At more or less the same time, United Nations
Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar undertook a lightning familiarization tour
of the affected countries, spending two days in Pretoria before flying north to
Luanda where he was personally received by Angolan President José Eduardo dos
Santos, and later introduced to Sam Nujoma, whom he referred to on the steps of
the presidential palace as “the representative of the Namibian people”. This,
of course, all combined to increase the sense in Pretoria that the entire
negotiated process was stacked against South Africa, which was probably not the
case in practical terms but in moral terms it certainly was.
Likewise, the threat of a more direct Soviet intervention on
the side of Angola appeared to be growing as the scale and severity of South
African operations grew. Demands for the removal of the semi-permanent garrison
of South African troops in Xangongo and Ongiva were also frequently being
heard, not least from the Americans who, as much as they did not want to commit
troops to the theatre themselves, also did not want the Soviets to have any
excuse to do so. It was impossible, of course, to hide the fact that the South
Africans were planning something. The pace of air reconnaissance flights over
any given area in Angola could always be regarded as fair warning of that, and
as South African aircraft began to appear with greater frequency in the skies
over southern Angola in preparation for Operation Askari, Moscow issued a quiet
warning to Pretoria that an expansion of the war, such as might be about to
take place, would carry with it a significant risks for South Africa.
The warning came in the form of a written dispatch handed to
South African diplomats – the precise venue for this is not known but it was
probably in Washington or at the United Nations – by their Soviet counterparts,
to be passed on to the government in Pretoria. While it was stressed in the
dispatch that the contents of the message should not be regarded as a threat,
it was nonetheless pointed out that the continued occupation of Angolan
territory by South Africa and ongoing support for UNITA were unacceptable to
Moscow. Moreover, it was stated that the desired withdrawal of Cuban troop from
Angola as a precondition for the extraction of South African troops from South
West Africa would not take place. The USSR, it was pointed out, was tied to
Angola by an agreement of friendship and cooperation and could be expected to
provide what support was required by Angola for the protection of its
sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Needless to say, Pretoria rebuffed this threat, which it
clearly was, while the final planning and preparation for Operation Askari went
ahead. The South Africans were nonetheless rattled by the exchange. The
offensive aspects of the plan were as a consequence modified, with the main
objective once again being to disrupt and destroy SWAPO’s logistics, deployment
and supply capability, but this time the emphasis was placed on a strategy of
isolating military strongpoints and applying threat and attrition in the hope
that enemy forces would suffer a collapse of morale and desert without the
necessity of a full confrontation. The operational plan was finally approved in
four phases:
Phase 1: Deep penetration Special Force reconnaissance
followed by SAAF air assault on the Typhoon/Volcano base located near Lubango,
taking place between 1 November and 30 December 1983;
Phase 2: Offensive reconnaissance operations and the
isolation of Cahama, Mulondo and Cuvelai, extending from 16 November 1983 to
mid-January 1984. The aim of this was to cut off enemy communication and
logistic lines in what was known as the Deep Area, or all areas of Angola which
were of operational interest to South Africa but not within the defined Shallow
Area. This, it was hoped, would demoralize and terrorize SWAPO defenders to the
extent that they would abandon their positions and withdraw northward;
Phase 3: Commencing at the beginning of February 1984, to
establish a dominated area from west of the Cunene River, through Quiteve,
Mupa, Vinticette and eastward through Ionde;
Phase 4: The final curtailment of hostile incursions into
South West Africa, internally if required.
The three principal targets of Operation Askari were located
in a wide arc within what was classified by FAPLA as its 5th Military Region.
Cahama, one of the main proposed targets, lay 150 kilometres northwest of
Xangongo on what at the time was a good road, while Mulondo, another key
target, was located a little farther than this, perhaps 200 kilometres from
Xangongo, but also on an accessible arterial route. Cuvelai lay farther north
still but was considerably more remote on the eastern perimeter of the derelict
Parque Nacional da Mupa.
