Stalingrad became a symbol of Russian endurance, of German
capability. It also had an important strategic significance. If the Germans had
cut across the Volga, they would have sliced right through the Russian lines of
communication, for oil and for transport. Stalingrad was not an altogether
facile quest on Hitler’s part but it became invested with enormous
psychological significance. Both sides in this ghastly chest to chest struggle
could not be unlocked. One side, it seemed had to be destroyed and the other
become victor. It had the quality of a titanic struggle, the political
importance which was attached to Stalingrad by both Hitler and Stalin was
immensely significant.
EXPLORATORY STEPS: JULY 1940 – SEPTEMBER 1942
To Hitler, the oil of the Caucasus had always been one of
the foremost attractions of Russia. He had mentioned the necessity of seizing
the Baku oil fields as early as 31st July 1940, during one of the initial
discussions of his plan to invade the Soviet Union. In the spring of 1941 the Armed
Forces High Command activated the so-called Oil Detachment Caucasus for the
purpose of taking over the oil fields. At that time the Germans expected that
their advance into the Caucasus would be so rapid that the Russians would not
be able to severely damage the oil wells, and the tables of organization and
equipment of the oil detachment were established accordingly.
The next step in this direction was the preparation of
Directive No. 32, circulated by the Armed Forces High Command among the three
services on 11th June 1941-11 days before the start of Operation BARBAROSSA.
This directive envisaged a drive from the Caucasus across Iran as a part of the
plan for the continuation of operations against the British Empire following
the defeat of the Soviets. At that time German expeditionary forces were to be
activated in the Caucasus and sent across Turkey and Syria to Palestine and
across Iraq to Basra. The same directive also visualized the use of the Arab
liberation movement against the British in the Middle East, and Special Staff F
was designated to initiate and coordinate the corresponding military and
subversive activities.
A few days later, on 16th June 1941, German
counterintelligence submitted to the Armed Forces High Command a plan for
securing the Caucasus oil fields as soon as the internal disintegration of the
Soviet Union would become manifest. A nucleus of 100 Georgians, trained by
German counterintelligence agents in sabotage and revolt tactics, was in
existence in Romania. These Georgians would have to be brought to the oil
fields by sea or air transport as soon as the German ground forces approached
the Caucasus region. In a somewhat optimistic vein the plan foresaw the
employment of the Georgians in two to three weeks after D-Day.
On 24th July 1941 the Army Operations Division wrote a
memorandum on the conduct of operations after the conclusion of Operation
BARBAROSSA. With regard to the Caucasus it was anticipated that the British
would seize and block this area as soon as the Germans approached the Sea of
Azov. The first British troop concentrations were believed to be taking place
along the northern and eastern border of Iraq. Because of terrain difficulties
a German offensive from the southern slopes of the Caucasus across Iran into Iraq
could not be executed before the spring of 1942. Meanwhile, data regarding the
Caucasus were to be collected; a list of German tourists, who had climbed the
Caucasus Mountains during recent years and knew the terrain and weather
conditions, was drawn up, and books dealing with the same subjects were
carefully scrutinized.
At the beginning of August the German Naval Operations Staff
submitted an estimate of the probable reaction of the Soviet Black Sea fleet in
the event of a German penetration into the Caucasus. It was believed that the
fleet could seriously hamper operations by keeping the coastal road and
railroad between Tuapse and Sukhumi under fire. Among the Soviet ships suitable
for such operations were one battleship, six cruisers, and 15 modern plus five
outdated destroyers. In the Black Sea area the German Navy had no units capable
of stopping or disturbing the movements of the Soviet fleet. Coastal batteries
would be of limited use; even if they did drive the Soviet ships farther offshore,
the latter would still remain within reach of the coast. Air force protection
was the only effective means of safeguarding coastal traffic.
In late September reports from agents and radio intercepts
indicated that the Russians had from five to six divisions in the Caucasus and
three in Iran. It was estimated that British troops entering the Soviet Union
would take three weeks to get from Iran to the Caucasus and four weeks to the
Crimea.
THE FIRST PLAN FOR A CAUCASUS OPERATION: OCTOBER 1941
In October 1941 the Operations Division of the Army High
Command drew up the first detailed plan for a Caucasus operation. The scope of
the offensive was limited to seizing the oil resources of the Caucasus and to
reaching the Iranian and Iraqi border passes for a possible farther advance
toward Baghdad. [See General reference map of the Caucasus area above.] The
operation was to be executed in six separate phases, extending from November
1941 to September 1942. These phases were outlined as follows:
1 Seizure of the approaches to the northern Caucasus,
starting in November 1941;
2 A series of preliminary attacks leading to the seizure of
favorable jump-off areas by May 1942;
3 Launching the offensive across the Caucasus Mountains in
two different stages in June 1942;
4 The advance across Transcaucasia toward the Turkish and
Iranian borders;
5 Seizure of favorable jump-off areas within Iran; and
6 Capture of the border passes leading into Iraq. The last
three phases were to take place in the period July-early September 1942.
