The superiority of the French artillery was not due to its
equipment, but to its tactical handling and to the efficiency and esprit de
corps of its officers and men. That superiority was very marked, for instance,
in the Jena-Auerstädt campaign of 1806. The Prussian army had a greater ratio
of artillery to infantry than the French; but in the artillery, as in the other
arms, the Prussian officers were still following the teachings of Frederick the
Great. In their time these had been revolutionary, but that student of the art
of war, Napoleon, had absorbed the lessons and had superimposed his own system
of a massive artillery reserve, in order to achieve artillery superiority at
the decisive point.
French artillery doctrine can be neatly summed up in this
passage from Tousard:
In defensive positions, place the large calibers in
situations from which you can discover the enemy at a great distance, and from
which the most extensive parts of its front are to be seen.
In attack, place these large calibers in the weakest part
of your order of battle, consequently the most distant from the enemy; on the
same side with the with the false attacks; on such heights which can, in
securing them from insult, afford you the means of seconding the flanks of the
real attack, and, if possible, batter de revers, the points which are attacked
…
You should know the effect which you are to produce; the
troops which you have to support; the points of attack, and take your positions
so as not to impede your troops, nor occupy such where infantry could be more
usefully employed than artillery. Avoid bringing your cannon too near and
exposing them too much. Avail yourself of the disposition of the ground to
cover your front, and especially your flanks; and, unless you are sure of a
decisive effect, never trust your cannon from the protection of the troops.
Your crossfires should embrace the whole of the enemy’s
position, and the ground he must march over to attack you. Let your fire be
concentrated, that is to say, offer to the enemy only scattered subdivisions to
fire at, whereas from your several positions you may batter the same object.
These same objects, in the defensive, are the Debouches,
or openings of the enemy; the heads of such of its columns which threaten you;
the ground in front of your weakest parts.
In the offensive; the whole front of the enemy’s army on
which you should fire, in order to check and perplex him; and the parts which
you intend to attack and destroy.
Force the enemy to make use of direct fire, before their
crossfires might annoy your attacking troops; and, when forced to cease firing
on the points which your troops attack, batter such of the enemy’s as are
collateral to them.
Fire on an extent which covers the amplitude with the
divergency of your shots.
Make your shot range the greatest dimension of a troop.
Consequently, batter a line obliquely, or en echarpe, and a column with direct
fire, but never trust your pieces from the protection of your troops.
Place your cannon so as to be beaten neither en echarpe,
in flank, nor in the rear, unless you can shelter yourself, or have the
certainty of producing the expected effect before you can be entirely disabled,
and put hors de combat.
Before adopting a situation, consider the nature of the
site, to avoid the miry, stony, and broken ground.
Secure to yourself easy means of advancing or retreating.
Choose positions not too much elevated. The maximum which
is the most advantageous, is thirty or forty yards on six hundred, and sixteen
on two hundred.
Avoid taking your situation behind your troops; your fire
makes them uneasy, and presents two objects instead of one to the enemy’s fire.
Give at least thirty-six yards for each piece of your
battery, unless the enemy may batter you en echarpe, under a very favorable
angle; for they fire on a front, and not at a single piece.
Prefer positions from which you may batter the enemy for
a longer time.
Never fire gun against gun, unless the enemy is under
shelter, and his cannon exposed; moreover, unless your troops, being more
annoyed by their fire than their troops are with yours, should be rendered
incapable of performing their maneuvers.
Embrace with your fire the whole field of battle, or such
part of it where the greatest number of their troops are collected, and do not
fire on a contracted point.
Accelerate your firing so much the more as you may do it
with more justness.
Make use of the grapeshot at shorter distances than such
as are prescribed by the tables, if the field of battle is unequal, soft,
covered, plunging, or plunged.
Spare your ammunition for a critical moment. Infantry, at
quick time, march two hundred yards in three minutes; cavalry, at gallop, in
half a minute.
Never abandon your cannon but when the enemy enters the
battery. The last discharges are the most destructive: they may perhaps be the
means of your preservation, but for certain those of your glory.
While the tumult of the Revolution did not affect the
artillery officer corps as much as it had in the infantry and cavalry, 81
percent of the artillery officers on the Army List in 1789 emigrated. This left
a burden on the remaining officers, such as Napoleon, and the NCOs, which was
eventually filled to some extent. Newly commissioned officers also filled the
void: Marmont, for example, expertly served and smoothly emplaced guns to
support Desaix and Kellermann at Marengo in 1800, smashing the Austrian pursuit
and helping turn defeat into victory.
Tactics employed by the artillery units in the Wars of the
Revolution reflected what had been taught in the schools before the wars.
Although not always successful, and many times outnumbered in guns and
equipment by the Austrians, the French artillerymen learned their trade and
supported their infantry brethren on the battlefields of the Republic. The
horse artillerymen brought a new variable into the artillery/infantry equation,
and Séruzier remarked that “they were renowned for their courage, and no less
for their contentious spirit. They pushed esprit de corps far beyond the point
of virtue and believed themselves infinitely superior to their comrades in the
foot artillery.” Horse artillery were assigned to the cavalry as, according to
Kilmaine, “it is the only way to make up for our scarcity of cavalry.” They
fought alongside the clouds of light troops that screened attacks, closely
supported attacking infantry in line or column, and in the advance guard of the
army. They furnished the needed artillery fire with the support that sometimes
kept a faltering attack moving. At the Battle of Wattignies in October 1793, a
French concentration of five artillery companies, three horse and two foot,
totaling thirty guns, paved the way for the decisive infantry assault: the
three horse artillery companies accompanied the French infantry, while the two
foot companies conducted counterbattery fire against the opposing Austrian
artillery. The doctrine taught and written about before the wars was starting
to bear fruit.