A heavy Special Force reconnaissance insertion, one of the
largest so far in the war, was done at a number of points behind enemy lines in
order to gather the necessary tactical intelligence on enemy strengths and
dispositions upon which detailed planning could be made. What was reported back
in general terms was that FAPLA was at brigade strength at Cahama, Mulondo and
Cuvelai – with a brigade in this context being somewhere between 600 and 1,000
men. In addition, each town was well defended by an extensive network of
bunkers as well as a great deal of razor wire, minefields and artillery. Of
particular concern to the flying crews were the well-integrated anti-aircraft
defences that included a brace of SA-8s and SA-9 missile systems as well as
14.5mm and 23mm guns. However, the entire configuration, in keeping perhaps
with the Soviet doctrine that inspired it, was clearly defensive in intent,
suggesting that there was only a very limited potential for any direct
offensive action on the ground.
What was also ascertained – although separate reports differ
on this fact – and notwithstanding a handful of Cuban and Soviet advisers in
situ, was that no meaningful foreign element to PLAN/FAPLA forces was in place.
A Cuban regiment was based at Jamba, however, and a second at Matala, both in
the Huíla Province north of the main focus of SADF attention.
Offensive action against Cahama began in mid-November with
an initial deployment of Special Force reconnaissance teams to cut logistics
and communication lines and to generally attempt the isolatation of Cahama
while the SAAF carried out strikes against identified targets within the
defensive perimeter. The strategy was to rattle and exhaust defending forces
prior to the additional psychological stress of realizing, with the arrival of
the main mechanized force, that a major South African attack was imminent.
This preliminary softening-up had a limited effect, as
Brigadier-General Dick Lord commented in his history of the SAAF in the Border
War, From Fledgling to Eagle, because a garrison such as that entrenched in
Cahama, fortified by the sense that it had beaten the Boere back on previous
encounters, was hardly likely to be overawed by the offensive efforts of a
handful of Recces and the attentions of the SAAF against its well-constructed
trench and bunker system. It was not until the forward advance of Task Force
X-Ray, comprising mainly 61 Mechanized Battalion and attached artillery, and
with a SAAF MAOT attached, appeared in mid-December that the real pressure
began to be applied. (See appendix for a first-hand account of a SAAF officer
serving as MAOT for 61 Mechanized Battalion during Operation Askari.)
In this regard, it is worth noting that Cahama had been
heavily and consistently bombed during earlier operations – particularly during
Operation Protea – although it had never been targeted with a view to being
taken or occupied, which had always tended to be interpreted by the enemy as a
tactical loss, with much subsequent propaganda mileage being made out of this
fact by the defenders who consistently claimed that they had driven off the
Boere.
Another point worth mentioning in regard to the assault on Cahama
is the fact that it was known prior to the launch of Askari that among the
anti-aircraft armaments deployed around the target was the vehicle-mounted and
radar-supported Soviet SA-8 missile system, a highly mobile, low-altitude,
short-range, tactical surface-to-air missile system that until then had not
been deployed outside of the USSR. The capture of one of these was the
objective of a high-priority side operation codenamed Fox. This operation
involved coordinated ground and air bombardments undertaken in such a way as to
force the southward movement of the mobile batteries in order that an SA-8
could be isolated by ground forces and snatched. The operation failed, although
an older SA-9 system was captured in Cuvelai which, even though not precisely
what was hoped for, was nonetheless an important acquisition and of significant
intelligence interest.
In the meanwhile, prior to the advance of Task Force X-Ray,
comprising mainly 61 Mechanized Battalion and attached artillery, on the
outskirts of Cahama, it successfully overran the small defended town of Quiteve
against almost no resistance. This prompted an unsuccessful probe north by a
detached company of Task Force X-Ray to begin the process of isolating Mulondo.
This caused some grumbling from SAAF command as it required the unscheduled
diversion of air resources to support the advance which reduced the cover
available elsewhere. Brigadier-General Dick Lord:
This diversion of the original Askari plan had
repercussions on the air plan. Support had to be flown for ground forces in
that area, thus utilizing aircraft hours and weapons set aside for the Cahama
and Cuvelai battles. It had a further tactical disadvantage in that the element
of surprise we had hoped to gain from our attack on Cahama was lost. After our
Mulondo strikes the entire air defence system of southern Angola was placed on
the highest state of alert.
