The Invasion of Italy
Stilicho, by his treaty with Alaric in Greece, had bought
himself time to deal with other enemies – notably some north African rebels.
Alaric, for his part, had obtained an excellent springboard for attack on
Italy. In addition, Illyricum contained mines and arsenals from which his
troops could be supplied. His offensive in the year AD 400 was well planned and
had been preceded by negotiations with Ostrogothic settlers north of the Alps.
As Alaric advanced round the Adriatic his allies descended from the mountains.
But Stilicho was able to deflect this pincer movement, which was perhaps
mistimed, and by prompt action compelled the northern enemies to retire before
he confronted Alaric.
Like other barbarians, the Goths found difficulty in
penetrating fortifications. Even so, the Emperor Honorius, placing little
reliance on his fortress of Asta (Asti), abandoned the area of Milan and took
up residence in Ravenna, where the marshes provided additional security.
Stilicho, after a campaign of much manoeuvring and a fierce battle at
Pollentia, inflicted a final defeat on Alaric near Verona in 403, thus securing
the return of the Gothic commander and his army to Illyricum. In the following
year, the Ostrogoths again attacked from the north, and on this occasion
Stilicho defeated them decisively, sold many of the survivors into slavery and
enrolled others in his own army.
In 407, another military usurper emerged from Britain, while
the activities of Vandals and other barbarians in Gaul occupied Stilicho’s
attention. Alaric, alive to his opportunity, supported by fresh Danubian
allies, led his people round to Noricum (Austria), north of the Alps, and
received from the Emperor that territory, with a substantial payment in gold, as
the price of quiescence at a difficult moment. The Emperor was closely
connected by marriage with Stilicho, who virtually controlled the Western
Empire during these years. But the great general suddenly fell from power, and
Honorius foolishly had him executed.
There was now no commander in the West capable of placing
any restraint upon Alaric, who at once asked for more gold and more land. When
these were refused, he invaded Italy and marched on Rome. He raised the siege
of the city when the Emperor temporized, but soon renewed it when negotiations
broke down. He was thus enabled to impose an emperor of his own choosing in
Rome, but quickly became disappointed with his choice and impatiently deposed
the puppet. Further attempts to negotiate with Honorius at Ravenna proved
fruitless, and after a third siege Alaric’s men were surreptitiously admitted
to Rome by some Gothic slaves within the walls. The Gothic army plundered the
city for three days, but did comparatively little damage. With Stilicho gone,
the sea was open to Alaric, and he aimed at North Africa. Unfortunately for his
purpose, the fleet which he had assembled at Rhegium was destroyed by a storm,
and he himself died soon after (410). He was buried in a river bed to ensure
that his last resting place should not be disturbed.
The Gothic capture of Rome hardly amounted to a “sack”.
There was certainly enough booty left to reward the efforts of Gaiseric’s
Vandal raiders when they arrived by sea and captured the city in 455. Gaiseric
carried away the Jewish temple treasures which Titus had appropriated four
centuries earlier. Ships, as the Vandals well understood, were useful for the
transport of moveables. The Vandal king also made prisoner the two daughters of
the Emperor Valentinian III, one of whom he married to his son. The other,
apparently not required, was sent home.
Imaginative illustrations of Rome’s barbarian invaders
easily leave the impression that they swept into the Empire with irresistible
verve in a series of cavalry charges. Consideration of the foregoing facts,
however, suggests a different view. Stilicho and Alaric, in their wars, were
extremely cautious, frequently preferring manoeuvre and negotiated peace to
pitched battle and bloody victory. Alaric, like Stilicho, was one of Theodosius’
old officers, and his outlook on warfare was that of a professional soldier.
Moreover, the people over whom he ruled, though they invaded Italy, as the
legions of rebellious Roman generals had often done in the past, were not
invaders of the Empire. They were simply a dissatisfied immigrant community,
asserting what they considered their rights as members of the Roman world.
