A special rehabilitation area for Army Group South was to be
established near Dnieperopetrovsk, while for Army Group Center similar areas
could be set up near Orsha, Minsk, Gomel, and Bryansk. Those few units of Army
Group North which were to be rehabilitated would probably be transferred to the
Zone of Interior. Rehabilitation was to begin in mid-March at the latest. After
the muddy season the fully rehabilitated units of Army Group Center were to be
transferred to Army Group South.
The exigencies of the last few months had led to the
commitment of a great number of technical specialists as infantrymen. The
overall personnel situation and the shortage of technically trained men made it
imperative either to return all specialists to their proper assignment or to
use them as cadres for newly activated units. The future combat efficiency of
the Army would depend upon the effective enforcement of this policy.
The high rate of materiel attrition and the limited capacity
of the armament industry were compelling reasons for keeping weapons and
equipment losses at a minimum.
In the implementing order to the army groups and armies, the
Organization Division of the Army High Command directed on 18th February that
those mobile divisions that were to be fully rehabilitated would be issued
50-60 percent of their prescribed motor vehicle allowance and infantry
divisions up to 50 percent. Every infantry company was to be issued four
automatic rifles and four carbines with telescopic sights; armor-piercing rifle
grenades were to be introduced. Bimonthly reports on manpower and equipment
shortages as well as on current training and rehabilitation of units were to be
submitted by all headquarters concerned.
The element of surprise was essential to the success of the
summer offensive. On 12th February Keitel therefore issued the first directive
for deceiving the Russians about future German intentions. The following
information was to be played into Soviet intelligence hands by German
counterintelligence agents:
At the end of the muddy season the German military leaders
Intended to launch a new offensive against Moscow. For this purpose they wanted
to concentrate strong forces by moving newly activated divisions to the Russian
theater and exchanging battle-weary ones in the East for fresh ones from the
West. After the capture of Moscow the Germans planned to advance to the middle
Volga and seize the industrial installations in that region.
The assembly of forces was to take place in secret. For this
purpose the capacity of the railroads was to be raised before the divisions
were transferred from the West. German and allied forces would meanwhile launch
a major deceptive attack in the direction of Rostov.
As to Leningrad, the prevailing opinion was that this city
would perish by itself as soon as the ice on Lake Ladoga had melted. Then the
Russians would have to dismount the railroad and the inhabitants would again be
Isolated. To attack in this area appeared unnecessary.
In addition, those German troops that were earmarked for the
Russian theater and presently stationed in the West were to be deceived by the
issuance of military maps and geographic data pertaining to the Moscow area.
The units that were already in the theater were not to be given any deceptive
information until the current defensive battles had been concluded. The same
directive also requested the Army and Luftwaffe to submit suggestions for other
deceptive measures. The maintenance of secrecy was strongly emphasized.
THE NAVY’S ROLE: FEBRUARY 1942
The German Navy’s principal concern in the Black Sea area
was the transportation of supplies for the Army. The difficulties were caused
by the shortage of shipping space and the absence of escort and combat vessels.
Measures taken to improve the German position in the Black Sea included
transfer of PT boats, Italian antisubmarine vessels, small submarines, and
landing craft; mine fields were also being laid. Orders had been issued to
speed up these measures and support the Army by bringing up supplies. Russian
naval forces in the Black Sea would have to be attacked and destroyed. The
degree of success obtained would determine the outcome of the war in the Black
Sea area. Attention was called to the fact that eventually it would become
necessary to occupy all Russian Black Sea bases and ports.
On the other hand, the remainder of the Russian Baltic fleet
stationed in and around Leningrad had neither strategic nor tactical value.
Ammunition and fuel supplies were exceedingly low. About 12 of the high speed
mine sweepers had been sunk so far, so that only four or five were left. About
65 out of 100 submarines had been sunk by the Germans.
THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE: 20th FEBRUARY 1942
In a summary dated 20th February 1942 the Eastern
Intelligence Division of the Army High Command stated that the Russians were
anticipating a German offensive directed against the Caucasus and the oil wells
in that area. As a countermeasure the Red Army would have the choice between a
spoiling offensive and a strategic withdrawal. Assuming the Russians would
attack, it was estimated that their offensive would take place in the south.
There they could interfere with German attack preparations, reoccupy
economically valuable areas, and land far to the rear of the German lines along
the Black Sea coast. If they were sufficiently strong, the Soviets would also
attempt to tie down German forces by a series of local attacks in the Moscow
and Leningrad sectors.