Cahama, meanwhile, was now subjected to an unrelenting
artillery bombardment during the day and night/day aerial attacks delivered by
Impala and Canberra formations that lasted throughout the second half of
December. In the midst of these raids a flight of Buccaneers was diverted
briefly to attack SWAPO/FAPLA forward training and logistics bases near the
town of Lubango on the main road north of Cahama.
The combined effect of weeks of intense attrition applied to
Cahama certainly did affect morale among the defenders, as had been hoped, with
radio intercepts confirming this fact, and had the operation been allowed to
continue it would certainly have succeeded. However, all SADF operations around
Cahama were abruptly ordered to cease by 31 December, largely as a consequence
of international pressure being brought to bear against the South African
government to withdraw its forces from Angola. This had the melancholy effect
of allowing the FAPLA 2nd Brigade in Cahama to observe one morning, to their
unutterable relief, the mighty SADF 61 Mechanized Battalion breaking the siege
and leaving the area, with the predictable result that yet another defeat of
the Boere was hailed by FAPLA. Similarly, the combined offensive plan against
Mulondo was discontinued.
In the midst of the Cahama siege, however air assets were
once again diverted when a Sector 20 SADF deception force was attacked and five
members killed during an unscheduled diversionary strike at a position close to
the town of Caiundo, more than 200 kilometres east of the main combat zone. The
SAAF had not been informed of this aspect to the operation and therefore had
not factored in any contingency for dealing with this sort of emergency. Air
activity was now spread even more thinly, with attack aircraft being diverted
to Caiundo from both Cahama and Mulondo in the midst of the campaign to
suppress both. Caiundo remained a focus of air activity for the remainder of
the life of Operation Askari, itself ultimately not being captured and
contributing to the similar marginal failures at Cahama and Mulondo.
At 14h05 on 27 December 1983, the aerial bombardment of the
final key target, Cuvelai, north of Xangongo, began. This followed a week or
more of photo-reconnaissance flights which had warned the defenders of the town
well in advance that something big was imminent. The aerial attacks continued
for the next few days, after which Task Force Delta-Fox, a battle group
comprising mainly territorial Citizen Force soldiers, was sent in to engage a
SWAPO HQ and logistics base located five kilometres northeast of the town. To
its horror, the group came under attack from the FAPLA 11th Brigade, reinforced
by two Cuban battalions, and utilizing T-54/T-55 tanks for the first time in
their correct mobile role. Task Force X-Ray was immediately reassigned to
assist and in a mere 16 hours was extracted from its activity around Cahama and
redeployed overland to the outskirts of Cuvelai. This epic forced march is
described in part by Captain Charlie Wroth in the appendix. There a combined
ground and air assault commenced on 3 January 1984.
Supporting air operations began with a determined and
coordinated series of strikes aimed at all known AAA and artillery sites. The
first wave comprised ten Impala jets followed by four Canberras. The combined
load of bombs delivered on the target was 60 120kg bombs, 18 350kg bombs, two
460kg bombs and 600 deadly anti-personnel alpha bombs, followed by a second
wave of Impalas dropping 32 250kg bombs. Each pilot was equipped with an
up-to-date aerial photograph of his intended target and a high degree of
accuracy was achieved.
This was confirmed on completion of the air attack by an
intercepted radio call from the Angolan commander pleading for help from his HQ
in Lubango, claiming that 75 per cent of his artillery had been taken out by
the SAAF. If this was even partially so then this certainly would have ranked
highly among SAAF actions during the war. Dick Lord, remarking on this fact,
commented that: “This airstrike, together with the Cangamba attack, ranks
arguably as the two most successful airstrikes flown by the SAAF throughout the
history of the war.”
