stocks and thus a continuation of the offensive on its axis: that is, it would
have to make operational a couple of lines going forward and two or three
laterally, together totaling 800 to 1,500 km (500 to 930 miles) of track and
carrying forty to fifty trains a day. During the course of the initial
operation, a front would work to restore one or two lines with an early
capacity of eight to fourteen pairs of trains each day. Where conditions were
favorable, such as on 3 Belorussian Front’s sector in Belorussia, railheads
could catch up to within 70 to 130 km (40 to 80 miles) from the line of
contact. Where conditions were less benign, as in the sectors of 2 and 1
Belorussian Fronts, the lag could be 150 to 380 km (90 to 235 miles) and more.
Thus, rail transport generally played only a limited role in sustaining
operations in the enemy’s depth. The Yassi-Kishinev Operation was an exception.
There, the railway lines were taken virtually intact, and in their swift
offensive into Romania, 2 and 3 Ukrainian Fronts captured about 2,000
locomotives and 56,000 wagons, enabling them to exploit standard-gauge railways
from the outset; this contributed to the depth of advance achieved by Sixth
Tank Army between 20 August and 25 September—about 1,000 km (620 miles).
The number of mechanized and motorized formations and units
in the Red Army grew continuously as the war progressed. Operations developed
increasing tempo and depth and became more complex and harder to predict, with
their switches of axes and uneven evolution. There was therefore an increasing
reliance on motor transport for logistic support at the operational level as a
supplement to and, for lengthy periods, a substitute for the railways. Prompt
road repair and maintenance were vital. Front Road Directorates controlled
twelve to fifteen separate road-building and maintenance battalions and four to
five bridge-building battalions. These were used for the creation of military
roads going forward to army rear boundaries; there would be two or three roads
on the most important axes, each some 300 to 400 km (185 to 250 miles) long, or
sometimes longer in highly successful operations.43 Much attention was devoted
not only to the engineering side but also to the efficient organization of
command and control and the provision of refueling and vehicle recovery and
maintenance points.
The greatest challenge facing motor transport troops was to
ensure the uninterrupted resupply of tank armies and their subordinate elements
during rapidly evolving, dynamic operations in the enemy’s depth. A tank army’s
rear services were organized in two echelons. The first, tactical, mobile
echelon followed directly behind the combat units. The second, lacking
mobility, comprised the army dumps, which remained static until a reduced tempo
or an operational pause enabled forward redeployment. Typically, tactical
supplies on wheels would be divided as follows: ammunition—1 unit of fire
carried on each combat vehicle or prime mover and by each soldier for small
arms, with another 0.25 in unit, brigade, and corps transport, for a total of
1.75 units of fire;44 fuel—1 fill per vehicle, with another 0.5 refill in both
unit and brigade transport and a third at corps; food—two daily rations carried
by each man, with two to three in unit and three to four in brigade transport
and an additional four to five at corps, enough for eleven to fourteen days.
Army dumps usually held 1 to 1.5 units of fire, two to four refills, and
fifteen to twenty rations to replenish mobile stocks. However, experience soon
showed that the fighting troops could exhaust their stocks of fuel and, more
rarely, ammunition before they could be replaced. To ensure against this and
the possibility of a new mission being assigned for which supply had not been
budgeted, more flexibility was needed. Extra transport was provided so that
army dumps could form a mobile echelon and act as an emergency reserve for the
immediate delivery of fuel. And as corps’ rear became separated from army dumps
by much more than 100 km (60 miles), the latter formed advanced sections or
delivered direct to brigades, bypassing the corps level in the interest of
time. With deeper advances, army resources increasingly failed to guarantee
continuous resupply, and the front responded by either reinforcing the most
important formations with extra motor vehicles or delivering direct to corps.
Once supplies had to be hauled over distances of 500 to 600
km (310 to 370 miles) or more between front dumps and the troops in contact—a
round-trip of four or five days—fronts had generally reached their culminating
point. Even before that point was reached, army operations frequently suffered
from enforced, temporary pauses as their logistic support failed to keep up.
For instance, Third Guards Tank and Fourth Tank Armies failed to take L’vov
from the line of march on 19 July when distance, congestion, and bad roads in
the Koltuv corridor, together with high consumption rates, combined to create
ammunition and especially fuel deficiencies. In the Vistula-Oder Operation,
Second Guards Tank Army was halted, at one time or another, for a total of five
days during the sixteen-day operation. Even if the advance was not brought to a
complete halt, armies could be forced to check one of their corps, or corps to
check one or two of their brigades, until more fuel could be brought up. Thus,
on 25 January in the Vistula-Oder Operation, Third Guards Tank Army’s 9
Mechanized Corps had to limit its advance to two brigades; in the same
operation, Fourth Tank Army was able to employ only a single tank brigade in
its forcing of the Oder. On occasion, a continuation of the advance became
possible, even though the system was failing, because significant stocks of
fuel were captured. In the Lublin-Brest Operation, more than 30 percent of
Second Tank Army’s consumption consisted of such trophy fuel, as did 25 percent
of Second Guards Tank Army’s in advancing from the Vistula to the Oder. Such a
development was, of course, more likely when surprise and, in consequence, a
high tempo of advance were achieved. In the Yassi-Kishinev Operation, Sixth
Tank Army captured the Ploiesti oil fields and refineries intact, and a further
advance of more than 500 km (300 miles) by 2 Ukrainian Front was sustained by
laying a 225 km (140 mile) pipeline. Of course, such windfalls were only that;
they could not be factored into planning.