Numerous reports from German agents in Soviet-held territory
indicated that the Red Army had been planning the recapture of the Ukraine for
some time. At the earliest the Russian attack could take place immediately
after the muddy season, i. e. at the beginning of May.
The Russian forces identified opposite Army Group South
consisted of 83 infantry divisions and 12 infantry brigades as well as 20
cavalry divisions and 19 armored brigades, plus an unknown number of newly
organized units.
Interference from British forces seemed unlikely. The latter
would move into the Caucasus area only if their supply lines could be properly
secured, a time-consuming process that had not even been initiated. On the
other hand, lend-lease materiel was arriving in considerable quantities; the
first U. S. fighter planes had been encountered along the German Sixth Army
front.
Caucasus Campaign (22 July 1942-February 1943)
German campaign, dubbed Operation EDELWEISS, to capture the
rich Caspian oil fields. Although the offensive was unsuccessful, the territory
taken in this operation represent- ed the farthest points to the east and south
reached by the German army during the war.
The great German summer offensive, Operation BLAU (BLUE),
opened on 28 June. General Erich von Manstein had argued for a concentration in
the center of the front. He believed that Soviet leader Josef Stalin would
commit all available resources to save Moscow and that this approach offered
the best chance of destroying the Red Army; it would also result in a more
compact front. Adolf Hitler rejected this sound approach and instead divided
his resources. In the north, he would push to take Leningrad, still under
siege, and link up with the Finns. But the main effort would be Operation BLAU
to the south, in which the Caucasus oil fields located near the cities of Baku,
Maikop, and Grozny would be the ultimate prize. Securing these areas would
severely cripple Soviet military operations, while at the same time aiding
those of Germany.
Hitler ordered Field Marshal Fedor von Bock’s Army Group
South to move east from around Kursk and take Voronezh, which fell to the
Germans on 6 July. Hitler then reorganized his southern forces into Army Groups
A and B. Field Marshal Siegmund List commanded Army Group A, the southern
formation; General Maximilian von Weichs had charge of the northern formation,
Army Group B.
Hitler’s original plan was for Army Groups A and B to cooperate
in a great effort to secure the Don and Donets Val- leys and capture the cities
of Rostov and Stalingrad. The two could then move southeast to take the oil
fields. The Germans expected to be aided in their efforts there by the fact
that most of the region was inhabited by non-Russian nationalities, such as the
Chechens, whose loyalty to the Soviet government was suspect.
On 13 July, Hitler ordered a change of plans, now demanding
that Stalingrad, a major industrial center and key crossing point on the Volga
River, and the Caucasus be captured simultaneously. This demand placed further
strains on already inadequate German resources, especially logistical support.
The twin objectives also meant that a gap would inevitably appear between the
two German army groups, enabling most Soviet troops caught in the Don River
bend to escape eastward.
On 22 July, Army Group A’s First Panzer and Seventeenth
Armies assaulted Rostov. Within two days, they had captured the city. A few
days later, the Germans established a bridgehead across the Don River at
Bataysk, and Hitler then issued Führer Directive 45, initiating EDELWEISS. He
believed that the Red Army was close to defeat and that the advance into the
Caucasus should proceed without waiting until the Don was cleared and
Stalingrad had fallen. The operation would be a case of strategic overreach.
Securing the mountain passes of the Caucasus region between
the Black and Caspian Seas was crucial in any operation to take the oil fields.
To accomplish this task, Army Group A had special troops trained for Alpine
operations, including Seventeenth Army’s XLIX Mountain Corps. Supporting Army
Group A’s eastern flank was Army Group B’s Fourth Panzer Army.
At the end of July, List had at his disposal 10 infantry divisions
as well as 3 Panzer and 2 motorized divisions, along with a half dozen Romanian
and Slovak divisions. Hitler expected List to conquer an area the size of
France with this force. Despite these scant German and allied forces, the Soviets
had only scattered units available to oppose the German advance. On 28 July,
the Soviets created the North Caucasus Front, commanded by Marshal Semen
Budenny, and Stalin ordered his forces to stand in place and not retreat. But
even reprisals failed to stem the Soviet withdrawal before Army Group A’s rapid
advance, which had all the characteristics of a blitzkrieg. Indeed, the chief
obstacles to the German advance were logistical, created by the vast distances
involved and terrain problems. The Germans used aerial resupply where possible
and also horses and camels to press their advance.
