A posed photo showing an Austro-Hungarian bombing party cutting its way through enemy wire. The soldier on the right has wire cutters and, like the others, is carrying grenades in his belt. They are carrying the Steyr-Mannlicher M1895 rifle, nicknamed the “Ruck-Zuck” (“right now” or “very quick”).
Pioneers crossing the Narotsch River in Belarussia. German army pioneers were regarded as a separate combat arm trained in construction and demolition of fortifications, but they were often used as emergency infantry. One battalion was assigned to each Corps.
General von Pflanzer-Baltin with his staff. In the autumn of 1914, when Romania appeared to be turning against the Central Powers, he was charged with the defence of Transylvania. When the Russians crossed the Carpathians, and there was immediate danger of their driving onto the plains of Hungary, Pflanzer-Baltin, with an improvised division conducted a defence by taking the offensive. After fighting with varying success in the southern part of Eastern Galicia and in the Bukovina, the VII. Army under his command, was driven back by the Brusilov offensive in June 1916, and he was relieved of his command.
A German map of the southern sector of the Russian front to show gains between December 1915 and January 1916.
A German map of the northern part of the Russian front in 1916.
‘Over Christmas 1915, Falkenhayn had submitted a memorandum
on the state of the war and prospects for the coming year to the scrutiny of
his All-Highest War-Lord. He was opposed to further offensive action on the
blank plains of Russia.’ Falkenhayn expected the Russian state’s problems to
cause it to collapse in the near future but Hindenburg was not so complacent.
He knew the German extended line was inadequately held and needed more troops.
Pointing to the summer successes, Falkenhayn told Hindenburg
and Ludendorff there would be no major initiatives on their front. He also
denied them any reinforcements and withdrew all German troops from Galicia,
leaving its defence to the Austrians who were more occupied ‘with defeating
Serbia and planning an offensive against Italy’. For Falkenhayn the west was
where the war could be won: Verdun was chosen as the place to bleed France to
death. Stavka chose to break this complacency with a major attack in March.
Winter passed with only minor activity by both sides on the
Northern Front. Each army now dug-in to strengthen their positions. The German
trenches were ‘strongly built in concrete, equipped with light railways and
often their own generating plants, they included bomb-proof shelters.
Recreation areas had been established not far behind the lines’. On the other
side of the wire, the Russians were producing trenches that were comfortable.
Walls were planked and stoves provided heating. There were even opportunities
for relaxation.
The object of the three-pronged Russian attack was to throw
the German northern wing back to the Baltic coast. When the build-up of forces
had been completed, the Russians were to have numerical manpower superiority of
5:1 supported by artillery on an unprecedented scale. Captured soldiers in
peasant dress and observed troop concentrations led the Germans to conclude an
attack was likely.
The spring thaw began the day before the start of the
offensive. After an eight-hour bombardment, the Russians launched their attack.
Everywhere it failed. The next day the attack was resumed and although the
situation was critical at times the German lines held: ‘the barbed wire in
front of the German trenches was hung with the corpses of Russian attackers as
far as the eye could see’. The same happened the next day, but when winter
returned during the night the Russians were able to advance through relatively
unprotected swamps. Little progress was made on day five until early evening
when the Germans were threatened with disaster.
As the temperature rose, so did the water level. Everywhere
turned to mud. Leutnant Stegemann wrote home describing the sudden change in
his sector on the Dvina. ‘The river suddenly rose during the night of April 2nd
with overwhelming force and rapidity. The previous afternoon the water in the
flooded meadows had already risen so considerably that I had to send rations to
posts about a mile away…in a boat’. The men in the boat were caught in the
flood and its accompanying ice floes. ‘The water rose five feet in an hour. The
floating masses of ice…capsized the boat’. In the pitch-dark night his men had
to vacate ‘seven block-houses in a twinkling’. His own dug-out disappeared
under the water.
The men held onto the capsized boat while efforts were made
to establish telephonic contact with troops in the rear. Eventually a boat was
found but all the time the water was rising, making it more difficult to get to
the men. Then it was realised that thirty men were trapped in houses near the
river bank; fortunately a bigger boat had been called for as well. Frozen and
done in, all Stegemann could do was wait. While doing so, he changed his
clothes, and smoked a cigar while drinking five glasses of brandy in an attempt
to warm himself up.
During the wait, the boat from the rear area had managed to
pick up three of the men in the river. Frozen through, they were sent off to
hospital. By first light all his men had been rescued, except a
sixteen-year-old corporal whose body was never recovered. His company now had
new positions overlooking a two-mile broad lake. Other units were not as lucky
as Stegemann’s: many men were drowned by the flood.
