Generalmajor Erich Diestel’s 101. Jäger-Division was first
into action and easily overran Apsheronsk on 15 August, then pivoted westwards
to outflank the Soviet blocking positions at Khadyzhensk. Initially, Diestel’s
Jäger made good progress, approaching the outskirts of Khadyzhensk by evening
of 16 August. However, the lead elements of Polkovnik Mikhail F. Tikhonov’s
32nd Guards Rifle Division – transferred by sea from the Taman Peninsula –
began to arrive in the area at the same time, which re-energised the 12th
Army’s defence. By the time that Diestel began to organise a deliberate assault
upon the town, the 32nd Guards Rifle Division was dug in around the train
station and nearby railway tunnel. When 101. Jäger-Division began its attack
upon Khadyzhensk on 18 August, supported by Stukas and corps-level 21cm Mörser
fire, Tikhonov’s troops repulsed every German attempt to advance.
On de Angelis’ left flank, Generalmajor Ernst Rupp’s 97.
Jäger-Division began a major attack southwards from Apsheronsk on 16 August
with two regimental-size Kampfgruppen. The Jäger moved quickly through the
rugged and heavily forested terrain, capturing Samurskaya on the first day.
Soviet resistance was spotty and Rupp allowed his division to disperse, with individual
battalions pushing forward as fast as possible. On 18 August, I./Jäger-Regiment
204 captured the Neftyanaya oilfield. Hauptmann Friedrich Höhne’s
III./Jäger-Regiment 204 achieved a remarkable 25km advance in three days
towards the Tuby Pass and overran a Soviet 15cm howitzer battalion. However,
the Soviet 12th Army had merely retreated to more defensible positions on
mountain tops further south and Höhne’s lone battalion boldly advanced along a
narrow track into a classic ambush at the 50m-wide Wolf’s Gate Pass. Both sides
of the narrow pass were flanked by steep, wooded ridges which were occupied by
the Soviets. Höhne’s battalion advanced in a long column and was blasted from
both sides as it entered the pass, destroying the vanguard. The Soviets had
fortified Mount Oplepek (Gora Oplepen), which overlooked the Wolf’s Gate Pass
and brought the German column under heavy fire while Soviet infantrymen
manoeuvred through the hills to cut off their escape route. With great
difficulty, Höhne extracted his bloodied battalion from the ambush at the cost
of abandoning his wounded and heavy weapons and retreated 12km back to
Samurskaya. The next day, Rupp tried an outflanking manoeuvre with
II./Jäger-Regiment 207, but this too failed.
De Angelis’ XXXXIV Armeekorps offensive towards Tuapse had
been halted after only four days by the increasing Soviet resistance and rugged
terrain. Diestel’s 101. Jäger-Division brought up more artillery and attempted
an ambitious double envelopment of the 32nd Guards Rifle Division between 28
and 30 August; the jaws of the two converging Jäger-Regiment almost closed
around Tikhonov’s division, but ground to a halt just short of their objective.
Tikhonov launched a counterattack that briefly surrounded II./Jäger-Regiment
228 before Diestel called off the offensive. West of Khadyzhensk, 198.
Infanterie-Division had captured Goryachy Klyuch on 20 August, which offered
the possibility of outflanking the Soviet position, but the offensive was
called off. Instead, 17. Armee remained in a funk for the next month, slowly
preparing for another offensive and drifting into command limbo after List was
relieved by Hitler on 10 September.
While Ruoff’s army sat immobile, the Soviets used the
respite to rush reinforcements to Cherevichenko’s Black Sea Group from the
Transcaucasus. Kamkov’s 18th Army eventually absorbed the depleted 12th Army
and assumed primary responsibility for defending the main avenue of approach to
Tuapse; this army was rebuilt around six rifle and one cavalry divisions, and received
substantial artillery reinforcements. On 23 August, the Military Council of the
North Caucasus Front ordered the creation of a Tuapse Defensive Region (TOR),
under the command of Rear-Admiral Georgy Zhukov – which would be subordinate to
Kamkov’s 18th Army. Ryzhov’s 56th Army, with four rifle divisions, was ordered
to defend Kamkov’s left flank and to tie in with Grechko’s 47th Army. The 5th
Air Army also received another fighter division and more Il-2 Sturmoviks.