During the air operation an Impala piloted by Captain Joe
van den Berg was clipped in the tail by an SA-9 missile, completely destroying
the right side tail-plane and elevator. A combination of skilled piloting and
controlled elevation loss allowed the aircraft to land safely at the recently
resurfaced airstrip at Ongiva.
The SAAF, meanwhile, continued to fly in support of ground
troops moving in on Cuvelai, with Alouette pilot Captain Carl Alberts winning
the Honoris Crux for marking gun positions under heavy fire, evading, so the story
is told, four simultaneously fired RPG rockets. After labouring through the
extensive minefields surrounding the town, and losing a Ratel to a T-55 hit
that resulted in the death of ten men, ground forces entered Cuvelai to find
that both SWAPO and FAPLA had fled, later running into 32 Battalion stop groups
positioned south of Tetchamutete where a handful were killed and many more
captured. Eleven enemy tanks were taken out during the battle, with an
estimated 324 Angolan and Cuban lives lost.
It need hardly be said that Operation Askari stirred up a
ferment of hyperbolic but hardly exaggerated pleas on the part of the Angolans
and gales of outrage from the international community. All of this the South
Africans deflected with as much stone-faced denial as was possible, but with,
nonetheless, a finger on the pulse of the wider international reaction to gauge
the point at which the operation would need to be brought to a close.
Mopping up was still underway in Cuvelai when news reached
Pretoria of a dispatch between SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma and UN Secretary-General
Perez de Cuellar, pleading for the latter to arrange a direct ceasefire between
the SADF and his own forces in order to “contribute meaningfully to an early
ceasefire agreement”.
This was obviously done under pressure from the reeling
Angolans and as such was something of a red herring. There had been throughout
the liberation period in recent African history many similar incidences where
pleas such as this were simply used as an opportunity for rearming, regrouping
and the reoccupation of territory defined as demilitarized by any ceasefire
agreement. It was simply a fact of the times.
Phase 3 of Operation Askari, the establishment of a
dominated area between the Cunene and Cubango rivers and as far north
Tetchamutete, had been achieved, although the area west of the Cunene remained
broadly hostile. The success of Phase 4 – the halting of the annual SWAPO
incursion – is subjective, and can be measured only in terms of insurgent and
SADF deaths in the area of border operations in the weeks and months that
followed. An incursion in 1984 did take place, so SWAPO activity was certainly
not halted, although it was undoubtedly a less ambitious penetration than had
originally been planned.
By 15 January, the last of the raiding forces had crossed
back into South West Africa where the planners and commanders of the operation
could step back and ponder what really had been very mixed results. On the
whole, however, Askari was deemed a success, in particular when measured using
the yardstick of enemy losses and the accumulation or destruction of
astronomical quantities of war booty. (It was frequently remarked, obviously,
but not wholly fallaciously that, under a general and increasing arms embargo,
the Soviets remained the largest supplier of arms to South Africa. Indeed,
South Africa did make practical use of many articles of captured hardware in
the form of vehicles, artillery and some aircraft.) Also, of course, another
significant blow had been delivered to the logistical and deployment capability
of SWAPO which, although diminishing the organization’s short-term
effectiveness on the battlefield, it did nothing to significantly alter the
overall trajectory of either the situation or the pace and intensity of the
war.
In fact, the South Africans had much to reflect upon as 1984
dawned that must at the time have seemed quite depressing. South African troops
in the battle for Cuvelai had for the first time encountered tanks used in
their correct mobile capacity and, although still not deployed with quite the
level of skill necessary to defeat a force on a par with the SADF, it still
marked a turning point on the battlefield that would no doubt develop further.
It was also evident that Angolan, Cuban and Soviet commitment to the defence of
Angolan territory had been markedly more aggressive during this operation than
at any previous time which again could be expected to increase as the situation
unfolded. Lastly, there remained a residual unease occasioned by the Soviet
threat of robust intervention should the South African presence in Angola ever
become more overtly threatening than it had been hitherto, unease that remained
strong with the ongoing South African occupation of Xangongo and Ongiva.