The rising water level and the mud made movement difficult
and the dense fogs caused units to lose contact. As the front turned into a
lake, the Russians called off their attacks and withdrew troops. Any Russian
success was short-lived. On 28 April, after a high explosive barrage followed
by gas, against which the Russians were unprotected, the German infantry
reclaimed their lost positions in just one day.
Much concern had been expressed about the loyalty of some of
the ethnic groups that made up the Habsburg forces. While there was no concern
over German troops deserting, many of the ethnic groups in the Russian Army
were happy to cross over to the Germans. Oskar Greulich was serving near
Świniuchy during the April thaw. As on the Western Front, there was some degree
of live-and-let-live in the east and religious festivals were often observed.
‘For some time not a shot has been fired on either side, although everybody is
calmly walking about on the top, and even taking an afternoon nap up there!’
Whilst wary, both sides felt it foolish to disturb each
other by shooting. ‘When the Russian sentry goes on duty, he thinks it
necessary to inform his vis-à-vis of the fact. “Morning, Auyoosht!” he calls
across the lake.’ Initially they did not respond or just sent an occasional
bullet across, which was met by cries of ‘Germanski damn! Shoot nix!’ Greulich
and his men then realised that their opponents were Lithuanians and Poles: ‘It
is a good thing that there is a lake between us,’ he wrote, ‘otherwise many of
these men would certainly have deserted to us.’
Both sides were religious, especially Bavarian soldiers. ‘On
Easter Eve they (the Russians) called out: “Germanski shoot nix. Tomorrow
peace!”’ The Russians then treated the Germans to a concert with mandolins and
violins, ‘as beautiful as any one could hear at Easter in Eichelburg. In the
evening the male voice choir strikes up, and solemn chants – no doubt Easter
hymns – ring out into the night in three parts and sung by very good voices.’
Across the front many units witnessed similar events but
only in the front line. In the rear, headquarters staff kept on planning. At
the Austrian HQ, the Italian problem was paramount. They were not expecting a
Russian offensive, had become obsessed with Italy, and had dedicated most of
their staff energies to planning a south Tyrol offensive. To give the offensive
every chance of success, they moved six infantry divisions from Galicia.
Unknown to them, Brusilov had four armies, ready to strike consecutive blows
along a nineteen-mile front. Careful shepherding of reserves had given the
Russians a superiority of 125,000 men. Fortunately for the Russians, their
postponed attack coincided with the birthday of the Fourth Army commander, so
many key officers were not in place when the attack came.
The offensive began on 4 June with a hurricane bombardment
(using two weeks’ supply of ammunition) that destroyed, except for some deep
bunkers, the first three lines of the Austrian positions in Galicia. Part of
the success was due to the Russian use of aircraft equipped with radio to
direct the gunfire accurately. ‘The barrage continued throughout the day and
well into the night to prevent the enemy repairing his barbed wire under cover
of darkness, but was temporarily halted between midnight and 2.30 a.m. so that
scouts could inspect the damage.’
The Austrian Fourth Army front collapsed. Against minimal
resistance, the Russians were able to push a wedge between Fourth Army and
Böhm-Ermolli’s Army Group. By the following day 40,000 prisoners had been
taken, a number that swelled as the offensive spread along the line.
As Fourth Army collapsed, its neighbour, Seventh Army,
retreated south. In turn First Army withdrew, putting the whole
Austro-Hungarian position in considerable danger. Whole units melted away with
some joining the Russian forces. ‘By the third day of the offensive, the
severity of the situation was plain for all to see. The Russians had torn open
a sizeable hole 32Km (20 miles) wide in the Austro-Hungarian front. Hundreds of
thousands of Austro-Hungarian troops were prisoners of war or had simply fled
from the battlefield.’
After four days of fighting Fourth Army had shrunk from
110,000 to just 18,000 men under arms. As many as sixty per cent of the
casualties were actually deserters.
‘Only in the centre was there little progress. Here
Sakharov’s Eleventh (Army) had met Bothmer’s German-Austrian South Army which
repulsed all assaults upon it.’ However, even here there was success. On 15
July, warned by his intelligence about a forthcoming attack on 18 July by
Südarmee, Sakharov launched his own pre-emptive assault which took 1,300
prisoners and captured much of the ammunition stockpiled for the German attack.
Even though some Russian commanders did not attack until the
due date and the northern end of the South West Front was pinned down, the
advance moved rapidly. ‘By 17 June Czernowitz was taken and, on the 21st, the
entire province of Bukovina. By the 23rd, the Russians were in Kimpolung and
once more threatened the Carpathian foothills.’
Austro-Hungarian units were in retreat on a 250 mile front
from the Pripet marshes to the Carpathians. German help would be forthcoming
but only with strings. The South Tyrol campaign was to be closed, and troops
moved from that front to Russia were to be under German control.
However, the Russians did not have it all their own way.