The Fate of Roman Britain
In considering these years, when chaos engulfed the centre
of the Empire, we may understandably feel curiosity as to the fate of Britain,
situated at the circumference. In AD 410, answering a request for military aid
against barbarian invaders, Honorius advised the Roman community of Britain to
arrange for its own defence. Like other parts of the Empire, Britain was under
attack, and the attackers were no longer merely the Picts (Painted-men). They
were Germanic tribes from Frisia and the mouth of the Rhine. The term “Saxon”
at first denoted a particular tribe; later, it was applied with little
discrimination to Germanic peoples who inhabited the regions around the mouth
of the Rhine and the North Sea coast.
At the end of the third century, Constantius, father of
Constantine the Great, after eliminating Carausius and his successor, improved
a chain of forts, which Carausius and other commanders had established, to
defend the “Saxon Shore” – ie, the south and east coasts of Britain and the
Channel coast of Gaul. The idea of such a defence may indeed have originated
with Carausius. The Saxon-shore forts were much bigger than earlier Roman forts
in Britain, and they relied upon massive masonry, not merely stone-faced
earthworks. Imposing ruins are still visible and nine British forts are listed
in the Notitia Dignitatum. Ammianus Marcellinus mentions that these defences
were placed under the command of a “Count of the Saxon Shore” (Comes litoris
Saxonici), while in the north, the Wall was the responsibility of the “Duke”
(dux) of Britain who had his headquarters at York. In the time of Diocletian
and Constantine, dux, that general term for a leader or guide, had become the
specific title of an officer in charge of frontier defence. It was later
applied to the chiefs of barbarian tribal groupings too small to qualify for
rule by kings. Similarly, comes, meaning literally a “companion”, had denoted
membership of the emperor’s staff. Under Constantine, it became a title for
high-ranking officers and officials.
In 367, Saxons, acting in collusion with Scots (who came
originally from Ireland) and Picts, overran Britain. Like other barbarians,
they failed to capture the strongly fortified towns, but damage done to a
previously flourishing rural community was severe, and the Duke of Britain and
the Count of the Saxon Shore were both killed. The situation was restored by
the valiant Roman general Theodosius (father of the Emperor Theodosius the
Great), who drove out the barbarians, rebuilt fortifications, and established a
valuable line of signal stations on the Yorkshire coast to give advance warning
of sea-borne attack.
After two imperial pretenders, Magnus Maximus (385) and the
upstart Flavius Claudius Constantinus (407) had drafted troops away from the
island in support of their southward adventures, Britain was again left
virtually undefended, though in the intervening period (395) Stilicho had done
something to reorganize garrison forces. After Honorius’ negative reaction in
410, we can rely on little but archaeological evidence for our knowledge of
Roman military administration in the island.
To this obscure epoch must be assigned the exploits of the
legendary King Arthur – in so far as they have any real historical basis. A
Romano-British chief named Artorius perhaps resisted the Saxon invaders.
Gildas, the Celtic monk, writing in Latin in the sixth century, records a great
British victory in the Wessex area in about AD 500, and Nennius, a
ninth-century chronicler, associates this victory with the name of Arthur,
which he gives as that of a victorious general, not a king.
Aetius surveys the Catalaunian fields.
Aetius was still generalissimo of the west, and as we know from
Merobaudes’ second panegyric, he had been anticipating the possibility
of a Hunnic assault on the west from at least 443.
The Defeat of the Huns
In AD 446, Roman Britain made its last known appeal for
imperial help to Flavius Aëtius, the commander-in-chief (Patrician) of the
Emperor Valentinian III, grandson of the great Theodosius. But Aëtius was
already heavily engaged against other barbarians – who were soon to include the
Huns. It was, of course, inevitable that the Huns, whose westward progress had
precipitated the migration of other peoples, should sooner or later appear in
their own persons. The reputation of the Huns is well known. Their cruelty was
often without malice, and their malice was too terrible to contemplate.
Nevertheless, in their early contacts with the Roman world, they had sometimes
been enrolled in the imperial service, and Stilicho had been served by a very
faithful Hunnish bodyguard.