Ruoff’s 17. Armee was not able to resume the offensive until
late September; he wanted proper mountain troops to conduct the operation, but
none were at hand. Since the promised Italian Alpine Corps had not arrived, the
OKH finally cancelled the operation by XXXXIX Gebirgskorps against Sukhumi and
sent parts of both of its divisions, totalling five infantry and five artillery
battalions, as Division Lanz to reinforce 17. Armee. Ruoff also received an
infantry regiment from 46. Infanterie-Division. Altogether, Ruoff intended to
hurl three German corps against the Tuapse defences, but the delay allowed the
Soviets to regain their confidence. During the lull, on 6 September Soviet
troops from the 395th Rifle Division managed to ambush and kill Generalmajor Albert
Buck, commander of 198. Infanterie-Division, and wound his operations officer.
Ruoff’s offensive, dubbed Operation Attika, began on 23
September when LVII Panzerkorps committed 125. and 198. Infanterie-Division
against the 56th Army’s 395th Rifle Division south of Goryachy Kluych. His
intent was to penetrate through Ryzhov’s weaker defences and push down the
Psekups Valley to reach Shaumyan, thereby enveloping Kamkov’s left flank.
Kirchner’s two infantry divisions succeeded in making a modest 10km bulge into
Ryzhov’s front and captured Fanagoriyskoye by 30 September, but were then
stymied by tough Soviet resistance. In the centre, de Angelis’ XXXXIV
Armeekorps concentrated both Jäger-Divisionen, reinforced by
Infanterie-Regiment 72 from 46 Infanterie-Division, against Tikhonov’s 32nd
Guards Rifle Division on 25 September; although they kept pounding for a week,
they could not capture the main defensive positions. Despite support from
Stukas, heavy artillery and assault guns, 101. Jäger-Division was repeatedly
repulsed by Tikhonov’s division. The 97. Jäger-Division succeeded in pushing
back the 236th Rifle Division and capturing Mount Lyssaya, but was fought out
after just four days of combat.
It was Generalmajor Hubert Lanz’s ad hoc division of
Gebirgstruppen that achieved the most success. Lanz did not launch his attack
until 27 September and his battalions advanced across mountainous terrain that
the Soviets regarded as nearly impassible. In just three days, Lanz’s
Gebirgsjäger advanced 10–15km, capturing Mount Geiman and Mount Gunai. On 28
September, the remainder of 46. Infanterie-Division (two regiments) conducted a
supporting attack on Lanz’s left flank and succeeded in capturing Mount
Oplepek. Having broken through Kamkov’s centre, Division Lanz pivoted westward
into the Gunaika Valley, intent upon outflanking Tikhonov’s 32nd Guards Rifle
Division. Kamkov was forced to pull some of his units back to prevent
encirclement. The 46. Infanterie-Division achieved a clear-cut breakthrough
south of Mount Oplepek and advanced to seize Kotlovina on 3 October. De
Angelis’ XXXXIV Armeekorps continued to pound on Tikhonov’s nearly encircled
division and briefly cut it off by seizing Kurinskiy, but a rapid Soviet
counterattack by 32nd Guards Rifle Division reopened the road.
By early October, the German advance towards Tuapse was
bogged down, moving only occasionally in fits and starts. Ruoff could only jab
in a few sectors – he lacked the resources to mount an all-out offensive. Short
of infantry, Ruoff was forced to use Sicherungs-Regiment 4 in the front line to
cover his army’s left flank. Kamkov received reinforcements from the 47th and
56th armies, enabling him to mount local counterattacks between 7 and 13
October, which succeeded in cutting into the flank of XXXXIX Gebirgskorps and
recapturing Mount Oplepek. The weather was beginning to turn and would soon
make offensive operations impossible in the mountains. Nevertheless, on 14
October Ruoff kicked off another offensive by all three corps. The 198.