When the French phased out the divisions of all arms by
1800, artillery was still assigned to infantry and cavalry divisions. Artillery
was initially employed to support the skirmishers in attacks, as well as being
formed in multiple company batteries along the front of the army to support the
infantry’s main and secondary attacks. One of the problems in the Revolutionary
campaigns was that the French were many times outnumbered in artillery by the
excellent Austrian artillery, and were many times outshot, as at Neerwinden in
1793.
Napoleon’s coming to power in 1799 gradually changed all
that. The artillery arm was enlarged, and more guns were manufactured and
issued to the gun companies. The Grande Armée of 1805, the best Napoleon ever
led, was short of horse transport (which is an indication that Napoleon’s
actual intention was to invade England), and the artillery was short of horses
when it moved east to face the Austrian invasion of Bavaria. Not all the guns
and ancillary equipment could be taken until the horse shortage could be
solved. Davout had to leave some of his guns and artillery equipment at
Mannheim during the French offensive, to be retrieved later.
After the Austerlitz campaign and subsequent peace treaty, Napoleon
reorganized his artillery in a more logical manner. New guns of the Système AN
XI, of which the 6-pounder, a new 12-pounder, and a 5.5-inch howitzer were
being produced, and now were issued as soon as they were manufactured. What
Napoleon wanted to do was issue every infantry division in the Grande Armée
with two artillery companies. He also wanted one of them to be a horse
artillery company if there were enough to go around. One horse artillery
company would be assigned to every light cavalry division, and the heavy
cavalry divisions would get two each, and all divisional artillery companies
would be equipped with 6-pounders and 5.5-inch howitzers. An army artillery
reserve would be formed, where most of the 12-pounders would be held.
Additionally, corps artillery reserve companies would be held by the corps
commanders. The 4- and 8-pounder Gribeauval guns would either be placed in the
arsenals for storage as they were replaced by the new ordnance, or assigned to
armies in secondary theaters, such as Italy and Spain.
In December 1814, General Ruty conducted a study that
favored the older 8-pounder Gribeauval gun tube over the newer and widely
employed 6-pounder of the Système AN XI. His main points were that the older
piece was better and more accurate, that there had been no field testing
comparing the two pieces, and that the weight saved by using the lighter piece
failed to give it a decisive advantage over the older 8-pounder.
Ruty also found that the companies of each gun type were
almost identical in size, and that the number of horses needed to haul both
guns and their ancillary equipment was also nearly identical. He also came to
the conclusion that:
The 8 caliber has, in all respects, an undeniable
advantage over the 6-caliber. The use of the former, in preference to the
latter, could not be put in doubt if we disregarded all economic considerations
in the use of the resources. If, on the other hand, we proposed to coordinate
with these last considerations, rather than with the first ones, the
determination of the field calibers, the advocates of the old system would
appose [sic] to the 6 caliber, the 4 caliber which, for the economy of the
resources, obtains more advantages in relation to the 8 caliber. Yet, if the
question was considered from only one of these points of view, it would be
discussed in an incomplete and wrong way. In order to grasp the real point of
view of the question, we must determine, in a more precise manner, the various
purposes the cannon can serve in field warfare and then, examine if, for a
definite sum of resources, the combination of the 8 and 4 calibers serves
better these purposes than the intermediate 6 caliber.
Finally, Ruty stated that:
If the reasoning itself did not suffice to establish the
advantages of the 8 caliber or the 6 caliber in the formation of the batteries…
it would rely on the memories of the past to convey its undeniable advantages …
Twenty years of brilliant success had sanctified it. Nobody can feel more
inclined than an artillery officer to grant the personnel a share of merit it
has to claim in these successes; yet it is for the same officer to judge to
what extent the nature of the weapon has played a part in obtaining these
successes. It seems impossible to deny that the material and positive
superiority of a caliber more significant than the usually weaker caliber, had
a lot to do with the superiority of our horse artillery batteries generally accepted
at the time of the war currently being discussed. This opinion was so
widespread that the gunners brought themselves reluctantly to renounce a weapon
that so many reasons of pride and trust made it precious to them. They seized
with eagerness the opportunity to take it back, wherever the 8 caliber was
still accepted in the composition of field companies, in competition with the 6
caliber, which has been introduced in our armies only successively.
The addition of the new 6-pounder into the French artillery
simplified many issues, such as ammunition resupply and the number of calibers
used by the field armies. However, the Système AN XI was not fully implemented,
only the 6-pounder and 5.5-inch howitzer being issued in large numbers.
Furthermore, as has been noted, the new carriage for the 6-pounder was
unsuitable and fell apart after hard campaigning, so the 6-pounder had to be
remounted on the older Gribeauval carriages taken from the armories.
On campaign, French artillery was organized by company, the
companies being assigned to a separate corps under a corps artillery chief who
was usually a general officer. Companies of the same regiment did not
necessarily serve together, or even in the same corps, though sometimes it was
specified that they should. There was no battalion-level organization in the
artillery regiments.
Corps artillery was organized with a corps reserve, and with
every infantry division receiving one company of foot artillery. Those
companies were also issued with four extra caissons to carry ammunition
resupply for the infantry. There were also companies assigned to the army
artillery reserve, that mission generally being taken over after 1809 by the
larger Guard artillery.