Falkenhayn was concerned about the Lutsk salient and managed to build up an
eight division force (mixed Austrian and German units), without much opposition
from the Russians. Commanded by General von der Marwitz, the force struck in
the Kovel area. In four days of fierce fighting, they recovered a few miles of
ground.
The Russian gains so far included 350,000 Austrian
prisoners, 400 artillery pieces and 1,300 machine guns. Many defenders had been
killed and wounded along a 200 mile-long front that had been penetrated, in
places, to a depth of forty miles. On the Russian side, losses had also been
heavy with over 300,000 casualties. Ammunition for the artillery was also very
short. A great deal had been achieved by an offensive designed to pin down
forces before the principal attack.
Brusilov’s men rested and waited for their supply columns.
Without support from other armies the offensive would stall. None came, and,
while the Russian commanders fought among themselves, the Germans moved four
divisions from France and five from East Front reserves. The Austro-Hungarians
also moved four divisions from the South Tyrol Front and the Turks sent troops
to help.
No second Russian attack materialised. This gave the Germans
time ‘to set up solid defensive lines, restore discipline and assume command of
Austro-Hungarian units as small as companies’. The control by the German Army
was confirmed when on 27 July, Hindenburg was made Supreme Commander of the
Eastern Front with control of all military operations in the east. This was
followed by the Kaiser becoming titular head of the United Supreme Command. The
Habsburg army now had little say in its role.
The appointment of Hindenburg gave rise to great rejoicing
among many of the troops, mainly because he had never lost a battle. Leutnant
Stegemann described the men’s reactions: ‘I was quite astonished at my
Hanseatickers, Mechlinburgers and Holsteiners, they were so wild with joy at
the news.’ He was now the Company Commander and enjoying the responsibility.
Ordered to renew the offensive, Brusilov’s forces attacked
on 27 July, routing the remnants of the Austro-Hungarian First Army. A pivotal
point between Brusilov and Evert’s fronts was Kovel. With the offensive losing
impetus, its capture became very important. The Tsar, as commander-in-chief,
decided that this task should be undertaken by his Guards Army. The plan was
for the infantry to break through and the cavalry to attack, routing the
Germans. The attack was launched without artillery support and with
insufficient preparation: the troops had to cut through the barbed wire before
they could move. On the left the Russians were successful, taking 11,000
prisoners, forty-six guns and sixty-five machine guns, but losses were heavy.
They were especially heavy in some units of First Corps,
whose commander felt that a flank attack was beneath his troops. He sent two of
the finest Russian Regiments – the Preobrazhensky Guards and the Imperial Rifle
Regiment – in a frontal attack along a causeway. Casualties were so heavy ‘many
preferred to wade waist-deep through the bog’ even though their slow progress
made them excellent targets for the German machine gunners and for the planes that
bombed them. To make matters worse, their commander had forgotten to tell the
artillery of the changed plan so they were shelled by their own side. With
seventy per cent casualties, they took their objective, but the supporting
cavalry withdrew and they were forced to abandon their gains.
A further attempt to take Kovel, as part of the re-opened
offensive, appeared to be achieving results. Then the flanks failed and the
impossible happened – the Guards withdrew. The reason was clear the next day.
An army, classed by Major-General Knox as “‘physically the finest human animals
in Europe” had lost 55,000 men. Throughout the army and the country there was
an almost speechless fury at the whole catastrophic and futile episode’.
The advance continued. On 28 July Brody fell, Monstryska was
occupied on 7 August, Nadworna fell on 12 August. Russian troops were across
Südarmee’s lines of communication. There was no option but to pull back to the
Zlota Lipa line to defend Lemberg.
As the offensive moved forward, it met German units that
offered stiffer resistance. The advance slowed down and became costlier. Other
fronts were stripped of men and equipment to keep up the pressure but this
created bottlenecks and funnelled troops into positions where the Germans were at
their strongest. Despite desperate attacks in August and September, the front
eventually solidified.
It had been a bad period for the Central Powers. Between 4
June and mid-August, they had lost 400,000 men as prisoners and 15,000 square
miles of territory. Their total losses were probably around 750,000 men. But
many Russians had also been taken prisoner, sometimes gladly, as Adolf Stürmer,
a law student who had volunteered in 1914, found out. He had volunteered for a
patrol that was to blow up a bridge to slow down the Russian advance. Crossing
the river they surprised a Russian post. There was no fight. The biggest
Russian, immediately ‘made the sign of the cross and then put up his hands.
Then they were all full of joy; kissed our hands and coats; tore the cockades
out of their caps, and threw down their arms’.