The feasibility of the entire offensive would depend on the
course taken by current operations in the Russian theater. The second and third
phases could be executed only if German troops reached the lower Volga during
the winter of 1941-42. The scope of the preliminary attacks to be launched
during the second phase would depend on the overall plan adopted for the
offensive across the Caucasus. The latter could be launched via the two roads
following the Black and Caspian Sea coasts respectively and over the mountain
road leading to Tiflis. The interior roads crossed the mountains over passes
more than 10,000 feet in altitude. These roads could be negotiated only by
mountain divisions. The movement along the Caspian coastal road would be easier
because only a few outdated Russian destroyers were liable to interfere.
During the first stage of the offensive proper, two
motorized and two mountain corps were to be employed, driving toward Sukhumi
and Kutaisi in the west, Tiflis in the center, and Baku in the east,
respectively. As soon as any one of these forces had achieved a breakthrough,
one additional motorized corps that was being held in reserve was to move up
and launch the pursuit. The commitment of this reserve force would determine
where the point of main effort was to be placed during the second stage of the
offensive.
The employment of two corps in the west during the first
stage would be necessary because of the vulnerability of the lines of
communications along the Black Sea. Moreover, in the west was the only opening
for launching an enveloping drive, since unfavorable terrain conditions
prevented any such maneuver elsewhere. During the second stage of the offensive
the penetration into the mountains would have to be exploited by the reserve
corps which could thrust either via the Black Sea coastal road to Batumi and
from there via Tiflis to Baku; or across the mountains to Tiflis and from there
either to Batumi or Baku; or along the Caspian shore to Baku and from there, if
necessary to Tiflis.
While the offensive was in progress, German naval
contingents would have to protect Novorossiysk and Tuapse by taking over captured
coastal batteries. In addition, some submarines would have to keep the Russian
Black Sea fleet under control, and the Navy would also have to make available
the shipping space needed for carrying supplies from Novorossiysk to Batumi
once the Russian fleet had been eliminated.
The Luftwaffe would have to protect and support the ground
forces; combat the Red Navy and its ports; commit airborne troops to capture
the major cities; use dive bombers against the pass fortifications; and prepare
transport planes to airdrop supplies.
This plan met with general approval at an exploratory
conference held at Army High Command headquarters upon request of the
Operations Division on 24th October 1941. An attack across the Caucasus was
considered the quickest solution to Germany’s Middle Eastern problems. The
effect of such an offensive would induce Turkey to join the Axis Powers. In
addition, British forces that would otherwise oppose Rommel in North Africa
would be tied down in Iran.
An offensive launched in the spring of 1942 would first lead
to the seizure of the Caucasus oil fields, then open the passes from Iran to
Iraq, and finally permit the capture of the Iraqi oil fields in the autumn of
1942, when the weather favored the commitment of large ground forces. The
essential prerequisite for such far-reaching operations was the seizure of the
west bank of the lower Volga from Stalingrad to Astrakhan. This realization
implied that if, for instance, the Germans failed to capture Stalingrad, a
complete reevaluation of the plans for an offensive against the Caucasus would
become necessary.
Among the essential preparations for a Caucasus operation
discussed at this conference were the production of military maps and tropical
clothing as well as the activation and equipment of special mountain troops.
CAUCASUS PLANNING: NOVEMBER 1941
In a conversation with Field Marshal von Brauchitsch on 7th
November Hitler mentioned that the seizure of the oil fields would have to be
delayed until the following year. This delay had actually been anticipated by
the Operations Division of the Army High Command. However, a new point was
brought up by the Führer when he added that he had no intention of going beyond
the Russian border. The scope of the offensive was thus limited to the Caucasus;
this change in plans was probably due to the slowdown in the 1941 advance
caused by the muddy season.
According to all available intelligence the Red Army
intended to put up stiff resistance in the Caucasus. By 9th November German
intercept units had identified 5 army headquarters in that area. If exact, this
information would imply the presence of at least 15 divisions, whereas prior to
that time the presence of only 5 had been assumed. It seemed improbable that
the Russians would move sizable forces across their border into Iran. And it
seemed even more unlikely that the British would send strong forces northward
into the Caucasus. For the time being the situation in the Caucasus remained
obscure.
In a conversation with General Halder on 19th November,
Hitler stated that the first objective for 1942 would be the Caucasus. An
offensive launched for this purpose in March-April 1942 would bring the German
forces to the Soviet border with Iran. Depending on the situation at the end of
1941, offensives in the center could subsequently be launched beyond Moscow
toward Vologda or Gorki by the end of May 1942. Other objectives for 1942 could
not yet be designated.
Their scope would depend mainly on the capacity of the
railroads. The question of whether a defensive wall separating Asiatic from
European Russia was subsequently to be constructed remained open.