The boastful menaces of Attila, who became sole king of the
Huns in 445, suggest something of a buffoon but, far from that, he must have
been a commander of very shrewd ability. Under his rule, the Huns dominated and
terrorized wide tracts of Europe and Asia, but their power collapsed after his
death. Apart from Attila’s leadership, the main strength of the Huns, as of
other barbarians, lay in their immense number, swollen as it was in their case
by the addition of many subject peoples. They were a Mongoloid nation of
hunters and shepherds from the steppes of central Asia and, as one might
expect, they extensively employed the horse and the bow for warlike as well as
peaceful purposes. But the trappings of their horses were of gold and their
sword hilts were inlaid with gold and precious stones. Indeed, they had an
insatiable appetite for gold, and were usually willing to refrain from
hostilities if offered sufficient of it. Attila had inherited from his father a
royal capital “city” in Pannonia (Hungary). It was built of wood but contained
a stone bath-house. From this base, Attila was able to threaten the Bosphorus.
The Emperor paid him gold and ceded him territory, but though the Huns had
ravaged the Eastern Empire, they could not hope to prevail against the
impregnable walls of Constantinople.
Meanwhile. the Western Emperor’s sister, Honoria, who for
her past sins had been relegated by pious relatives to a condition of perpetual
chastity, for which she had no vocation, offered herself secretly to Attila,
and he would have been willing to concede her the status of concubine in return
for a dowry of half the Western Empire. But these terms were rejected and
Attila unleashed an attack against Gaul and Western Europe.
Aëtius, the Patrician, as commander-in-chief, now formed an
alliance with his old Visigothic enemies in Gaul, and halted Attila’s advance
at Orléans, The combined Imperial and Gothic forces then inflicted a bloody
defeat upon the Huns in the “Catalaunian Plain”, somewhere near Châlons. This
battle has been reckoned as one of the most decisive in the world’s history,
but considering its violence, it decided very little. The defeated enemy was
not pursued. Attila retreated to his wooden capital in Pannonia and the next
year launched a major offensive into Italy. He requisitioned siege-engines with
their operators, and after a three-month investment utterly destroyed Aquileia.
Some fugitives escaped to the Adriatic lagoons, where their refugee settlement
eventually gave rise to the city of Venice.
Attila was now met near Lake Garda by Pope Leo (the Great)
who dissuaded him from marching southward against Rome. The Huns, though not
Christians, tended to regard any religion with awe, and much was due to the
personality of Leo, whose deterrent influence was again successfully exercised
three years later when Gaiseric’s Vandals entered Rome. At the same time,
Attila exacted a promise that Honoria and the treasure which constituted the
moveable portion of her dowry should be surrendered to him, failing which,
hostilities would be renewed. However, before the promise could be fully
carried out, he died suddenly, having burst a blood vessel on his first night
with a new concubine (453). Without their leader, the Huns ceased to be a
serious menace and were soon annihilated, dispersed or expelled by the combined
efforts of Goths and other Germanic barbarians who opposed them.
Aëtius, who defeated Attila in Gaul, was the son of a Count
(comes) of Africa. In his youth, he had been a hostage among the Huns and
during his sojourn among them learnt much of their customs, establishing some
friendship with them. Indeed, Aëtius originally imposed his power at Ravenna
with the help of Hunnish auxiliaries, and expectation that he might again need
their aid explains his reluctance to pursue them after his great victory in
Gaul.
Aëtius was a colourful character. History credits him,
during the confused civil strife that followed Honorius’ death, with having
killed one of his professional rivals in single combat. He was eventually
stabbed to death by his imperial master, Valentinian, whose jealousy recalls
that of Honorius for Stilicho.
The Defences of Constantinople
Although the Goths and the Huns were able to exact
ever-increasing payments in gold as an inducement to spare the territories of
the Eastern Empire, both Alaric and Attila realized that they had little
prospect of capturing Constantinople itself, and they did not waste time and
effort in the attempt. We have already drawn attention to the ideal strategic
position of the city. A plan of Constantinople will show it to be built on a
roughly triangular promontory: the profile of a vulture-like beak, across the
landward base of which a heavily fortified wall extends from the Sea of Marmara
in the south to an arm of the Bosphorus (The Golden Horn) in the north.