Infanterie-Division was able to break through the 56th Army’s defences, which
finally caused Tikhonov’s 32nd Guards Rifle Division to evacuate its positions
at Khadyzhensk and retreat towards Tuapse. The 101. Jäger-Division followed and
captured Shaumyan on 17 October. Ruoff was confident that 17. Armee would make
it to Tuapse before the weather closed in. Then it began to rain on 18 October,
turning the mountain trails into untrafficable muck. Low cloud cover also
interfered with the ability of I./StG 77’s Stukas to provide close air support.
Only Division Lanz continued to push forward slowly, while
the rest of Ruoff’s army struggled merely to hold on to what they already
possessed. Kampfgruppe Lawall, with all three battalions of
Gebirgsjäger-Regiment 98, pushed on resolutely despite the rains that began on
18 October. Four days later, the Gebirgsjäger were able to capture the
1,016m-high Mount Semashkho, from which they could see the Black Sea in the
distance.
However, furious Soviet counterattacks by the fresh 408th
Rifle Division and 383rd Rifle Division brought the German advance to a halt
and inflicted heavy losses on Division Lanz. Although the German effort to
capture Tuapse would continue for two more pointless months, Ruoff’s offensive
had peaked by late October 1942 and the front line settled into a static
nature. Soviet counterattacks kept picking at the exposed German flanks
throughout the next two months. The commitment of three German corps to capture
a minor Black Sea port had proved to be a costly diversion in a campaign which
had little margin for error.
TO THE HIGH CAUCASUS, 10 AUGUST– 2 SEPTEMBER 1942
The offensive against Tuapse had been weakened from the
beginning by the OKH’s last-minute decision to send General der Gebirgstruppe
Rudolf Konrad’s XXXXIX Gebirgskorps far to the south to advance down the
so-called ‘Sukhumi Military Highway’ in order to seize several mountain passes
in the High Caucasus Mountains and then capture the port of Sukhumi. Konrad
argued for using his corps in the advance upon Tuapse, while von Kleist wanted
to use the Gebirgsjäger to assist 1. Panzerarmee’s advance to Grozny, but both
were overruled. As early as 5 August, Konrad was informed that in addition to
seizing several key passes, he was to organise an expedition to occupy Mount Elbrus
– the highest point in the Caucasus and in Europe. The powers back in Berlin,
like Dr Joseph Goebbels, wanted a photogenic propaganda triumph which planting
a Nazi flag on Elbrus would serve admirably, while ignoring the affect of this
extravagant diversion on the overall operation.
Konrad knew that the Caucasus mountain passes would be
closed by snow by September, so like a good soldier he forced-marched his two
divisions 200km southwards as rapidly as possible, following in the path of von
Kleist’s panzers. Amazingly, his vanguard – Kampfgruppe Lawall from 1.
Gebirgs-Division – reached Cherkessk on 11 August and then stormed into
Mikoyan-Shakhar (Karachayevsk). The ‘Sukhumi Military Highway’ turned out to be
little more than a dirt road, which turned into an even narrower track as they
approached the main Caucasus peaks. Meanwhile, Tyulenev’s ZKF (Transcaucasus
Front) staff were completely unaware that Konrad’s troops were pushing through
the mountains towards Sukhumi and did not even issue orders to defend the
passes until 10 August. General-mayor Vasiliy F. Sergatskov’s 46th Army was
assigned the mission of defending the Caucasus passes, but even Soviet sources
are frank about condemning his lethargic effort to move units towards them.