It was a decisive victory, arguably the greatest achievement
of the war but it had been won at a high cost. ‘Brusilov’s losses were 450,000
and his reserves reduced from 400,000 to 100,000. Total Russian war losses were
now 5½ million. It had been a spectacular but Pyrrhic victory that weakened and
destabilised the Romanov Empire, and gained little of strategic importance.’
All eyes then turned to Romania.
Romania’s entry into the war meant that Brusilov had to make
a fresh effort in support of Russia’s new ally. On 29 August, Bothmer’s
Südarmee was attacked at Brzezany and the town of Potutory taken. While the
offensive failed in its main purpose of removing a German salient because of
stubborn German resistance, Niziov on the Dniester fell and the Austrians were
forced back to Halicz. Continued fighting brought the Russians some local
successes, but the continual reinforcement of Bothmer’s men meant that there
was no chance of a serious Russian success. And with the Romanians quickly
needing help, the Russian focus moved further south.
The Romanian retreat after their defeat at Kronstadt meant a
further change in Russian plans. Although twenty-seven Russian divisions moved
to help, a further Romanian retreat meant that the Russian front had to be
extended 400 kilometres. This new responsibility was paid for at the expense of
Brusilov’s offensive.
Russian officers blamed the Romanians for their situation,
but in truth, their offensive effort had been slacking because of a shortage of
men and arms. They were now fighting against positions where reinforcements
could be made available. The balance of strength had also shifted. ‘At the
beginning of the battle 39 Russian infantry divisions opposed 37 Austrian and
one German division. By 12 August, reinforcements from other fronts had
increased the South West Front to 61, but they were opposed by 72 enemy
divisions of which 24 were German – 18 having been sent from the west.’
Writing home on 3 September, Leutnant Stegemann described
the fighting his company had been through. ‘Fierce but victorious battles. I
have been through some ghastly times. On the 31st August the Company lost three
officers and 50 men, mostly in hand-to-hand fighting…The Russians attack every
day, but are always repulsed with terrific loss’. Three days later he was
awarded the Iron Cross First Class by Excellenz Litzmann, Hindenburg’s
second-in-command and a Stegemann family friend. Litzmann sent his greetings to
the family and told him to ‘write this: I congratulate you on the success of
your son, who, through his smartness and courage, with the assistance of his
splendid Company, has by his counter-attacks driven back the already
demoralized Russians, and by storming Hill 259 averted what was a grave menace
to my army-group.’ Two weeks later he was killed in action. General Litzmann
wrote to his parents when he heard the news. ‘I wish to express my deep
sympathy with you and your wife. You may both feel proud of your son, and may
say to yourselves that you have offered up a sacrifice to the Fatherland the
influence of which will be of lasting value to the brave 165th Regiment. Our
heroes do not die in vain and they live on for us through their shining
example. Leutnant Stegemann, who held the recaptured Hill 259 for 5½ hours
against overwhelming odds with the greatest gallantry, and only after the last
cartridge had been fired fought his way, with his little handful of men, back
through the Russian ranks, will never be forgotten.’
Brusilov had been ordered to stop the attacks but insisted
on a few days longer. On 16-17 October fifteen divisions attacked towards
Vladimir-Volhynskyi and its railway lines. German artillery caused heavy
casualties among the attacking troops but without spotter planes the Russian
artillery could do nothing to affect the outcome. After two days the Russians
abandoned the battle. The last campaign of the Russian Army had been mounted on
behalf of Italy and, the Russians believed, destroyed by Romania.
In Russia there were food and fuel shortages. The number of
strikes was increasing and the dissatisfaction was spreading to the armed
forces. Military rioters were shot as were soldiers who fired on the police
during a strike at the Renault factory in Petrograd. There was discontent in
the navy and merchant marine: during 1915 there had been mutinies aboard two
ships. ‘Amidst these manifestations of unrest, the government remained
paralysed by internal upheaval.’
Some realised that ‘the long-awaited revolution was moving closer’
and began to plan their programmes for when it arrived. Only one of the many
plots and conspiracies hatched in the last month of the year came to fruition:
Rasputin, a court favourite and confidant of the Tsarina, was murdered by a
trio that included a Prince. One of his predictions would come true before the
war ended. ‘If he died at the hands of any member of the royal family the
dynasty would fall within a year, and that its principal members would suffer
violent deaths.’
However, the discontent was in the rear. At the front the troops were outwardly untouched. Reinforcements had arrived and morale was good. Heavy artillery was arriving from Britain and supplies were at a high level, putting them on a parity with the Germans. Although fraternisation was not allowed, from the messages exchanged by both sides it was clear that the Austro-Germans were war-weary. The British naval blockade was working and they were hungry: at times they crossed the lines to beg for food from the Russians. They were also aware of the growing Russian strength, realised that there was no breakdown of authority among the front-line soldiers, and knew that they could not leave the Habsburgs to look after the front themselves.