The original wall of Constantine, damaged by an earthquake
in AD 401, was promptly repaired by Arcadius, but during the minority of his
son and successor Theodosius II, the Praetorian Prefect Anthemius demolished
the old walls and built new (413). These ramparts were again ruined by an
earthquake, but in the year 447 they were rebuilt in three months. Situated one
mile to the west of the line traced by Constantine, Theodosius’ walls enclosed
a city of double the area, and in the space between the old and the new walls
the Imperial Gothic guard was stationed.
The outer face of the fortifications was protected by a
broad, deep moat. An attacker who overcame this obstacle would then be
confronted by a breastwork approximately equal to his own height, and some 40
feet (12m) behind this, as an inner defence, stood a chain of towers, linked by
a curtain wall 26 feet (8m) high. The fourth line of defence was the main city
wall itself, lying back at a further distance of 66 feet (20m), 43 feet (13m) in
height, and fortified by great towers from which enfilading showers of missiles
could be directed into the flanks of the assailants. Other walls of solid
masonry defended the perimeter of the city where it was adjacent to the sea.
These embraced the whole headland and connected with the land walls at either
end. They consisted, like the land walls, of a double rampart, fortified by
towers at brief intervals. The Golden Horn itself was guarded against enemy
naval attack by a chain boom.
However, the walls of the capital might not have been enough
to defend its inhabitants, if they had not given a high priority to naval
strength. The Byzantine fleet made use mainly of light galleys (dromones in
Greek), the equivalent of the liburnae used by Augustus. Clearly, with their
ever-pressing need to conserve manpower, the Eastern emperors could not have
afforded to develop the multireme leviathans of earlier times. The Byzantine
vessels also made considerable use of sails, and they often featured several
masts, which – contrary to earlier Roman and Greek practice – were not
dismounted during action. From their Arab enemies of a later date, the
Byzantines also adopted the triangular lateen sail.
Relying, in the tradition of Graeco-Roman civilization, on
science and technique to defeat overwhelming enemy odds, the Byzantines
produced a secret weapon, which for many centuries gave them a decisive
advantage. This was a type of flame missile, which was used with devastating
effect against enemy ships. Many combustible mixtures employed in the Middle
Ages were loosely termed “Greek Fire”. The precise Byzantine compound was based
on ingredients which are unknown, for it was a well-kept secret, but the
characteristic of the original Greek Fire was that it ignited – or was at least
not quenched – on contact with water. This suggests that quicklime was an
element, and it must also be remembered that petroleum, known to the Greeks as
naphtha (Persian naft), was available in surface deposits in Babylonia. The
invention of Greek Fire was attributed to Callinicus, a Greek engineer from
Heliopolis in Syria, who lived in the reign of the Emperor Constantine
Pogonatus (668-685). Greek Fire was sometimes projected in containers in the
manner of grenades, but it was also released through tubes, with which
Byzantine warships were specially fitted.
Apart from the defence of Constantinople itself, the
Byzantines maintained a flotilla to patrol the Danube, and behind this river
frontier Justinian built a four-line system of nearly 300 fortresses and
watchtowers to defend the Empire at what had for many centuries proved to be
its most vulnerable point.
It should be noticed that even in Justinian’s day, when
Constantinople was the focus of an expansionist strategy which emulated the era
of the first Augustus and his immediate successors, war on some fronts remained
defensive. While Africa was being won from the Vandals, Italy from the
Ostrogoths, and southern Spain from the Visigoths, repeated military efforts in
the East were necessary to hold the Sassanid Persians at bay. Inevitably, with
the death of Justinian, the Byzantines, deprived of dynamic leadership,
reverted to a defensive strategy, which in the centuries that followed was
often barely enough to save the city itself from occupation by invading forces.
Despite Justinian’s Roman sentiments and aspirations, the
army which manned his defences and fought his wars was far from being Roman in
character. It was not any longer primarily an army of legionary foot soldiers,
but of heavily mailed cavalry on the Persian model, and the weapons on which it
chiefly relied were the lance and the bow. Even in the infantry, archers and
javelin-throwers predominated. Light cavalry was supplied by Huns and Arabs.
There was, of course, nothing un-Roman in using barbarian auxiliaries to combat
barbarian enemies. Julius Caesar had done as much. It was simply a question of
degree. Indeed, many of the gradual changes in equipment may be traced back to
the second century AD.