Sergatskov merely ordered General-mayor Konstantin N. Leselidze’s 3rd Mountain
Rifle Corps to send company and battalion-size detachments from the 9th and
20th Mountain Rifle divisions and the 394th Rifle Division to observe the
passes. One unit, the 1st Battalion, 815th Rifle Regiment from the 394th Rifle
Division marched to the town of Teberda, where it was surprised and defeated by
Kampfgruppe Lawall on 14 August. The German Gebirgsjäger pushed on, with a
single picked battalion known as Kampfgruppe von Hirschfeld and seized the
important Klukhor Pass on the evening of 17 August. Stalin was furious that the
Germans had penetrated so deeply into the Caucasus and ordered his NKVD chief
Lavrenti Beria, who had arrived at Tyulenev’s headquarters in Tbilisi, to
relieve Sergatskov of command. Leselidze, a Georgian officer (Stalin and Beria
were both Georgians) managed to survive this shake-up and demonstrated ability
by rushing a reinforced regiment to the Klukhor Pass to block any further
German advance towards the coast; Stalin gave him command of the 46th Army.
Konrad’s other division, 4. Gebirgs-Division, also initially
made good progress towards the coast by marching on a parallel route, and its
vanguard Kampfgruppe Stettner (two Gebirgsjäger-Bataillone and six 7.5cm mountain
guns) seized several passes. Yet despite the apparent proximity of Sukhumi –
just 30km away – Konrad never really had a chance to reach that objective. It
began to snow in the mountains on 18 August and continued for several days,
reducing the German advance to a crawl. The Sukhumi Military Highway petered
out after the Klukhor Pass into trackless mountains. The OKH staff members who
thought that Konrad’s Gebirgstruppen could advance from the Klukhor Pass to the
southern segment of the Sukhumi Military Highway near the coast did not
appreciate that this would require a corps to supply itself along a 90km
stretch of trail that was only fit for mules; the nearest railhead was over
170km distant. It was not the Soviets that defeated Konrad, but a combination
of the terrain and weather. Even if Konrad could somehow have reached the
coast, he would have had to defeat the bulk of the 46th Army with a handful of
battalions in order to seize Sukhumi – and then his lines of communications
across the Caucasus would be severed by snow for the entire winter. If his
corps was caught on the wrong side of the passes once winter arrived, it would
eventually be destroyed. Neither the Kriegsmarine nor the Luftwaffe would be
able to supply the Gebirgskorps in the Caucasus Mountains for an entire winter.
Indeed, the entire OKH plan to push Konrad’s Gebirgskorps towards Sukhumi was a
half-baked concept that ignored terrain and weather and which risked these
elite troops becoming isolated and possibly destroyed, all for the sake of a
tertiary objective.
After taking the Klukhor Pass, 1. Gebirgs-Division sent a
hand-picked force to climb Mount Elbrus, which was accomplished on 21 August.
Hitler was rightly furious when he heard about this frivolous expedition, which
caused further friction with List. Konrad’s advance was now running up against
serious opposition. Leselidze quickly shifted his 46th Army divisions along the
coast road and received reinforcements from Tyulenev, while Konrad was on his
own. Kampfgruppe Stettner was able to cross the Bsyb River on 28 August but was
blocked by the 354th Rifle Division near the Achavkar Pass, while Kampfgruppe
Lawall was blocked by the 304th Rifle Division. Konrad’s supply lines were a
mess, requiring four days or more for mule convoys to reach Kampfgruppe
Stettner. By late August, it was clear that the plan to seize Sukhumi had
failed and List, Ruoff and Konrad met in Krasnodar to discuss options. It was
decided that the Gebirgstruppe could be better employed in supporting Ruoff’s
offensive towards Tuapse, rather than freezing to death in the High Caucasus.
The Sukhumi front would become an economy of force effort, where the Germans
left only enough troops to prevent Tyulenev’s forces from threatening von
Kleist’s lines of communications. Gruppe von Le Suire, consisting of five
battalions, was left to guard the passes. Consequently, Konrad pulled the rest
of his corps back to reduce his supply problems and transferred the remaining
units to Division Lanz, which was sent north to join in the second offensive
against Tuapse.
What was supposed to be the advance intended to decide the
whole war had stalled at Novorossisk, on the Terek, and in the mountains. There
are indications that by early September, Hitler realized that the objectives in
the east could not be attained and even that the war was lost. This defeat was
the result of failure in the Caucasus and not Stalingrad, where he still hoped
for at least a local victory.