Hitler thus revealed a number of interesting facts. Even as
late as 19th November he seemed convinced that the Germans would be able to
capture Moscow before the end of 1941. Furthermore, he seemed to believe that
the Caucasus offensive across difficult mountain terrain could be successfully
executed within a few weeks in April and May, as a kind of southern interlude
prior to another offensive farther north. Three days later, on 22nd November
1941, Halder ordered a light infantry division organized for the Caucasus
operation and mountain personnel withdrawn from combat. As late as 16 days
before the turning of the tide in front of Moscow the atmosphere at Army High
Command headquarters appeared definitely optimistic.
EFFECTS OF THE MOSCOW SETBACK: JANUARY 1942
An order dated 10th January 1942, originating from the Armed
Forces Economics Office and the Organization Branch of the Armed Forces
Operations Staff and signed by Hitler brought out the newly imposed material
limitations—if not the change in scope—of the 1942 operations.
In the introductory paragraph Hitler stated that the
long-range strategic plans remained unchanged; the Navy and the Luftwaffe were
to be expanded for the showdown with the Anglo-Saxon powers. Until further
notice, however, the operations scheduled for 1942 would not permit a reduction
in armaments destined for the Army. On the contrary, the Army would have to be
given even more than its ordinary share of manpower and armaments so that it
could accomplish its mission for 1942.
In effect, the Army was to have top priority on armament
production. Wherever shortages of raw materials developed, the Navy and
Luftwaffe would have to take the cuts. Greater standardization, the
introduction of more substitutes, and the increased use of captured munitions
were recommended as means to overcoming production bottlenecks.
The ground forces were to be ready for offensive commitment
by 1st May 1942; supplies for at least four months of continuous operations
would have to be accumulated by that time. The units taking part in the
offensive would have to be amply provided with supply and service troops as
well as motor vehicles, while those committed along the Atlantic Coast would
not need many trucks. Ammunition supplies for all weapons used in the Russian
theater would have to be built up to one month’s expenditure in addition to the
basic load.
The Navy was to concentrate on submarine construction and
maintenance. The Luftwaffe was to continue its current programs, except for a
temporary curtailment of its ammunition and bomb production schedules.
Among the military-economic programs, oil had first
priority. The railroad transportation, signal, and other programs were to be
carried on along the same lines as before, whereas the motor vehicle output was
to be increased. Military manpower requirements were to be coordinated with the
industrial ones.
Perhaps the most striking note in this order was its
pessimistic undertone. Written at a time when the Germans were desperately
trying to stem the Russian tide west of Moscow, the order showed the many
weaknesses in the German war machine which had become manifest after less than
seven months of fighting in Russia. During the following weeks further planning
for the summer offensive came to a standstill, probably because of the
life-and-death struggle that raged along the Army Group Center front.
THE FIRST PREPARATORY ORDERS: FEBRUARY 1942
With the acute danger past at the front, the military
planners were able to pursue more actively the preparations for a summer
offensive. On 12th February 1942 the Operations Division of the Army High
Command issued a directive for the conduct of operations after the end of the
winter. An introductory statement anticipated that the Russian winter offensive
would not succeed in destroying the German troops and their equipment. During
the coming weeks the Germans would have to consolidate their lines, eliminate
Russian forces that had penetrated into their rear areas, and generally attempt
to seize the initiative. At the same time they would have to prepare themselves
for the muddy period following the spring thaw.
The directive then went into great detail in describing the
different aspects of the muddy season and the countermeasures to be taken. The
Army High Command intended to use this probable lull in operations to
rehabilitate and regroup its forces.
Army Group South was to hold its positions and make
preparations for the planned offensive. First, the Russian penetration west of
Izyum would have to be eliminated, then the Kerch Peninsula recaptured and
Sevastopol seized, so that the forces stationed in the Crimea would become
available for employment elsewhere.
Army Group Center was to seize Ostashkov and shorten its
front line by eliminating various dents and penetrations.
Army Group North was to hold its lines near Kholm, Staraya
Russa, and north of Lake Ilmen.
After the end of the muddy season all three army groups were
to improve their front lines and establish continuous defensive positions, if
possible. Because of the precarious supply situation, it seemed doubtful
whether more than isolated strong points could be held along certain sectors of
the front. Armored and motorized reserves would have to be assembled in
accessible areas.
Units withdrawn from the frontline for rehabilitation would
have to train their recently arrived replacements on the basis of past
experience in combat. Because of a shortage of equipment, only a certain number
of divisions could be fully rehabilitated. The ones selected for this purpose
were the armored and motorized divisions as well as the army and corps troops
of Army Group South, and three armored and three motorized infantry divisions
as well as some of the army and corps troops of Army Groups Center and North.
In the process of rehabilitation, each armored division was to have three tank
battalions, and each motorized infantry division one. The armored divisions of
Army Groups Center and North that were not to be rehabilitated would have to
transfer some of their cadres to the south. Three armored and six infantry
divisions of Army Group Center were to be moved to western Europe without their
equipment. There they were to be completely rehabilitated and reequipped. The
armored and motorized infantry divisions remaining with Army Group Center and
North would have to be rehabilitated in the line without being issued any new
equipment. The armored divisions in this category would probably have only one
tank battalion. Approximately 500,000 replacements were supposed to arrive in
the theater by the end of April 1942.