By 9 August, the 5th SS Panzer Division had taken the first
of the Caucasus oil fields at Maykop. To the west, infantry and mountain
formations of the Seventeenth Army had made slower progress, but on 9 August,
they took Krasnodar, capital of the rich agricultural Kuban region. They then
moved in a broad advance into the Caucasus Mountains, with the goal of taking
the Black Sea ports of Novorossiysk, Tuapse, and Sukhumi. Soviet forces, meanwhile,
continued to fall back into the Caucasus. As Budenny’s North Caucasus Front
prepared to defend the Black Sea ports, the Soviets sabotaged the oil fields,
removing much of the equipment and destroying the wellheads. So successful was
this effort that there would be no significant oil production from the region
until after the war.
SOVIET THERMOPYLAE: THE PROLETARY CEMENT FACTORY, 8/9
SEPTEMBER 1942
After the German 73. Infanterie-Division captured
central Novorossiysk, Ruoff ordered Wetzel’s V Armeekorps to continue the
advance along the coast road to threaten Tuapse from the west. The Soviet 47th
Army had been virtually demolished in the fight for the city and the only
significant Soviet force blocking the coast road was three battalions of naval
infantrymen, formed from survivors of Gorshkov’s Azov Flotilla and the 83rd
Naval Infantry Brigade. On 8/9 September, the German Infanterie-Regiment 213
began the effort to push along the coast road, supported by assault guns and
heavy artillery.
The 16th Naval Infantry Battalion had occupied a
strong position in the Proletary Cement Factory, on the outskirts of the town,
while the other two battalions were in the nearby Krasny Oktyabr Factory. Like
Thermopylae in ancient Greece, the terrain was narrow here due to the water of
Tsemes Bay and the nearby mountains, which reduced the German numerical
advantage. At dawn on 8 September, the German Landser from Infanterie-Regiment
213 came on at the point of the bayonet, but encountered unexpectedly strong
resistance at the Cement Factory. German infantrymen fought their way into the
lower floors and engaged in hand-to-hand combat, while Soviet sailors fired
down upon them from upper floors. After a day of intense fighting, the Soviet
battalion was nearly surrounded, but the survivors were able to slip out to
continue the fight at the Oktyabr Factory. Despite repeated attacks, the German
V Armeekorps could not achieve a breakthrough along the coast road and the
costly Soviet defence ultimately proved successful.
This scene shows the side of the factory and the
oncoming German infantry. Several of the Germans have already become casualties,
but a few of the Germans have reached the lower floor and are engaged in
vicious hand-to-hand combat with the Soviet naval infantrymen.
By the end of August, the German advance had slowed to a
crawl. For the Seventeenth Army, the problems were terrain and a stiffening
Soviet resistance. Bitter fighting occurred in Novorossiysk, beginning on 18
August when the Germans threw six divisions against the city. It fell on 6 September,
although the Soviets managed to evacuate their defending marine infantry by
sea.
To the east, the advance of the First Panzer Army, pushing
toward the oil fields at Grozny, also slowed. Problems there were largely
logistical, with a serious shortage of fuel impeding forward movement. In
addition, Hitler was gradually siphoning off First Army’s strength, including
two divisions, some of its artillery, and most of its air support (diverted
north to the cauldron of Stalingrad). Weather now became a factor, with the
first snowfall in the mountains on 12 September. Displeased with the progress
of his forces in the Caucasus and despite List’s objections, Hitler assumed
personal control of Army Group A on 10 September and sacked List.
Hitler’s plan was far too ambitious for the assets committed.
The weather had become a critical concern, as did continuing German logistical
problems. The Soviets, meanwhile, were able to feed additional resources into
the fight. On 14 October, the Germans suspended offensive operations in the
Caucasus, except for the Seventeenth Army efforts on the Terek River and around
Tuapse. The Germans took Tuapse several days later but then called a halt to
offensive operations on 4 November.
Events at Stalingrad now took precedence. By the end of
November, Soviets forces had encircled the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, and
Soviet successes there placed the Axis forces in the Caucasus in an untenable
situation. Then, on 29 November, the Soviet Transcaucasus Front launched an
offensive of its own along the Terek. The Germans repulsed this attack, but on
22 December, German forces began a withdrawal from positions along the Terek
River. At the end of December, with the situation to the north growing more
precarious daily, Hitler reluctantly ordered Army Group A to withdraw. This
movement began in early January, with Soviet forces unable seriously to disrupt
it. By early February, German forces had withdrawn to the Taman Peninsula, from
which Hitler hoped to renew his Caucasus offensive in the spring. In October
1943, however, German forces there were withdrawn across Kerch Strait into the
Crimea.
Germany’s Caucasus Campaign turned out to be a costly and
unsuccessful gamble. Ultimately, by splitting his resources between Stalingrad
and the Caucasus, Hitler got neither.
